Islamist party and democratic participation:Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) in Indonesia 1998 - 2006 by Permata, A. (Ahmad-Norma)
POLITIKWISSENSCHAFT 
 
 
ISLAMIST PARTY AND DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION:  
PROSPEROUS JUSTICE PARTY (PKS) IN INDONESIA 1998-2006 
 
Inaugural-Dissertation zur Erlangung des Doktorgrades 
der Philosophischen Fakultät  
der Westfälischen Wilhelms-Universität zu Münster (Westf.) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Vorgelegt von  
Ahmad-Norma Permata  
aus Kediri (Indonesien) 
Münster 2008 
 
 
 
Tag der Mündlichen Prüfung : 2 September 2008 
Dekan     : Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Wichard Woyke 
Referent    : Prof. Dr. Susanne Feske 
Korreferent    : Prof. Dr. J. D. M. Platenkamp 
 
 2
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
 
 
Die vorliegende Studie untersucht das politische Verhalten einer indonesischen islamischen 
Partei, der Prosperous Justice Party (PKS). Diese Partei erzielte öffentliches und 
wissenschaftliches Aufsehen, als sie ihre Wählerzahl im Jahr 2004 von 1,7 % auf 7,3 % 
versechsfachen konnte. Kritiker werfen der Partei vor, dass ihre Ideologie undemokratische 
Elemente enthalte, so etwa die Verwischung der Grenzen zwischen Religion und Politik oder 
Fragen wie die Gleichberechtigung der Geschlechter und der religiöse Pluralismus. Die 
Beteiligung der PKS an demokratischen politischen Prozessen sei daher weder ernsthaft noch 
nachhaltig. Vielmehr werde die Partei entsprechend ihrer Zielsetzung letztendlich 
islamistische Politik machen, die mit Demokratie nicht kompatibel sei oder gar versuchen, die 
Demokratie durch ein islamisches System zu ersetzen. 
 Die vorliegende Studie folgt einem neo-institutionalistischen Theorieansatz nach 
Douglas C. North, um den Einfluss der Ideologie auf das politische Verhalten der PKS 
gegenüber den demokratischen politischen Institutionen in Indonesien zu untersuchen. Die 
Hypothese der Arbeit lautet, dass Ideologie immer dann die dominante Richtlinie für das 
politische Verhalten der Partei bildet, wenn die formellen Institutionen wirkungslos sind. Dies 
ist weniger stark der Fall, wenn die formellen Spielregeln funktionieren. 
 Ein historischer Überblick zeigt, dass sich die Verhaltensmuster der PKS von 
„heimlich“ zu „offen, aber ideologisch“ zu „programmatisch/pragmatisch“ gewandelt haben. 
Diese sich wandelnden Muster verlaufen parallel zu den Veränderungen der politischen 
Institutionen Indonesiens, die freier und demokratischer wurden. Die Demokratisierung 
ermöglichte es muslimischen politischen Akteuren, sich rational und pragmatisch zu verhalten 
– die PKS stellt hierfür ein dramatisches und wichtiges Fallbeispiel dar. Während der Wahlen 
1999 versuchte die Partei, die politischen Präferenzen des konservativsten Teils der 
muslimischen Gemeinschaft zu artikulieren. Daher wurde sie am rechten Rand des 
ideologischen Spektrums in Indonesien eingeordnet. Im Zuge der zunehmenden Stabilität der 
demokratischen politischen Institutionen wandelte sich die PKS jedoch von einer 
konservativen zu einer pragmatischen Partei – ohne jedoch ihre konservative Ideologie 
aufzugeben.  
 Die sich ändernde organisatorische Balance der PKS beeinflusste ihr Verhalten in 
Wahlen. Während der Wahlen 1999 sah die Partei, die zudem nur schlecht organisiert und 
vernetzt war, ihre Wahlaktivitäten lediglich als Bestandteil von religiösen Aktivitäten an. So 
ermahnte PKS ihre Mitglieder und Aktivisten während der Vorbereitung auf die Wahl immer 
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wieder, ihre religiösen Pflichten zu intensivieren und warnte sogar davor, sich zu sehr mit der 
Mobilisierung von Wählern zu beschäftigen. Dies änderte sich dramatisch anlässlich der 
Wahlen 2004, die die Partei nicht länger als ein mögliches Mittel zum Zweck ansah, sondern 
vielmehr als das Mittel, um ihre ideologischen Ziele zu erreichen. Im Ergebnis motivierten 
ihre Mitglieder und Aktivisten so viele Wähler wie möglich ohne sich darum zu sorgen, ob 
die Wähler die Ziele der Partei verstanden hatten. 
 Die zunehmende Stabilität und Effektivität der demokratischen Institutionen als 
Arenen des politischen Wettbewerbs haben auch das Verhalten der Partei als Regierungspartei 
beeinflusst. Während des Zeitraums von 1999 bis 2004 verhielt sich die Partei ideologisch, in 
dem sie ausschließlich mit anderen islamischen Parteien zusammenarbeitete und sich 
gegenüber der säkularen Politik sehr zurückhaltend verhielt. Als die Partei nach den Wahlen 
2004 in die Regierung eintrat, änderte sich ihr Verhalten maßgeblich. Mit Ausnahme ihrer 
starken Unterstützung für den Gesetzesentwurf gegen Pornographie und pornographische 
Handlungen (RUU-APP) lässt sich das politische Verhalten der PKS in der Regierung als 
weitgehend pragmatisch und machtorientiert beschreiben.  
Das sich wandelnde Verhalten der PKS ist ein Anzeichen für den Erfolg des 
Demokratisierungsprozesses in Indonesien. Die politischen Institutionen waren in der Lage, 
den politischen Akteuren, und hier besonders muslimischen Akteuren, ein gewisses Maß an 
Sicherheit zu bieten, damit diese ihre Interaktionen, Transaktionen und Zusammenarbeit nach 
formal kodifizierten Regeln durchführen konnten. Diese Sicherheit motivierte die politischen 
Akteure dazu, rational zu handeln und ihre politischen Ziele kooperativ zu verfolgen. Noch 
wichtiger ist die Tatsache, dass, soweit das Verhalten der PKS betroffen ist, das 
demokratische System substanziell funktioniert: es ermöglicht politischen Wettbewerb, der 
die Partei dazu bewegt, eine Plattform zu bilden und politische Programme nach den 
Präferenzen ihrer Anhänger zu formulieren, aber auch Wahlversprechen einzuhalten. Der 
Demokratisierungsprozess war in der Lage, die PKS davon zu überzeugen, dass 
demokratisches Handeln und die Einhaltung von Regeln der einzige Weg ist, die eigenen 
politischen Ziele zu verfolgen – selbst wenn dieser Weg manchmal mit den ideologischen 
Grundlagen der Partei in Widerspruch steht.  
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CHAPTER I 
ISLAMIST PARTY AND DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA: 
ON RESEARCHING THE INDONESIAN PROSPEROUS JUSTICE PARTY (PKS) 
  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation examines the democratic participation of an Islamist political party in 
Indonesia, the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS, or Partai Keadilan Sejahtera). The focus of this 
research is to assess the influence of ideology on the party’s behavior in democratic politics. 
The PKS has been a great success, but has at the same time triggered controversies in 
Indonesian politics, after it successfully increased its vote from 1.7% in 1999 to 7.3% in 2004. 
The controversy stems from perceptions—among observers as well as the public—that the 
Islamist ideology of the PKS contains elements that are incompatible with democracy, and 
that its participation in democracy is merely a pretext for its true objective of establishing an 
Islamist political system. Utilizing theories of party studies, this research analyzes the impact 
of ideology upon the behavior of the PKS in democratic politics, i.e. in its organization, its 
participation in elections, and its role in government.  
 
1.1. Islamist Parties: A Democratic Dilemma  
In fact, suspicions about the participation of Islamist parties in democratic politics are by no 
means a unique Indonesian problem. A scholar of Islamist parties calls it a “democratic 
dilemma” in that, on the one hand, the parties adopt a strictly religious political ideology with 
elements that are incompatible with democratic values—such as, for example, their 
approaches to questions of gender equality and religious pluralism. Yet on the other hand, 
Islamist parties are gaining popularity in many Muslim countries when they participate in 
democratic politics and have a presence in elections (Jonasson, 2004). From the point of view 
of political democratization, a process that is only in its initial phase in the Muslim world, this 
is gives rise to a difficult dilemma. On the one hand, banning Islamist parties from 
participation in democratic politics would obviously be an undemocratic option, as it would 
disenfranchise significant Muslim groups. Yet on the other hand, letting parties with 
undemocratic objectives compete and win elections, some would argue, is democratic suicide, 
as it will risk giving such parties opportunities to turn the democratic system upside down and 
establish their preferred undemocratic political systems.  
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At an empirical level, it is true that the emergence and growing popularity of Islamist 
parties is a widespread phenomenon in many Muslim countries, ranging from North Africa, to 
the Middle East, to Central Asia, to South Asia and Southeast Asia. Even the manner of their 
emergence is quite uniform: they started from small but militant Islamic groups that emerged 
amidst widespread public resentment toward the existing political systems. Their moralist and 
religious images were in contrast to the rampant corruptions among existing regimes, and 
their care for the needy was in antithesis to the prevalent selfish politicians. When the groups 
entered into the political arena, they became popular almost immediately. However, this rapid 
popularity triggered counter-reactions from the political and military establishment that led to 
political crises and even violence.  
 The first and perhaps the most notorious case was the Algerian Islamic Salvation Front 
(FIS). Growing from the Islamic movements in the 1960s and 1970s, the FIS emerged as the 
most well-organized political organization in 1980s Algerian politics. This period was also 
marked by the rise of oil prices that severely affected the country’s economy, with 
unemployment reportedly reaching forty percent of the total force work. The economic crises 
triggered mass riots in major cities in early October 1988, which demanded that the 
government resign. The authorities suppressed the mobs with counter-violence, causing the 
deaths of hundreds of people. Yet, the demonstrations were able to force the government to 
carry out political reforms.  At the end of the year the government passed bills that allowed 
citizens to organize opposition parties and provided a legal framework for economic 
liberalization, and by early 1989 no les than eighteen political parties were founded, including 
the FIS, which was established in February 1989. Led by two figures – Abasi Madani, an 
elderly professor from the University of Algiers who displayed a moderate political stance, 
and a fiery young preacher Ali Belhaj, who staunchly promoted strict and radical Islamist 
political views – the FIS attracted a wide spectrum of support from Muslim communities, 
,especially in urban areas, amid high levels of disappointment with the existing regime.  
The government organized the first multi-party elections for district and provincial 
legislatures in June 1990, and the FIS won 54 percent of votes and collected 46 percent of 
district and 55 percent of provincial legislatures. The Incumbent party reaped only 32 percent. 
The first Gulf War reportedly galvanized the FIS’s popularity. Shocked by its defeat, the 
government started to engineer the incoming national legislative election, by redrawing the 
electoral districts. Rejecting the government Gerrymandering strategy, the FIS called for a 
nation-wide strike, driving hundred of thousands of people to the streets. In June it agreed to 
put an end to the protests after the government agreed to guarantee a fair election. Yet, the 
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compromise sparked a split among the FIS’s leaders, and the prolonged show of people’s 
power alarmed the military, which then arrested Madani and Belhaj. The party’s leadership 
was handed down to Abdul Kader Hachani, in preparation for the election. In the first round 
of elections held in December 1990, the FIS garnered 48 percent of the total votes, and won 
188 out of 231 seats in parliament. Unfortunately, the army could not accept the prospect of 
Islamist rule and in January 1992 it cancelled the electoral process, forced the government to 
resign and declared a state of emergency and martial law. In March the military government 
dissolved and banned the FIS, and in June it sentenced Madani and Belhaj to 12 years in 
prison (Shahin, 1997: 112-161).  
A similar story took place in Turkey, when Islamist parties repeatedly gained 
successes but were repeatedly suppressed by secularist politicians and the military. The 
history of Islamist parties in Turkish politics had been centred on its prominent figure, 
Necmettin Erbakan (b. 1926). In 1970 the industrialist Erbakan and his associates founded 
The National Order Party (Mili Nizam Partisi or MNP) which differentiated itself from other 
existing parties by its religious orientation. However, this party disbanded following military 
intervention in Turkish politics in 1971. In the next year Erbakan founded another Islamist 
party, the National Salvation Party (Mili Selamat Partisi or MSP) with a similar moral-
religious tone. This party enjoyed considerable success as a minor party and won 11.80 
percent of the national vote in the 1973 elections, thereby achieving the 10 percent Electoral 
Threshold which allowed the party to have seats in parliament, which saw it breifly join the 
coalition Government during the Cyprus crisis in 1974. Binnaz Toprak, a respected Turkish 
political analyst, wrote that the MSP’s success in the election told the people and politicians 
that religion played a significant role in structuring voters’ behavior. Although officially  an 
Islamic party was prohibited by the constitution, most of its constituents voted for it because 
they perceived it to be Islamic party. In fact, the party’s platform was not specifically 
religious or Islamist, but rather framed the country’s political problems from a moral point of 
view. Its platform envisaged that the party struggled for:  
 
A political system that would eliminate squander, bribery, and corruption through the 
screening of both the politicians and the public administrators on the basis of their 
moral character in addition to objective testing and qualification; and a nation which 
has a historical consciousness, unity, and faith in common national goals (Toprak, 
1990: 99).  
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This deceptively non-religious statement used a rhetoric that enabled the party to touch upon 
voters’ religious sentiments. Firstly, by evaluating the political and administrative 
shortcomings of the government in moral terms, it implied that the solution—i.e. the party’s 
platform—was a religious one. Secondly, by making historical consciousness one of its 
objectives, the party also implicitly pointed to Islam as the major uniting factor in the history 
of the Turkish nation. 
Civil unrest in 1980 lured the military to intervene in national politics, dissolving 
political parties and banning their leaders. Another Islamist party was founded by Erbakan’s 
followers in 1983 – the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi) – and when, in 1987, the new 
constitution  restored the political rights of the banned parties’ leaders, Erbakan took over the 
Welfare Party’s leadership as it prepared to compete in the elections.  Initial results were 
lukewarm result, with the Welfare Party winning only 6.7 percent of votes in the 1987 
election. Yet it steadily increased its appeal in subsequent elections. In 1991, in a temporary 
coalition with the right-wing nationalist party, WP eventually won 17 percent of votes and 
entered into the parliament. Finally, in the 1994 parliamentary election it managed to collect 
21 percent of votes, which eventually enabled Erbakan to lead a government in 1996, 
becoming the first ever Islamist prime minister. Although it enjoyed strong support at the 
municipal level, the Erbakan administration suffered from various controversies and bouts of 
ineffectiveness, which were partly due to a corrupt coalition partner and the narrow space for 
political maneuvers that it was allowed by the military. Erkaban’s foreign policy showed an 
Islamic inclination, with serial visits to Libya and Iran and participation in the formation of an 
economic block of Muslim countries (D-8), triggering criticism from other parties and the 
military. At the end of 1997, with his coalition partner allegedly involved in corruption 
scandal, Erbakan was forced to publically defend the fragile coalition, which negatively 
affected his popularity. Furthermore, WP’s  policy of expanding Islamic elements in 
educational and bureaucratic  institutions, and of promoting religious symbols in public, led 
the military to warn that the Refah government was trying to establish Islamic law, while also 
giving rise to resistance  from the business community, which saw the populist budget as 
favoring Islamic cultural entrepreneurship. In February the military issued demands to the 
government: these included the elimination of Islamist influence and symphatizers from the 
state system, restrictions on religious civil organizations, the closure of hundreds of religious 
schools, and tight controls over religious mystical orders and religious dress. These demands 
eventually led to the collapse of the government, and in June 1997, Erbakan resigned. In 
January 1998 the authorities declared Refah to be a banned party ‘because of evidence 
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confirming its actions against the principles of the secular republic’. Erbakan, together with 
five of his deputies, were banned for five years from political leadership (Mecham, 2004: 
339-358). 
  A similarly gloomy story concerning an  Islamist party can be found in Egypt, where 
the centrist Hisbul Wasath (or Central Party) was denied its right to participate in elections. 
This began in 1995 when the authoritarian government escalated its repression of Islamist 
politicians, especially those which belonged to the Muslim Brotherhood. In early 1980’s the 
regime conducted democratic experiment of multiparty system. In the 1984 election, in 
coalition with the nationalist Wafd Party, politicians from Brotherhood managed to garner 15 
percent of votes and 13 of percent seats, and in 1987 in another coalition with the Liberal 
Party and the Labor Party, the Brotherhood won 17 percent of votes and 13 percent of seats. 
Anticipating unhappy prospects, the regime stopped its multiparty experiment. As could 
easily be predicted, the votes for non-government parties declined drastically; their vote 
dropped to only 14 percent, from 28 percent in 1984 and 30 percent in 1987. in response, 
opposition parties tried to strengthen their base by signing a ‘civic compact’ in 1995, a join 
commitment to promote inclusive democratic participation, freedom of belief and women’s 
rights. Initially the Brotherhood was enthusiastic to join the coalition in the hope of improving 
its electoral prospects, but finally it withdrew from signing the compact when the document 
did not declare the Sharia to be the sole basis of law. In that year many of its credible young 
leaders of the Brotherhood were also arrested and charged with conducting illegal political 
activities.  
This political situation—i.e. the Brotherhood’s reluctance to join a reforming coalition 
on the one hand, and the escalating oppression from the regime on the other—had frustrated 
many of its activists and members, especially among professionals. Together with other 
reform-minded professionals and politicians these activists established the Hisbul Wasath in 
late 1995. The name Wasath or center implies its two fundamental objectives: firstly, it 
marked a moderate political movement that sought a middle way, an alternative to the 
deadlock of antagonism between the regime and the opposition; and secondly, the name 
alludes to a key and popular Qur’anic term—‘Thus have We made you a justly balance 
(wasath) community. That ye might be witness over the nations’ (Qur’an, 2: 143)— thereby 
giving it Islamic credentials. The project thus represented a new moderate politics waged by 
new generation of Islamist democrats. It is interesting to note that 64 out of 72 of the party’s 
founders were Brotherhood activists. Surprisingly, the Brotherhood’s leadership reacted 
swiftly and furiously toward the indication of independence among its young activists, and 
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publicly opposed the new organization’s application for legal recognition as a political 
organization. The Brotherhood’s harsh reaction drew public concern, and even a highly 
respected ulama associated with it, Yusuf Wardhawy, opined that Hizbul Wasath was a way 
to break the isolation that the government had imposed on Islamic movements. Wardhawy 
said that the Brotherhood’s actions were regrettable: 
  
I fear that the Islamic movement constraints the liberal thinkers among its children and 
closes windows of religious renewal and progressive interpretations, and stand on one 
side of ideas and thoughts while not accepting the other point of view or those who 
hold different opinions about objectives or the means to accomplish them (Norton, 
2005: 142). 
 
The strong reaction and even intimidation from the Brotherhood caused many of the Wasath 
founders to withdraw from the new organization and return back to the Brotherhood’s fold, 
thereby making Wasath unable to apply to the court to have status as a political party because 
it was unable to meet the requirement of 50 founders. In the following month, after it met the 
50 founding members requirement, the Court rejected its application based upon the existing 
law 40/1977, which stipulated that a new party must fulfill a legitimate purpose not met by an 
existing party. And since the ruling National Democratic Party claimed to provide everything 
Egyptians needed, the standard was virtually impossible to fulfill. In fact, the Wasath was 
only one among more that thirty parties rejected by the court. In 1988 the party was renewed, 
under the name of the Egyptian Center Party (Hizbul Wasath al-Mashri), founded by 92 
activists, including three Christians and nineteen women, with only 21 of the founders coming 
from a Brotherhood background. The platform of the new organization layed out its objective 
of in principle rejecting secularism, while also advocating toleration, diversity and pluralism. 
It said:  
 
“National unity and religion as one unit are of extreme importance whereby each 
Muslim and Christian, through their own religion, would compromise the national 
unity… Islamic scholarship affirms that too much religion on its own does not insure 
justice, and not enough religion does not prevent acquiring what is just. Invoking what 
is just in the political arena or exercising authority on behalf of a particular religious 
faction in a religious pluralistic country is a claim that has no judicial base (Norton: 
2005: 143)” 
 
However, based upon the evaluation that the organization contributed nothing new that the 
existing parties could not provide, the court rejected again Wasath’s appeal for legal status in 
September 1998 (Norton, 2005: 133-160) 
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 In spite of repeated failures, Islamist parties continued to attract attention and support 
from voters in Muslim countries. Writing on the electoral support for Islamist parties in the 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA), Garcia-Rivero and Kotze observed that the parties 
indicated a developing trend in Muslim politics in the region, where such parties were able to 
mobilize popular support in elections in the last decades. In addition to the aforementioned 
FIS in Algeria in 1990, Islamist parties were also on the rise elsewhere. These included:  the 
Turkey Justice and Development Party (AKP) in the 1995 and 2002 elections;  the Jordanian 
Islamic Action front (JAI), which initially boycotted the first election in 1997 in protest at the 
government’s manipulation, but then won 23 percent of seats in 2003, thereby becoming  the 
only political party in parliament (the others being independent candidates); in Morocco, the 
Party of Justice and Development (PJD) received 14 seats in parliament in 1997 and increased 
this to 42 seats in the subsequent election of 2002. The most surprising of all, perhaps, was 
the landslide win of the Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) in the 2006 
parliamentary elections, with 44 percent of votes and 56 percent of the seats in the national 
parliament. This result eventually brought this radical Islamist party, founded in 1986, to form 
a coalition government with its archrival: the Fatah party (Garcia-Rivero and Kotze, 2007).  
It is this persistence and growing popularity of the Islamist parties that has triggered 
suspicions and anxieties. Many scholars perceive that the political values in Islamic traditions 
are hardly compatible with democratic norms. First, Islam is seen as an all-inclusive religion 
which regulates all aspects of the lives of its followers. It apparently draws no line between 
religion and other aspects of human life and, as a result, it seems impossible for Muslim 
communities to develop any system, institution or mechanism for their life outside of their 
religious boundaries. There also perceived to be no secularization in Islam in terms of the 
separation of politics from religion. It means that in Islam political life is governed by 
religious dogmas, which give only limited space for rationality and other human creativities. 
Islamic political culture, therefore, is seen as being very unlikely to nurture democracy. 
(Lewis, 2002: 100)   
Second, the absence of a secularization process in Islamic communities is seen as 
preventing the emergence of two basics institutions essential for democracy, i.e. the nation-
state and civil society. The universal concept of Ummah is the foundation of Muslim political 
identity, which divides the world into two irreconcilable realms:   Darul Islam or the abode of 
Islam and Darul Harb or the abode of war. The ultimate ideal for Muslim politics is to 
establish a universal polity, in the past in the form of Caliphate, that encompass the whole 
Muslim world (Kedourie, 1992: 1). The notion of a universal Muslim community is seen as 
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being incompatible with concept of the nation-state, which is fundamental for modern 
democratic practice (Linz & Stephan, 1996). Moreover, the inclusion of religion over other 
communal spheres has made it impossible for any civil society to emerge among Muslim 
communities, because civil society required equal civic interactions, whereas the religious 
character of Islamic culture has made it cliental and hierarchical. (Gellner, 1996: 23-29). 
Third, the long history of confrontation between the Islamic world and the western 
world, from the crusades up until the history of colonialisms has created anti-western 
sentiments among Muslim societies as well as anti-western tendencies in Islamic culture. 
These sentiments have become even stronger after the abolishment of the last Islamic 
Caliphate and its impotence in the face of western modern development (Lewis, 2002). Anti-
Western sentiments, furthermore, have made Muslims tend to reject any products of western 
culture including democracy (Huntington, 1997: 112).  
Of course, not all agree with those assessments. Many scholars suggest different 
analyses of democratic underdevelopment in Muslim nations. Some of them argue that 
Muslim countries are not unique in their democratic underdevelopment, which means that 
anti-democratic sentiments are not the exclusive property of Muslim countries, and should 
therefore not be attributed to Islam alone, but also to other factors such as social and political 
and economic conditions, geo-politics and international factors (Abdel Fatah, 2003: 5; Mujani 
2003). Many theories of democracy and democratization also suggest that democratic political 
institutions require certain economic and social conditions to thrive (Lipset, 1959). Although 
scholars are more critical of Lipset’s original thesis that economic development almost 
certainly produces democracy, they do not reject the significant contribution of the economy 
to the development of democratic politics (Przeworsky, 2004). It is in this context that 
Abootalebi wrote that the inauguration of democratic elections in Muslim countries will not 
succeed without addressing the fundamental problem of the uneven distribution of 
socioeconomic and political resources. The religious debate on Islam and democracy must 
then deal with not only the normative questions of justice and freedom, but also with 
developing the mechanisms necessary to remedy the structural problems (Abootalebi, 1999: 
9). Rose, who studied the values and attitudes of Muslims in Central Asia, also found that 
‘there is little difference between Muslims, the Orthodox, and non-believers. Even more 
strikingly, the most observant Muslims are almost as pro-democratic as those who are non-
observant’. He concluded that ‘neither nominal religion nor the degree of religious observance 
has much influence on democratic values’. At a glance, ‘being Muslim does not make a 
person more likely either to reject democracy or to endorse dictatorship’ (Rose, 2002: 110) 
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Others even argue that there are democratic values in Islamic religion, such as the 
principle of shura or consultation and ijma or consensus. In fact, these deliberative methods 
are common traditions among Muslim societies in solving problems at various levels of 
communal life from politics, to society, to family. (Mousalli 2001). A recent study by Pippa 
Norris and Ronald Inglehart on ninety-two countries, out of which forty five are Muslim  
countries, shows that contrary to widely held opinion in terms of their attitudes towards 
democracy Muslim countries have an equal score compared to those of Western Christian 
countries. Even more surprisingly, on the approval of the democratic ideas, Muslims have a 
higher score. The study suggests that what differentiates Muslim countries from Western 
Christian countries—and the more likely source of conflict, if there is any—are issues of 
gender equality, and not of democracy (Norris and Inglehart, 2002). Scholars of Muslim 
politics are reporting similar findings. Esposito and Voll, for example, have argued that those 
who maintain that democracy and Islam are not compatible make two faulty assumptions. 
They assume that democracy can only be implemented in one form and that there is only one 
expression of Islam. While Stephan and Robertson add that one should be cautious in 
ascribing the lack of democracy in Muslim countries to the nature of Islam. Islam, they argue, 
cannot explain the exceptionally low performance of democracy in Muslim-Arab countries 
(2003: 39). 
 However, the emergence of series of Islamist parties and their growing popularity in 
Muslim countries have cast equally growing doubts on the prospects of democratization in 
those countries. Huntington says in his book about the latest global wave of democratization, 
“Whatever the compatibility of Islam and democracy in theory, in practice they have not gone 
together”. He is also doubtful about the prospects of democracy in those nations where 
Islamists are among the participants in politics. Democracy, he argues, requires not only 
consent to establish institutions but also a commitment to enact its values. As was shown in 
the history of many Asian and Muslim countries, political leaders tended to be enthusiastic 
about democracy only when they were outside government, while undermining it when they 
were in power. Hence, according to Huntington, the participation of Islamist parties in 
democratic politics endangers the prospects of democracy. 
 
Liberalization in Islamic countries thus enhanced the power of important social and 
political movements whose commitment to democracy was questionable… Would 
the existing governments continue to open up their politics and hold elections in 
which Islamic groups could compete freely and equally? Would the Islamic groups 
gain majority support in those elections? If they did win the elections, would the 
 14
military, which in many Islamic societies are strongly secular, allow them to form 
government? If they did form government, would it pursue radical Islamic policies? 
(Huntington, 1991: 208-209). 
 
1.2. The PKS and Democratization in Indonesia  
It is surprising that until quite recently only a few studies on Islam in Indonesia— a nation 
with a Muslim population of 88.2% among its 240 million citizens—have been undertaken 
either by international Islamic scholars or Southeast Asian scholars. Robert Hefner describes 
this as a double marginalization. Scholars of international Islamic studies, according to 
Hefner, tend to see Indonesia as historically the last nation to join the caravan of Islamic 
civilization and therefore less original compared to the cultures and traditions of Muslims in 
the Middle East region. While scholars of Southeast Asian studies had sensed that Islamic 
culture was just an outer veneer of the more real characteristics of Indonesian societies 
(Hefner, 1997).  
Recent developments have, however, brought Indonesian Muslims into the spotlight of 
the international media and international scholarships. On the one hand, some indications of 
democratic consolidation, especially two successful parliamentary and presidential elections 
during which Muslims played a pivotal role, have led observers and analysts to refer to 
Indonesia as an empirical example of a democratic Muslim country (Carter, 2004). In a closer 
observation, it is worth noting that Indonesian Muslims have a considerably long history in 
seeding democratic cultures (Hefner, 2000). These cultures have shown themselves to be 
capable of  exercising democracy not only at a procedural level, but also down to the basic 
elements of democracy such as pluralistic ideology (Ramage, 1996), a strong civil society 
(Bush, 2000) and social capital (Mujani 2003).  
At the same time, several violent acts carried out by Muslim extremists have invited others to 
warn that Indonesia, and Southeast Asia in general, are potential hotbeds for global terrorism 
(Abuza, 2004). Some reports indicate the increasing trend of using Islamic languages and 
symbols to legitimize violent acts. For several years Muslim hardliners had waged Jihad 
against Christians in Indonesian cities of Ambon and Poso, which claimed thousands of 
casualties. Several bomb attacks were launched, especially toward Christians and western 
targets, including two bomb attacks on the tourist island of Bali in 2002 and 2005, and similar 
attacks on the J. W. Marriot Hotel and the Australian Embassy in Jakarta.  
Examined against this backdrop, the Indonesian Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) 
represents a fault line between two conflicting trends in Southeast Asian Muslim society; 
namely, democratization and radicalization. Some observers have used double 
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characterisations to refer to this party. Van Bruinessen, for instance, described the PKS as 
‘imperfect democrats but perhaps Indonesia’s strongest force for democratization’ (van 
Bruinessen, 2003) based on the fact that many of the party’s spokesmen believe in anti-
Islamic conspiracies, are anti-Zionistic, anti-Western, and have been known to be hostile to 
liberals and secularist Muslims.  At the same time  it ‘is one of the very few forces in the 
political arena that may seriously contribute to a gradual democratization of the country, as it 
believes in participation in the existing political system and in changing society through 
persuasion of individuals rather than through grabbing power’ (also Collins, 2004).  
Founded in 2002, the PKS grew from the PK (Partai Keadilan or Justice Party) 
following the latter’s failure to pass the electoral threshold in the 1999 general election. PK 
was founded in 1998, after the collapse of New Order authoritarian regime, by ex-Muslim 
student activists of 1970s-1980s known as the Tarbiyah student network. The network was 
actually a group of extra-curricular Muslim student-groups developed mostly in secular 
universities. The Arabic term Tarbiyah simply means ‘education,’ which implies that these 
groups were focusing their studies on traditional-religious Islamic subjects—such as theology 
(Tauhid), rituals (Ibadah), ethics (Ahlaq), history (Tarikh), and politics (Siyasah)—in contrast 
to the secular subjects they studied in universities. Tarbiyah groups were almost absent 
among traditional Islamic educational institutions, i.e. in the Pesantren and other Institutes of 
Islamic Studies, where Islamic religious sciences were studied as the main subjects 
(Abdulaziz et al., 1996).  
One of the specific characters of Tarbiyah groups, which differentiated them from 
other Muslim civil organizations, was their overt political orientation. In contrast with most  
Muslim organizations during the Indonesian New Order era, which tended to avoid political 
discourses, under the state’s repression and due to the state trauma of radical Muslim politics, 
the Tarbiyah groups took politics as their main discourse. It was a prevalent conviction among 
Tarbiyah activists that the ultimate goal of their Dakwah or Islamization was to Islamize the 
state. Three reasons may explain this situation. Firstly, the fact that Muslim political activists 
from the former Masyumi party initiated this movement meant that this movement held a 
political orientation since the beginning of its invention. Secondly, it adopted a non-
conventional approach to studying Islamic sciences by including political subjects (Siyasah), 
which were normally not studied in formal Islamic educational institutions. Thirdly, their 
extensive networks with Middle Eastern groups and organizations informed them with 
political practices from the Middle East (Machmudi 2005). The fact that these groups 
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developed among students had also helped to give the impression of enthusiasm and militancy 
within the Tarbiyah movement.  
Immediately after the regime change took place in Indonesia in May 1998, the 
national leaders of the Tarbiyah movement conducted a survey of their networks about an 
initiative to form a political party. The result was strongly supportive, and Partai Keadilan 
(PK) or the Justice Party was declared in Jakarta July 1998. The decision to form a political 
party was a natural course for Tarbiyah movement (Damanik, 2000). PK joined the 1999 
election with highly Islamist appeals. The issues of the Islamization of society and the 
purification of Islam dominated their campaign. However, PK was able to get only 1.7% of 
the national vote in the 1999 election, and failed to pass the 2.5% electoral threshold,  thus 
preventing it from competing in the next election. Even when it gained only a small vote, 
PK’s appearance in the Indonesian political arena generated noticeable reactions in Indonesia.  
Fore some, PK marked a new generation and new hope for Muslim political interests which 
had been marginalized and repressed by the secular state, but for others it offered a worrying 
signs of the return of exclusivist and chauvinistic Islamism which in turn would encourage the 
regime and the military to take a repressive stance against the Muslim community (Basyaib, 
1999). 
In order to be able to contest in the next election, PK was transformed into the PKS in 
2002, and received all of PK’s properties and organizational structures as well as 
functionaries. While retaining almost all PK’s organizational structures, the new PKS shifted 
its appeals from Islamism to general issues such as anti-corruption, law enforcement and 
concerns toward needy people. PKS not only spoke about their policies but also proved what 
they said in their actions. Local media routinely reported how PKS representatives in national 
as well as local parliaments returned illegal moneys, and how they were always in the 
frontline in times of disaster, sending volunteers and paramedics. These strategies had an 
enormous impact. In the 2004 elections, PKS raised its votes to 7.3% and even won the 
majority vote in the Special Province of Jakarta, the state capital, which is politically the most 
important province on theIndonesian political map.   
The PKS’s success once again generated controversy. On the one hand, from an 
insider point of view, this success proved the PKS’s seriousness in participating in democracy 
and countered the allegation that the majority of Indonesian Muslims would eventually reject 
the PKS. For its opponents, however, the success raised yet another suspicion concerning the 
real motives of the PKS. They argued that in spite of its newly political slogans, structurally 
the PKS was almost the same as the PK in terms of its personnel and organization. Therefore, 
 17
the argument goes on, the PKS’s democratic orientation was just a political trick to cover their 
real Islamist agendas. With the PKS targeted to win 20% of the vote in the 2009 election, and 
with some polls confirming the PKS’s growing popularity, concerns about the PKS’s real 
motives are also mounting. A commentator even expressed his fear by saying that a ballots for 
the PKS is more or less what a bullet is for Jama’ah Islamiyah (Dumme, 2005). 
 
1.3. Research Questions  
The present research on the PKS is concerned with the following question: 
To what extent do the PKS’s ideological orientations explain its organizational behaviors in 
democratic politics: i.e. in organization, in election and in government? 
 
1.4. Explanation of the Terms 
1.4.1.  Islamism refers to an interpretation of Islam that emphasizes the ideological and 
political aspect of the religion. The word ‘Islamisme’ was first coined by the French 
philosopher, Voltaire, as a substitute for the problematic term ‘mahometisme’ to refer to the 
religion of the Arabs. This word was adopted into English in the 1900 edition of the Oxford 
English Dictionary.  After the adoption of the Arabic word ‘Islam’, the term Islamism was 
no longer used. However recently, when political Islam has been a major topic in 
international politics after the collapse of the former Soviet Union, ‘Islamism’ once again 
became ubiquitous among scholars and journalists (Kramer, 2002). Now it refers more 
specifically to certain types of religious interpretations, organizations and movements 
among Muslims that emphasize the ideological and political aspects of the religion, 
combined with a strong belief in the uniqueness and superiority of Islam vis-à-vis other 
political ideologies. Other synonyms are also used, oftentimes interchangeably, such as 
fundamentalism (Voll, 1995), and Salafism (Kepel, 1985).  
 
1.4.2. Political Party is defined as an organization with the following fundamental set of 
properties. Firstly, following Joseph Schumpeter, who defines a party as a group whose 
members propose to act in concert in the competitive struggle for political power 
(Schumpeter, 1962: 283). Secondly, following Sartori’s tracing of its etymology, which 
sees party being derived from “part”, implying that a political party is part of a whole. This 
means that, although it is a partisan organization and its members may  oftentimes be 
greedy politicians, party behavior is intended to serve the wider interests of the public. In 
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this point, “party” differs from “faction” which is a partisan group pursuing its own 
interests (Sartori, 1976: ). 
 
1.4.3. Democratic Participation. I define democratic participation as the consent granted to 
a political party to participate in electoral politics. There are two different conceptions of 
democracy, the so-called procedural and participatory concepts of democracy. The first, 
accentuating the normative elements of  a party, suggests that in order to truly participate in 
democratic politics, a political party should focus on the democratic processes through 
which it becomes an  open organization, providing its members with opportunities to 
participate in decision making. This is because a  political party is not only a vehicle to 
achieve political power, but also an incubator to nurture citizens’ political competences. 
Open participations in party activities are fundamental for the sustainability of democracy 
(Scarrow, 2003; Torell, 1999). Meanwhile, the second conception of democratic 
participation stresses the effectiveness of party activities as a vehicle of political 
competition. In order to be effective, a party needs to have the capacity to act decisively 
and to react quickly, and therefore it must be centralistic and party leaders must assume 
solid control of the party. According to this point of view, democracy lies outside the party, 
in its ability to serve as an effective political tool (Schumpeter, 1962: 269; Huntington, 
1991: 6-7). This research will provide analysis of the  PKS’s democratic participation from 
both the participative and competitive perspectives of democracy. 
   
1.5. Relevant Academic Literature 
1.5.1. Studies on Islamist Parties 
Although party studies are among the most fertile field in political science (Janda 1993: 
163ff.; Mair, 1995: 120), studies on Islamic political parties are sparse. The pessimistic 
situation in Muslim countries with regard to the democratization process seems discouraging 
to any extensive studies on the topic. Most studies on Islamist parties are cursory overviews, 
such as Liou (2004) on PAS in Malaysia; Shanahan on Iraqi Hizbu ad-Da’wah Al-Islamiyya 
(2004); Mecham on Turkey’s Islamist parties (2004); or Nortons’ study on Egyptian Hizbul 
Wasat (2005).  
 Shahin wrote an extended comparative study on North African Islamist political 
movements (Shahin, 1998). Comparing some Muslim countries in Northern Africa, he 
concludes that radicalization among Muslims was caused by historical and political factors. 
Historically, in those countries, Muslims played a significant role in fighting against 
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colonialism, but after independence the governments tended to repress Muslim political 
aspirations, which had caused resentments among Muslim leaders, who felt that they had been 
betrayed by the their own countries. Meanwhile, politically the resentment and hatred had 
mounted when the secular governments turned into corrupt regimes where greedy politicians 
competed with one another to pursue their personal interests at the expense of the desperate 
people. Typically, slowly but surely Muslims adopted another strategy by forming militant 
groups which exploiting people’s miseries, which had been caused by massive economic 
inequalities and popular hatred toward corrupt regimes and selfish politicians, and which led 
to intense, and oftentimes violent, clashes with the secular establishments (Shahin 1997: 235). 
Shahin adds, though, that Islamist politics is not always violent in character and some 
violence done by Islamists such as in Algeria was more a product of the military, licensed by 
secular politicians, mishandling the situation. Shahin’s study, however, focuses on Muslim 
politics in terms of social movements, even when he discusses political parties; therefore he 
gives no specific answer to the question as the nature of Islamist parties.  
 An in-depth study of an Islamist party is conducted by Farish Ahmad Noor on Parti 
Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS). In his two volumes edition, Noor goes into almost all the details of 
the party, from its historical development since the colonial era; the internal dynamics under 
successive leaders and their respective strengths and weakness; its struggle as an opposition 
party in Malaysian politics against the governing party UMNO and the coalition of Barisan 
National; and its policies in promoting Islamist politics. Regarding the last point, Noor notes 
an interesting fact that PAS’s Islamist project is indeed flexible and in line with the 
development of global political trends. In the 1980s, PAS Islamist projects were designed to 
change the constitutional set-up of the Federation of the State of Malaysia by giving the 
central power into the council of ulama and reducing parliament to a rubber stamp for the 
council. Meanwhile from the late 1990s PAS developed a new discourse, when younger 
generations of its leadership try to reinvent the party’s image not just as the defender of 
Islamic teachings but also as a promoter of human rights, democracy and constitutionalism in 
Malaysia (Noor, 2002: 730-31).  
 In his concluding remarks, Noor explains that while there are some undemocratic 
elements in the PAS’s project of Islamism, especially with regard to religious pluralism and 
gender justice, it is not true that Islamist politics is always dedicated to the creation of 
authoritarian regimes and despotic modes of rule. The plain truth, for him, is that the problem 
of government and the centralization of power has been at the heart of modern political 
projects. In western political thought, he argues, the need to find a justification for social 
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ordering, policing and governing; the need to root projects in some teleological or 
eschatological formula; the need to locate the political moments of the present within some 
greater reality that transcends the confines of the mundane and profane, were major themes of 
great thinkers: Hobbes found the answer in Reason, Rousseau found his solution in the state 
of Nature, while Hegel sought refuge in Absolute Spirit. Islamism, therefore, is neither new 
nor unusual in the history of modern politics (Noor, 2002: 734).  
 Nevertheless, a pioneering study of Islamist parties using specific party theories is 
found in Jonasson’s work on the linkage of Islamist parties, i.e. how Islamist parties play an 
intermediary role between civil society and the state as well as why they organize the way 
they do. Comparing three Islamist parties operating in three different countries with different 
regime types and with different political milieus—Fizilet Partisi in secular Turkey, Jabhat al-
Amal al-Islami in monarchic Jordan, and Jamaat e-Islami in militaristic regime Pakistan—
Jonasson found a striking uniformity of linkage organization among the Islamist parties that 
she studied. This seems to defy the standard theoretical explanations of party linkage 
behavior. In the standard theories of party linkage, derived from the history of western 
societies, the societal origin of parties, as well as the institutional structures in which the 
parties operate, define the way the parties organize their linkage.  
 Firstly, in rural societies that are characterized by interpersonal relationships among 
their members, the typical political party that emerged was the cliental party: a political party, 
which is organizationally dominated by local elites and which mobilizes support from a non-
elite mass. The political mission of cliental parties is to maintain the existing—usually 
hierarchical—structures of society. Secondly, modernizing societies, characterized by 
modernization and urbanization processes that are typically followed by economic, social and 
cultural alienation and anomy, usually produce mass-integration (socialist) or total-
integration (communist) parties, which are organizationally dominated by political activists 
with strong ideological commitments, develop thick organizational structures with activities 
that are labour-intensive and not limited in the electoral periods. They mobilize support from 
the lower class of the society, and their political mission is to transform the existing structures 
of the society into the one that favors the masses.  Thirdly, modernized societies would 
produce catch-all parties, characterized by thin organizational structures, run by professionals 
with capital-intensive organizational activities—especially the utilization of the mass media—
which are confined to campaigns at elections times. Their political mission is pragmatic, 
focuses on issues-based programs, and mobilizes support from all segments in the society. 
 21
 Quite surprisingly, Jonasson found that these rules do not apply to Islamist parties. 
Three Islamist parties in three different countries, with different societal backgrounds—
urbanized Jordan, modernizing Turkey, and rural Pakistan—as well as different regime types 
and different electoral systems, come out with very similar linkage behavior.  
Organizationally, these parties resemble the characteristics of mass-integration parties, with 
strong ideological commitments among their leaders and members, thick organizational 
structures and political activities beyond elections times; yet electorally they resemble the 
catch-all party, which mobilizes support from all segments of society. Since Islamist ideology 
is the only thing these parties have in common, Jonasson concludes that ideology is the main 
driver of Islamist parties in organizing their linkage (2004: 465-472).  
 
1.5.2. Studies on the PKS 
 With regard to the Indonesian PKS, although it is as relatively a new party there are 
already plenty books and articles written about it, as the PKS have attracted much attention 
among the observers of Indonesian politics. So far, studies on the PKS can be categorized into 
three types of literature. Firstly, sympathizers’ works, usually written by the party members or 
supporters that promote certain features or characteristics in an uncritical way. 
Zulkiflimansyah, a PKS member of parliament, wrote several articles of this type. He 
eloquently argues how the party, which evolved from the dakwah movement, seeks to achieve 
progressive objectives in democratizing Indonesia, without losing its commitment to moral 
ideals. In one of the articles he wrote (Zulkiflimansyah, 2006):  
 
As a political party, the PKS has had to adapt its ideological framework to the 
realities of democratic politics in Indonesia. The PKS is not confronted with an 
authoritarian regime that it must fight against. Instead, it is faced with access to 
government via a democratic process, and this has translated into the practical 
realities of bargaining as part of a governing coalition. In other words, the party has 
to deal with the necessary compromises with other actors within the political system, 
including other political parties and the government. 
There are ample examples which point to the complexities inherent in the PKS 
functioning as a political party and not just a religious movement. As the seventh 
largest political party in the country, PKS leaders were faced with the option of 
joining the governing coalition in 2004 or serving as an opposition in the legislature. 
Had the party leaders stuck to the static framework of the Muslim Brotherhood, it is 
unlikely the PKS would have agreed to partake in government. 
Yet, the PKS decided to engage with and support the governing coalition led by 
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Vice President Jusuf Kalla. Party leaders 
were convinced that such cooperation would add to their political education, 
including the art of governing. The party leaders also saw participation as a means to 
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prevent Islamic radicalism from entrenching itself in Indonesia as a result of Muslim 
communities feeling alienated from participation in the government structure. 
 
Other works of this category were written by Yon Machmudi, one of the PKS’s founders, in 
his doctoral dissertation and in another more popular version. An interesting topic Machmudi 
highlights in his works is that the PKS represents one of three strands in the new generation of 
Indonesian Islamic movements. The first strand is convergent Muslim, which synthesizes the 
inheritances of Indonesian Muslim movements in previous eras, especially the antagonism 
between the traditionalist and modernist camps. The focus and objectives of this group are to 
adapt Islamic values and practices in line with the modern context of Indonesian society. The 
second strand is radical Muslim, which intends to transform the existing societal and political 
structure radically, and replaced them with an Islamic system. Different from the convergent 
group, radical Muslim believes that the existing mainstream Islamic movements are unreliable 
and diluted by compromising with the secular and oppressive regime. Therefore, it prefers 
radical methods to implement Islamic teachings in Indonesia. This motive led the group to 
become involved in various violent actions. The third strand is global Muslim, which takes its 
inspirations from trans-national Islamist movement such as Egyptian Muslim Brothers and 
Palestinian Hizbut Tahrir. PKS, which evolved from Tarbiyah Movement, belongs to this 
group. According to Machmudi, the adoption of internationalist issues was initially a tactic to 
divert the attention of the repressive regime by avoiding discussions of local topics or 
criticizing the status quo. But indeed, the PKS pays a lot of attentions to international issues, 
and in fact adopted the organizational structures and mechanisms of trans-national Muslim 
organizations, e.g., the Egyptian Muslim Brothers. 
 Secondly, there are strategic works that provide analyses of the PKS based upon 
certain programmatic objectives and recommendations—positive or negative—as to how 
public policy makers should  deal with the party. It is natural that writers and analysts come 
up with such studies, since as a political party the PKS is part of a governing coalition, and 
the PKS is involved in policy decisions which are of interest to both the national and 
international communities. Analyses that provide recommendations will be useful, especially 
for the general public and policy makers, since the PKS is a new party with no previous 
record in government. One of the widely circulated articles on the PKS is from Sadanand 
Dhume, which describes the PKS as a radical party actively promoting the Islamisation of 
Indonesian politics. Although Dhume sees the PKS as a  peaceful political organization which 
is willing to participate in the democratic political process, he also argues that the PKS adopts 
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a radical Islamist ideology similar to that espoused by other radical organizations. He 
provocatively wrote (Dhume, 2005):  
 
Despite the Justice Party’s social work, little separates its thinking from Jemaah 
Islamiyah's. Like Jemaah Islamiyah, in its founding manifesto, the Justice Party 
called for the creation of an Islamic caliphate. Like Jemaah Islamiyah, it has placed 
secrecy—facilitated by the cell structure both groups borrowed from the 
Brotherhood—at the heart of its organization. Both offer a selective vision of 
modernity—one in which global science and technology are welcome, but un-Islamic 
values are shunned. The two groups differ chiefly in their methods: Jemaah 
Islamiyah is revolutionary; the Justice Party is evolutionary. 
 
There are many works which put forward a negative evaluation of the PKS, usually written by 
non-specialists and in popular rather than in scholarly writings (Aguswandi, 2006). 
Nevertheless, other analysts provide positive judgments of the party. Greg Fealy, for example, 
suggests that it is true that, due to its ideology being adopted from the Muslim Brothers, the 
PKS has some ambivalence towards the West, actively participated in various protests against 
the American support of Israel and the invasion to Iraq, and tended to be suspicious of the EU 
and US political agendas, especially the ‘war on terrorism’. Yet, many of its senior figures 
have a Western tertiary education and visit the West frequently, and their awareness of 
international developments is probably higher than that of any other Indonesian Islamic party. 
He also prefers to see the PKS ideology as moderate, instead of radical, based upon the fact 
that although it seeks to implement Islamic law, its leaders believe that this objective should 
be pursued indirectly, not by imposing it forcefully, but rather by raising the society’s 
religious awareness. According to this view, the people themselves will demand the sharia. 
Fealy, then, recommends that:  
 
Of all Indonesia’s Islamist parties, the PKS offers the best prospects for meaningful 
engagement. Despite the party’s concerns about Western motives and manipulation, 
its leaders are nonetheless worldly and open to reasoned argument, and the PKS is 
also keen to be seen as a responsible party and to allay impressions that it is fanatical 
or introspective. All these factors favour a fruitful interaction between the PKS and 
European interlocutors (Fealy, 2007: 38). 
 
 
  Thirdly, there exist descriptive-interpretive writings that try to capture a more 
complete picture of the PKS in open-ended ways, see the PKS as still in a process of 
development. The first such writing is a 20 page sub-chapter in Z. A. Amir’s Peta Islam 
Politik Pasca Soeharto (Map of Political Islam in Post-Suharto Era), which briefly yet 
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informatively describes the profile of the Justice Party after the 1999 election. Amir discussed 
the party’s formation, its ideological principles, its social base. its organizational structures, 
and its decision-making mechanisms (Amir, 2003: 83-106). A. S. Damanik (2002) provides a 
fuller exploration of the party’s profile. Based on his bachelor thesis, this work supplies rich 
detail concerning the party’s history, starting from its embryonic phase in the form of the 
Tarbiyah movement, the development of network organizations through which it recruited its 
most active leaders, and description of the party’s mission and objectives in promoting 
politics according to Islamic ideals. Damanik raises a very interesting point in his work, when 
he compares PK/PKS with the Democratic People’s Party (PRD), a tiny leftist Indonesian 
party, which collected 0.07 percent in the 1999 elections. He suggest that these two 
ideologically opposed parties shared three characteristics: Firstly, they started from social 
movements that responded to an authoritative and repressive government, in the form of the 
Tarbiyah movement in early 1980s for  thePKS and in the shape of the Indonesian Student 
Solidarity for Democracy (SMID) in early 1990s for the PRD. Secondly, more than merely 
providing political responses, the groups were in fact ideological movements, one based on 
Islam and the other on Socialism, in which activists were militant and enthusiastic, and in 
which organizational activities were dominated by the recruitment and indoctrination of new 
members and activists. Thirdly, when eventually they transformed their organizations into 
political parties, their main initial agendas were not pursuing votes or public office, but rather 
promoting their political visions and ideologies (Damanik, 2002: 223-227). A. M. Furkon 
wrote another descriptive work on the PKS, which focuses especially on the history of the 
party during its formative period.  
 
1.6. Theoretical Notes: Religious Ideology and the Rationality of Party Behavior 
1.6.1. The End of Ideology, the Beginning of Religious Politics  
The term ideology was coined by the French thinker, Destutt de Tracy, in his four volumes 
Elements d’ideologie (1801-1815), to refer to what he intended to be a ‘science of ideas’. In 
the spirit of the anti-clerical French revolution, de Tracy and his colleagues in the French 
National Institute intended the discipline to provide a ground for reducing ideas to the 
activities of sensations. By using this method, they wanted to critique transcendent notions of 
philosophy and religion with the aim of hindering the perpetuation of false abstract principles 
which, they believed, distorted the true understanding of men, society and politics. This 
iconoclastic view brought the group in loggerhead with Napoleon Bonaparte who saw the 
group and their views undermined the political authority. The French emperor then 
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reorganized the Institute and abolished the Moral and Political Sciences, the sanctuary of de 
Tracy’ group, and denounced them as ‘ideologues’: pejorative dreamers who do not 
understand real political affairs. Since then the term ideology has carried negative 
connotations (Cox, 1969).  
 In the hands of Karl Marx, the term ideology achieved its modern standard meaning, 
as a distorted way of understanding political affairs. For Marx, ideology includes all ideas that 
reflect the interests of a particular class at a particular time in history, but which are presented 
as universal and eternal. It represents human misunderstandings of the true nature of their 
relationship with the economic environment and the significance of that relationship within 
the whole development of history. In the stage of industrial capitalism and bourgeois society, 
the entire cultural-superstructure—which includes law, philosophy, religion, and politics—are 
all forms of ideology. And for Marx, only Marxist social theories that understand the true 
nature of human history, i.e. the history of class conflicts and struggles, are free from 
ideological distortions. Later on, Karl Manheim proposes a more systematic conception of 
ideology, which he defined as ‘the whole outlook of a social group, conditioned by the 
group’s political orientation, and temporally by its location in ongoing historical processes. 
Using his definition, Manheim concludes that Marxism is itself an ideology (Manheim, 125). 
 Sinister uses of the terms ideology and ideological were also prevalent among political 
scientists during the first half of the twentieth century, referring to grand political 
philosophies such as Marxism, communism, Nazism and Fascism. This discourse culminated 
in Daniel Bell’s The End of Ideology (1960). According to Bell, the old nineteenth-century 
ideologies had failed and become exhausted, leaving behind only memories of events that 
marked the darkest calamities of modern history: the horrors of Soviet communism, Hitler’s 
Nazism and Mussolini’s Fascism. By 1950, he said, the old politico-economic radicalism had 
lost its meaning, the ideological age had ended, and was replaced by a new era of capitalism 
and the welfare state. Younger intellectuals had put an end to radical and apocalyptic 
ideologies (Bell, 1960: 13). S. M. Lipset also agrees that the fundamental political problems 
of modern industrial societies no longer give rise to ideological disputes, but tend to revolve 
around the question of how to fulfill peoples’ economic interests. The very triumph of the 
democratic social revolution in the West brought to an end domestic politics for those 
intellectuals who needed ideologies or utopias to motivate them to political action (Lipset, 
1963: 17). 
 There was an interesting development in political studies, however, after the 
declaration of the end of ideology in the 1960s, i.e. the continuation of the usage of the term 
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albeit in revised and hence more neutral way, and the resurgence of religion in politics, which 
generated non-rationalistic political behaviors. The first point emanated from initial findings 
of a survey on the US presidential election in 1950s by Michigan political scientists, 
published in The American Voter (1960). The study found that most of the American voters 
cast their ballots not based on their understanding of the competing political issues and policy 
programs offered by candidates and their parties, but rather based on personal and 
psychological identifications with parties or candidates (Angus et al. 1960).  
 One member of the team, Philip Converse, who wrote a lengthy article on ‘The Nature 
of Belief Systems in Mass Publics’ (Converse, 1964), further developed this idea. Preferring 
the term ‘belief system’ as a substitute for ideology, Converse defines a belief system as “a 
configuration of ideas and attitudes in which the elements are bound together by some form of 
constraint or functional interdependence.” Yet, interestingly, he calls the usage of such value-
attitudinal configurations ‘ideological’.  Studying American voters and examining their 
capacity to understand political preferences, he classified them into five levels: (1) 
Ideologues, who were able to use in some active way a relatively abstract and far-reaching 
conceptual dimension to evaluate political preferences and policy positions. (2) Near-
Ideologues, who mentioned such concepts in a peripheral way, did not rely on their evaluation 
of the concepts in explaining the political affairs, or who used such concepts in a fashion that 
raised doubts about the accuracy of their understanding of the concepts. (3) Group Interest, 
who failed to rely upon any such far-reaching concepts, yet they were able to evaluate the 
political parties and their candidates in terms of their expected favorable or unfavorable 
treatment of different social groups—e.g. they disliked the Democratic Party was because it 
helped Negroes too much. (4) Nature of the Times, who invoked some policy considerations 
in their evaluation, yet were unable to base their evaluation on substantial societal or historical 
categories and only related parties or candidates to momentary occurrences or personal 
interests. (5) No Issue Content, which included people whose evaluation of parties and 
candidates did not provide any reference to policy preferences whatsoever. Sometimes, 
members of this group said that they were loyal to parties or candidates but had no idea what 
policy the parties or the candidates stood for.  
 The significance of Converse’s work lies in its treatment of the ideological judgments 
as evaluations of political preferences and policy positions. In doing so, he set up a new way 
of using the word ideology: it no longer referred to abstract, grand political visions, but rather 
to a set of policy preferences commonly found in a continuum of left vs. right or liberal vs. 
conservative politics. Observing the usage of the word ‘ideology’ in a century history of the 
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American Political Science Review, and especially with regard to the impact of Converse’s 
work, Kathleen Knight summarizes:  
 
Although the core definition of ideology as a coherent and relatively stable set of 
beliefs or values has remained constant in political science over time, the 
connotations associated with the concept have undergone transformation. In the 
nineteenth century, ideology connoted attachment to values of liberal democracy, and 
to be an “ideologue” was to support “the rights of man” against an absolutist state. 
The implication of being unrealistically dedicated to those ideas was added by 
Napoleon and later by Marx. In the first half of the twentieth century, as the fights 
against fascism and communism took center stage, ideology came to connote any 
belief system. Democratic ideology was contrasted with totalitarianism, as good 
against evil. The image of Hitler and his followers as ideologues extraordinaire was 
imprinted in the public mind, perhaps to be resurrected at the opportune moment. 
But, at least as apparent in the pages of the Review, the connotation of irrational 
commitment to a set of ideas faded with the internal anticommunist crusade and the 
(academic) furor over the “end of ideology.” The behavioral revolution reinforced 
the concept of ideology as a “belief system” and relieved the concept of remaining 
negative connotations (Knight, 2006: 625). 
 
 While relieving the concept of ideology from non-rational connotations, scholars 
observed the reemergence of irrational, uncompromised, and emotionally charged political 
behaviors, which were now driven by religions. This phenomenon was rather unexpected 
since on the one hand the grand-thesis of twentieth century social sciences was the prophecy 
of the rationality of modern civilization and the wane of myths and religions. On the other 
hand, policy makers were highly optimistic about the democratic developments and cultural 
secularizations that they hoped would bring a prospective new world order, while on the other 
hand denouncing religions as among the obsolete remnants of bygone civilizations. However, 
as an astute sociologist of religious studies—who happened to be the supporter of the 
secularization thesis—clearly shows, the accurate description of the situation is rather the de-
secularization of the world: 
 
The world today, with few exceptions, is as furiously religious as it ever was, and in 
some places more so than ever. This means that the whole body of literature by 
historians and social sciences loosely labeled ‘secularization theory’ is essentially 
mistaken (Berger, 1999: 2) 
 
Thought-provokingly, a French sociologist Gilles Kepel calls the phenomena ‘the revenge of 
God’: after being denounced as negative elements in modern human history and in many 
places prohibited from public spheres, religions came in from the cold in the 1970s and 
conquered  centers of world political power from America, to Israel, to the Vatican, to Iran. In 
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1976 in America, a Baptist priest Jimmy Carter was elected president, apparently to wash 
away the sins of the Watergate scandal of the previous administration, and the press did notice 
that in this year there was a rise of religion in US politics. In 1977, the conservative Likud 
Party won the Israeli election and chose Menachem Begin as prime minister, who fostered the 
prominence of Jewish religious orthodoxy in the country’s politics. In 1978, the Polish 
Cardinal Karl Wojtyla was elected Pope John Paul II, and the Catholic religion witnessed the 
growing dominant of the integriste wing that managed to overcome the internal uncertainty 
caused by the 1968 protest movement. In 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini, the supreme spiritual 
leader returned to Tehran and initiated the first ever religious revolution in modern history 
(Kepel, 1994).  
 So prevalent and intense was the resurgence of religions in political affairs, that 
Samuel Huntington was led to launch his famous thesis of the ‘clash of civilization.’ There 
are five factors, Huntington wrote, that should make us believe that religions are the next 
source of conflict on international politics. Firstly, the differences between cultures, traditions 
and religions are real, sometimes beyond compromise, and not negotiable. Secondly, thanks to 
the rapid development of communication and transformation technology, the world has 
become a smaller place, and people with different cultures, traditions and religions will be 
increasingly involved in interactions, tensions and eventually conflicts. Since the interactions 
among peoples of different civilizations enhance the civilization-consciousness of people, 
this, in turn, invigorates differences and animosities  that are thought to stretch back deep into 
history. Thirdly, the steady progress of economic development has weakened local and 
national identities, and pushed younger well-educated generations of believers to unite in 
civilizational levels. Fourthly, the emergence of the non-western (Confucian, Hindu, Muslim, 
and Japanese) civilizations has started to challenge the dominance of the West in world 
affairs. Fifthly, religions have proven to be uncompromising identities: one can certainly have 
mixed race or ethnicity, and hold double citizenships, but surely they could only have one 
religion. Finally, the religions increasingly also influence economic organizations, activities 
and networking that produces economic regionalism, which facilitates people to think in 
dichotomies—us vs. them—in economic and business activities (Huntington, 1993). 
 However, many political scientists as well as scholars from other disciplines reject 
Huntington’s claim that conflicts between religions—especially Christianity and Islam—will 
dominate global political affairs, though they possibly agree with his six propositions. A 
methodologically more rigorous study on the role of religion in politics, and with more 
realistic findings, was provided by Norris and Inglehart. Analyzing statistical data from eighty 
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countries around the globe during a twenty  year period, the authors examined six hypotheses 
on the topic and draw six conclusions. Firstly, the religious values hypothesis, in which 
religiosity is the result of one’s formative years of experience. Moreover, the data showed that 
people who live in low levels of economic development and other human development 
indexes are more religious than those who live in more affluent and secure environments. 
Secondly, the religious cultures hypothesis, in which societies tend to follow the long lasting 
religious traditions rooted in their histories, with developments in the economy and education 
having the capacity to affect these trends. This point in particular counters Huntington’s 
thesis—which claims that democracy is the crux that differentiates the Western and Muslim 
civilizations—by providing data that shows the disjunction is not one of democracy but rather 
of gender equality, and that the main source of difference is not clashing religious values but 
rather disparities in economy and education. Thirdly, the religious participation hypothesis, in 
which the research found that the scale of religious beliefs are not necessarily parallel with 
religious participation.  This is the case, for example, in some societies, such as Western 
Europe, in which church attendance is low but beliefs in religious ideas—God, the afterlife, 
Heaven and Hell—is still quite high. Some Muslim societies like Iran and Turkey also show 
high appreciations of religious values accompanied by low participation in religious worship. 
Whereas in various other societies, from Ireland in Europe, Nigeria in Africa to India in Asia, 
high participation in religious activities is also the result of social norms and networks instead 
of religious values alone. Fourthly, the civic engagement hypothesis, in which it found that 
participation in religious activities has a positive correlation with social activisms, whether in 
the form of joining religious organizations, participating in civil society groups or support for 
political parties. Especially in post-industrial societies, belonging to religious organizations 
accurately predicts the support for conservative politics. Fifthly, the religious market 
hypothesis, which says that religiosity is like market, it will increase in plural societies and 
where the state regulations are minimal. Norris and Inglehart disprove this hypothesis by 
showing that religiosity is high in religiously homogeneous societies where religions are in 
line with the degree of state regulation. Finally, the demographic hypothesis, in which the 
study concludes that the level of religious population in the globe is steadily increasing, not as 
a results of proselytizing but because the secular societies of post-industrial countries have 
lower and more constant birth rates while religious societies of rural countries are growing 
faster (Norris and Inglehart, 2004).  
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1.6.2. The Ideology of Islamist Political Party 
 It is interesting to note, in this connection, that while political studies in general 
perceive ideological behaviors in politics as being in conflict with rational ones, early party 
studies treated ideology as being among the sources of party rational behavior. The seminal 
work of Anthony Downs, The Economic Theory of Democracy (1957), laid the ground in 
analyzing how party leaders use ideology rationally to articulate public political aspirations 
and attract their support. Assuming that party’s ultimate objective is being elected to public 
office, and that the voters hardly have the capability to thoroughly compare policy alternatives 
offered by competing parties, Downs suggests that adopting ideological rhetoric is the most 
rational way for party leaders to attract public support. On the one hand, it helps the public to 
understand easily what the party stands for by summarizing its detailed programs into general 
propositions; and on the other hand, it will also help the potential voters to differentiate one 
party from the others (Downs, 1957: Chapter 7).  
 Combined with of the theories of Converse (1964), Downs’ study initiated what is 
known as a ‘spatial theory’ of party ideology, which placed party ideologies as positions 
along linear continuum, commonly referred to as left vs. right. The former indicate 
preferences for loose social norms combined with high state participation in politics, while the 
latter prefers strict social norms and minimum state involvement in the economy. With regard 
to the rationality of party ideological behavior, scholars hold different assumptions. Some 
follow Downs’ line, assuming that a party’s ultimate objective is to win elections and assume 
positions in public office, therefore the party will easily change their ideological in 
accordance with the changing moods of voters. In other words, these scholars believe that 
party ideological positions are merely instrumental to other, more substantial ends, i.e. that of 
being elected to public office. Yet other scholars make a different assumption, which sees 
party ideological positions as direct results of their leaders’ ideological preferences, since 
party leaders and activists are commonly more ideological than their followers, and it is this 
ideological commitment that led them into party activism in the first place. Therefore, 
according to this group, pursuing certain policies is the ultimate goal of political parties, while 
wining elections and taking public office are merely instrumental. Trying to overcome this 
antagonism, Strom-Mueller proposes a ‘unified theory’ of party behavior, which takes 
elections to be the immediate objective and it is instrumental to either office orientation or 
policy orientation. 
 And what about religious parties? Do they also change policy positions arbitrarily, or 
pursue them consistently? Before proceeding to answer this question it is worth noting that 
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religious elements play an important role in party behaviors and competitions. In their 
pioneering research on party alignments, which found that parties in Western politics are 
rooted in old social competitions during the Industrial Revolution, Lipset and Rokan also note 
that religion was among the factors that created political cleavages. Religions provided values 
and identities that influence and structure people’s political preferences (Lipset and Rokan, 
1966: 26-33). Consistent with this notion,  a world wide survey by Lijphart on elections in 
four countries—Canada, Belgium, South Africa, and Switzerland—found that religion is the 
strongest factor in influencing political cleavages in those countries—the second one being 
language, the third being social class (Lijphart, 1979).  
 In relation to the ideological and policy position of religious parties, the first data 
available is a world-wide survey conducted by Keneth Janda, which included around 150 
parties. Although it was difficult to measure and only less than 50 percent of the parties were 
coded on religious items, Janda found that,, when politically relevant, religion is a powerful 
indicator of party support. Moreover, parties with strong support from religious cleavages, 
although they operate in different societal and political settings, show similar patterns of 
behavior: they exhibit stronger opposition to secularization than other political parties with 
non-religious bases of support (Janda, 1989). Other more specific studies on Catholic parties 
in Europe also support the suggestion that religious ideology can structure political behaviors. 
A cross-national survey provided evidence that party governments in Catholic countries in 
western and southern Europe exhibit similar patterns in pursuing welfare policies. This meant 
that Catholicism structured their political preferences (Castles, 1994). Similarly, Kersbergen’s 
and Becker’s study on Christian democracy in the Netherlands showed that religious 
ideology—and not socialism—is the strongest force behind welfare policies in the country 
(Kersbergen and Becker, 1988).  
 Exploring the wider picture of Christian Democratic parties, Jonasson suggests that 
the influence of religious ideology is more encompassing than the conventional discussions of 
party ideology describe. Religious ideologies are not only influential for Christian Democratic 
parties in formulating policy preferences, but also in structuring how the parties develop their 
organizations. One the one hand, the parties intend to reform the society following the 
Catholic religious doctrines, and therefore they set up organizational structures and 
mechanisms in which the commitment to religious values is of paramount importance. On the 
other hand, in order to gain broader support from the masses in elections—that would enable 
them to take public office and implement policies—the parties develop pragmatic external 
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networking, by developing extra-political organizations in order to socialize their missions to 
the society and to build coalitions with other political parties (Jonasson, 2004: 420-444).  
 It is this double characteristic of party behavior—internally resembling a mass-
integration party while externally resembling a catch-all party—that Jonasson also found 
among Islamist parties. In a similar way to their Christian counterparts, on the one hand, 
Islamist parties organize their internal networks following strict religious lines. They require 
certain religious values of their activists and members, and collecting as many votes as 
possible and wining elections are not the ultimate objectives, but rather the promotion of 
religious values. On the other hand, since the religious calling is universal, addressed to all 
people regardless of their race, cultural background or economic strata, the parties also appeal 
for support from all segments in the society. She concludes that this peculiar feature is a direct 
result of the influence of religious ideology (Jonasson, 2004: 468). 
 Jonasson’s conclusions are very informative in understanding the unique pattern of 
behaviors of the religious political parties which she studied. However, her theory is 
problematic if we consider a wider application or the wider context of party behavior. Firstly, 
her conclusions suggest that the influence of religious ideology is exogenous, i.e. that the 
ideology is fixed and affects the parties’ behavior from the outside, or that the ideology 
produces the organizational structures and behaviors. Literatures on party behaviors provide 
mixed evidences on the relations between political preferences—i.e. ideology—and actual 
political behaviors. There are researches that show that preferences influence behavior, yet 
there are equally many works which suggest that what happens is not exogenous influences of 
fixedly formulated preferences on political actors who passively adopted them, but rather a 
strategic action of creative actors to adopt and adapt the preferences to given opportunities. In 
this way, the actual behaviors oftentimes reflect more the structure of the opportunities rather 
than the political preferences. A telling example is found in party behavior in elections, in 
which—at the first glance—it seems that electoral strategies are derivative of electoral 
objectives which are defined by the party’s political preferences. Closer observation, 
however, reveals that electoral strategies and techniques are structured not only by party 
objectives, but by strategies and techniques of other rival parties. Therefore, what one sees as 
ideological party behavior may well in fac bet strategic behavior under the influence of 
opportunities created by inter-party competition (Aranson, Hinich, Ordershook, 1974).  
 Secondly, she observed that institutional contexts played no significant role in 
affecting the behavior of the Islamist parties which she studied. On this point, Jonasson 
assumes that the political institutions in which Islamist parties operate are given and static. 
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From the point of view of the democratization process, institutions are very dynamic in that 
they have a wide range of possible conditions both in terms of the variety of their structures 
and the degree of their stability and effectiveness. If one confines her observation only to 
political institutions in Jordan, Turkey and Pakistan, and takes  these institutions to be given 
and static, then Jonasson’s conclusion that the influences of institutions is far weaker than 
ideology in affecting Islamist parties’ behaviors is sound. However, if one widens the 
perspective to the comparative context of democratization it will become clear that political 
institutions in those three countries are weak, ineffective, unstable and un-institutionalized. 
Students of democratization characterize the degree of institutionalization of the political 
system as a fundamental element in measuring the degree of democracy. Some indicators of 
the level of institutionalization may be the parties’ roots in society, the level of moderate 
inter-party competition, the legitimacy of elections as the only way to power, and the stability 
and effectiveness of parties’ organizations (Mainwaring and Scully, 1995). Those three 
countries—as Jonasson explores extensively—exhibit strong characteristics of 
authoritarianism, paternalism and clientelism, which indicate the low degree of 
institutionalization of the political systems. From this insight, Jonasson’s findings may well 
be read from the opposite direction: the fact that the behaviors of Islamist parties appear 
ideological, is not because their ideology is all-encompassing, but rather because the existing 
institutions are weak and ineffective. In the context of political institutions in Indonesia, 
which have undergone progressive reform and institutionalization in the last decade, we can 
expect a different impact upon Islamist party behavior.  
 
1.6.3. The Institutional Factors: Douglas North’s Cognitive Institutionalism 
 In order to analyze the influence of ideology on party behavior in the context of 
democratizing political institutions, this research applies the new-institutionalism approach 
from the American economist and Noble Prize laureate Douglas C. North. In the literature on 
new Institutionalism, North is known as a proponent of an historical approach to 
institutionalism, which underlines the importance of historical sequences of human actions, 
i.e., actions and decisions taken in previous times which influence and bind subsequent actors 
in taking actions and making decisions (Hall and Rose, 1996; Steinmo 2003; Peters, 2005). 
More specifically, North’s theory explores institutions from the cognitive science perspective, 
which elaborates the impacts of institutions on human understandings and behaviors.  
 North defines institutions as “humanly devised constraints that shape human 
interaction”. Throughout history human beings have needed institutions to stabilise their life 
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as well as to structure the incentives for interactions, in society, in politics and in the 
economy. In everyday activities, it is institutions that provide guidelines for regularity, from 
greeting friends in the streets, driving a car, shopping in the supermarket, attending religious 
ceremonies or burying the dead. In the economy, the regularity of all sorts of economic 
activities from bartering, retail, banking, the stock exchange and monetary trading are enabled 
by institutions. And in politics, the various political activities from state administrative 
bureaucracy, to political persuasion and mobilisation in election campaigns, to lobbying 
behind closed doors, are all conducted under institutional arrangements.  In sort, institutions 
define and limit the choices of individuals (North, 1990, 3). 
At the core of North’s theory, institutions play two fundamental roles: i.e. as rules of 
the game and as a system of incentive distribution. The former means that institutions regulate 
actors’ behaviors, specifying what they can and cannot do. In this way, institutions reduce 
uncertainty for interactions, transactions and collaborations, by providing information on the 
range of what actors are allowed to do. Such information is substantial in helping actors to 
calculate what sort transactions they may undertake and with whom. Without institutions, it 
would be very costly to conduct interactions, transactions and collaborations because one 
would need to spend time and effort to get to know about potential partners. And without such 
information, transactions and collaborations are unlikely to take place because it would be 
unlikely that rational actors would proceed on the basis of pure speculation. The latter (system 
of incentives distributions), meanwhile, points to the ability of institutions to provide stable 
and sustainable rules under which actors may conduct exchanges. The stability of the 
exchanges is guaranteed by institutions’ capacity to provide regular and consistent rules and 
enact sanctions for transgressions; while sustainability is provided by the fact that under 
regular and consistent rules actors can formulate long-term strategies and maximize their 
gains (North, 1990: Chapter 4).  
Furthermore, North classifies institutions into formal an informal categories. The 
former have well-defined rules with a variety of scope and specification, from constitutions, 
to statutes and common laws, to specific bylaws, and finally to individual contracts. Formal 
institutions can, in turn, be divided into three categories: politic, which broadly defines the 
hierarchical structure of polity, its basic decisional structure, and the explicit characteristics of 
its agenda control; economy, which defines property rights, i.e. the rights over the use of and 
the income to be derived from property, as well as the ability to alienate an asset or a 
resource; and contract, which contains specific provisions of agreement in exchanges (North, 
1990: 47).  
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Informal institutions are conventions, codes of conduct, norms of behavior, and so on, 
which have arisen to coordinate "repeated human interaction" (1990: 40). While formal 
institutions can be created overnight, informal institutions develop and change incrementally. 
In general, informal rules of the game evolved from human culture, i.e. from the accumulation 
of knowledge, values and other factors that influence human behavior transmitted from one 
generation to the next through teachings and imitations. Referring to the abundance of  
literature on this topic in anthropology, North points out that in pre-modern societies, where 
there were no states and other formal institutional arrangements, informal rules provided an 
explanation for the regularity and stability of the societies (1990: 37-38).  
 According to North, the difference between formal and informal institutions is one of 
degree rather than substance, in which the former are more rigid and codified while the latter 
are more fluid and casual. These two dimensions of institutions are also complementary in 
their functions. On the one hand, formal institutions may develop from informal practices in 
order to make them more effective and reliable by reducing the cost of information, 
monitoring and enforcement. There are countless real world examples in which laws, 
regulations and institutions are derived from informal practices prevalent in society (1990: 
46ff). In the same vein, on the other hand, informal institutions also have the capacity to 
substitute the formal rules of the game whenever the latter become too rigid and are unable to 
guarantee regularity and sustainability of interactions and transactions. There are equally 
abundant instances among economic and political actors in which informal negotiations and 
deals are used to overcome deadlocks that are unresolved by existing formal regulations 
(North & Denzeu, 1994). 
 In this research, North’s conception of the roles of institutions and the inter-relations 
between the formal and informal elements of institutions are applied to scrutinize PKS 
behavior under the simultaneous influence of ideology and institutions. In this case, I take 
ideology as a sort of informal institution that structures repeated human behaviors. 
Furthermore, I follow Hinich & Munger who define political ideology as: “a worldview that 
explains three major topics of human collective life: ethics or what is good and what is bad; 
economy or how should the society’s resources be distributed; and politics or where power 
appropriately resides”: 
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 IDEOLOGY  WHAT IS GOOD?       WHO GETS WHAT? WHO RULES? 
CAPITALISM       Individual achievement    Distribution according            Wealthy have more  
      through work; Observance    to output                     control over goods,  
      of property rights.             services and policy 
 
COMMUNISM        Self-realization from role   Distribution according         Party represents  
        In society; Brotherhood of   to need           general will; All are  
        working class              equal, so no politics. 
 
FASCISM      Nationalism, Racial purity,   Distribution according         Corporatist view of  
       Service of fatherland                     to contribution military/         military-labor industry. 
                 economic  might of nation 
 
NEW-DEAL     Individual achievement        Distribution according          Wealthy get  
DEMOCRATIC     Through work; Self respect;    to output; progressive tax          disproportionate power;  
     Self improvement    structure to finance safety         Experts and technocrats  
        Net whose output is           correct the excesses of  
        insufficient           market processes. 
 
 
Meanwhile the rules of the game, or the institutions, in which the PKS conducts political 
behaviors are democratic institutions especially party laws, electoral laws, and the party 
system. Party Laws are regulations issued by the government to regulate political parties, 
addressing issues such as the formation of political parties, how parties should be organized, 
what sort of funding sources they may pursue, what actions are forbidden and what sanctions 
may apply to transgressions (Janda, 2002). Electoral Laws, refers to the regulation of 
elections which specifies, among other things, the schedule of elections, who is in  charge of 
the election, who is eligible to participate, who oversees the events, etc. Electoral Laws also 
specifies the ‘electoral system’ or the method by which votes are collected by parties in 
elections, and how they are translated into seats in parliament. There are many types of 
electoral system adopted in different countries across the world, but in general those systems 
can be classified into three basic categories: majoritarian systems, also known as winner 
takes all systems, in which the party which collects the most votes in an electoral district wins 
the contest and all the allocated seats; proportional representation (PR) system in which a 
party will receive seats according to the percentage of its votes; and a mixed system, in which 
the two systems are adopted simultaneously at different levels or in different rounds of 
elections (see Balis & Masicotte, 1996). Party system refers to the pattern of interactions of 
political parties operated in a given country. Classical theories derived from the experiences  
of advanced democracies point to the number of parties and the distance of their ideologies as 
the determinants: the greater the number of parties and the wider the distance of their 
ideologies the weaker the system will be, and vice versa (Sartori, 1976). Whereas 
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contemporary theories based on observations of new democracies propose that the stability of 
the party system depends on its degree of institutionalization, indicated by: (i) parties’ roots in 
society (so that parties would change in every election); (ii) parties’ acknowledgement of 
elections as the sole procedure to power; (iii) moderate inter-party competition; (iv) degree of 
parties’ organizational stability (Mainwaring, 1995). 
  The findings of this research confirm North’s theoretical explanations that formal and 
informal institutions structure actors’ behavior by providing information—and thus reducing 
uncertainty—and provide stable systems of distribution of incentives. The PKS as a political 
actor utilizes both ideology and formal rules in its endeavor to pursue its political goals. 
North’s descriptions on the inter-substitution between formal and informal institutions are 
also supported by the findings of this study. During the early period of its participation in 
democratic politics, when regime change had just taken place and democratization had barely 
begun—and thus the political institutions were rudimentary and ineffective—the party relied 
more on its ideological vision in understanding politics, identifying its competitors, and in 
directing its political behaviors. Whereas in subsequent years, during which the 
democratization process steadily gained ground and political institutions started to function 
effectively to reduce uncertainty as well as to provide a fair and stable system of incentives 
distribution, the PKS increasingly adopted formal rules in perceiving the political 
environments and formulating their programs accordingly. 
 
1.7. The Structure of the Dissertation  
 This dissertation consists of eight chapters. Chapter I (the introduction) explains the 
background, research questions, methodology and the structure of the study.  In this chapter, I 
review previous works on the PKS as well as on Islamist parties in general and their place in 
the context of the wider discipline of party studies. I also introduce the theory of Cognitive 
Institutionalism from Douglas C. North and show how it can help to understand the structure 
of the PKS’s behavior under the simultaneous influences of ideology and institutions.  
 In Chapter II, I review the history of Islamist parties in Indonesian history, i.e. Sarekat 
Islam (1912-1929) and Masyumi (1946-1660). This chapter has a double function. On the one 
hand, it provides an introductory background to the Muslim political tradition in Indonesia, as 
well as comparative data on the political behavior of Islamist parties under the simultaneous 
influences of ideology and political institutions. On the other hand, this chapter also functions 
as a sort of “theoretical warming-up” to test the capacity of Douglas North’s theory to explain 
Islamist parties’ behaviors under the simultaneous influences of ideology and political 
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institutions. The results are convincingly consistent. Both parties tended to be cooperative, 
trusted in and relied on the formal rules of the game whenever the latter were advantageous 
for their political objectives (SI 1912-1923, Masyumi 1946-1955). Yet they also tended to 
distrust the same formal institutions, retreated into ideology in understanding the political 
environment, and became uncooperative and reactionary whenever the existing system was 
disadvantageous to their aims (SI 1923-1929; Masyumi 1955-1960).  
  Chapter III deals with the genesis and the development of the PKS, starting from the 
underground Tarbiyah movement in the 1970s and 1980s, its adoption of the methods of the 
Egyptian Muslim Brothers’, its success in taking over student campuses and organizations in 
early 1990s,  and finally its metamorphosis into a political party after regime change in 1998. 
This chapter also reviews three competing theories on the genesis of Tarbiyah movement. In 
retrospect, North’s theory on the substitution of formal and informal institutions can explain 
the PKS history quite neatly. When the political environment was hostile toward Muslim 
politics in 1970s and 1980s, it operated in a clandestine and exclusive fashion. Yet when 
Suharto leaned toward the Muslim community—as a compensation for his souring relations 
with the military—Muslim groups started to open their activities to the public; after the 
regime changed and politics became democratized, the PKS joined the political system; 
finally, when democracy started to be institutionalized, it adopted democratic discourses. 
 Chapter IV discusses the relation between the dynamics of the PKS’s political 
ideology—its conceptions of ethics, economy and politics—and the development of 
Indonesian political institutions. It is interesting to find that the development of political 
institutions in Indonesia, from the authoritarian regime dominated by the military apparatus 
and restrictive toward civil liberties, into the democratic political system, was paralleled by 
the PKS’s increasingly more open and cooperative approach to politics. 
 Chapter V focuses on the PKS’s behavior and its organization. A political party is 
never a unitary actor. There are three different elements within each party, with their own 
logic and mechanisms: (i) the party on the ground, which represents the idealist face of party; 
(ii) the party in public office,  which represents the realist, power hungry, element of party, 
and; (iii) the party’s central office, the task of which is to balance the two conflicting 
elements. This internal tension has caused ambiguity in the organizational behaviors of the 
PKS. Driven by the party on the ground, and under the influence of ideological inspirations, it 
applies religious-moralist ideas in the party organization, in which party leaders are seen as 
moral and religious leaders who command religious and moral authority over the party 
members. Yet under the pressure of the party in public office, in order to achieve success in 
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political competition, it develops rational and pragmatic organizational structures and 
mechanisms, such open membership, democratic leaders and candidate elections, and the 
mobilization and empowerment of female activists in the party workforce.  
 Chapter VI analyzes the PKS’s behavior in elections, focusing on the antagonism 
between party electoral objectives, following its ideological inspirations, and the logic of 
party competition as a result of the democratization of political institutions. Under the 
influence of its ideology, the party perceived elections as just another event to communicate 
their Islamist political visions to the Indonesian public. This was the dominant tone during the 
1999 election. In 2004 election, however, the party shifted its rhetoric, from a party that 
promotes religious and moral reforms into ‘clean and caring’ party that advocates clean 
government and anti-corruption, and is willing to support people in difficult times. The new 
strategy was adopted when the PKS started to understand the mechanisms of democratic 
politics and became confident of benefiting from them. 
 Chapter VII explores the PKS’s behavior in government, both in the legislature and in 
the executive. The party’s behavior in the legislature clearly indicates its internal dynamics In 
the former period of the legislature (1999-2004) its members were known for their almost 
excessively strict commitment to moral ideals in their political activities, such as refusing 
bribes, kickbacks or other unofficial funds. In the current period (2004-2009) when many of 
its younger politicians entered the parliament, the PKS MPs started to do politics as usual, 
making coalitions and undertaking other political deals and maneuvers. A similar situation has 
arisen with regard to the PKS’s involvement in the executive branch of government. During 
Abdurrahman Wahid’s presidency (2000-2002), a PKS Minister was staunchly pursued in 
order  to eradicate corruption in his department, and this allegedly caused him to be sacked 
from the cabinet. Meanwhile, under the Yudhoyono presidency, the party has received three 
ministerial positions and has eagerly supported unpopular government policies such as raising 
the price of oil and oil exploration in spite of strong protests from its supporters. 
 Chapter VIII summarizes the study’s findings and conclusions on the rationality of the 
political behavior of an Islamist party that participates in a democratic political system. 
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CHAPTER II 
POLITICAL ISLAM IN INDONESIAN HISTORY:  
IDEOLOGY, INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT AND THE POLITICAL BEHAVIOR OF 
SAREKAT ISLAM (1912-1929) AND MASYUMI (1945-1960) 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
After introducing what I call ‘cognitive institutionalism’ theory from Douglas North to 
analyze the influence of ideology to political behaviors of Islamist parties, this chapter applies 
the theory to analyze the history of political behaviors of two major Islamist political parties 
in Indonesian history, i.e. the Sarekat Islam (1912-1929) and Masyumi (1946-1960).  The 
focus is on the relations between ideology and institutional contexts in influencing the 
political behavior of the parties. Applying North theoretical insights—that on the one hand 
institutions are rules of the game through which actors regulate their interactions, transactions 
and collaborations in order to make them fair and sustainable to all participants; and on the 
other hand ideology is an informal element of institutions with capacity to supplant basic 
institutional functions, especially to reduce uncertainties, whenever the formal ones failed to 
do so—this chapter shows how the influence of ideology is parallel with the dynamics of 
institutional contexts.  
The pattern is consistent for both Sarekat Islam (SI) and Masyumi. Operating in the height 
of colonial era in early decades of the 20th century, in its early years the political behavior of 
SI was cooperative when the colonial ruler—under looming threat of the World War I in 
Europe—promised greater political roles for native Indonesians. In this period, SI leaders 
interpreted Islam as socialist and democratic doctrines: that all humans are equal hence 
against capitalistic exploitations, and that the people embody the rights to chose their ruler 
hence greater political participations for native Indonesians. However, when the colonial 
policies were increasingly restrictive and repressive—after the WW I was over—SI switched 
its behaviors to be non-cooperative, adopted Pan Islamism which ultimate objectives were 
establishing universal Islamic caliphate, together with other Muslim countries launched all-
out struggle to expel colonialism and imperialism from Muslim lands.  
Similarly, the political behaviors of Masyumi evolved in the same pattern. Soon after 
Indonesian independence, Masyumi was the most significant political party, and it adopted 
Islamist ideology and wanted to implement Islamic system in the republic. During the liberal 
parliament era of 1950s, Masyumi assumed three periods of Premiership and involved in 
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almost all coalition governments. Adopting Islamist ideology notwithstanding, Masyumi 
developed proactive and liberal policies—welcome foreign capitals, recognizing de facto 
economic domination of Western and Chinese entrepreneurs, even signed a Mutual Security 
Act (MSA) with the USA—when the institutional context favored its positions. This occurred 
in the period when political parties were dominant players in Indonesian politics, during 
which the president was at odds with the military. Yet, in the second half of the 1950s, when 
the army reached an agreement with the president and dominated political affairs and push 
aside political parties, the behavior of Masyumi became reactionary, criticized government 
policies using religious and moral judgments. Eventually, some of its top leaders were 
involved in a politico-military insurgency, and the government disbanded the party. 
In summary, this chapter’s findings challenge both Jonasson’s conclusion on exogenous 
influence of ideology in Islamist parties and Huntington’s argument that Muslim political 
leaders tended to support democratic systems only when they were not in power. Different 
from Jonason’s inference, this chapter proves that although ideology did motivate and drive 
Sarekat Islam and Masyumi political orientations, the actual behaviors significantly reflected 
the dynamics of institutional contexts as well as inter-party competitions. Different 
institutional settings made the Islamist parties to interpret the same ideology differently. And 
unlike Huntington apprehension, this chapter provides evidences that Islamist political leaders 
tended to support democracy whenever it was advantageous to them, either when they were 
inside or outside the government, and showed deviant behaviors when the democratic 
institutions were detrimental to their politics.  
 
2. SAREKAT ISLAM (1912-1929) 
2.1. Ideology and Programs 
Sarekat Islam was the first truly national political organization, in the sense that its 
memberships and activities were cross-ethnic, cross-cultures and cross-regions. In the 
Indonesian history, the political movement officially recognized as the first national 
organization is Budi Utomo, an organization established by students of medical school in 
1908. Yet in fact, Budi Utomo’s membership was limited among Javanese aristocrats, and had 
no real mass supporters. While Sarekat Islam, facilitated by its popular ideology, was able to 
recruit supports from both the elites urban groups as well as the mass rural communities.  
According to a German historian Bernard Dahm, three critical factors contributed to 
the SI rapid development (Dahm, 1971: 40-42). Firstly, its initial mission as cooperative 
organization among the Javanese traders, and its successful boycotts of the Chinese traders in 
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Solo Central Java had attracted support from Indonesian emerging native middle class, i.e. 
merchants, professionals like medical doctors, teachers, and civil servants. Although it was a 
trading organization, the first SI political move in boycotting the Chinese traders had attracted 
supports from other vocational groups since they perceived it as a heroic and nationalist 
political action. This was because the Chinese community drastically changed their public 
behavior after the China Revolution in 1911. They started to see themselves as a great nation, 
equal to the Europeans, and behaved like the Europeans and undermined indigenous 
Indonesians. This was not only annoyed the native communities, but also insulted the elites 
and aristocrats. Therefore, albeit the fact that those elites and professionals were 
indifference—even hostile—toward Islam, they appreciated SI political maneuver as heroic, 
and lent their supports to the organization.  
Secondly, its Islamic rhetoric had strong appeals to Muslim leaders and communities. 
In the second decade of the twentieth century the Hajis or Muslims who performed the hajj 
pilgrim to Mecca had already became dominant local leaders in many part of the country. In 
the previous time the Dutch treated Muslim community with hostility and oppression. Islam 
had for long time become the symbol of local patriotism against the foreigners, and the 
Christian Dutch, and it had caused a trauma among generations of colonial administrators, 
because since their early arrival in the 17th century, they encountered series of Islam-inspired 
local resistances, virtually across the archipelago from Sumatra, to Java, to Sulawesi. The 
most dramatic was the Java War 1825-1830 led by a millenarian King Diponegoro from 
Yogyakarta, which claimed more than 8000 casualties among European, and some 200,000 
among Indonesians (Ricklefs, 2004: 153). However, since Christian Snouck Hurgronje 
became advisor for the colony, the Dutch started to change its perception and attitude toward 
Islam and Muslims. He was able to convince the colony’s administrators that Islam has no 
hierarchical structures, and that there is no Pope in Islam. Therefore, Hurgronje advised, that 
the government should allow and even protect Islam as ritual systems and activities, and it 
must be suppressed only when it turned into political activities (Buskirk, 1975: 84-87). As a 
result, the Government allowed Muslims to observe their religious rituals including the hajj. 
In Dham’s record, since 1900, thousands of Indonesians went to Mecca, for example in 1914 
the total number of pilgrims from Indonesian was 28,427 with 19.784 were from Java when 
the total number of the pilgrims from around the world was only 58,855 (Dahm, 1971 : 41). 
And it was these Hajis who commanded religious, social and political influence among its 
community who were among the core supporters of SI. 
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Thirdly, its millenarian rhetoric—of the advent of the just prince that will save the 
nation with divine power—had also attracted people of rural areas. During the last century, 
amid terrible economic and social conditions, the Javanese rural communities had developed a 
millenarian doctrine of the arrival of the Just King (Ratu Adil), who would save the nation 
with divine power. The source of such a myth was a prophecy written by a medieval king of 
Kediri in East Java, named Jayabaya, which foresight the coming of distressful period in Java, 
when people lived in unbearable sufferings, then the just king named Heru Cokro would come 
and save the history. Coincidentally, the SI leader and top figure was Tjokroaminoto (read: 
Cokro-aminoto), whose name was strongly reminded the mass to the promised just king. And 
SI activists did exploit the fact enthusiastically to socialize the organization among rural 
community. This myth had fostered SI’s popularity among the mass, and the absence of this 
mythical factor had prevented previous organizations to become real mass organizations. The 
harshness of the Dutch colonial policies during the 19th century had triggered massive 
disappointments at all levels of Indonesian society. These mounting resentments were 
inarticulate until the turn of the 20th century. And SI became the first organization and 
movement that met this long awaited needs for political articulation and expression (Kahin, 
1952: 44) 
As is expressed by its name, Sarekat Islam adopted Islam as its political ideology. To 
recall the definition from Hinich and Munger, ideology contains philosophical principles and 
guidelines for party pertaining ethics or what is good, economy or who get what, and politics 
or who rules. In its two decades of history, Islam had been the worldview of SI and the source 
of guidelines for political behaviors. 
 In relation to the ethical value or what is good and what is bad of the society, SI 
leaders perceived that Islam provided answers for Indonesians’ important questions with 
regards to the meaning, the condition, and the future of their collective life. The SI leaders 
grew in the height of the colonial era when massive economic exploitations, political 
oppressions and social and cultural discriminations occurred.  In such historical contexts, the 
highest moral values for SI were the reversal of those unequal conditions, and into complete 
equal statuses and rights, especially between native Indonesians and Europeans. And SI found 
that Islam provides ethical sources for human equality, in which all human beings, regardless 
of their ethnicity, nationality, culture and ideology, are equal in front of God and are counted 
upon his deeds and behavior rather than their origins (Amelz, 1954: 77).  
On economy, SI perceived that Indonesian people should control and received benefits 
from the county’s economic resources, and put an end to exploitations by foreigners. In his 
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speech at the first national congress, Tjokroaminoto fierily decried: “it is not decent to regard 
Indonesia as a milk cow which is given food only because of its milk” In the Declaration of 
Principles 1917, SI stated that it fought ‘sinful capitalism which is the origin of the present 
deteriorating economic condition of the largest part of Indonesian population.’ The principle 
of economy for SI was to distribute the economic resources equally, in which the powerful 
assists the weak and the needy (Noer, 1973: 113). SI economic view was Islamic socialism. In 
his book Islam and Socialism (1923) Tjokroaminoto wrote that since the earliest history of 
Islam, socialism has been known and practiced by Muslims.  
 
Since the time when our prophet Muhammad established a state, he governed the state 
according to socialist principles, in which the land was owned by the state. The 
principle was also adopted in the subsequent Muslim governments such as Mongol 
Indian dynasty… In this regard Muslim has reached the highest level of socialism 
based not upon man-made rules but God’s rules. Since the time of the Prophet, Islam 
has regulated the principles of economy, in which it prohibits usury and hence it 
against capitalism (Amelz, 1954: 143-144). 
 
 Meanwhile on politics, with regard to the question of where the power properly 
resides, Sarekat Islam perceived that the highest authority is in the hands of God the 
omniscience. However, Islam also gives equal rights for all people to interpret God’s laws, 
and therefore Muslim rulers should consult the people in adopting and implementing God’s 
laws. Tjokroaminoto made this very clear that: “if we really are Muslims, who understand and 
consistently follow the teachings of Islam, we must be democrats” (Amelz, 1954: 155). 
 Islam as a political ideology, as understood by the SI leaders was articulated in the 
organizations’ programs. The 1913 statute stated that the aims of the organization were: (a) 
To promote commercial enterprise, (b) To aid members who had got into difficulties through 
no fault of their own, (c) To foster the spiritual and material interests of Indonesians, and (d) 
To further the cause of Islam by combating misconceptions, spreading knowledge of its true 
precept. (Amelz, 1954: 96). And in 1917 Declaration of Principles, those objectives were 
elaborated into eight basic programs (Noer, 1973: 113-115): 
a. Politics: SI demanded the establishment of the regional levels of the People’s Council 
(Volksraad) and transform it into a real representative body with legislative powers; 
implementations of electoral suffrage for all men over eighteen years; and the 
abolition of mandatory labor and travel permits. 
b. Education: SI demanded the abolition of discrimination in schools’ admission; 
mandatory education for children under fifteen years of age; the increase of the 
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number of schools and improvement of the educational institutions at all levels; the 
development of law and medical studies at university; and scholarships for 
Indonesians to study abroad. 
c. Religion: SI demanded the abolition of any regulation that hampered the propagation 
of Islam, government salary for Muslim clerics, subsidies for Islamic educational 
institutions, and recognition of Islamic holidays. 
d. Judiciary: SI demanded the separation of judiciary from executive power; 
establishment of a single unitary judicial body for all populations in the country; and 
special assistance and protections for the poor and the needy. 
e. Agriculture: SI demanded the abolition of landed estate; and the improvement of 
agricultural irrigations. 
f. Industry: SI demanded the nationalization of industries which monopolize and supply 
essential services and commodities, such as textile and paper factories, industries 
which produce iron materials and means of communications, and enterprises which 
control the distribution of water, electricity and gas. 
g. Taxation: SI demanded the introduction of proportional tax, and the implementation of 
taxes on estate profits. 
h. Social services: SI demanded for governmental assistance for cooperative societies; 
eradication for social vices such as opium consumption, gambling, prostitution, child 
labor, and support for workers’ rights and the increase of free medical clinics. 
  
2.2. Institutional Context 
The first fundamental institutional context as a backdrop of the emergence of SI was the 
implementation of the Ethical Policy by the Dutch colonial power. This was a historical 
turning point, in which the Dutch launched proactive initiatives of welfare programs to 
improve the living standard of native Indonesians. However, there were two basic dilemmas 
in the policy, in both political and economic level. Politically, there were two different 
motives in launching the policy, i.e. humanitarian and capitalist visions. On the one hand, 
humanitarian drives to take proactive measures in improving Indonesians’ social and 
economic conditions were pushed strongly by the Dutch liberals and humanists. A Dutch 
writer named Dauwesdeker a.k. Multatuli wrote a novel Max Havelaar (1860) narrated the 
sufferings of the Javanese people under the Agricultural System policy in the 19th century. In 
1899 a Dutch lawyer who spent some years in Indonesia, C. Th. Van de Venter, wrote an 
article entitled “Debt of Honour”  (de Gids, 1899), in which he argues that the Dutch people 
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owed for their wealth and prosperity to the people in Indonesia,  and they had to pay for the 
debts. On the other hand, the policy also seemed to serve the interests of the Dutch businesses, 
in which the colony was increasingly perceived as a source of both labors and potential 
markets. And in order to be able to work and consume better, the Dutch had to provide 
economic stimulations to improve their economic conditions (Ricklefs, 2002: 193-94).  
 Economically, new developments in economic balance between Java and the outer 
islands caused the policy to become problematic. The initial designs of the policy were for the 
Javanese people, who suffered the most from the previous century policies, and most of the 
Ethical policy programs were implemented in Java. However, the opening of new plantations 
and explorations of natural resources had shifted the economic focus from Java to the outer 
islands. And since the financial scheme of the program was not intended as a grant but 
investment, focusing on Java would make the program unsustainable, and eventually it was 
implemented only half-heartedly. Nevertheless, it did make a difference for Indonesians, 
especially the opening of mass-education for native Indonesians and the opening of 
administrative decentralization (Cribb, 1993: 226-230). 
For the first point, there were two different educational schemes the government 
developed, the elite and mass educations. The reformation on the educational system for the 
elite Indonesians started in 1900 when The Training Schools for Native Officials 
(Opleidingschole voor Indlandische Abtenaren, OSVIA) were opened in three cities in Java. 
These schools were intended to train Indonesians to become civil servants. At the same year, 
schools for native doctors (School tot Opleiding van Inlandische Artsen, STOVIA) were 
established. In 1908, the modern educational system was enlarged to include the development 
of elementary Dutch Native Schools (Holandisc-Inlanderische Scholen, HIS) intended for 
elementary education for the Javanese elites. A sort of junior high schools were also 
established in 1914, the Extended Lower Education (Meer Uitgebreid Lager Onderweijs, 
MULO). The senior high schools level, the so called General Middle Schools (Algemeene 
Middelbare Scholen, AMS), was established in 1919. Finally tertiary level of educational 
institutions were established in 1920s, i.e. Technical College in Bandung and Law College in 
Jakarta (Ricklefs, 1981: 149-50). 
Those educational institutions were accessible and affordable only to Indonesian 
elites. For the non-elite Indonesians, the colonial government provided special First Class and 
Second Class schools. From 1907, the government opened village-schools in which the 
student must pay themselves and the government subsidized only if necessary. At the 
beginning the villages seemed reluctant to establish the idea of village-schools, and then the 
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government put “gentle pressures” from above to continue the program. By 1912, there were 
about 2500 village-schools. Although the educational reformation achieved much lower than 
it was initially programmed, it had enormous impacts for Indonesians. Statistically, in the first 
third decade of the 20th century, Indonesians who visited schools at any level had increased 
from 265,940 in 1900, into 1.7 millions by 1930. More significantly, it produced a new class 
of educated lower middle-class. It is this new educated generation that provided the seeds for 
nationalist movements in the country (Ricklefs, 150-51). 
The proponents of Ethical policy also advocated that in order to achieve a sustainable 
welfare improvements, a greater autonomy should be granted to the Dutch Indies, through 
gradual process of decentralization of power: from The Hague to Batavia (Jakarta), from 
Batavia to regions, and finally decentralization from Dutchmen to Indonesians. The first 
decentralization scheme was passed in 1903, and implementation was started in 1905 with the 
formation of local council for the main cities. Although these councils enjoyed only advisory 
capacity with no real representative power, and was also criticized because it consist mainly 
of the Dutch members and only small elite of native Indonesians, such bodies nurtured more 
confident for greater autonomy of the colony among native Indonesian elites. The 
decentralization program was further revised in 1922, restructuring the bureaucratic 
administrations into further details. Yet, these new laws gave no greater rights for natives in 
political affairs. Meanwhile, in 1912 the Dutch central government in the Netherlands passed 
a bill on monetary autonomy that granted the colony administrators to manage their own 
income and expenditure. This policy made colony administration became more responsive—if 
not more effective—to the developing problems, as the decisions were in the hand of field 
officers and no longer in the parliament in The Hague (Gonggong, 2001: 253-257).  
Another new and more significant institutional development was the formation of 
Volksraad, or people council, as a representative body for the Europeans and indigenous 
Indonesians in political affairs.  The idea started from a proposal from business community to 
form a committee on Indie Weerbaar (Indies Defense) a sort of part time militia composed of 
native Indonesians to help the Dutch military. The government initially rejected the idea, but 
when the shadow of WW I loomed in the European sky, it perceived the proposal as a cheap 
mass mobilization against possible external enemy. In December 1916 the Dutch parliament 
passed a bill to create a representative body for the citizens of the colony, the Volksraad, 
which main tasks were giving advices to the administrator of the colony especially on 
budgetary matters.  Volksraad also had the right to forward petitions, but had no capacity of 
legislation. The absence of legislative function of the body was—according to Minister for 
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Colonial Affairs—because legislate laws and regulations are complex tasks which needed full 
time works, while Volksraad representatives worked in the council in part time schemes (Van 
Helsdingen, 1976: 46).  
The Volksraad started its functions in May 1918, with thirty eight elected and 
appointed members. Nineteen members were elected, ten of whom were Indonesians; the 
other nineteen were appointed, five of whom were Indonesians. Although the council only 
had advisory functions, it did play as a medium of negotiation between Indonesian leaders and 
the colonial regime. Governor-general van Limburg Stirum deliberately appointed more 
radical leaders such as Tjokroaminoto and Tjipto Mangunkusumo into the council in a hope to 
bring the radical elements of Indonesian nationalist movements to the system and into 
cooperation. On the other side, the European members of the council were also dominated by 
the supporters or sympathizers of Ethical policy that joined in Netherlands-Indies Liberal 
Alliance and Dutch Socialist Workers Party (Ricklefs, 1981: 153-54). Dahm notes that the 
council served two important functions in nurturing nationalism and national unity among 
native Indonesians. Firstly, it gave a truly united and nation-wide symbol of hope for greater 
political roles and autonomy that previously existed only occasionally in individual parties. 
Secondly, the broke of WW I and its aftermath had caused many difficult communications 
between colonial administrations and The Hague, which eventually compelled the Governor 
General to seek advices to the council on more important matters, which gave to Indonesians 
self confidence and experience on national affairs (Dahm, 1971: 49-50).  
In a statement passed in November 1918, the Governor General van Limburg-Stirrum 
said that the latest world events would have equal consequences for the Netherlands and its 
Indonesian colony, and therefore the Volskraad should play more roles in working with the 
colonial administrators. This statement, known as the “November Premise,” almost 
immediately triggered responses from members of the council. The nationalists, chafed at the 
restricted competence of the council, demanded fundamental reforms of the council as well as 
the government. Tjipto Mangunkusumo demanded legislative capacity for the council, while 
Tjokroaminoto sued a motion to reform it into parliament elected from and by the people. 
Even the Bupatis, aristocrat district leaders, who hitherto were regarded as loyalists similarly 
demanded for greater roles.  
These developments sent an alarming signal to the government, which changed its 
perception toward the council from hope into doubt, and then into worry of a unitary 
nationalist resistance. As a response, the new Governor General Idenburg who was appointed 
for the third term started to thwart Volksraad from further development by proposing a 
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creation of local councils at regency levels. This law was intended to put legislative and 
representative functions in regency levels, which was easily co-opted by the government, and 
at the same time denied the chance of Volskraad  from assuming legislative functions. This 
policy was pushed further by the next Governor General Dirk Fock (1921-1926), who 
denounced Volksraad as no more than “an oligarchy of intellectuals representing only 
themselves” (Dahm, 1971: 50).  
Meanwhile simultaneously, as a result of Bolshevik Revolution, the communist 
group—led by several Dutch political activists—became more active and launched more open 
political actions that caused riots in a number of areas. In late 1917, the communist reportedly 
gathered no less than 300 sailors to be sent to Russia. And in 1918 the government started to 
crush communist activists, exiled its leader Sneevliet and arrested many other Dutch 
communist activists. In early 1919 in Surakarta Central Java, railway workers launched a 
strike demanding for a better salary, but then they started to storm into the town causing mass 
riots, attacking traditional palaces which they deemed as the embodiment of feudalism. The 
government arrested the leader, Haji Misbah, who earned a reputation as a ‘red haji’ because 
of his promotion of Islamic communism.  Another incident occurred in May, in North 
Sumatra, when a Dutch official was murdered after an SI leader, Abdul Muis, gave a speech 
in the region. Muis was soon arrested. In the following month, another more systematic 
movement was unfolded in Garut West Java after the police clashed with a group of SI local 
branch—known as Section B—that claimed a number of casualties. In this period, some 
communist groups were members of SI, and therefore the Bolshevik euphoria was also 
apparent in SI (Ricklefs, 2002: 217-220). 
Facing this situation, the newly appointed Governor General Dirk Fock (1921-1926) 
set up tighter policies by enacting strict regulations of order and tranquility. He had used his 
legal ability to create networks of regulations, by which he succeeded in prevented mass 
strikes, as well as suppressed offences in public speaking and in the press. His administrators 
never hesitate to arrest and banish just about anyone who made slight actions against 
tranquility and order in the colony. It is under the Focks term that the bonds between ethical 
policy in the Netherlands and nationalist movements in Indonesia came to an end. However, 
since the bonds had rooted so deeply among Indonesian nationalists, the latest government 
policy had caused bitter anger and frustrations (Dahm, 1971, 50-51). He even ratified very 
specific orders to guarantee that no one would disturb the colony, for instance he in 1924 
passed an order to restrict Muis movement to Java and in 1925 prohibited Tjokroaminoto and 
Agus Salim from attending SI meetings in Kalimantan.  The next administrator de Graeff 
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(1926-1931) was reportedly sympathetic to the ethical policy, however the Dutch government 
in the Netherlands as well as the Dutch community in Indonesia at the period had been 
influenced by conservative political interpretation and already developed antagonistic attitude 
toward Indonesians. Even they opened an Indology Faculty in Utrecht in 1925 purposively to 
disseminate conservative-imperialistic academic views (Noor, 1973: 203-4). 
The increasingly conservative policy by the colonial government triggered two major 
developments among indigenous Indonesians. Firstly, increasing frustrations among 
nationalist and communist groups had led the latter to launch open rebellions. In November 
1926, an uprising broke in Banten West Java, killed one European, that took the government a 
month to put an end. In January 1927, other uprisings took place in Padang and Batam in 
Sumatra, which killed another European, but were quickly crushed by the authority. Secondly, 
increasing repressions from the government and equally radical reactions from communist 
groups had led into the emergence of a new generation of nationalist political activists, who 
were better educated and inspired more by the ideals of nationalism which transcended all 
particularities and conceived Indonesia as a united whole, rather than communism which 
emphasized class struggles or Islam which gave priorities to Muslims over other believers. 
Two nationalist groups emerged almost simultaneously, one in Indonesia led by Sukarno—the 
disciple and son in law of Tjokroaminoto—and Mohammad Yamin, two in the Netherlands 
led by Mohammad Hatta and Sutan Sjahrir. This new generation of nationalist leaders would 
soon dominated Indonesian political arena and discourses of national independence until the 
Japanese arrived in 1942 and replaced the Dutch as the colonial power in the country 
(Ricklefs, 2002: 227-233). 
 
2.3. Political Behavior 
Sarekat Islam (SI, or Islamic Union) founded in 1912 by Samanhudi and H. O. S. 
Cokroaminoto was the first national political organization carrying Islamic ideology that 
appeared in the Indonesian history. The organization was originated from the Islamic 
Commerce Union (Sarekat Dagang Islam, SDI), a cooperative for Javanese batik traders 
intended to prevent the increasing activities of Chinese interlopers. In colonial time the Dutch 
employed Chinese—along with Arabs and Indians—as middlemen in its trade with 
indigenous people. In Solo, the conflict mounted into physical clashes between the Chinese 
and the Javanese, and led into the formation of SDI (Ricklefs, 1981: 158ff).  
Initially, the colonial government granted recognition for SI only as a local 
organization, and could replicate itself in various places but had no right to form a national 
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organization. However, as local SI branches developed rapidly, it became necessary to form a 
central coordinating body. In its founding year 1912, about 4,500 members were registered, 
and by 1914 there were no less than 56 local SI organizations, with total members in excess of 
366,000 people. A Central Sarekat Islam (CSI) hence was formed in 1914, with 
Tjokroaminoto in the helmet of the organization, and Abdul Muis as the vice chairman. The 
function of CSI is to coordinate SI local branches. In other words, CSI members were not 
individuals, but local SI organizations (Noer, 1973: 105).  
Under the leadership of Tjokroaminoto and Muis, CSI soon transformed itself into a 
political movement and forgot its origin as a commercial organization.  In 1915, the younger 
generations from different political orientation joined SI and were to exercise dominant roles 
in directing the organization. The first were Fachrudin and Agus Salim who had Islamic 
background in their activism, and the other were Semaun and Darsono who started their 
organizational carrier in a Marxist organization under the mentorship of the Dutch Sneevliet 
(Noer, 1973: 107-112).  
In 1916, SI held its first National Congress in Bandung. In the previous annual 
congresses, the word “national” was never used. And it was for the first time Indonesian 
nationalist organization had literally a nation-wide gathering. The congress was attended by 
no less than 80 branches from various major areas in the archipelago, not only from Java and 
Sumatra, but also from Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Maluku, Bali and Lombok (Amelz, 1954: 101). 
In this event, Tjokroaminoto explained the long term objectives of SI, i.e. the creation of 
Indonesia as a nation.  At this stage, there was no sign or indication of anti-colonial character 
in SI policies. It still saw the colonial government as the accepted status quo, and the struggle 
for political freedom for Indonesian people would be pursued through cooperation with the 
colonial power. The term “cooperation” is an important term in the history of Indonesian 
nationalist movement, referring to an approach adopted by the early generation of Indonesian 
nationalists. This is contrasted with another approach, “non-cooperation”, which was became 
the trend in the final years of the Dutch colonialism (Buskirk, 1975: 93). When the colonial 
government formed a parliament for the colony, Volksraad, in 1918, Tjokroaminoto and Muis 
were among its members in the first period (1918-1921). Already in the first year, 
Tjokroaminoto proposed a motion to transform the council into a parliament elected from and 
by the people, which motivated similar demands from loyalist district officials, the Bupatis 
(Dahm, 1971: 49-50).  
Yet in the next national congress held in Jakarta 1917, SI rhetoric became more radical 
when the leftist group of Semaun and Darsono gained more popularity, and succeeded to 
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endorse SI to declare capitalism as “sinful”, although the term referred mainly to Chinese and 
Dutch and not to indigenous Muslim traders (McVey, 1962). It was true that the leftist wing 
successfully asserted its greater influence over SI in 1917 and was a memorable event for 
historians and commentators, yet at the same year the influence of Islamic ideology was also 
increasing. Endorsed by Salim and Fachrudin, Tjokroaminoto took the leftist rhetoric on anti-
capitalism and the struggle for the proletariats, but wrapped it in Islamic vocabularies. In a 
speech at the conference, Tjokroaminoto said that Islam had become the main inspiration as 
well as opened up opportunities for Indonesians to struggle for a national independence. Later 
on, after his release from detention without trial following the abortive tiny armed rebellion of 
SI Section-B in West Java 1921, Tjokroaminoto was more enthusiastic in promoting the idea, 
and published a book entitled Islam and Socialism (1922). In the book, Tjokroaminoto 
discusses extensively about socialism and the history of Islam, and he concludes that the 
history of Islam—especially the history of the prophet Muhammad—was perfectly socialist: 
in favor of the poor, widows and orphans, and strictly prohibited usury and other excessive 
accumulation of wealth (Tjokroaminoto, 1922).  
Meanwhile, after its Dutch leaders were exiled or arrested, the leadership of the 
communist group ISDV was handed into Indonesians, especially Semaun and Darsono, and in 
May 1920 ISDV congress, they changed the organization into Communist Association of 
Indies (PKH, Perhimpunan Komunis Hindia) and later into Indonesian Communist Party 
(PKI). It was a member of SI and controlled a number of local SI branches. Internal tensions 
between Islamic and Marxist camps were soon escalating, each camp criticizing the other, and 
soon became personal enmities among SI leaders. Islamic faction accused Marxist to be 
misleading the organization from its true spirit in achieving objectives through Islamic way, 
while the latter slammed the accuser to be unrealistic in pursuing soft-approach of cooperation 
in confronting colonial oppressions. This strives were usually neutralized by Tjokroaminoto 
who put the priority on the unity of the organization over factionalism.  However, in October 
1921, while Tjokroaminoto was in detention, Islamic camp that dominated the SI central 
leadership held an Extraordinary Congress in Surabaya discussing the so called party 
discipline. The forum decided to ban double membership, and thus expelled the Marxists from 
the organization (Suradi, 1997: 50-52).   
In the following years, SI took fundamental changes on its policy.  In the national 
Conference February 1923, SI changed itself into a political party Partai Sarekat Islam (PSI, 
or Islamic Union Party). This internal reform was intended to consolidate the organization. 
Formerly, SI local branches were autonomous and SI central leadership had only capacity as 
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coordinating body, and the real policy power were in the hands of local SI leaders. The 
change was intended to vest organizational power in the hands of national leaderships, in 
order to enable them to make decisions that bound the whole organization (Amelz, 1954: 134-
137).  
Two developments marked the new phase in the history of SI (now PSI) and 
dominated its course until it was changed again, followed by a prolonged organizational crisis 
in 1929. The first was the shift into non-cooperation policy in relation with the colonial 
government. This means that PSI refused any cooperation with the government in the form of 
participation in the Volksraad, and it set its objective to achieve the independence of 
Indonesia, instead of being merely a greater autonomy. This decision was triggered by the 
government’s decision to exclude Tjokroaminoto from the membership of Volksraad second 
period (1921-1924), followed by the aforementioned SI Section-B incident. PSI leaders 
perceived the government’s decision as undermining their organization, and should be 
responded in equal way. In the national congress in 1924 in Surabaya, PSI ratified the non-
cooperation as the new course of the organization. It refused to participate in the Volksraad, 
and even expelled its member, R. P. Soeroso, who received government’s appointment as a 
Volksraad member (Suradi, 1997: 43). Even when eventually the government issued a letter 
to appoint Tjokroaminoto in the next Volksraad period (1927-1930), Tjokroaminoto 
consistently refused the offering by saying that, in addition to the fact that his party decided 
non-cooperation policy, he would love to join the Volksraad only if it is reformed and more 
receptive to the political aspirations of Indonesian people (Suradi 1997: 44; Amelz 1954: 110-
111). It is important to add here, that at the second part of the decade, the nationalist spirit was 
at its peak, when the younger generation of the nationalist leaders were born and held the 
historic “Youth Oath” in 1928 declaring “One country, one nation, one language: Indonesia.” 
Among this new generation leaders was the future Indonesian president, Sukarno, who was 
Tjokroaminoto’s disciple and son-in-law. 
Secondly, PSI new policy was the adoption of Pan-Islam political rhetoric and 
programs. The outset was in 1922 when Agus Salim, then SI general secretary, organized All-
Indies Islamic Congress in Cirebon, West Java, in which he invited major Muslim 
organizations in the country to discuss political Islam and Pan-Islamism. The idea of the 
congress was to link the political struggle for Indonesian Muslims with their fellow Muslim 
brothers across the Islamic world against European colonialism, with the ultimate objective to 
establish international Islamic Caliphate. The Islamic Congress was held annually in the 
following years, until the end of the Dutch colonial era in 1945. According to Salim, a truly 
 54
international Islamic political authority deemed necessary, since western colonialism were 
international networks that systematically occupy almost the entire Muslim world (Van 
Bruinessen, 1995).  
Coincidentally, in March 1924 the last Islamic caliphate of Ottoman Turkey was 
abolished by a nationalist movement led by Mustafa Kemal Pasha, known as Ataturk. This 
event shook the Muslim world, not only in the Middle East, but also in remote Southeast 
Asian area, since the Caliphate and the caliph was perceived as the highest spiritual-political 
authority in the Islamic tradition. Interestingly, although PSI leaders such as Tjokroaminoto, 
Salim and Fachrudin were keen to the idea of Islamic politics and Islamic caliphate, they 
seemed to be more sympathetic to the nationalist Ataturk rather than the ousted Caliph Abdul 
Madjid who was regarded as corrupt and western collaborator. In December that year, an 
extraordinary Congress was held with a special purpose to discuss the aftermath of the 
abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate. Two international congresses were to be held to discuss 
this matter, one in Mecca and another in Cairo, and Indonesian Muslims needed to send their 
delegates. The extraordinary congress agreed to send Indonesian envoy to both upcoming 
international congresses with a message that the Caliphate that was going to be established 
should be in a form of a council which members were representatives of Muslim countries, 
and the chairman of this caliphate council was elected by the council members for a given 
term (van Bruinessen, 1995).  
 After returning from the international congress—which was successfully held but 
without any concrete decision—the PSI leaders established an Indonesian branch for Mecca-
based International Islamic Conference. PSI organizational activities focused on socializing 
Pan Islamism as the alternative way in political struggle for Indonesian Muslims. In 1929, PSI 
changed its name once again following several internal strives among its leaders, and with 
Tjokroaminoto became less active because of his health, the organization lost its popularity 
and was overshadowed by new political organizations. The organization suffered internal 
frictions between Salim and his followers who advocated a more flexible relation, even 
cooperation, with the government and Abikusno Tjokrosuyoso who drove the party further 
into confrontations with the status quo (Noer, 1973: 139-140, Suradi 1997). 
  
3. MASYUMI (1945-1960) 
3.1. Ideology and Programs 
MASYUMI (Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia, Indonesian Muslims Consultation Council) 
was not only the most important Muslim political party of post independent Indonesia, but 
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also the most important party in Indonesian politics of the period. During the short era of 
parliamentary democracy (1949-1957) of post-independence Indonesia, Masyumi was the 
biggest party in the parliament and assumed three periods of Premierships, and played a 
substantive role as well as received a large share of portfolio in almost every cabinet (Luciu, 
2003: 15).  
The history of Masyumi started in 1937 when the leaders of major Muslim 
organizations, who were concerned about the heightening antagonism between Muslims and 
secular-nationalists and the communists, agreed to form a join federation of Indonesian 
Islamic Higher Council (Majelis Islam A’la Indonesia, MIAI)  to provide a national forum for 
Muslims political struggles. The council played as unified front for Muslim politics when the 
Japanese army took over Dutch East Indies. However, when it was reluctant to cooperate, the 
Japanese dissolved it and replaced it with Masyumi (Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia, 
Consultative Assembly of Indonesian Muslim), in 1943 and made sure that only cooperative 
Muslim organizations were allowed to join (Ricklefs, 2002: 240-243).  
 In March 1945, in the final months of its surrender, the Japanese helped Indonesians to 
create an Investigating Committee for Preparatory Work for Indonesian Independence (Badan 
Penyelidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia, BPUPKI) which then changed into 
Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence (Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan 
Indonesia, PPKI) by August that year. During this occasion, representatives for Muslims 
community came from Masyumi. It was these Masyumi delegates who pushed Islamist issues 
in the draft of the constitution, such as requirement that the president and the vice president 
should be Muslims, the ratification of Islamic laws for Muslims, and the demand for a special 
ministry of Islamic affairs. Under strong rejections from Christian politicians as well as the 
most respected nationalist figures such as Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta, Islamist supporters 
were willing to compromise. The first two demands were rejected, and the third request, the 
creation of an Office of Religious Affairs was accepted. The Muslim politicians assumed that 
the Office would deal exclusively with Islamic affairs, yet in turn it concerned the affairs of 
all religious groups in Indonesia (van Dijk, 1981: 48-55).  
 Three months after the declaration of independence on August 17, 1945, the new 
government announced an endorsement for Indonesians to create political parties as means for 
people representations. On 7-8 November that year, Masyumi held an Islamic Conference in 
Yogyakarta to discuss the government proposal, and the forum unanimously agreed to change 
Masyumi into a political party representing political interests of all Indonesian Muslims and 
participate in the parliament. It was even reported that the conference agreed to denounce that 
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any Muslim organization participating in politics outside Masyumi was illegitimate. Yet not 
all major organization complied, such as Sumatran Islamic organization named PERTI 
(Perhimpunan Tarbiyah Islamiyah, or Islamic Educational Congregation). Nevertheless, eight 
major Muslim organizations joined the new party (Ricklefs, 2002):  
 
Organization Members of Masyumi (1946) 
 
- PSII (Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia, Indonesian Islamic Union Party) 
- PII (Partai Islam Indonesia, Indonesian Islamic Party), 
- Muhammadiyah 
- NU (Nahdhatul Ulama, Revival of the Ulama) 
- PERSIS (Persatuan Islam, Islamic Union), 
- PUI (Partai Umat Islam, Muslim Party) 
- PUII (Partai Umat Islam Indonesia, Indonesian Muslims Party) 
- Jamiatul Wasliyah  
 
Organizationally, Masyumi was a party of indirect rule, in which its memberships was 
composed of organizations (Douverger, 1954: 6). This means that the sources of authority 
were not inside but outside the party, in the hands of the leaders of its various organizations. 
This structure had an enormous impact to the political behavior of Masyumi, in which it 
always needed consents and supports from the organizations for its policies. 
Like SI in the early decades of the century, Masyumi represented the political 
aspirations of Indonesian Muslims, and adopted Islam as its ideology, as was clearly defined 
in its statutes (Basic Statute, 1955: verse II). On ethical values, or what was good in society, 
Masyumi perceived that Islam was the solution for Indonesian politics, as the best alternative 
for world conflicting ideologies. Masyumi leaders portrayed the time in which they lived as 
characterized by deadly antagonism between the Western block led by the USA under 
capitalism versus the Eastern block headed by the Soviet Union under the ideology of 
communism. In fact, the two ideologies had caused human sufferings: capitalism with its 
principle of unrestrained accumulation of wealth had led nations into wars, drove oppressions, 
exploitations and discriminations under colonialism; while communism with its doctrines of 
materialism and atheism that contradict the basic nature of men as spiritual beings had 
produced proletariat dictatorship that destroyed the traditional structures of the society and 
caused sufferings among the people living under communist states. According to Masyumi, 
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Islam was the best political system for Muslim and non-Muslim alike, with a balance 
perspective on human nature: submission to religious rules and peaceful interactions with 
other human being. Islam teaches compliance to Gods’ laws for its adherents, unity among its 
followers in society, cooperation among members of society to achieve common goods, and 
tolerance toward people from other religions (Masyumi, 1955: 31-48). 
 Secondly, on economy, Masyumi held a perspective that Islam basically recognized 
the rights of individuals to own means of productions, as long as they acquired those through 
good ways (halal), as was prescribed by the Qur’an that (IV: 31): “men have rights for what 
they achieved, and women have rights for what they achieved. And ask to God for His 
wealth” (Masyumi 1955: 89-90). However, according to Islam, society has a collective duty 
to look after the poor and the needy. Masyumi perceived welfare services as fardhu kifayah or 
religiously collective duty of the society that at least part of the community should 
accomplish, and when no one did it the whole society would be guilty (Masyumi, 1955: 54).  
 Thirdly, on politics Masyumi believed in the principle that the true authority was in the 
hands of God, and therefore Muslim should have been the leader of the countries where 
Muslims constitute the majority in the population, such as in Indonesia. In the words of 
Mohammad Natsir, the most prominent leader of Masyumi and the former Indonesian prime 
minister, Islamic political formula was neither completely identical nor totally different from 
democracy. “Islam is not one hundred percent democracy, neither it is one hundred percent 
autocracy. Islam is… Islam” (Noer, 1973: 291). According to Natsir, Islam is democratic in 
terms that it is against despotism, absolutism and arbitrary measures by the ruler to the ruled. 
However, in Islam not every issue is subject to consultation and deliberation (shura), such as 
the eradication of social vices—gambling prostitution, superstitions, polytheism etc. 
Consultation applies only to the methods, no to the actions (Burns, 1981: 29). 
  Under such ideological formulations, Masyumi set its political objective to “implement 
Islamic teachings and laws in the lives of individuals, the society and the state of Republic of 
Indonesia to achieve Allah’s will” (Basic Statute, Verse III). To achieve the objectives 
Masyumi endeavored to (Basic Statute, Verse IV):  
 
a. Inform, teach and train Indonesian Muslim in political matters. 
b. Build and empower the unity and potentials of Muslim community in every walk 
of life. 
c. Advocate humanity, solidarity, brotherhood and religious piety according to 
Islamic teachings. 
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d. Cooperate with other organizations for common objectives and with mutual 
consents.  
  
In order to achieve the political visions, Masyumi formulated its party programs as follows: 
(Masyumi, 1955: 60-69): 
 
1. Politics: (a) The state is a constitutional Republic based on Islamic teachings, to guarantee 
the safety of lives and wealth of all people in Indonesia, native and foreigners. Republic is 
the most suitable form of Islam and democracy. (b) The state must guarantee freedom of 
religion. (c) The government is presidential who responsible to the House of 
Representative. (d) The House is bicameral with democratically elected members of 
Parliament and Senate. (e) The Constitution must guarantee human rights. (f) 
Acknowledge the equal rights for men and women based upon their respective natures. 
2. Economy: (a) proposing guided economy in which resources distributed for the maximum 
of the people welfare; prohibiting private monopoly; promoting cooperative economy. (b) 
Nationalization of vital business such as banks, transportation services, mines and 
undustries that supply public needs. (c) Industrialization to reduce import, especially in 
densely populated areas. (d) Encouraging foreign capital with mutual profits. (e) 
Protecting and empowering agricultural enterprises, advocate price regulation to protect 
peasants’ economy and regulating wages for peasant workers. (f) Protecting fishery 
enterprises by providing training and education for fishermen, assisting fishermen 
cooperatives, modernizing technologies and facilities for fishery. (g) Agrarian policy that 
give priority to protect productive lands. (h) Promoting the development of the middle 
class. 
3. Monetary: (a) Private Banks are regulated by law and the government oversees the banks’ 
credit policies. (b) Tax policies to simplify tax regulations, cut ordinary good taxes and 
increase luxury goods taxes. 
4. Social: (a) government provides social services and health, pension, and unemployment 
insurances. Protect workers rights, protect minimum wage, and dispute settling. (b) 
Advocating social loans, in addition for work loans, for workers. (f) Regulate workers’ 
unions. (g) Developing social regulation for helping needy children and eradicating social 
vices such as prostitution and gambling. (h) The state should look after the veterans of 
revolution and their families. (i) Transmigration from dense to less dense populated 
regions. 
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5. Education and Culture: (a) Developing additional religious private schools, providing 
scholarships for selected students especially from poor families. (b) Developing cultural 
constructive activities, such as boy scouts for the youth.  
6. Foreign Policy: (a) Against any form of colonialism. (b) Promoting peaceful international 
politics and cooperate with all nations, especially those religious and democratic. (c) 
Participate actively in international organization such as the UN. (d) Support world order 
based on humanity and morality. (e) Accepting foreign aids that bring no constraining 
military and political consequences. 
7. West Irian: (a) Demanding the inclusion of West Irian (Papua) into Indonesian territory. 
 
3.2. Institutional Context 
The years during which Masyumi was active in Indonesian politics were among the most 
unstable decades in Indonesia’ history, when it witnessed the end of colonialism that lasted 
for centuries, followed by the invention of the new republic of Indonesia. During this period, 
from 1945 to 1960 there were intense institutional engineerings to create, reshape and revise 
the structure of the new republic. These engineering contests were the inevitable result of the 
clashes of interests between various powers to install state institutions  
 Following Herbert Feith explanation,  there were three streams of constellations or 
rivalries—which were distinguishable but inseparable—simultaneously influenced the 
dynamics of political institutions during the period of Masyumi history, 1945-1960. Firstly, 
was institutional rivalries between civilian versus military in controlling the direction of the 
new republic, especially in dealing with the Dutch who wanted to reclaim the country after 
the Japanese surrender. The civilian politicians preferred to pursue a diplomatic way, in the 
hope of international supports especially from the newly formed United Nations, with the 
consequence of compromises and concessions with the Dutch; while the military commanders 
perceived diplomacy as adverse and betraying the spirit of independence, and therefore 
favored strict and all-out resistances in protecting the republic from the Dutch efforts to 
reclaim it.  
Secondly, ideological rivalries—among civilians as well as military—with regards to 
the directions of the national development of the new republic, between three dominant 
camps, i.e. the nationalists who wanted the republic to be developed on the basis of common 
historical and cultural identities of Indonesian people, the so called spirit of “unity in 
diversity” (Bhineka Tungga Ika); the Islamists who wanted the state to be developed on the 
basis of Islamic law, in order to be fair to the fact that the majority of Indonesians were 
 60
Muslim; and the Marxist who wanted the new state to be established in the spirit of anti-
imperialism, anti-fascism, anti-capitalism, and in favor of the mass.  
Thirdly, administrative rivalries—among both civilians and militaries—between the so 
called “administrators” who gave priorities on regulation, institutionalization and 
rationalization of the new state, versus “solidarity makers” who emphasized the mass 
mobilizations and consistent calling upon national identity (Faith, 1962: 113-120).  
 When the republic of Indonesia was declared in 17 August 1945 following the 
Japanese surrender in the pacific war, it was intended to include the whole area of the former 
Dutch colony from Sabang in the northern tip of Sumatra to Merauke in the southeast corner 
of West Papua. The institutional processes to be accomplished were to install central 
governmental institutions, to create national bureaucracy, and to form national armed forces. 
The first point was accomplished quickly by developing a government and a temporary 
parliament (KNIP, Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat or Central Indonesian National 
Committee) to which the cabinet was responsible. The second point was also implemented 
quite smoothly by turning the existing bureaucratic system installed by the Japanese under the 
latter undeclared approval and assistances, while the third, the nationalization of military, met 
various difficulties especially because of disagreements among its top leaders between the 
Japanese-trained officers who preferred to maintained large forces which include irregular 
military units and the Dutch-trained officers who preferred rationalization of the military.  
 The Dutch forces returned to Indonesia by September 1945, behind the British forces 
of Southeast Asian Command under Lord Luis Mountbatten which arrived at Indonesia to 
take over the Japanese power. The Dutch intention was to reclaim the colony after the 
Japanese surrendered to the Allied Forces. However, they met fierce resistances from the 
republican forces in various fronts across Sumatra and Java that pushed them to come to 
negotiations. Indonesian leaders also agreed a negotiation in the face of a possible 
asymmetrical war between the well-equipped and well-coordinated Dutch armed-forces and 
the poorly armed and coordinated republican army. The first diplomatic agreement was 
reached by March 1946 between Prime Minister Sutan Sjahrir with the Dutch Van Mook, in 
which the republic assumed sovereignty over Java, Madura and Sumatra while the Dutch 
controlled other regions, and followed by Linggarjati Agreement in November that year, in 
which the two sides agreed to form a Federal State of Indonesia in which the republic would 
be one of its part. 
 The agreement triggered rounded criticism, especially from the military and Marxist 
camps, because they regarded it as selling the republic to the Dutch and betraying the 
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independence, and eventually forced the cabinet to resign. In the strong anti-colonial political 
atmosphere the next cabinet that was formed in July 1947, was conspicuously leftist with 
Amir Sjarifuddin as the Prime Minister. Facing indications of change of policy directions in 
Indonesian leadership, the Dutch launched the first military aggression in 20th July 1947 and 
in a few days captured major cities in Sumatra, Jakarta, West Java and East Java, leaving for 
the Indonesian only central Java. By August 1947, the republic moved its capital to 
Yogyakarta. Under strong pressures from the UN, the Dutch and Indonesia come to another 
agreement aboard USS Renville in Jakarta harbor January 1948, for cease fire and that the 
republican army in West and East Java must retreat into Central Java.  
 The Dutch military aggression and the Renville agreement humiliated the cabinet and 
forced it to resign, and created other crises, even brought the republic into the brink of civil 
war. The first crisis emerged immediately after the Siliwangi Division of the army left West 
Java and moved to Central Java following the agreement. Amid the power vacuum, an 
irregular military unit, from Hizbullah Batallion, refused to comply and declared an Islamic 
State/Islamic Army of Indonesia (DI/TII Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia) in West Java 
led by S. M. Kartosuwiryo in May 1948. This would be the longest military rebellion in 
Indonesian history that lasted until 1962 (van Dijk, 1981).  
Meanwhile, the arrival of the Siliwangi Division to Central Java had intensified the 
existing tensions inside the military as well as between the military and civilian politicians. In 
order to adjust to the situation, the central government planned to rationalized the military and 
cut the number of soldiers into half, especially by demobilizing the irregular units. The 
Siliwangi Division, being the most trained, skilled and well equipped unit, under the 
leadership of Dutch-trained Col. A. H. Nasution, was likely to be secured from this plan, 
while irregular units in Central Java, many of them affiliated with leftist groups, were the 
likely victims. The tensions soon broke into open conflicts between the opponents and the 
proponents of the planned policy. Outnumbered in skills and equipments, the irregular units, 
joined soon by leftist groups, were driven out into mountainous country sides between Central 
and East Java. Coincidentally, a senior leader of the communist party named Muso who just 
returned from Soviet joined and led the movement, followed by the former leftist Prime 
Minister Amir Sjarifuddin. In 18 September 1948, the Communists declared a National Front 
Government (FDR) in the district of Madiun East Java, and appealed to the Indonesians to 
expel Sukarno-Hatta government who they perceived as collaborators of Japanese fascism and 
Dutch imperialism. The rebellion was contained in around a month, and the top leaders Muso 
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and Amir Sjarifuddin were killed. This incident marked the communist with treason against 
the republic (Ricklefs, 2002).  
 The armed rebellions by DI/TII and FDR had caused a deep trauma for the army 
toward political ideology, both Islam and communism, which would influence its attitude and 
behaviors in years to come. The incidents helped it to construct its image as ideologically 
neutral group, and that its main objectives were for the good of Indonesian nation; and it also 
portrayed political parties and civilian politicians as groups who were preoccupied with 
ideologies, and they struggled for their own respective groups. 
 Amidst the chaotic situation in the republic, the Dutch launched a second military 
aggression in December 1948, conquered Yogyakarta and arrested all national leaders, and 
cornered the republic to rely on the military under Gen. Sudirman who waged guerilla war 
between Central and East Java and an Emergency Government in the hand of the Minister of 
Economy from Masjumi, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, who were on hiding in Sumatra. The 
aggression caused a strong reaction from the UN, and especially the US which drastically 
more sympathetic to the republic after the repression of the communist groups in Madiun. By 
August 1949, the conflicting sides agreed to come to another negotiation, known as the Round 
Table Conference held in The Hague that was to last about three months, and in November 
that year some agreements were reached, in which the Dutch recognized and handed over full 
sovereignty into a Federal State of Indonesia, in which the Republic of Indonesia was only 
one of its seven federal state members. 
Although the Dutch seemed to be the winner in the conference in which it succeeded 
in reducing the republic into territorially tiny portion of Indonesia, in reality given the already 
strong feeling of nationalism even among the states, the federation soon fell down and the 
state dissolved itself one after another and joined the republic. According to Herbert Faith, the 
decisive factor that contributed to the reformation of a unitary state was the common feeling 
that the situation was not a choice between federal or unitary forms of state, but rather a 
choice between supporting the spirit and ideals of 1945 declaration of independence or siding 
the Dutch in their efforts to reclaim the country. On the fifth anniversary of independence, 17 
August 1950, the federation state was abolished and the unitary republic of Indonesia reborn 
with Jakarta as the capital that consisted of the whole territory of the former Dutch colony 
minus Irian Jaya (Faith, 1962: 74-77).  
 The return of the unitary republic, however, was accompanied by significant 
institutional changes that were to influence the structures of political dynamics of the decade, 
especially the new role of the president and the strengthening position of the parliament. The 
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original institution was the so called 1945 Constitution, and during the transfer of sovereignty 
in 1949 it was adopted by the Republic of Indonesia as a part of the Republic of the United 
States of Indonesia (RUSI) and for the federation state adopted its own constitution. The 
reformation of the unitary Republic of Indonesia had urged the politicians to reformulate the 
constitution into what is known as 1950 Provisional Constitution (UUDS—Undang-Undang 
Dasar Sementara—1950). In 1945 constitution, Indonesian government is presidential in 
which the president is the head of the sate as well as the government, and appoint ministers 
who help him and responsible to him. In 1950 Constitution, the government was 
parliamentary, led by a Prime Minister who responsible to the parliament, while president was 
confined to figurehead of the state. Moreover, the parliament had a capacity to force to resign 
not only cabinets, but also individual ministers. Although the constitution did provide a power 
for the president to dissolve the parliament, the statement was ambiguous. It reads “the 
President decree announcing such dissolution shall also order the election of the House of 
Representative within 30 days,” in which the dominant interpretation was that the presidential 
right was only applicable if it would be possible to call upon elections within 30 days—which 
was an extremely difficult requirement.  
  The dominant position of the parliament implied the dominant position of political 
parties in Indonesian politics. There were five major political parties which dominated the 
parliamentary politics, plus a number of nationalists and Christian parties (Feith, 1962: 122-
145).  
a. The biggest party was Masyumi, which held Islamist ideology and represented the 
political aspirations of Muslim communities, and promoted the implementations of 
Islamic laws and systems in the republic. It had 49 seats in the parliament or 21.1 
percent. Its memberships composed of two major categories, the modernist and 
traditionalist Muslim groups. The latter split from the party in 1952 after several 
internal conflicts. In terms of governmental politics, Masyumi was in a tight rivalry 
with the PNI, but in term of ideology its archrival was the communist PKI. 
b. The second was the nationalist PNI with 36 seats or 15.5 percent in the parliament. It 
was founded by Sukarno in 1927 and based upon the ideals of nationalism, which 
objectives was to preserve Indonesia as united nation and country. After the 
independence, however, Sukarno did not involve in PNI activities since as the 
president he was above all parties. PNI became the party of Javanese traditional elites 
and aristocrats, and to some extent embodied Javanese political cultures.  
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c. The next major party was the socialist PSI, founded and led by Sutan Sjahrir in 1948, 
with 17 or 7 percent parliamentary seats. In fact, PSI political clout was much greater 
that its parliamentary portion indicated. There were two main resources of PSI strong 
influence in national politics. Firstly were human resources, in which many of its 
leaders were western-educated intellectuals who played important roles in various 
major political events. Secondly was an ideological element, in which PSI political 
ideology which was very close to the western democratic-socialist tradition was able 
to provide vivid analyses of the political situations as well as consistent and easily 
understandable prescriptions—which had widespread currency outside the party itself. 
d. The fourth dominant party was Marxist Murba Party, founded by a former 
Communist leader Tan Malaka and his followers, which received only four seat or 1.7 
percent. In contrast to PSI, which represented the party of administrators that run by 
intellectuals and pursued rational and programmatic politics, Murba represented the 
party of solidarity makers which activists were mostly without higher educations who 
came to prominence as leaders of mass organizations or militia groups during 
Japanese occupations and independence revolution, and its main supporters were ex-
guerilla fighters, low ranking professionals, and other groups who preferred expressive 
politics. Just like PSI, or perhaps even more, Murba political influence was much 
larger than its actual number in parliament. This was, firstly, because Murba earned a 
historical credit for the event of Indonesian proclamation of independence in August 
1945, when its top leaders were the initiators of the youth group that forced Sukarno 
and Hatta to make the proclamation immediately after the Japanese surrendered. 
Secondly, its radical political views combining Marxism, nationalism and 
millenarianism—which demanded consistently abrogation of all diplomatic 
agreements with the Dutch, confiscation and nationalization of all vital enterprises 
from transportation facilities, industries, mines, and plantations—were gained 
currency among wider political groups. 
e. The Communist PKI, was another major political force in the parliament with 13 
seats or 5.6 percent. This party showed a formidable resilience both in ideological 
visions and organizational works. Founded in 1920, it was banished by the colonial 
government after the abortive putsch in 1926, and its leaders were either arrested or 
fled the country. But it returned into a major political group during independence 
years with strong ideology and vast mass support. Yet again, the failed revolt of FDR 
in November 1948 had dragged the party into political pariah in the country, 
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stigmatized with treason of national independence. And by 1950s it was able to 
recover, return into the political system, and receive seats in the parliament. PKI once 
again showed its organizational superiority when in 1955 election it garnered 16.4 
percent of national votes and tripled its parliamentary seats into 16.8 percent.  
f. The sixth political power composed of minor nationalist parties—such as PIR, PRN, 
SKI, Democratic Faction, and the Labor Party. In terms of number of parliamentary 
memberships these group was large, with 38 seats or 16.3 percent, but because of the 
absence of neither clear and consistent ideological visions nor loyalty to policy 
positions, the group was fluid and opportunistic, sought any possible opportunity to 
take advantages from any political transactions, and was keen to participate in any 
cabinet.  
g. Lastly, the recognizable faction in the parliament was of Christian and Catholic 
parties. In contrast with minor nationalist parties, which in fact personality-parties 
with no real mass support, the Christians parties did commanded popular support 
among Christians especially in the eastern provinces. The parties also had relatively 
strong influence in national politics because of the disproportionately large numbers of 
Christians in the bureaucracy, the military, and business and educational institutions. 
The parties had highly qualified leaders with high political and administrative skills, 
and were regularly included in the cabinets. Their policy positions were mainly to 
maintain their groups’ political interests and advocated religious freedom.  
 
Theoretically, Indonesian party system during the period liberal democracy was an 
unstable system, where the parties were numerous and their ideological distance was both 
wide and intense. Following the classification from Sartori (1976: 125-128), the number of 
parties and their ideological distance are the main indicator of party system stability. For 
Sartory, any party system which consisted of more than five parties is a plural system, and 
when the ideological gaps between those parties are wide, the system became polarized. 
Indonesian party system was indeed a polarized system, in which there were seven 
parliamentary factions which composed of around 20 parties. Moreover, the ideological 
distances between parties were not only wide but also intense, involving different spectrums 
of ideological, religious and cultural orientations. Firstly, there was an ideological continuum 
between leftist PKI and Murba on the one hand and rightist Masyumi and Christian parties on 
the other. Secondly, thee was a cultural-regional continuum, with Masyumi in one end 
representing Muslim culture and outer-islands communities and PNI on the other representing 
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political aspiration of Javanese culture and community. Thirdly, the system was divided by a 
religious continuum that extended from Communism on the one hand and Islam and 
Christianity on the other. In reality, the system instability was exacerbated by the presence of 
‘bilateral opposition’ of two irreconcilable ideological and policy positions, that make two 
parties or factions impossible to come together in a coalition (Sartori, 1976: 134-35). This was 
the case of antagonism between Masyumi and PKI, in which both sides portrayed the other as 
anti-system. 
Caught in polarized systems notwithstanding, Indonesian political parties were able to 
maintain a relative stability and eventually enacted constitutional democracy. There were 
several factors scholars believe contributed to the situation. Firstly, the fact that the political 
scene was dominated by ‘administrators’ politicians, whose focus was solving pragmatic 
problems rather than refining political discourses such as independence, revolution, or 
nationalism. In fact this group of politicians was cross-parties, and included figures of the 
politicians were the Vice President Mohammad Hatta, former Prime Minister and PSI leader 
Sutan Syahrir, Masyumi chairman Mohammad Natsir, PNI chairman Wilopo, leaders of 
Christian parties and a handful of independent members of parliament. During the first four 
parliamentary cabinets—those of Hatta, Natsir, Sukiman, and Wilopo—the group advanced 
consistent political programs focusing on pragmatic issues.  
There were three major priorities: (a) Rationalization of public services and the 
military; (b) Establishing a legitimate authority, in which the cabinets were able to convince 
the public and interest groups that they had the rights and capability to govern the country. 
They set up Ministry of Information which main tasks were providing information to the 
public especially in rural areas beyond the reach of mass-media; building schools to prove to 
the public of the effectiveness of their governments; and building a mutual cooperation with 
religious leaders and groups to promote pro-government views in exchange of financial 
supports. These consistent set of policies had enabled political parties to enact a constitutional 
democracy, and compelled other political elements to follow rules of the game they set up. 
Secondly, economic booming caused by the Korean War in the turn of the decade which 
drastically raised the price of Indonesian export commodities especially rubber. The 
increasing revenues enabled the government to fully fund its programs, and more importantly 
to fund the military. The increasing military budget gave the civilian government political 
leverage to draw sympathy and support from the army leaders. And during the period the 
major faction in the military did support the government programs, especially the 
rationalization of the military personnel.  
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 The upper hand position enjoyed by the parliament and the political parties was even 
greater when in 1953 the military suffered internal crisis, as the result of “17 October affair” 
when a number of army central command officers and territorial commanders organized mass 
rallies accompanied by tanks and armored vehicles in front of the presidential palace, 
demanding the dissolution of the parliament. Some factors simultaneously contributed to the 
military maneuver. Firstly, the long established anti-civilian-politicians feelings among the 
military who perceived them as opportunistic and concerned for their own interests; secondly, 
growing internal divisions in the military between a number of cliques; and finally, the 
government plan to cut military budgets following the sharp decrease of state revenues, 
especially declining prices of export commodities after the Korean War. This coup attempt 
provoked fierce reactions from the cabinet, the parliament and the president that cornered the 
military and ended in the suspension of a number of senior officers including the chief of 
staffs, Col. A. H. Nasution. The suspension of Nasution opened up opportunity for anti-
Nasution clique in the military, who soon replaced pro-Nasution officers in key posts. With 
the military fell in internal conflicts, the civilian politicians in the cabinet, in the parliament as 
well as in the political parties expanded their roles in Indonesian politics, since the only 
counter balance was the President whose constitutional status was a figurehead (Feith, 1962: 
303-330).  
In the first two cabinets, during which Masyumi assumed Premierships, this dominant 
position was exercised by playing the political balance between the military on the one hand 
and the President on the other. Natsir cabinet (September 1950-March 1951) which excluded 
PNI in its coalition continued the policy priorities from its predecessor Hatta cabinet, focusing 
on economic development, and rationalization of the bureaucracy and the military. This 
rationalistic and non-sensational politics pursued by Natsir was fully backed-up by the 
military commanders led by administrator-officers like Simatupang and Nasution who 
preferred to have small but well trained and disciplined military forces. Yet it was disliked 
and opposed by President Sukarno, who perceived it as neglecting the spirit of nationalism 
and Revolution. While the next Masyumi cabinet led by PM Sukiman in coalition with PNI 
(April 1951-February 1952) was disliked and criticized by the military on the matter of 
Defense Minister, yet was able seek counter support from Sukarno by expanding presidential 
budgetary and endorsing his enthusiasm for public speeches (Glassburner, 1962: 123-124; 
Feith, 1962: 146-224). 
 The supremacy of civilian politicians reached its peak in the election in September 
1955. The election itself seemed to become an anticlimax. Indonesian society put a very high 
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expectation to the election as panacea for the hardships and disorientations they suffered. The 
civilian politicians, especially those from political parties, emphasized the hope even more 
when they answered all criticisms against them with a promise that everything would be fixed 
after the elections. However, the election produced only paradoxes, anguish and uncertainties. 
Instead of bringing a unity, political parties’ anxiousness to maximize votes had led them to 
use vulgar ideological mobilizations which caused tensions and conflicts along ideological 
and other primordial lines in the society that lasted months after the polls (Feith, 1954). The 
electoral results were also surprising and perplexing, especially the poor achievement of 
Masyumi and PSI and huge gain of NU and PKI. This somewhat unpredictable electoral result 
recast the whole picture of national politics. Masyumi and PSI which hitherto dominated the 
political scene, inside and outside the parliament, must realized that their electoral gains were 
not as expected; while NU and PKI which achieved big successes naturally demanded greater 
roles. This tension brought yet another uncertainty for the future of Indonesian politics, and so 
many fingers pointed to civilian politicians and their political parties as the suspects (van der 
Kroef, 1957a, 1957b).  
 The mounting resentments to the civilian politicians gained momentum in November 
1955, when Nasution was reappointed as the army Chief of Staff. Nasution’ appointment 
(now Major General) created new rivalries inside and outside the military. In the military, the 
reappointment of Nasution inevitably brought his old associates, many of whom were 
suspended after 17 October affair 1953, and the replacement of many of the current officers in 
army headquarter and territorial commanders. Seemed to learn from history and was driven 
by common disappointment toward the parliament and political parties, Nasution then was 
willing to cooperate with President Sukarno and was able to attract considerable support from 
PNI. Meanwhile anti-Nasution clique, now under the figures of army Vice Chief of Staff Col. 
Zulkifli Lubis and the commander of North Sumatra Division Col. M. Simbolon tried to resist 
Nasution’s reforms. Outside the military, Nasution-Sukarno-PNI collaboration had pushed 
Masyumi and PSI—the archrivals of Sukarno and PNI—to side Lubis and Simbolon, 
although not too publicly. During October and November 1956 Lubis who then no longer 
Vice Chief of Staff mobilized two attempts of coup d’etat to arrest Nasution and dissolve the 
cabinet, but no avail. Nasution proved himself as the better in the maneuver and networks 
(Feith, 1962: 440-444). 
 The rising collaboration between President Sukarno and the Army was soon 
accompanied by another important political developments, i.e. the rapid grew of PKI and 
Sukarno’s deliberate attempt to use it as counterbalance against the Army. Because of its 
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involvement in FDR rebellion 1948, PKI was decimated and discredited, and many of its 
activists split into Murba party. However, it was able to rebuild its organization, when in 1951 
younger generation of leaders—such as Aidit, Lukman, Njoto, and Sudisman—took over the 
Politburo and implemented new course of party programs. Marxism was now a guide for 
political programs and no longer an inflexible dogma. Ricklefs summarizes the situation:  
 
The party’s strategy was cloaked in Marxist-Leninist terminology which concealed a 
departure from conventional Marxist-Leninist theory. Rather than social class 
determining political orientation, in Aidit’s arguments political orientation became a 
determinant of social class… Aidit’s strategy in seeking allies among other political 
streams meant that in practice PKI adapted itself to a social structure in which 
cultural, religious, and political allegiances were horizontal or communal rather than 
horizontal, as in a class-conscious society. 
Aidit strategy was defensive, for PKI was widely distrusted by many in the political 
elites and the military. His main aim was protecting the party from those who hoped 
for its destruction, whatever theoretical adjustments or political alliances this might 
required… In the end, what was at stake was less the future of working class or of 
Communism as a political ideology than the future of PKI as an organization 
(Ricklefs, 2001: 294). 
 
PKI political flexibility combined with organizational skills of its activists had brought 
the party back into the center of political stage, when it tripled its parliamentary seats in 1955 
elections. As the fourth largest party, PKI had more confidence to push its demands especially 
on the abrogation of the Round-Table debt agreements with the Netherlands and the inclusion 
of West Papua to Indonesia. Coincidentally these were the favorite issues of President 
Sukarno, and then increasingly PKI’s issues and enemies were also Sukarno’s issues and 
enemies. By 1957 PKI had extended its influence beyond formal politics, by developing filial 
mass-organizations, establishing intellectual networks, even infiltrating the army. Meanwhile, 
Sukarno perceived in PKI’s increasing power a potential balance for the army increasing 
influence in politics and in economy, and he was keen to use it for his advantage. For 
example, in 1957 he praised the one party-system of Soviet Union, and said that he preferred 
such a structure (Pauker, 1962; Ricklefs, 2002: 314-315).  
 Lubis coup d’etat and its aftermath of political crisis urged Nasution to endorse 
Sukarno to dissolve the parliament and impose martial law, which the latter did in March 
1957. Subsequently business cabinets—or cabinet based on expertise of the elected 
ministries—were formed and responsible to the president. Following the end of constitutional 
democracy, which then denounced as western-style democracy, Sukarno forwarded his own 
conception of Guided Democracy, which combined democracy, the spirit of revolution, and 
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Indonesian identity. Later on he elaborated his conception to include 1945 constitution, 
Indonesian socialism, guided democracy, guided economy, and Indonesian identity (USDEK: 
UUD 1945, Sosialisme a la Indonesia, Demokrasi Terpimpin, Ekonomi Terpimpin, 
Kepribadian Indonesia). In December 1957 Vice President Mohammad Hatta resign, as a 
protest against Sukarno uncontrolled political maneuver, which immediately amplified anti 
Sukarno feeling especially among non-Javanese politicians and military officers. In February 
1958, military officers from Lubis and Simbolon groups, joined by Masyumi and PSI 
politicians, declared rebellion and gave the central government ultimatum to install a new 
cabinet under Hatta, and return Sukarno into his constitutional figurehead position. Yet the 
movement was abortive, and Nasution was able without much difficulty to contain the 
rebellion and captured the leaders (Lev, 1963; Feith and Lev 1963). 
 The national political scene was then practically under the control of Sukarno and 
Nasution. Civilian politicians and political parties were exhausted in their debates in 
Constituent Assembly elected by the elections. And for more than two years of the constituent 
sessions and deliberations, the parties were trapped in protracted deadlocks and were unable 
to write any significant legal product. In early 1959 Nasution brought a proposal to the 
president to solve the prolonged deadlocks in the Constituent Assembly, i.e. to return to the 
original version of 1945 Constitution and dissolve the assembly. With no indication of 
progress in its sessions, Sukarno dissolved the Constituent Assembly in 5 July 1959, and 
reinstalled the old constitution.  After dissolving the parliament, Sukarno appointed a 
‘Business Cabinet’ (Kabinet Karya) under non-party politician Djuanda Kartawidjaja as the 
prime minister, although most of the ministers were from parties especially PNI and NU. 
When eventually the cabinet resigned in 1959, Sukarno enacted a presidential government, 
under the Guided democracy (Palmer, 1957). 
 In fact, the triumph of Sukarno’s regime and the failure of constitutional democracy 
were products of various factors. Firstly, public dissatisfactions were mounting after the 
elections, when it turned to add new conflicts instead of solving problems. Secondly, the 
relatively successful economic programs of the previous cabinet governments had induced 
social modernization, in which more people were moved from rural into urban lives, and had 
greater abilities to articulate their demands especially for more economic growth and job 
opportunities. Thirdly, the fact that the main actors of Indonesian politics were people from 
middle class whose only financial incomes were from governmental rents or political 
contracts, had made political competition a zero-sum game. The politicians were ready to 
exploit any means in their disposal—especially ideologies—to gain and defend governmental 
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positions, since it meant not only power and prestige but more importantly, incomes. These 
factors had triggered two growing demands, i.e. disapproval of political parties and 
constitutional democracy they advocated, and demands of an alternative system that 
eventually paved a way for Sukarno’s Guided Democracy, the raise of military in politics and 
economy, and the retreat of parties into the background of Indonesian politics (Feith, 1962: 
500-538). 
 
3.3. Political Behavior 
 The history of Masyumi reveals the deeper nature of modern history of Muslim 
politics as well as Indonesian politics in general. First, the formation of Masyumi represented 
Muslim’s antagonism with secular ideologies. The Islamist-secular antagonism that started in 
earlier decades of the twentieth century persisted if not more articulated, especially with 
regards to the status of Islam in Indonesian constitutions. Islamist politicians demanded the 
formal status of their religion in the constitution given the fact that Indonesia is a 
predominantly Muslim country, while the secularists maintained that the existing constitution 
which is religiously neutral represented a conclusive national consensus, since Indonesia is 
religiously plural country. Furthermore, the history of Masyumi also recorded the first 
political schism between the modernists and the traditionalists, the two major religious 
schools among Indonesian Muslims. In a closer observation, the split was a logical 
consequence of the political dilemma lingered in Muslim politics, in which the traditionalists 
had larger mass-supports especially from rural communities that constitute the major part of 
Indonesian society but they lacked modern educational qualifications and organizational skills 
to participate and compete in modern politics, while the modernists on the contrary had more 
advance political and organizational knowledge and administrative skills but obtained only 
limited supports among the mass . The modernists, then, tended to dominate the party courses 
that generated disappointments among the traditionalists who felt they received unfair share. 
Finally, Masyumi policies in the government had been liberal and rational, they welcome 
foreign capital investments, accepted the status quo of economic dominance of the Westerners 
and the Chinese, tight fiscal programs, and rationalized—quite successfully—the military and 
the bureaucracy. This policy style was in contrast to another dominant approach that 
emphasized the national spirit and identity over economic performance, exemplify by 
President Sukarno (Bone Jr., 1954).  
 During transition period of 1945-1949 Masyumi participated and even played major 
roles in most of transitional cabinets. Only during Amir Sjarifuddin cabinet (1946-1949) 
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Masyumi refused to join in. This refusal to join the cabinet had caused the first split when 
PSII as organization-member protested the decision and left the party. The short acquaintance 
with PSII left dilemmatic political problem for Masyumi in the coming years. One of PSII 
leaders was S. M. Kartosuwiryo who in 1948 declared an Islamic State /Indonesian Islamic 
Armed Forces (Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia, DI/TII) in West Java. DI/TII rebellion 
became Achilles’ heel for Masyumi, especially when it was in the government, when 
opposition parties accused it as having secret collaborations with the rebels. In fact, Masyumi 
leaders publicly denounced and consistently differentiated themselves from the rebellion, yet 
at the grass root level many Muslims had great difficulties to separate the two, especially in 
the time when it was still common that political organizations had military wings (van Dijk, 
1981). 
The new period of Masyumi history began on the 4th National Congress in Yogyakarta 
1949, in which it took two important decisions. Firstly, it elected Mohammad Natsir (1908-
1983) as the executive chairman of the party. Natsir election symbolized the ascension of 
younger generation of Masyumi leadership, who had western educational backgrounds and 
with high political and administrative skills. Other figures from this generation that were 
going to dominate the party included people with high caliber such as Sjafruddin 
Prawiranegara, Mohammad Roem, Jusuf Wibisono, and Burhanuddin Harahap. They replaced 
the older generation whose leadership was set up by the Japanese, designed to garner supports 
from the mass and not for modern political competitions. Secondly, the congress also changed 
the role of consultative body in the party (Majelis Syura) from legislative into advisory body. 
This decision drew the older leaders further into the background, and gave the younger 
leaders a full control over the party (Ricklefs, 2002). 
After the Dutch eventually recognized Indonesia’s full independence on 17 August 
1949, a new government was set up with Sukarno as the President of the republic and 
Mohammad Hatta the Vice President. Continuing the parliamentary tradition of the previous 
period, Hatta was elected prime minister of the transitional cabinet, and Masyumi received 
four out of fourteen ministerial posts. When the new parliament was set up in 1950, Masyumi 
represented the largest faction (Faith, 1962: 128):  
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                         The Parliament of the Republic of Indonesia (1950) 
 
 
PARTY    SEAT 
Masyumi    49 
PNI (Nationalist Party)  36 
PIR     17 
PSI (Socialist Party)   17 
PKI (Communist Party)  13 
Democratic Fraction   13 
PRN     10 
Catholic Party      9 
PARINDRA      8 
Labor Party      7 
PSII       5 
Christian Party (Protestant)    5 
Murba (Proletariat Party)    4 
Labor Front      4 
FKR       4 
SKI       3 
Peasant Group      2 
Independent Members   26 
   TOTAL             232 
 
 One month after Hatta’s cabinet resign in August 1950, a new cabinet was formed 
with Mohammad Natsir of Masyumi as the Prime Minister. Under strong pressures from 
Masyumi organization members to keep majority portfolios of the cabinet, Natsir failed to 
negotiate a coalition with PNI and took up an unpopular decision by forming a cabinet that 
include smaller parties: PSII, PIR, the Catholic, the Christian and Democratic Fraction. 
However, the cabinet was short-lived because of their unability to build a necessary base for 
political supports in the parliament and resigned in March 1951, especially under strong 
critics of PKI, PNI and President Sukarno over the issue of Irian Jaya (west Papua). 
According to the Round Table Conference agreement (1949), the Netherlands recognized 
Indonesian territory without Irian Jaya, while Indonesia demanded Irian to be included as it 
was part of the Dutch colony. Natsir managed to solve the problem through diplomatic way 
with some options for compromise, while PKI, PNI and Sukarno demanded outright inclusion 
by the way of mass mobilization and threats of military invasion (Glassburner 1962; Feith, 
1962: 146-175).  
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Yet Masyumi still have another opportunity to form the next cabinet, with Sukiman as 
the Prime Minister in April 1952. Sukiman was Natsir’s rival in Masyumi, represented the 
older generation of leadership with close relations with Javanese politicians such as Sukarno 
and PNI leaders. Learned from its previous mistake in excluding PNI, Sukiman formed a 
coalition cabinet with the second largest party. Yet, Sukiman’s strategy in building a strong 
support in the parliament had to be compensated with other frictions inside the parties, 
especially with his conspicuously pro-America politics. The first criticism broke when 
Sukiman ordered mass arrest of communist politicians, activists and symphatizers without 
informing the military and even many of his cabinet members. According to Faith, the 
Sukiman action was a result of false intelligence reports combined with his excessive anti-
communist sentiment. It was the same sentiment that led him to sign Mutual Security Act 
(MSA) with the US, in which Indonesia would receive US aids in compensation of 
Indonesia’s participation in promoting the free world. Strong reactions came from inside 
Masyumi and PNI, which perceived the policy as against the spirit of Indonesia’s n neutrality 
in international politics. Sukiman cabinet resigned in February 1952, after only ten months in 
power (Glassburner 1962; Feith, 1962: 177-215).  
In July 1952 NU disaffiliated from Masyumi as a protest against the party’s decision 
not to re-nominate NU’s chairman Wachid Hasyim as the Minster of Religious Affairs and 
gave NU no ministerial post in the following PNI-led coalition cabinet. Indeed, it was merely 
a trigger, since there were several factors contributed to the split. Firstly, theological 
divergence between the traditionalist NU and the modernists that dominated Masyumi 
executive leadership had created latent distrust among the two groups. Secondly, the Masyumi 
decision to confine the role of Consultative Assembly as advisory body was perceived by NU 
as systematic marginalization of the role of NU senior leaders in the party. Thirdly, a strong 
demand from one of the main Masyumi organization members, Muhammadiyah, which 
wanted its turn to have Minister of Religious Affairs after three consecutive terms were held 
by NU. Fourthly, there were asymmetrical and dilemmatic divisions of labor and shares of 
resources between traditionalists and modernist Masyumi leaders. The traditionalists NU 
commanded large mass-supports from Muslim communities, at least in Java, but with scarce 
resources of political and administrative skills outside religious affairs. Fifthly, personal 
enmity between NU chairman Wachid Hasyim and Masyumi chairman Natsir after the latter 
accused the former for mismanaging the shipment of Indonesian pilgrims to Mecca during 
Sukiman tenure. Since NU exit reduced only seven seats and did not change Masyumi’s status 
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as the largest faction in the parliament, Natsir and other Masyumi leaders seemed quite 
confidence that the split was harmless for their party (Bone Jr. 1954; Feith, 1962: 233-236).  
Meanwhile it is important to note at this point, that observers at that time gave high 
credits to Masyumi’s economic and political performances. On economy, many confirmed 
that Masyumi provided a major contribution to the economic progress in early period of 
constitutional democracy.  
 
Dr. John Sutter; in his extensive descriptive study of Indonesian economic policy, 
sees the period as being divided into two parts, which are, roughly, the times of 
political ascendancy of two major factions in the struggle. The period of the first 
four cabinets, from December 1949, when Dr. Mohammed Hatta took office as 
Prime Minister, until June 1953, when the cabinet of Mr. Wilopo fell, is referred to 
by Sutter as "the Masjumi period." He regards it as such in spite of the fact that Dr. 
Hatta and Mr. Wilopo were not members of the Masjumi political party, because, in 
his view, during this period the dominating outlook among members of the cabinet 
was the "Sjafruddin-Masjumi" outlook. (Mr. Sjafruddin Prawiranegara was first 
minister of finance, and later the governor of the Bank of Indonesia. He was also 
quite consistently the Masjumi party's outstanding spokesman on matters of 
economic policy. The period following the fall of the Wilopo cabinet is referred to 
by Sutter as "the PNI period" and as having been dominated in outlook by "the less 
tolerant ultra-nationalist and socialist politicians (Glassburner, 1962: 114). 
 
An optimistic observer even likened it with US Democratic Party: 
 
Within the vast, sprawling confederacy of the Masjumi there is more surface unity at 
present than there has been for months past. 'In some ways the Masjumi resembles 
the Democratic Party of the United States. It commands the almost automatic 
allegiance of a certain section of the population, albeit on a religious, not regional, 
basis. The Masjumi has its conservative wing (Sukiman and Wibisono) and its "New 
Dealers" (Natsir and Roem). To complete the analogy, Masjumi has even had its 
"Dixiecrat" revolt in the shape of the Nahdatul Ulama secession of late 1952. Again, 
as with the Democratic Party at various stages of its history, the Masjumi's 
opponents gleefully and wishfully continue to predict further schism and even its 
disintegration (Bone Jr., 1954: 20).  
 
On politics, in the meantime, Herbert Feith also praises Masyumi at this period as the major 
champion of constitutional democracy. He cites Natsir, when the latter warned his fellow 
parliamentarians not to loose faith to, and act in consistent with, democratic principles: 
 
If we want to teach our people to practice parliamentary democracy, let us not make 
a caricature of democracy… whoever weakens democracy, whoever for group or 
personal interests undermines its power to serve as the basis for a strong 
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government, he consciously or unconsciously is quietly arousing a proneness to 
dictatorship in the hearts of our people (Feith, 1978: 326). 
 
Masyumi obtained a third opportunity to form a government in August 1955 with 
Burhanuddin Harahap in the premiership post in coalition with other Islamic parties but 
excluded PNI which fell under strong pressures from the parliament as well as from the 
military for alleged corruption scandals in the previous cabinet. The main task set to the 
cabinet was to hold elections for the intended Constituent Assembly which would rewrite the 
constitution. Indeed, it was the long awaited election since the original schedule was in early 
decade. Had the election was conducted on schedule, Masyumi would certainly be the winner. 
However, by the mid 1950s many things had changed, as was Masyumi’s fortune. The vote 
was scheduled at 29 September 1955, preceded by weeks of heightening political tensions 
among political parties and their supporters, which impacts would last for months after the 
voting day. The result was surprising in many aspects, especially the surprising success of NU 
and PKI and the poor performance of Masyumi and PSI. Furthermore, the long awaited 
elections, which so many Indonesians believed to be able to solve many of national problems, 
proved to create another episode of political crisis, when parties in the parliament had to 
adjust to the new political constellations (Bone J. 1955; Pauker 1958; Feith, 1962: 414-459).  
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The Result of 1955 General Elections 
 
PARTY   PERCENTAGE          SEATS 
PNI     22.3    57 
Masyumi    20.9    57 
NU     18.4    45 
PKI     14.4    39 
PSII     2.9      8 
Christian Party    2.6      8 
Catholic Party    2.0      6 
PSI     2.0      5 
IPKI     1.4      4 
PERTI     1.3      4 
PRN     0.6      2 
Labor Party    0.6      2 
GPPS     0.6      2 
PRI     0.5      2  
PPPRI     0.5      2 
Murba Party    0.5      2 
BAPERKI    0.5      1 
PIR Wongsonegoro   0.5      1 
GERINDA    0.4      1  
PERMAI    0.4      1  
Dayak Party    0.4      1   
PIR Hazairin    0.3      1  
PPTI     0.2      1   
AKUI     0.2      1  
PRD     0.2      1  
PRIM     0.2      1   
ACOMA    0.2      1  
Prawirodirdjo & Associates  0.1      1  
Others     2.7      0   
TOTAL    100             257  
 
  
 
Analysts did notice that Masyumi was getting frustrated by the new course of political 
development—the dissolve of the parliament, and the increasingly strong triangle of the 
President, the Army and PKI—that pushed aside parties from the political stage, and electoral 
result and the existing institutional settings which it perceived blocked its future electoral 
success. Firstly, the 1955 electoral performance was shocking for Masyumi, as it had high 
expectations of success. The exit of NU in 1952 posed no significant problem for Masyumi 
leaders, and they doubted the traditionalists’ capability to organize party and mobilize voters. 
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Coincidentally, Masyumi held the government position in election time, and Burhanuddin 
Harahap made sure that the polls were held in due time. Even the prime minister who visited 
Pakistan before the election predicted that his party was expected to win 40 to 50 percent.  
Thus the final result that it only got runner up position with only 20 percent—with PNI in the 
first place, NU in close third position and even PKI loomed not far in the fourth, while its 
ideological ally PSI was far behind won only 2 percent of vote—was shocking. Initially, it 
could maintain the disappointment when PSI was excluded from the Ali Cabinet by 
demanding that PKI must not be involved. In the following months it became apparent that 
Ali intended to dominate the cabinet, undermining the fact that Masyumi had equal seats. In 
the parliament, PNI took the speaker position when its candidate defeated Masyumi, and Ali 
seemed determined to get rid of Masyumi’s supporters whenever he could. He blocked any 
minister of former Harahab cabinet from entering his cabinet, and expelled Masyumi and PSI 
men from strategic positions (Teik, 1972: 233-234). 
In the Constituent Assembly, Masyumi also failed to win the first position and lost 
from PNI, which also took the leadership of the Assembly after defeating the NU’s candidate. 
Masyumi could not threaten to leave the cabinet because of the possibility of PNI-NU-PKI 
coalition that would form a majority in the parliament. Masyumi leaders soon realized that the 
existing institutional settings—PR electoral system and Unicameral legislature—would cause 
a permanent defeat for their party. The most dominant leaders of the party who happened to 
be non-Javanese—Natsir, S. Prawiranegara, and B. Harahap are Sumatrans—seemed 
convinced that Javanese voters tended to vote for the Javanese parties—PNI, NU, PKI. The 
political situation was so pessimistic for Masyumi which until the election believed to be the 
largest party (Teik, 1972: 234-235). Concluding Masyumi situation, an observer wrote: 
 
Masjumi's dilemma was self-evident. Its continuation in the Sastroamidjojo cabinet 
was futile given PNI's refusal to share power equitably. Threatening to quit was 
equally futile since Sastroamidjojo could resort to another alignment without losing 
his government's parliamentary majority. Planning for larger margins at future 
elections would be a waste of resources in view of the Javanese voter's stubborn 
ethnic loyalty. Masjumi's leaders did not know what precise course of action to 
pursue but in the months after March 1956, they were very evidently restless (Teik, 
1972: 236-37). 
 
Teik even suggests that this political catastrophe had caused Masyumi’s leaders to lose their 
confidence and trust in the constitutional principles. In the party conference in December 
1956, it passed a bill that Sastroamijoyo’s cabinet could not be maintained. And Natsir 
proposed for a new cabinet under Hatta—presumably in an effort to find opportunity to get a 
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fair political share. However, the maneuver in fact undermined democratic values Masyumi 
championed in the previous period.  
 
Perhaps he was not conscious of it but by advocating a Hatta-led cabinet, Natsir was 
undermining confidence in the legitimacy and utility of democracy. Hatta was not a 
member of any political party and he did not contest the parliamentary election. By 
demanding that Hatta be made Prime Minister, Natsir was insisting by implication 
that fame was a more valid source of political authority than the mandate of the 
people (Teik, 1962: 241). 
 
In March 1957, when PNI-led post-election cabinet resign, Sukarno declared martial 
law and dissolved the parliament, and proposed his infamous Guided Democracy, and 
installed non-party cabinets. Masyumi, under the leadership of Natsir refused to join the 
cabinets, and vehemently denounced the Guided Democracy as unconstitutional. The martial 
law was in fact suggested by the newly (re)elected Army Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. A. H. 
Nasution who wanted to put order in his chain of commands, especially against rebellious 
regional military units. Infuriated and threatened by Nasution maneuvers, a number of senior 
army officers led by Col. Zulkifli Lubis and Col. M. Simbolon declared a Revolutionary 
Government of the Republic of Indonesia (PRRI, Pemerintahan Revolusioner Republik 
Indonesia) in Bukit Tinggi - West Sumatra in February 1958.   This was supported by Col. 
Ventje Samual who declared PERMESTA (Piagama Perjuangan Semesta Alam, Universal 
Declaration of Struggle) in the eastern province of Moluccas a few days later. It was soon 
known that national civil politicians were involved in PRRI, including Masyumi top leaders 
Mohammad Natsir, Burhanuddin Harahap and Sjafrudin Prawiranegara. The rebels gave the 
central government five days ultimatum with three demands: the cabinet must be dissolved, 
the vice president Mohammad Hatta and Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX of Yogyakarta must 
be appointed to form a business cabinet until elections were held, and Sukarno must return to 
his constitutional position as figurehead President. In response, Nasution acted decisively and 
by May 1958 the rebel head quarter was taken over, and the rebel leaders surrendered and 
were taken to Jakarta and imprisoned. Nasution also banned Masyumi, PSI and Christian 
Party in all regions where they supported the rebellion (For detail account of 
PRRI/PERMESTA, see H. Feith and D. Lev, 1963; Doeppers, 1972).  
Meanwhile, in the Constituent Assembly that was inaugurated on 10 September 1956, 
Masyumi with other Muslim party—NU, PSII, Perti, PPTI, AKUI—engaged in heated 
debates with nationalists and communists in efforts to rewrite the constitution. Initially, the 
debates were three partite involving Islamic, nationalists and Marxist ideological aspirations. 
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However, given the solidity of the Islamic block in pushing their agenda to invest Islam in the 
constitution, the Nationalists and Marxists came into a single block and the debates evolved 
into antagonism between Islamic and secular ideology. The political disagreements had been 
protracted, and the political deadlocks in the Assembly sessions were lasted for two years 
without any indication for possible compromise. In May 1959 the Assembly voted for the 
inclusion of seven words of The Jakarta Charter which would make Indonesian Muslims 
subject to Sharia law, which ended in another deadlock as it failed to achieve two third 
quorum. Annoyed by the prolonged squabbles Sukarno dissolved the Assembly and issued a 
decree to return to the original 1945 constitution, again with the full support from the military. 
The Jakarta Charter was included in the preamble of the constitution but with the seven words 
obliging Muslims to comply with Sharia Law omitted (Feith, 1962: 597-608). 
 The involvement of Masyumi top leaders in PRRI rebellion shattered Masyumi 
irrecoverably. It was reported that Sukiman, then the chairman of the party’s advisory body, 
proposed to expel Natsir, Sjafrudin Prawiranegara and Burhanuddin Harahab from the party 
for their involvement in PRRI, but to no avail. Natsir still had a popular image among 
Masyumi rank and files and grass root members. He even retained his position of the 
chairman up to one year after the rebellion. However, the party would soon meet its final 
destiny. Its leaders’ long enmity with President Sukarno, its persistent rejection of Guided 
Democracy, as well as its leaders’ involvement in PRRI rebellion, contributed to the final 
sealing of its history. In August 1960, the government banned the party (Ricklefs, 1981: 256). 
 
4. CONCLUSSION 
The previous paragraphs in this chapter discuss the roles of ideology and institutional setting 
in the history of two major islamist political organizations in Indonesian history, i.e. Sarekat 
Islam which operated in Indonesian politics during the emergence of nationalist movement in 
colonial era and the and Masyumi which was present and participated in political system after 
national independence. Using North theory of new institutionalism to analyze the structure of 
the behavior of the political parties, by taking the influence of ideology and institution into 
account, this chapter find a number of parallel features in SI and Masyumi. 
 Firstly, both SI and Masyumi were Islamist, that is, they adopted Islam as political 
worldview, advocated Islamic values and teachings as the solution for the existing political 
problems, and used Islam to mobilize support from the mass. In the case of SI, the 
significance of Islam as the base for the organization was clear in its name, that the 
organization was advanced to pursue Islamic values, and that Islam was a solution for 
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Muslims problems. Even when it changed its organizational course from trade into political 
organization, its ideological orientation did not change. Similarly, in the case of Masyumi, 
Islam was the fundamental identity, symbol and rhetoric—perhaps more than SI. Masyumi 
was formally a federation of major Muslim organizations in the country, and represented 
political aspirations for Indonesian Muslims. Masyumi’s programs were also marked by its 
Islamist tone, and quite ambitious, to promote Islam as the base of Indonesian constitution.  
 Secondly, although both parties adopted Islam as identity, program, rhetoric, and 
symbols, SI and Masyumi accentuated different discourses of Islam, in line with structural 
contexts in which they emerged and operated. SI was founded at the height of the colonial era, 
when the Duct eventually took control conclusively to the archipelago, and applied colonial 
policy characterized by economic exploitation, political repression and social and cultural 
discrimination. In such contexts, SI leaders perceived that Islam provides solution to get rid 
from those maladies. Islam teaches equality, that ones should be judged according to their 
religious piety and not according to their ethnicity or nationality. On politics, Islam promotes 
the rights of people to participate in collective decision making, hence Islam promotes 
democracy and against imperialism. Islam also emphasizes social solidarity, and since natural 
resources belong to God they should be shared equally among members of the society. Hence 
Islam is anti colonialism. Meanwhile, having emerged and operated in different structural 
milieu, Masyumi emphasized a different Islamist discourse. Masyumi emerged in post 
colonial time of post WW II, in which the structural political context was the combination of a 
need to find national identity and the abundance international influences in the form of 
ideological rivalries between Western Democracy plus Capitalism and Eastern Communism. 
In such contexts, Masyumi’s founders believed that Islam was the best alternative, since on 
the one hand it had rooted in Indonesian history and traditions, and on the other hand it 
contained all the positive elements found in both Democracy and Communism and devoid of 
their weakness. Islam provides a system of consultation and deliberation in collective decision 
making, hence Islam is democratic. Islam also guarantees individual rights to own properties 
and pursue economic enterprises; hence Islam is in accords with capitalism. Yet Islam strictly 
sanctions social equality and collective duty of the society to take care of the needy and the 
powerless, hence Islam matches Communism. 
 Thirdly, the political behavior of SI and Masyumi did not only reflect their Islamist 
orientations but were also parallel with the existing institutional settings. In a striking parallel 
manner, SI and Masyumi tended to behave moderately and proactively in the system in which 
the existing institutional settings were advantageous and accommodative to their aspirations, 
 82
and their positions ascended in political constellations and their influence on the public 
expanded. During 1914-1918 when its memberships expanded rapidly, SI vowed its loyalty to 
the colonial government and actively participated in the Volksraad in line with the facts that 
the government promised greater political roles for indigenous Indonesians.  However, after 
the government changed its course upside down and started implementing strict controls on 
nationalist movements, combined with internal frictions and the exit of the Marxist faction 
that severely weaken SI organization and reduced its public supports, SI started to launch 
reactive and radical policy by withdrawing its participation in the Volksraad and even adopted 
Pan-Islamic political programs, to join with nationalist movements in other Muslim lands to 
expel colonial powers and to gain full independence. In a similar manner, during 1950-1955, 
Masyumi acted proactively and rationally in advocating constitutional democracy and in 
formulating pragmatic political and economic policies. This was the period when political 
parties enjoyed an upper hand position in Indonesian politics when the president was confined 
by the constitution merely as a symbolic figurehead with little political capacity and the 
military suffered from internal frictions. However, when the political constellation changed—
when its electoral achievement was shockingly poor and thus its portion in parliamentary 
politics was significantly reduced, the president collaborated with the military by imposing 
martial law and pushing political parties to the background of national politics and 
economy—Masyumi’s leaders started to loose their confidence in the existing system, so they 
proposed maneuvers that contradict constitutional wisdoms, and even participated in open 
rebellions against the government.  
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CHAPTER III 
FROM CAMPUESES TO THE PARLIAMENT: 
THE ORIGIN AND HISTORY OF PKS 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
As is discussed in the previous chapters, ideology did not drive political behaviors 
independently, but rather in combinations with formal institutions. Ideology and institution 
are two sides of the same coin in affecting political behaviors of Sarekat Islam and Masyumi, 
two major Muslim political organizations in the Indonesian history. In the history of the two 
parties, ideology worked in combination with institutional settings, it informs the parties’ 
leaders about the conditions of their political environments. Moreover, ideology does not 
necessarily inspire political actors to act irrationally, although it might as well. In tracking the 
history of political behaviors of Islamist political organizations, the previous chapters found 
that ideology works in combination with institutional setting, in informing actors about the 
situation in the environment and supply alternative options to survive and to get benefits in 
doing transaction and cooperation. Actors’ trust to the rules of the game tended to be strong 
when—through ideology—they perceived that the system was beneficial; and the trust tended 
to weaken when the actors saw no opportunities for their sustainable benefit in participating in 
the system.  
In this chapter, I discuss the historical development that led into the formation of PKS 
from the perspective of Northian institutionalism. As in the previous chapter, the focus is on 
explaining the role played by ideological drives and inspirations, in relation with the existing 
institutional settings and competition opportunities in structuring historical developments of 
PKS. The first part of the article will discuss the origin of PKS, i.e. the history and 
development of Tarbiyah Movement, followed by a section on the Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood as the ideological progenitor of the movement. The later part will deal with the 
chronological account of the formation of the Justice Party (PK), its participation in the 
election and early experience in real political battlefield of the parliament. Finally, this 
chapter will discuss the transformation of PK into PKS, after the former was unable to pass 
the electoral threshold to be present in the next elections. This continued with discussion on 
PKS electoral success and its taking part into coalition government.   
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1.1. Theories of Political Party’s Life Cycle 
Before discussing PKS history, it is useful at this point to introduce theories 
formulatee by scholars of party studies in understanding the historical development of 
political party. As will become clearer in the next chapters, a political party is a distinct 
organization with unique structure that combine organizational properties of business firm, 
voluntary organization and governmental bureau (see Chapter V). The unique characteristic of 
a party organization has made a political party evolve in a distinct pattern, and gone through a 
distinct life cycle. As long as the organizational aspect is concerned, there is one fundamental 
factor that significantly affects party functions. This is what Panebianco calls “degree of 
institutionalization” and “degree of systemness”, which refers to the party’s ability to cope 
with changing environments and at the same time maintaining its identity and objectives. It 
must be kept in mind, following Panebianco’s line of argument, that those two tasks are not 
easy to tackle since they are in fact are of opposite directions. And he calls this an 
organizational dilemma. If it sticks consistently to its identity and objectives, the risk of the 
party is that its survival will not last in the face of changing environments; yet if it is willing 
to adapt to the dynamic surroundings it takes the risk of losing its identity and departure from 
its original objectives. A strongly institutionalized party is one that is able to maintain its 
organizational identity—as a mean to achieve certain objectives—while coming to terms with 
the changing environment; and the weakly institutionalized party needs to make a trade off 
between identity and survival (Panebianco: 1988: 11-14) 
In a chronological manner, there are four stages of developments in a party history that 
are substantial in affecting its degrees of institutionalization and systemness. Firstly, societal 
origin that provides basic orientation for party. Party scholars have documented that different 
societal setting affects the way political parties work in quite different manners. A traditional 
society, in which the dominant social and cultural characters are hierarchical, tend to produce 
‘cliental party’ in which the party is run by a handful of elites in the community, its objectives 
is to maintain the existing societal structures, and it woos support from the community 
through material incentives. A modernizing society that experiences rapid industrialization 
and urbanization, in which the society is divided by interest-based groupings, tend to produce 
‘mass-integration party’, which objectives are to reform the society according to the value of 
certain societal group, and therefore its orientation is ideological and mobilizing support from 
certain segments in society by exploiting ideological appeal. Lastly, an urbanized or 
modernized society, in which sufficient degree of welfare services are available and mass 
communications are common, the party which emerges tend to be a ‘catch-all’ party, a 
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pragmatic type of a party which objectives are to promote social and economic amelioration 
and mobilize political support from all segments of society (Gunter and Diamond, 2003: 169-
170). 
Secondly, the genetic factor or the process by which a political party was created. 
According to Panebianco in his classic book on party organizations, Political Parties: 
Organization and Power (1988) there are three different processes of genesis of political 
party, each will influence the way the party work in significantly different way: one is 
territorial penetration, a process in which a political party was created “from above”, when 
the first branch being formed was the national party center that subsequently creates or 
stimulates the development of periphery or the lower level branches. This genetic model will 
produce a centralistic and highly institutionalized party, in which the party central leadership 
holds strong power and control over its lower branches. This is because the central leadership 
is relatively solid and was established before the development of party branches. Two is the 
territorial diffusion, which is the opposite of the previous model in which party organization 
was created “bottom up”, when a group of regional political organizations agree to form a 
central party leadership. Party that was created in this way tend to have decentralized and less 
institutionalized organization, since the real authority is in the hand of regional organizations 
which existed before the creation of the central office and tend to be independent of it. Three 
is the combination between territorial penetration and diffusion. For example, a number of 
regional organizations agreed to form a national party organization, which subsequently 
created or stimulated the formation of lower level party branches. In this case, organizational 
centrality and its degree of institutionalization are in between of those model above, because 
there are three different organizations: the original initiators, the central office, and party 
branches created or stimulated by central office, that make it less centralized and 
institutionalized than territorial diffusion model but more so than territorial diffusion 
(Panebianco, 1988: 50-51).  
Thirdly, organizational factor important for the development of political party pertains 
with the source of legitimacy. Two factors are at stake, namely whether or not there is 
external sponsor of party organization and whether or not there is a charismatic leader in the 
party. If such an external sponsor exists, Panebianco argues, the party will be conceived as 
“political arm” of the sponsoring body, and will lead into the question of party’s loyalty in 
which the party’s loyalty and legitimacy. In this case, party’s loyalty will be primarily to the 
external organization and only secondarily to the party, and the external sponsor will become 
the primary source of legitimacy for the party’s leaderships, in term that every major decision 
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taken by party leaders need to be approve by the external sponsor. Interestingly, Penebianco 
notes the different between national or domestic-external sponsor and international-external 
sponsor. National or domestic external sponsor will undermine party organizational functions, 
and therefore weaken party organizational institutionalization since the sponsor will exercise 
control over it; but international-sponsor—typical for Communist party—tend to strengthen 
party institutionalization since the sponsor has an interest of the party high degree 
institutionalization to minimize other external influences. The next factor which influences 
party organizational performance is the presence or absence of a charismatic leader. If such a 
leader exists, the party will depend very much on him or her in which every major decision 
taken by party leaders need to have his/her approval. Instead of competing to propose the best 
programs and policies, party leaders will compete against each other to be close to, and 
favored by, the charismatic leader and hence undermines organizational procedures 
(Panebianco, 1988: 52-53) 
Fourthly, party organization will be going through a process of “organizational 
maturity” in the form of the institutionalization and establishment of organizational structures 
and mechanism. Typically, yet quite controversially, the organizational maturity is 
characterized by the formation of ‘party oligarchy’, in which a small number of leaders 
dominate the control over the party organization. This theory was originated by Robert 
Michels, who deems oligarchic tendency in party organization as inevitable, and dubs it as an 
iron law for party organizations. The oligarchic tendency of party organization is unavoidable 
because of the logic of the fundamental factors in the organization. One is technical factor, in 
which to become effective in making decision and reacting to new situations, it is necessary 
that the decision making be in the hand of small group of leaders who will be able to react and 
coordinate in better way. Two is sociological factor, in which the mass or party members and 
symphatizers tend to need strong leaders and they tend to venerate their leaders, because the 
mass need a sense of security.  They are also inclined to convince themselves that their 
leaders are strong and capable. Three is psychological factor, in which party leaders 
themselves will be motivated to develop an oligarchic organization, in order to get a more 
stable position and to secure greater material and prestige rewards from their positions 
(Michels, 2001) 
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2. ORGANIZATIONAL BACKGROUNDS 
2.1 The Origin: Tarbiyah Movement  
Like SI and Masyumi in the past, PKS developed from a semi-political organization, 
named Tarbiyah Movement (Gerakan Tarbiyah), a loosely organized Islamic movement 
popular among younger Muslims in Indonesia in 1970s-1980s, especially among university 
students. It was conspicuously very popular among students of secular universities and 
schools in which religious subjects were not studied, and less popular in religious educational 
institutions in which religious subjects were formally taught. Initially, it was a network of 
extracurricular study groups among Muslim students to study religious subjects, such as 
Qur’an and Hadits (prophetic traditions), Islamic Law (Sharia and Fiqih), and history of 
Islam etc. By late 1980s such study groups became a trend among university students. Major 
universities, usually state-owned, also became centers for Tarbiyah movement. Some of them 
even developed well-known centers of religious activism—such as the Community of Salman 
Mosque in of Bandung Institute of Technology in West Java, and Shalahuddin Communion in 
Gadjahmada University of Yogyakarta—which influenced the spread well beyond their 
university campuses (Azis et al., 1996). 
There are several theories on the origin of the movement. The first theory conceives 
that Tarbiyah movement was a further development of the movement initiated by student 
activists in Salman Mosque of Bandung Institute of Technology. The Salman Mosque was 
founded in May 1972, after years of efforts to establish a mosque in the institute back in 1960 
had been hampered by the campus authority. The initial idea to build a mosque and to develop 
an Islamic community among students was to facilitate Muslim students in observing 
religious duties such as daily prayers, and also to organize a Muslim community in the 
campus. Muslim students—many of whom came rural and traditional communities across the 
country to study in Bandung (the capital of West Java which in colonial era was known as 
Paris van Java)—felt that something was missing from their life when they lived in a secular 
campus located in secular urban environment and were doing mainly secular activities. They 
were longing for the warmth of religious atmosphere and community.  
However, the early 1960s was an era when the Indonesian Communist Party was on 
the rise and the military was still traumatic with Muslim politics (Masyumi, PRRI, DI/TII), 
therefore developing an Islamic community in a strategic university campus was not easy. 
After more than a decade of efforts, Bandung Institute of Technology founded a campus 
mosque named Salman Al-Farisi, or known simply as Salman Mosque. One of its founders 
was Dr. Imaduddin Abdul Rahim—a.k.a. Bang Imad or Brother Imad—who was the secretary 
 88
of International Islamic Federation of Student Organization and involved in various 
international activities at that period (Naipul, 200: 7-25). Bang Imad introduced to Salman 
community the thoughts and organizational traditions of Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood 
(Ikhwan al-Muslimun) that was to influence heavily the way Salman Mosque community 
organized its activities. More than merely a place of religious rituals, the Mosque evolved into 
a center of Islamic society. It provided various services for its members and Muslim 
community outside the campus, such as education, marriage consultancies, and even banking 
system. And it was soon became a model and replicated in various universities in the country 
(Djamas, 1989: 207-86). 
Interestingly, the history of the origin and development of Muslim student community 
in Salaman Mosque was quite in tone with the theory of the paradox of modernity and the 
Islamic revival, put forward by Eickelman and Piscatory in their classic study on the modern 
Muslim politics (see, Eickelman and Piscatory, 1996: 5-20). The classical formulation of 
modernization theories perceive that diversifications of economy and institutionalization of 
politics were sine qua non of modernization process. This process is best pursued through the 
advancement of specialized educations and trainings, by developing western-model 
educational institutions. Moreover, the argument also states that modernity was inevitably 
going to remove traditional structures in society. Religion, as part of traditional cultural and 
societal system, would be inevitably pushed aside by the modernization process. This view—
and some other variations—were adopted by many policy makers in the Muslim world in 
directing their national development.  
However, the difference between traditions and modernity was proved not so clear cut. 
When Muslims in various countries from Egypt to Iran, from Turkey to Pakistan to Malaysia 
and Indonesia developed modern educational systems, educated Muslims had abandoned 
neither their religion nor their tradition. On the contrary, modernization instigated a 
rejuvenation of religious sentiments. Eickelman and Piscatory call this process: 
‘Objectification of Muslim Consciousness’, which consist of three simultaneous elements. 
Firstly, modernization of education system introduced modern sciences to Muslim students 
that provide systematic understanding of reality. This enabled them to systematize their 
understandings of Islam, endorsed them to perceive Islam not merely as traditions they 
inherited from their parents but as a way of life (manhaj) to be pursued systematically, as well 
as to be differentiated—and in some occasion to be defended—from non-Islamic systems of 
life. Instead of weakening, modern educations strengthen Muslims religious understanding 
and sentiments. Secondly, education and economic modernization brought also the 
 89
development of mass publications that disseminated effectively religious teachings far beyond 
the capabilities of traditional religious propagation institutions. Mass publications of religious 
materials facilitated instant Islamisation of the society. Thirdly, institutionalization of politics 
attracted Muslims to participate and take control of the symbolic productions of Muslim 
politics. When the impact of objectification of religious consciousness had become visible 
among Muslim community, they naturally need institutionalized channels for their 
inspirations and interests in political sphere, and gradually new generations of politicians and 
political organizations entered the arena and compete for power on behalf of the new Muslim 
generation (Eickelman and Piscatory, 1996: 5-20).  
 The second theory of the genesis of the Tarbiyah movement argues that it was not a 
new story of Islamic activism in Indonesia, but rather a direct continuation of the previous 
ones. They were the fruits from a tree planted through systematic religious propagation 
programs organized by Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council (Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah 
Indonesia, DDII), founded by former Masyumi leaders such as M. Natsir, M. Roem, and S. 
Prawiranegara. By the late 1960s, Masyumi politicians pursued different public activities: 
some of them founded DDII as a new vehicle to promote Islamic interests when the new 
regime thwarted their reentering politics. Another group, mostly from second level 
leaderships, were allowed by the military establishment to form a new political party namely 
Indonesian Muslims Party (Parmusi) and to compete in the election. Finally, the younger 
generation of Masyumi activists took pragmatist way by joining the regime through Golkar or 
its filial organizations (Fealy and Platzdasch, 2005). Natsir was also active in religious 
activities at the international level, when he assumed several key positions in international 
Islamic organizations and enjoyed vast recognition in the Islamic world. DDII played 
significant roles in facilitating the establishment of Tarbiyah movement. Firstly, DDII actively 
contributed in building and developing mosques and Islamic communities in secular 
campuses, which then constitute Tarbiyah network. Secondly, DDII was assigned by the 
Ministry of Religious Affairs to organize scholarships to Middle Eastern universities, 
especially to Egypt and and Saudi Arabia. Among the students sent by DDII was Abdi 
Sumaiti a.k.a. Abu Ridho who was to became the ideologue and key figures in Tarbiyah 
movement and PKS. Lastly, DDII translated and published works of major modern Middle 
Eastern authors, including Hassan Al-Banna, Sayyid Qutub and Said Hawwa, whose books 
became the canon for Tarbiyah members (Furkon, 2005).  
This theory resembles Imaduddin Shahin’s thesis on the ascent of Muslim political 
movements in North African post-colonial Muslim countries. According to Shahin’s study on 
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contemporary Islamist political organizations in Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco, Islam was the 
main pillar of the society and politics in those countries before and during colonial era. In 
Tunisia it was represented by traditional ulama who took control over Sharia court and 
educational institutions; in Algeria represented by Sufi leaders and their mystical orders 
(tariqat); while in Morocco was a combination between the Sultanate, the ulama and the 
Sufis.  During the period of struggles for independence from French colonial occupations in 
those countries, the Muslim leaders contributed significant tasks in mobilizing mass support 
for the struggles. However, in the post colonial governments they were denied political rights, 
even were systematically discriminated and marginalized by the status quo in their respective 
countries.  
In Tunisia, the government under the president Habib Burguiba launched 
secularization program, focusing on economic productivity and development. Although his 
secularization program was not as explicit as that in Turkey that ban religion in any public 
activity, he took over traditional religious and education institutions and imposed government 
ultra-rational interpretations on religion that rendered it as merely an instrument for economic 
development. In Algeria, a similar scenario was also set up, in which the government took 
over traditional religious institutions, marginalized the traditional ulama, and imposed 
socialist-interpretation of religion. The President, Houari Boumedina, expressed his idea on 
socialist national policy that religion would be useless for Algerians when they were still in 
overwhelmed poverty and backwardness (Shahin, 1998: 47). Lastly, in Morocco, the 
manipulation and coercion of religious institutions followed by marginalization toward the 
ulama who contributed to national liberation was also conducted by King Hassan. He put all 
religious activities under the state’s controls and auspices and published official religious 
journals as the standard religious reading materials for the mass, and appointed religious 
leaders and preachers and made sure they would follow the government’s guidelines. The 
king even reportedly said, that he as the Amirul Mu’minin (the chief of the faithful, the title of 
Islamic Caliph) has the duty to defend Islam against everything, including the ulamas.  
Against these backdrops of political marginalization by the political status quo, 
Muslim political activists in the North African countries turned their activism from politics to 
da’wa, especially targeting younger and more educated generations. They founded small but 
solid organizations, focused their activities in social services helping people, and gained 
popularity. In Tunisia, they founded Harakat Nahda (Awakening Movement) that emerged in 
the 1970s and dominated Tunisian politics in the 1980s; in Algeria various small 
organizations eventually merged in Front Islamique du Salut (Islamic Salfation Front) which 
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surprising electoral win in 1990 and the government violent rejection has become an 
archetype of Islamist political organization and its participation in democratic politics. And in 
monarchic Morocco, various Islamist groups also emerged and articulated the political 
interests of new Muslim generation, especially Harakatul Islah wat Tajdid al-Maghribiyah 
(The Movement of Reform and Renewal) led by Abdul Karim Muthi’, and Al-Adl wal Ikhsan 
(Justice and Benevolence) led by Abdel Salam Yassin. 
 The third theory of the origin of Tarbiyah community, suggests that Tarbiyah 
movement was initiated by Indonesian students who had just returned from the Middle East in 
the 1980s. It was at the height of the government effort to contain Islamic radicalism and 
political activism among university students. Since the mass riots in Jakarta January 1974, 
following student demonstration rallies against government corruptions and unreserved 
invitations to foreign investments to build capital-intensive industries that devastated 
traditional labor-intensive economies, the government launched policies to thwart university 
students’ involvements in politics. Historians have recorded that the riots was in fact a pretext 
of intra-military conflict between anti-Suharto professional army generals vs. pro-Suharto 
business-generals which was won by the latter. In line with the policy of depoliticizing the 
mass, the government curbed university students, who had shown expressive discontents 
.Government decrees banned political activities in university campuses ratified in April and 
May 1978, the so called Normalisation of Campuses’ Life/Student Coordination Body 
(Normalisasi Kehidupan Kampus/Badan Koordinasi Kemahasiswaan, NKK/BKK). The 
government agued it wanted to protect the students from irresponsible influences that could 
distract them from their main activities of studying (Scwarz, 1999: 33-35; Kingsbury, 2002: 
84-86).  
Simultaneously the government and the military also launched operations to 
strengthen their power domination by secretly reviving the banned DI/TII remnants, and then 
violently crushed them to discredit Islamic politics. The 1970s was a crucial era for Suharto 
government in its effort to establish total control over the countries politics. Several senior 
former members of DI/TII were approached by Indonesian intelligence service (BAKIN) and 
were suggested to reconsolidate their organization to anticipate the reemergence of 
Communist groups. ICG report writes: 
 
Through the intelligence agency, BAKIN, former Darul Islam fighters, primarily but 
not exclusively from Java, who had been incorporated into the Indonesian army and 
government, were persuaded to contact their old comrades. The argument provided 
by BAKIN was that, with the fall of South Vietnam in 1975, Indonesia was in 
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danger of Communist infiltration across the Indonesian-Malaysian border in Borneo, 
and that only the reactivation of Darul Islam could protect Indonesia. Whether 
through coercion or money or a combination of both, a number of DI leaders rose to 
the bait, and by mid-1977, the government had arrested 185 people whom it accused 
of belonging to a hitherto unknown organisation called Komando Jihad, committed 
to following the ideals of Kartosuwirjo and establishing the Islamic state of 
Indonesia (NII). In realty, the Komando Jihad was Ali Moertopo’s creation (ICG: 
2002: 5). 
 
 
In such a situation, Muslim students were under double threats from the regime, i.e. as 
the generation of Muslim activists and as university students. It seemed this situation that led 
into the creation of an organization for Muslim students that would avoid government 
repressions but were still capable to focus its concerns about Muslim political aspirations at 
the same time. This theory reports that the movement was initiated by graduates of the Middle 
East universities who returned to Indonesia in the early 1980s, which included Hilmy 
Aminuddin, Salim Segaf Aljufri, Abdullah Said Baharmus, and Acep Abdul Syukur. Initially, 
they seemed to have difficult times with the authority, and Hilmy Aminuddin was detained 
but no further information is provided of the reason. When the situation was getting better, 
those activists reorganize their movement and organize their activities more systematically. 
Among the early figures who joined the movement were Abdi Sumaithi, Yusuf Supendi and 
Rahmat Abdullah. The main targets of recruitment were highs school and university students. 
Utilizing campuses’ mosques as the save haven to express student religious and political 
activism, they organized a network of Islamic study clubs in major universities that evolved 
into Tarbiyah movement, following the ideological and organizational pattern of Egyptian 
Muslim Brotherhood (Salman, 2006: 189-1990). 
The last scenario does not sound unique, as the Middle East has constantly influenced 
the dynamics of Indonesian Islam. Already in 1880, a Dutch prominent scholar Christian 
Snouck Hurgronje wrote that the city of Mecca for Indonesian Muslims was like the heart for 
a human limb; it pumped blood of fresh ideas to the whole populace of Muslim in Indonesia. 
In previous centuries, it functioned as arteries through which fresh ideas from the Middle East 
traveled into Indonesian archipelago, as the Mecca was where the pilgrims annually gathered 
in the holy city of Mecca in the 12th month of Muslim calendar, and returned back to 
Indonesia with updated news about developments and trends in various parts of the Islamic 
world (Bubalo and Fealy, 2005: 47). A historian of Indonesian politics wrote: 
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The holy city had a more than usual attraction for Indonesians. Snouck Hurgronje, 
who visited Mecca in 1885, remarked that the "Jawas" there were distinguished by 
their scorn for their own half-pagan country, and their naive respect for the idealized 
land where all institutions were presumed to be in accordance with the law of the 
Prophet.  The pilgrimage was the principal source of foreign ideas for nineteenth 
century Indonesians, particularly those outside Java. Though the majority of "Jawas" 
spent only a few weeks in the Hejaz, they made contact there with the remarkably 
large number of their countrymen residing semi permanently in Mecca, who had 
come to share the international and distinctly anti-colonial outlook of the holy city.' 
(Reid, 1967: 269) 
 
Moreover, many of these pilgrims were students who stayed in the Middle East for 
given periods of time, before they returned to their homeland with the newest religious 
discourses they learned. In the first decade of the 19th century, a number of returned pilgrims 
brought back puritanical interpretation developed by Ibnu Abdul Wahab—the founder of 
Wahabi—to Western Sumatra and initiated a religious reform (Reid, 1967: 272-273). In the 
early 20th century, other returnees brought Islamic modernism advanced by Egyptian 
Muhammad Abduh and founded Muhammadiyah. In the 1970s Saudi government intensified 
their contributions in propagating Islam in Indonesia, partly because of the abundance 
petrodollars and partly as an effort to hamper the spreading influence of Iranian Islamic 
Revolutions. Through various agencies, government and privates, they provided scholarships 
and other financial grants. It established the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO) 
that has made efforts to spread the message of Islam in the Islamic world, and also supported 
the installation of Indonesian branches of Saudi-based international organization, such as OIC 
and WAMY. In 1980 the Saudi Government set up the Indonesian Institute for Islamic and 
Arabic Sciences, Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab, or LIPIA (Bubalo and Fealy, 
2005: 55). The institution effectively became a channel for transmitting religious ideas and 
ideologies from the Middle East, not only that a-political Salafi tradition from Saudi, but also 
Palestinian Hizbut Tahrir, and Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.  
 
2.2. The Inspiration: Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood 
It seems quite save at this point to opine the three theories as complementary, instead 
of competing, namely that religious objectification among educated-urban-Muslim 
generation, strategic shift of Muslim activists from politics to religious propagation, as well as 
influences from the dynamics of religious discourses in the Middle East were simultaneously 
contributed to the emergence of the Tarbiyah movement. 
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What is clear was that the Tarbiyah movement developed into more synchronized 
networks, if with loose organizational structures, and more expressively avowing the ideology 
of Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwanul Muslimin), a religious-political organization 
founded by Hassan Al-Banna (1906-1949) in Egypt in 1928. Considering its important 
influence to Tarbiyah movement, it is worth a lengthy exposition. Initially, the Muslim 
Brotherhood adopted the ideology of salafi movement advocated by an Egyptian intellectual 
Rashid Ridha—who revised the original and more liberal version  advanced by his mentor 
Muhammad Abduh, into more conservative and apologist tones—to reform the society’s 
social, economic and political conditions by returning into the authentic teachings of Islam 
based on Qur’an and the Hadits, which were rational and practical, as were exemplified by 
earlier generations of Muslims (the Salaf). They believed that Islam provided all necessary 
requirements of social developments provided that the Muslims followed the correct 
understanding of their religion. At the same time, they refused and denounced traditional 
religious interpretations represented by Al-Azhar religious establishment which were too 
much preoccupied with impractical and obsolete scholastic teachings irrelevant to current 
events, as well as liberal-westernized thinkers who were keen to accept anything western that 
undermined Islamic identity (Lia, 1998: 76-79).  
However, different from other salafi movements which were commonly apolitical, 
Muslim Brotherhood was explicitly advocating political issues in their objectives and 
programs. Moreover, it adopted organizational structure that was also uncommon among 
salafi organizations, i.e. by combining military-like hierarchical structures and chain of 
commands and Sufi-Orders style of secretive networks and absolute obedience to the leader. 
Some analysts mistakenly argue that Al-Banna imitated the organizational structure of 
European fascism that combined militarism and absolute compliance to the leader:  
 
From Italy's Fascists, al-Banna borrowed the idea of unquestioning loyalty to a 
charismatic leader, modeling the slogan of his paramilitary organization--"action, 
obedience, silence"--on Mussolini's injunction to "believe, obey, fight." Taking a cue 
from the Nazis, he placed great emphasis on the Muslim Brotherhood's youth wing 
and on the marriage of the physical and the spiritual, of Islam with activism. 
Unsurprisingly, al-Banna also taught his followers to expect not encouragement but 
repression from traditional Islamic authorities (Fukuyama and Samin, 2002). 
 
However, a closer look to al-Banna personal backgrounds will give more accurate 
information. Al-Bana first organizational experience was in Sufi order, al-Hasafiyah group, in 
which he became a fully initiated member when he was only sixteen (Mitchell, 1969: 3-4). 
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There were two basic characters of Sufi organization: firstly it was secretive, because it taught 
esoteric knowledge that should have been kept secret and limited to selected individuals; and 
secondly it was hierarchical, in which it required an absolute obedience of the members or 
disciples to the spiritual master. It was more plausible to consider Sufi order tradition as the 
inspiration for al-Banna in constructing Brotherhood organization. Besides, Brotherhood 
activities exhibited clearly imprints of Sufi tradition, such as reciting formulations of prayers 
and meditation, although Al-Banna never considered himself a spiritual master in a Sufi 
tradition sense of the term.  
To realize his political vision, al-Banna created cell-like groups called Usrah, through 
which the organization carried out its recruitments and indoctrination programs. These 
organizational structures were created following organizational crisis in 1931-1932, when a 
number of prominent members challenged al-Banna leadership, but failed.  This forced the 
groups to resign. The structure assured al-Banna’s domination in the organization: on the one 
hand the military-like hierarchy and compliance created a solid and effective organizational 
mechanism and decision makings, on the other hand cell-like organs provided a decentralized 
autonomy of its branches and localized any possible problem, for example when a leader was 
arrested it would not caused any problem to other cells. Finally, the Brotherhood also 
developed a sustainable financial source for its organization by creating joint-stock companies 
in which only members were allowed to buy shares, to ensure its financial independence and 
prevent external intervention (Lia, 97-98). 
During the World War II, when the British military occupied Egypt, seized the Suez 
Canal and forced the Ottoman-backed monarch to install pro-British government, created 
social unrest and severed economic hardships, the Brotherhood created a military wing in 
spite of al-Banna’ insistences for non-violence policy. When the first Arab-Israeli war broke 
in 1948, following the creation of the state of Israel and annexation of Palestine land, the 
Brotherhood participated actively in fund rising and its military units were involved in various 
combat operations. During post-war turmoil period, the Brotherhood grew rapidly and was 
able to put its pressure on the government. In December 1948 the government charged the 
Brotherhood of accumulating weapons and bombs for a revolution, and issued a decree 
dissolving it. Al-Banna and other leaders vehemently rejected the accusation, and sporadic 
conflicts sparked between the Brotherhood and government security units.  
When in February 1949, al-Banna was assassinated—apparently under the 
government order—the conflict intensified. In retaliation, in May that year, a group of 
Brotherhood military unit launched a putative attempt to assassinate the Prime Minister Abdul 
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Hadi, and the government reacted with massive arrest and imprisoned thousands of the 
Brotherhood activists. In July 1952 a military group called Free Officer toppled down the 
monarch and installed a revolutionary government, led by Muhammad Najib, Gamal Abdul 
Nasser and Anwar Sadat. Initially the relation between the Brotherhood and the military junta 
was cordial, but soon it became sour when in October 1954 the Brotherhood was blamed for a 
failed assassination attempt to Gamal Abdul Naser. Massive arrest was launched to the 
Brotherhood activists, many served life sentence and six of its top leaders were hanged—
including Sayyid Qutub (1906-1966) who was executed in August 1966. Qutub was a prolific 
author and his works enjoyed international readerships especially Al-Adalah al-Ijtima’iyah fil 
Islam (The Social Justice in Islam), his commentary of the Qur’an, Fi Dhilalil Qur’an (in the 
Shade of the Qur’an), and Ma’alim fit Thariq (Milestones), in which he advocated an 
uncompromising struggle against infidels that referred to the western cultures and civilization. 
And for this reason many contemporary analysts depict Qutub as the forerunner of Jihadi 
movements, including Al-Qaeda.  
In a closer inspection, however, Tarbiyah movement adopted Muslim Brotherhood 
ideology and organizational structures of earlier period when it was under the leadership of 
Hassan Al-Banna. A senior member of the movement explained, that the Tarbiyah community 
perceived Brotherhood organizational model as a better alternative for Indonesian Muslims. 
For centuries—from colonial era down to independent Indonesia—Muslim political 
movements suffered from typical weaknesses, namely too much dependence on outstanding 
figures and lack of regenerations. They soon disappeared when the founder passed away or no 
longer in the organization for other reasons. The Brotherhood’s method provides a better 
alternative, which emphasized organizational mechanism instead of personal figures and paid 
serious attention to sustainable regenerations (Interview with Khalid Mahmud in Yogyakarta, 
03.04.2007). And these have been the characteristics of Tarbiyah movement: their leaders 
were student activists known only among themselves, and only later on when PKS gained 
popularity Indonesian public know those people.  
 Meanwhile another Tarbiyah activist Yon Machmudi, in his doctoral dissertation on 
the movement suggests that there were two main appeals of Brotherhood movement for 
Indonesian Muslim activists. First is its practicality, that is, it provides systematic guidelines 
to improve and develop Muslim society in various aspects, from social to economic to 
politics. Islam is not complicated scholastic teachings that only learned people can 
understand. Rather, it is a clever book for Muslims in pursuing a healthy and happy life, in 
this world and in hereafter (Machmudi, 2005: 207). This echoes Piscatori’s point when he 
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explains the development of mass-Islam that spread among non specialists as the product of 
modern education and mass media. And it is also consistent with the fact that most of 
Tarbiyah activists and members were students and graduates of non-religious studies. 
 Secondly, another selling point of Brotherhood among younger and educated Muslims 
was its moderately conservative religious views and gradual political agendas. At the religious 
level, although Brotherhood religious view is conservative, it is still possible to qualify it as 
moderate in term that if does not advocate violent rejection toward the others. Machmudi adds 
that among indications of its moderation is its adoption of Sufi traditions, since in Islam Sufi 
groups are the most well known of its inclusive religious outlook. At the political level, the 
moderation is indicated by it gradual political agenda, i.e. that the development of Islamic 
society and polity should be pursued in gradual, and not through grabbing power or 
revolution. The common understanding among Tarbiyah activists on the political project of 
the movement is that it should be started from individuals, to recruit members and to educate 
them according to Islamic teachings. The next step is to Islamize the family, because it is the 
fundamental unit of the society and strategic unit for regeneration. When Islamic family 
system is established, it will be highly likely that that the society is easier to be persuaded to 
follow Islamic principles. And finally, when the society has been Islamized, the political 
system would follow, because Muslim public will naturally ask for Islamic political systems 
(Interview with Khalid Machmud, 19.04.2007). According to Machmudi, the empirical 
evidence of Tarbiyah political moderation was the fact that whereas being arrested by the 
police or other government apparatus was customary in 1980s, no Tarbiyah activities were 
banned and none of its activists were arrested (Machmudi, 2005: 207).  
Tarbiyah movement adopted the organizational traditions of the Brotherhood, initially 
developed by al-Banna, with cell-like structures and stressing obedience to the leaders. This 
group was called Usrah, which consisted of 5 to 12 students who intensively studied Islam 
under the guidance of a mentor. In many cases, members of a cell did not reveal who was 
their mentor to members of other cells. The mentors on their part form further cells, etc. The 
movement was also marked by their typical activities. The first and the most fundamental was 
Liqo (Arabic term for meeting), a weekly gatherings in which members of cells meet with 
their mentor to learn and discuss religious subjects. The typical subjects were on theology and 
the history of the Prophet Muhammad, based on selective readings of the Quranic verses and 
prophetic traditions. The second was Mabit (Arabic: to reside), in which members spent a 
night in a Mosque do intensive learning and discussions on religious subjects, and practicing 
some special prayers. The session usually started at 10.pm, when the mentor delivered 
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lectures, followed by asking and answering questions. At around 3am, members woke up for 
special night prayers. This non obligatory prayer is valued very highly in Islamic traditions, as 
it provides Muslims with a very tranquil situation to pray, in addition to physical-
psychological efforts to get up early in the morning. The third was Daurah (Arabic: training), 
communion of larger numbers of participants in which the movement attracted new members. 
This session was typically organized on behalf of formal student organizations in faculties and 
departments, and was normally held during early academic years when new students just 
started their new lives in campus. Fourth, Rihlah (Arabic: trip), in which a large members of 
Tarbiyah travel into tourism sites. Usually they went with their family members and the 
session was in large part informal gathering in which members socialized with others. Fifth, 
Mukhayam (arabic: camping) was a special session during which members of Tarbiyah 
groups spent time outside towns to have special physical activities. In this session participants 
learned various physical skills and techniques necessary for survival (Damanik, 2002: 190-
193; Salman, 2006: 122-139). 
 
2.3. The Startup: Take over Students Organizations 
Those activities were carried out by and large in clandestine during the 1980s, in order 
to avoid unwanted curbs from the authority. Yet the situation was changed considerably 
during the 1990s, when the governments opened greater opportunities to Muslim public 
activisms. In August 1990, Association of Indonesian Muslim Scholars (ICMI, Ikatan 
Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia) led by then the Minister of Science and Technology B. J. 
Habibie was founded in Malang East Java. Legion of prominent Muslim figures and 
intellectuals such as Nurcholish Madjid, Amien Rais, Dawam Raharjo, Adi Sasono—to name 
but few—were on the board of the organization, and it represented the massive surge of 
Muslim politics in Indonesian history at the closing of the century. A leading member of the 
association even boasted that it was the third moment in the century when Indonesian 
Muslims joined to form an organization representing Indonesian Islam, after the formation of 
CSI in 1914 and Masyumi 1945 (Ramage, 1995: 77). ICMI became a political vehicle for 
Muslims to take positions in economy, bureaucracy, and in the military. However, not all 
Muslim leaders approved and joined ICMI. Abdurrahman Wachid, then the Chairman of NU 
criticized ICMI as a Trojan horse of the government to exploit Muslims (Ramage, 1995: 68). 
The friendly political atmosphere in the 1990s enabled activists of Tarbiyah 
community brought their activities into public. Firstly, they founded educational institutions 
to socialize their programs as well as to attract new recruits. They founded ‘Nurul Fikri’ in 
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Jakarta, study assistance (bimbingan belajar) to help high school students in their preparation 
to enroll into University, run by graduates of the University of Indonesia, including Suharna 
in collaboration with Hilmy Aminuddin. It soon became popular among students in the city 
because of its effective methods combined with low tuition fee, and students who were 
succeeded in enrolling into their favorite universities then became voluntary campaigners to 
promote the institution among their junior colleges in high schools. In addition to studying 
academic subjects, Nurul Fikri provided classes to study religion that the students were 
happily attended. It therefore effectively became a recruitment posts, and most of the students 
who were studied in Nurul Fikri joined Tarbiyah groups in their campuses. Tarbiyah activists 
also founded an Islamic boarding school, Al-Hikmah, in South Jakarta, led by Abdul Hasib 
Hasan, which provided facilities for their members to study religious subjects such as Arabic, 
Islamic theology and law more intensively, as well as a center of excellence for trainings and 
indoctrinations of Tarbiyah members. They also set up ‘Khairu Ummah’ an organization that 
provided preachers for religious speeches and propagations (lembaga dakwah) organized by 
Yusuf Supendi. Initially they sent their preachers in around Jakarta, but when many Tarbiyah 
activists finished their university studies and worked in various jobs across the country—from 
Aceh in Sumatra to Lombok in eastern Indonesia—it also sent preachers to give sermons to 
those workplaces (Damanik, 2002: 152-157).  
Secondly, they promoted publication of magazines to disseminate their ideas and 
communicate with their communities. The most well known was Sabili magazine, founded by 
Zainal Muttaqien and Rahmat Abdullah. In a quite short time, the magazine became very 
popular not only among Tarbiyah community but also among non-Tarbiyah Muslim students. 
The news and articles printed in Sabili were specially design for young readers, by avoiding 
complex analyses and technical terms of religious studies—that characterized many Islamic 
magazine at that time—and additional features contained information on Islam in various 
countries. Because of its popularity with rightist messages, the government banned Sabili in 
1993. Tarbiyah activists also founded a number of small semi-commercial publishing houses 
which were widely recognized of their publication of special editions of pocket books on 
Islam translated from chapters of books written by the Middle Eastern writers (Damanik, 
2002: 158-160).  
Thirdly, they also set up Studies and Information of Contemporary Islamic World 
(SIDIK, Studi dan Informasi Dunia Islam Kontemporer) as a think-tank to provide 
information analyses on international Islam, with special focus on various conflicts suffered 
by Muslim communities in various countries, from Palestine, Afghanistan, Bosnia etc. They 
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frequently organized seminars and workshops on the subjects, where participants watched 
video-film narrating the conflicts. Different from common opinions constructed by western 
media that depicted Muslim groups as the culprits of the conflicts, SIDIK sent messages that 
they were in fact the victims. Fourthly, Tarbiyah communities occasionally held cultural 
events, which the the most popular is Nashid or Islamic acappella performed by male singers 
(Damanik, 2002: 169-175).  
In mid-1990s Tarbiyah network was flourished in various university campuses in 
Indonesia, especially in major cities. In line with their political tendency—adopted from the 
Muslim Brotherhood—they started to expand their influence to formal structures, by 
systematically taking over student-parliaments, at university as well as at faculty and 
department levels. And they had done this quite smoothly, because their network was solid 
and comparatively better than other communities. In the University of Indonesia in Jakarta, a 
major center of Tarbiyah community, the first figure to emerge as the chairman of University 
Student-Senate was Zulkiflimansyah in 1994, and in the next periods the leaderships was 
handed down among Tarbiyah activist including Rama Pratama who was the Senate chairman 
in 1998 and often appeared on TV during student demonstrations before and after the regime 
change. The taking over of formal student bodies in university campuses were also took place 
in other major universities across the country. In the second half of 1990s, student activists in 
major universities were often associated with mosque-based activists, on the fact that 
Tarbiyah activists whose bases were mosques now dominated the structures. 
In mid 1997 monetary crisis severely hit Indonesia and other Asian countries, 
followed by price hikes on almost every commodity that triggered social and economic 
unrests. Calls for succession of national leadership were voiced by several political 
oppositions. Student groups organized rallies in major cities, demanded political reform. In 
tone with the political atmosphere, activists from Tarbiyah network founded Action Union for 
Indonesian Muslim Student (KAMMI, Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia) in March 
1998, in an annual meeting of Muslim student networks held in Muhammadiyah University of 
Malang in East Java. Elected as the first chairman was Fahri Hamzah. KAMMI adopted 
Islamist ideology, typical for Tabiyah network, by putting Islam as the solution to solve what 
they perceived as ‘moral crisis’ of national politics. It programs were to organize and to 
mobilize Muslim students to support the reformation of Indonesian politics. In the following 
months, during the regime change in 21 May 1998 when Suharto resigned and replaced by the 
vice president B. J. Habibie, KAMMI was among the major student groups in mobilizing 
rallies and demonstrations. In their rallies KAMMI’s mass was unique and easily 
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distinguishable from other groups, especially with a large portion of female students wearing 
headscarf. KAMMI was in close collaboration with some prominent Muslim political activists 
such as Amien Rais, and during transitional government under President Habibie KAMMI 
often organized rallies to support the government policies, since he was the former chairman 
of ICMI and the fact that many ICMI members gained position in the cabinet. Another 
KAMMI leader was Andi Rahmat who was elected Member of Parliament representing PKS 
(Siddiq, 2003).  
The success of Tarbiyah movement went through hostile political environment under 
Suharto regime was not without reactions. Other Islamist groups accused the Tarbiyah 
network of being either infiltrated or co-opted by the regime. The first accusation was based 
upon the fact that a former member of Indonesian intelligence service, Suripto, has become a 
leader and later on an MP of PKS. Suripto was a member of the intelligence bureau in 1960s-
970s during period when the regime launched harsh policy against Muslim activists, the 
accusers go on, and the conventional wisdom says that an intelligence agent never retired. 
Moreover, one of the founders and senior leaders in Tarbiyah movement Hilmy Aminuddin 
was arrested and held by the military for his involvement in radical activities, and then 
released. Conventional wisdom also says that when one was in military detention during that 
time, he had two options: either he compromised with the military in which case he would be 
released, or if he resisted to compromise he would stay there or even be banished without 
trace. The second accusation was that Tarbiyah activists made deals behind closed door with 
the regime, since in many occasions their activists carried meetings and religious sermons in a 
house belong to Suharto’s son in Jakarta (see, Dewan Rakyat, 1 October 2003). 
However, according to Machmudi, the accusations were baseless. Firstly, Suripto had 
been in close contact and interaction with Tarbiyah community since early 1980s, and after 
joined a humanitarian mission to Bosnia, representing Indonesian Muslim community, he had 
been in closer collaborations with Muslim activists (Machmudi, 2005: 115; also F. Hamzah, 
2002). Suspicion toward Aminuddin was also unsupported, since Hilmy denied that 
accusation, and that the formal report from the Military and the media coverage on the issue 
did not mention Aminudin’s name (Machmudi, 2005: 108). Secondly, with regards to the 
Tarbiyah activities that took place in Suharto son’s house, it was not because of the activists 
made any deal with the regime’s family, but rather because some of Tarbiyah activists had 
worked in business organizations which belong to Suharto family. Thus, the activities had 
nothing to do with Suharto’s family. Moreover, Machmudi suggested that the impressions that 
Tarbiyah community never experienced any inconvenient treatments from the regime were 
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misperceptions. It did receive close surveillances that severely restricted the activists from 
carrying out organizational programs. Even oftentimes they could not communicate with 
fellow activists. The success of Tarbiyah networks to keep away from the regime was its 
deliberately vigilant moderation (Machmudi, 2005: 115) 
 
3. ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT  
3.1 PK: The Formation 
After explaining the organizational origin of PKS, i.e. the Tarbyah movement, its genesis, its 
inspiration from Egyptian Muslim Brothers, and its organizational structures and main 
activities, in this section I discuss the formation of Justice Party (PK) as a political vehicle of 
Tarbiyah activists. The previous section provides necessary information about the societal 
backgrounds of PKS. It will elaborate more fully in the concluding section of this chapter, and 
at this point it would be enough to mention that the party stemmed from urbanizing societies 
especially among university students in Indonesia from 1970s to 1990s. This section traces 
the historical momentum of the formation of PK following the theoretical framework outlined 
in the opening of this chapter, to picture the organizational character of the party, from the 
formation period during PK and then in consolidation period when the party changed into 
PKS. 
The story began when on 21 May 1998 Suharto resigned from his thirty two years in 
power under mounting pressures of monetary and financial crises combined with concerted 
demands for political reform from the oppositions and students’ movements. He handed over 
the presidency to the vice president B. J. Habibie who headed a transitional government 
which main task was preparing an election. The regime change opened up a new era of 
political reform (reformasi) after more than three decades sealed by an authoritarian regime. 
Indonesian society wellcome the new political opportunity by forming political parties in the 
hope of participation in the upcoming election. So enthusiastic were Indonesians that almost 
200 political parties were declared during May 1998 to February 1999.  
 In tune with the political mood, the idea of forming a political party as a vehicle to 
furthering their political missions also emerged among Tarbiyah communities. However, two 
decades of experience under the repressive regime caused some of them resisted the proposal 
and perceived politics as a dirty business. Hidayat Nurwahid and Anis Matta were among the 
opponent of the idea of creating a party (Interview with Hidayat Nurwahid, 06.07.2007). 
When the controversy of whether or not the community should form a party could not be 
resolved in deliberations—something that was very unusual by their measure—they 
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conducted a voting survey to ask the opinion of the members of their networks. No less than 
6000 questionnaires were distributed to Tarbiyah activists across the country and even abroad, 
and more than ninety percents of the questionnaires were answered, out of which 68% agreed 
to create a party. The result of the polling clearly showed that the idea was very controversial, 
in which a large portion in the community refused it.  
In a closer observation, however, the refusal of the idea to form a political party and of 
participating in power politics was in fact classified into two different opinions. The first one, 
was refusing the idea of participation in practical power in politics because of historical 
trauma which had happened under the authoritarian regime, that gave strong impressions to 
many activists that politics was a dirty business, and a religious movement should have 
avoided muddy tracks, instead it had to find clean and save paths to achieve its objectives. 
Hidayat Nurwahid, for example, said that he preferred that Tarbiyah community created a 
mass-organization, one like Muhammadiyah or NU, which would keep distance from politics. 
Meanwhile, the second refusal was not to the idea but rather on the timing of the formation. 
As was mentioned earlier, Tarbiyah movement adopted Al-Banna bottom-up gradual political 
agenda, starting from Islamizing individuals, the family, the society, and only after then the 
politics. Many Tarbiyah activists believed that the development was still a beginning, and 
forming a political party and taking part in political struggle meant skipping necessary stages 
of development, and could make their movement to be unsustainable. The debates reportedly 
lasted even after the party was declared, but the majority of the activists agreed to enter the 
political arena (Damanik, 2002: 233). 
A political party was created in Jakarta 20 July 1998 under the name of Partai 
Keadilan (Justice Party), and the declaration was signed by 52 activists, with different 
professional occupations and represented various segments in the organization. Most of them 
are university graduates, in Indonesia and abroad, three of them hold PhD degree, five of 
them were women, and one person from ethnic Chinese (Damanik, 2002: 231-232). 
Conspicuous, in retrospect, of the list of party founders was that there were no names with 
great stature that could be recognized by wider public outside their community. Perhaps Daud 
Rasyid Sitorus was the only name circulated in the national media in the 1990s after he was 
involved in a public debate with a prominent Muslim intellectual Nurcholish Madjid.  
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The public declaration was held in Jakarta on 9 August 1998 attended by thousands of 
supporters. It was well covered in the media, and got positive responses from the Muslim 
public as well Muslim leaders.  
Elected as the party president was Nur Machmudi Ismail (then 37 years old) who 
holds doctoral degree on food production technology. There was also a behind the scene story 
about the election of Nur Machmudi Ismail as the first party’s president. He was not among 
the most senior figures in the organization, yet the community chose him because he was 
graduated from a western university. They argued that electing graduate from Middle Eastern 
university could expose them to possible sentiment from political groups that still had trauma 
with Islamic politics (Amir, 2003: 102-103). It is reported a number of Tarbiyah leaders, after 
they agreed to form a political party, approached Amien Rais, a former Chairman of 
Muhammadiyah and professor of international politics in Gadjahmada University, who was 
himself a student activist in the 1970s and wrote a doctoral dissertation on Muslim 
Brotherhood and had a close relation with Tarbiyah communities, to lead the party they 
wanted to establish. Yet Rais refused to do so as he had his own plan to create his own party 
based not on Islamic ideology. This caused strong reactions among some of Tarbiyah leaders, 
who regarded that Rais ‘has neglected the Ummah.’ (Confidential interview, Jakarta).  
Another interesting fact was that the party did not use “Islam” in its name to indicate 
its ideological orientation. There were many new parties which explicitly adopted the word 
Islam or Muslim as part of their names to indicate their ideological orientations. According to 
PKS leaders, and is also mentioned in its manifesto, ‘justice’ embodies the highest value of 
Islamic politics as well as the most universal aspect of the universe. Indonesian word for 
justice (adil) was adopted from Arabic, which is an important Qur’anic key term, understood 
terminologically as ‘to put thing in its proper place’. On the one hand, this term refers to 
moral values, which implies that the party should and will follow the Islamic rules and values; 
while on the other hand it also refers to natural realms, in which God has created the universe 
in a perfect balance, and that the nature also constantly follow God’s laws (Damanik, 2002: 
233-236). It is also interesting to note that PK also did not claim as the inheritor of the 
previous Islamic organization and Islamic movement, as was commonly had done by new 
Muslim parties. In post-Suharto democratic euphoria, the emerged political parties among 
Muslim community exhibit strong tendency to revive the political legacy previous 
generations. Among modernist Muslim, there were several examples, such as “Indonesian 
Syarikat Islam Party” and “Syarikat Islam Party of 1905” which brought the legacy of Sarekat 
Islam. There were also “Masyumi Party” led by Abdullah Hehamahua, “New Masyumi Party” 
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founded by Ridwan Saidi, and “Indonesian Islamic Party of Masyumi” which explicitly 
brought the legacy of Masyumi in their names. Other less explicitly, but still symbolically 
tried to give impression that they were the heirs of the greatness of the legacy of the past. The 
“Crescent Star Party” led by Yusril Ihza Mahendra, and “Islamic Ummah Party” led by Deliar 
Noer did it symbolically, by taking crescent-star as the parties’ logos. It was no coincident 
that after Masyumi was dissolved in 1960, its members and symphatizers called themselves 
‘Crescent Star Family’ to remind to the great idea of the bygone party (Fealy and Platzdasch, 
2005). This show quite convincingly that PK grew from new generations with new political 
agendas that made it took no interest to claim any historical relations with older generations’ 
Muslim politics, despite the fact that some of PK founders such as Abdi Sumaithi, Mashadi 
and Mutammimul Ula were activists of Crescent Star Family. 
In January 1999 the government passed election bill that set the requirements for 
parties to participate in elections. To create a political party was relatively easy: requiring 
only signatures of at least fifty citizens aged twenty one or over plus registration with a court 
and the Ministry of Justice, which was recorded in the government gazette (lembaran 
negara). However, to be able to present in elections parties needed to meet more difficult 
task, namely it had to have an organization established in one-third or nine of the provinces 
and half of the district or municipalities in each of those provinces. In addition, the law also 
stipulated a threshold, with delayed effect, of 2% minimum of national votes to be able to 
participate in the next 2004 election (King, 2003: 51).  Although creating a party was 
relatively easy for Tarbiyah community, meeting requirements to establish branches in half of 
the districts in nine provinces was a Herculean task that forced them to do their outmost. At 
provincial level the task is still easy, and they could rely on their own network, since they had 
set up network in universities in major cities and provincial capitals. Yet in setting up 
organizational branches at district levels they could not rely on their on network, and need to 
recruit personnels from outside the network. Imam Nur Azis, who then the secretary and 
founder of PK in Central Java recalled that during that period he traveled intensively to every 
district in the province to mobilize supports found party branches. It was very difficult in 
small town, because Tarbiyah network was popular in major cities, and less known in small 
towns. In a similar vein, the founder of PK in Yogyakarta, Khalid Mahmud confirmed that the 
first expansion of PK organization to meet election requirements was the most difficult period 
for the organization. In small districts, it would be very lucky for them if they found persons 
who had knowledge on the movement that was very helpful, but on many other cases they had 
to appoint people who barely heard about their movement (Interview with Cholid Machmud, 
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19.04.2007; Iman Nur Aziz 22.05.2007). The desperate organizational situations were 
recorded in PK statutes, in which it set a requirement for a person to be elected as party 
leaders at district level was twenty five years of age (PK , ART Article. 45). It is easily read 
that this was intended to recruit party functionaries from among university students. But they 
made it, and qualified to present in the elections.  
 The Election Day was 7 June 1999, when 48 parties competed for 105 millions votes. 
PKS ended at seventh position with 1,436,670 votes or 1.36 percent of national votes and 
qualified to have seven seats in the parliament. Out of forty eight parties participated in the 
elections only twenty one were able to get seats in the parliament, yet only eleven parties had 
more than one seats: 
 
The Result of 1999 Elections 
 
 PARTY  PERCENTAGE         SEATS 
PDIP   33.73   153 
Golkar   22.43   120 
PKB   12.60   51 
PPP   10.70   58 
PAN   7.11   34 
PBB   1.94   13 
PK    1.36   7 
PKP   1.01   4 
PNU   0.64   5 
PDI   0.62   2 
PDKB   0.52   5 
 
This was a mix result for PK. On the one hand, it was surprisingly successful result, given the 
fact that this was a party of amateur politicians with no prominent figure whatsoever and 
bring no symbolic legacy of past Muslim politics. Yet on the other hand, it was not good 
enough since the result was under the minimum electoral threshold, which implied that it 
could not participate in the next elections.   
 It is important to note here that although PKS was created by the activists of Tarbiyah 
movement, it does not imply that the latter was the external sponsor of PK. This was because 
PK leaders were in fact the most senior leaders of Tarbiyah movement. The two organizations 
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were in fact overlapped in their organizational structures, and PK had no external sponsor, 
which meant that it had internal source of authority. In addition, there was no charismatic 
leader in the party whose influence was greater than party organization, and thus PK 
organizational functions run on its won mechanisms. This was to influence the way PK 
organize its political behaviors and maneuvers.  
The first important political move was when they joined Consultation Forum for Islamic 
Parties (Forum Silaturrahmi Partai-Partai Islam, FSPI) that included: 
 
- United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan PPP) 
- Crescent Star Party (Partai Bulan Bintang, PBB) 
- Islamic Ummah Party (Partai Umat Islam, PUI) 
- Indonesian Islamic Party of Masyumi (Partai Islam Indonesia Masyumi, PIIM) 
- Ummah Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Umat, PKU) 
- Ummah Awakening Party (Partai Nahdhatul Ummah PNU) 
- Indonesian United Islamic Party (Partai Islam Persatuan Indonesia PIPI) 
- Indonesian Islamic Mystical Orders Party (Partai Thariqat Islam Indonesia, PITI) 
- Indonesian Islamic Union Party (Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia, PSII). 
 
These small parties—known as partai gurem, or bug parties—launched its first action in 
demanding the government to call off Law No. 3/1985 and 8/1985 on the obligation for 
organization to adopt Pancasila as their ideology. The law was eventually called-off and in the 
new Party Law No. 2/1999, no ideological standardization was applied. With those small 
parties PK was also involved in a plan to combine their votes to get additional seats or known 
as stambus accord. However the accord was eventually canceled by the election committee 
when they could not reach agreement on how it should be done.  
The next major political action taken by PK was joining with National Mandate Party 
(Partai Amanat Nasional, PAN) led by Amin Rais to form a joint fraction, named Reform 
Fraction. This coalition was significant in democratization process, because by having 41 
seats in combination (PK 7, PAN 34) it was the fourth biggest fraction in the parliament and 
was eligible to have it representative as the fourth vice chairman of the parliament, and ruled 
out the unelected Military-Police Fraction from getting seat in chairmanship. This was a 
significant political moment in parliament, because one of the main objectives of political 
reform was reforming the parliament as a real political representative of the Indonesian 
people, which means to gradually reduce the unelected representatives such as from special 
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appointed Military-Police Fraction. PKS perceived this collaboration as ideological as well as 
strategic, for the former it saw that PAN had a common platform and objectives with PK both 
as reformist parties and parties of Muslim activists, and that this collaboration would 
overcome the politics status quo represented the military faction. In fact, a group of small 
parties—PNU, PKU, PSII, PDR—invited PK to form their own parliamentary fraction but PK 
refused it and even PK replied by inviting them to join Reform Fraction with PAN. The small 
parties went on to form their own fraction (PK, 2001: 83-84). 
 Perhaps the most significant experience in this period was when it joined a strategic 
coalition in ‘Central Axis’ (Poros Tengah) group during the first democratic presidential 
election. According to the old 1945 Constitution, the president was elected by the highest 
political body, the People Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, MPR), 
which members were 500 parliamentarians as representative of political parties plus the so 
representatives of interest groups (Utusan Golongan) and Regional Representation (Utusan 
Daerah). In its first post-Suharto sessions in October 1999, the parliament was polarized 
between the two biggest parties, PDI-P and Golkar, which represented secular political 
groupings, while Muslim parties and political aspirations seemed powerless since the biggest 
of them (PKB) earned only 12% of the total seats, and were overwhelmed by the antagonism 
between the two biggest parties. However, there were six Muslim parties in the top ten parties 
in the parliament, and the total sum of their seats was more than that of PDI-P. Yet, the 
Muslim parties represented different ideological stances with a long history of rivalries and 
enmities among each other, especially between traditionilist camp (PKB, PPP, PNU) and 
modernist camp (PAN, PBB, PK), and any effort to bring them into one single faction seemed 
impossible. But this is what happened. Under the highly skillful maneuvers of Amien Rais, 
combined with apparent external threats from the old authoritarian regime represented by 
Golkar—which formed a ‘National Axis’ (Poros Kebangsaan)—and the Christian and secular 
block represented by PDI-P—which then created ‘People Axis’ (Poros Kerakyatan), Muslim 
parties were willing to join their forces to form the Central Axis.  
 The People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) session had three major schedules, i.e. 
electing the chairman of the House of Representative (DPR, the parliament), the chairman of 
the Peoples Consultative Assembly, and electing the President and the Vice President. PDI-P 
as the plurality-winner in the election was very confident that it will dominate and control the 
sessions and put their representatives in top national leaderships. On the other hand Golkar, as 
the main vehicle of the old regime and had been in power for the last three decades was also 
still command of large control over representatives of interest groups and regional 
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representatives in MPR. Golkar also pushed their candidates into the top national leaderships. 
Yet, the self confident of the two biggest parties proved counterproductive as it made them—
especially PDI-P—less willing to compromise and made concessions to other parties. 
Whereas political lobbies offered bargains and concessions to small and big parties were done 
very well by the Central Axis, and would bring them into victory. The first session was 
electing MPR’s chairman, in which Amin Rais was elected, with the help of Golkar. In the 
second session to elect DPR’s chairman Central Axis gave its vote to Golkar and this made 
the party’s chairman Akbar Tanjung win the post. Finally, and the most important was 
presidential election. Golkar’s candidate, the former transitional president B. J. Habibie 
called-off his candidacy after the MPR rejected his report in running the transitional 
government. PDI-P played a significant role in lobbying parties to reject the president’s report 
and subsequently pressed Habibie to call-off his candidacy, in order to secure its own 
candidate Megawati Sukarnoputri. Knowing this fact, Golkar gave its vote to Central Axis 
candidate Abdurrahman Wahid to win the presidency. PDI-P was forced to accept its 
stubbornness and attained only vice presidency.  
 It is interesting to not at this point, that PK initially nominated its own candidate for 
president since before the election. It was among recommendations of the first national 
workshop in December 1998. Alongside with its plan to join election competition, it decided 
to nominate presidential candidate who will carry its political missions. Among the names 
included in the selection were Amin Rais, Nurcholish Madjid, and Hidayat Nurwahid and 
A.M. Syaefuddin. Under the agreed criteria of (a) intellectual and religious integrity, (b) 
leadership capabilities to bring the nation out of crisis, (c) personal capacity as public 
example, (d) international vision and diplomatic capacity, (e) clean political records and did 
not involved in previous regimes, (e) able to stand above diversity of Indonesian society. The 
fact that it decided to nominate Didin Hafiduddin—less known religious-intellectual figure 
from Bogor West Java, compared to national stature such as Amin Rais and Nurcholish 
Madjid—show that political mood in the party was very idealistic, and that upholding its ideal 
vision is more important than formulating realistic programs (PK, 2001: 73-75). 
 Wahid presidency, however, was short lived because of his inability to maintain the 
cohesiveness of his multiparty cabinet combined with his acrobatic political maneuvers. His 
grand coalition cabinet, installed in October 1999, was definitely oversize with 35 ministerial 
posts to accommodate representatives of coalition members. In August 2000 he reshuffled his 
cabinet, and installed a new one with only 26 ministries. This policy disappointed his 
coalition partners in Central Axis, especially Amien Rais, who perceived him as betraying 
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their supports. Wahid also created his enemies in the military as well as in the police by 
unilaterally replacing commanders in strategic posts without approval from the military, the 
police as well as the parliament. In April 2001 he sacked PDI-P and Golkar ministries from 
his cabinet, on alleged corruption and nepotism, but was unable to give sound evidence. This 
escalated criticism in the parliament when PDI-P and Golkar as the two biggest parties in 
parliament joined Central Axis in opposing Wahid. Using two corruption scandals, one of 
Logistic Body and the other on the grant from the Brunei Sultan, the MPR held special 
session in 23 July 2001 to hold the president accountable. When he failed to do so, the MPR 
impeached Wahid, and handed over the presidency to the vice president Megawati. In fact, 
anticipating the impeachment in one o’clock early morning early hour of Wahid issued a 
presidential decree to dissolve the parliament and called for an early election, but failed to get 
support both from the military and the police. 
 The early years of political reform became the most productive years of learning real 
politics for PK. Through joining various coalitions it learned from scratch the vocabulary and 
mechanism of Indonesian politics, knowing firsthand the major actors and their 
characteristics, as well as witnessing the geniuses of Indonesian politics at works doing on of 
the most creative and successful political maneuvers in uniting Muslim political groups into a 
single political faction. It learned how to approach ones’ opponents, how to compromise and 
make concessions, etc. for example, PKS was initially reluctant to give support to 
Abdurrahman Wahid’s candidacy, because, in addition to the fact that he has an image as the 
leader of traditionilist Muslim, it perceived his political track records—his close relations with 
the military and Catholic communities (i.e. Gen. Benny Murdany), his alliance with Megawati 
Sukarnoputri in months before and after regime change, as well as his liberal thinking—as 
insulting the ummah (PKS, 2001: 81-82). However, when it involved in the political game, in 
learned what mattered and what were at stake, it changed its decision, aborted the candidacy 
of Hafiduddhin and supported the candidacy of Wahid (PKS, 2001: 189-192). 
 In October 1999 president Wahid appointed PK’s president N. M. Ismail as the 
minister of forestry. Ismail then resigned from his party’s position in April 200, and the party 
leadership was held by Untung Wahono as the caretaker. In May 200 it held a Special 
National Congress, in its first National Congress Leadership, Hidayat Nurwahid was elected 
as the second party’s president. Hidayat Nurwahid was to play a significant role in building 
the party’s image in the subsequent years. He was born in Klaten Central Java—a district 
between Yogyakarta and Solo/Surakarta— in 1960. His parents were both activists of a local 
branch of Muhammadiyah, and he was brought up in strong religious tradition. After 
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graduated from an elementary school near his home, Nurwahid spent his junior and senior 
high schools at Gontor Islamic Boarding School in Ponorogo East Java. He enrolled in State 
Institute of Islamic Studies (IAIN, Institute Agama Islam Negeri) in Yogyakarta in 1979 to 
study Islamic Law. After finishing his bachelor degree in 1983, he received a scholarship 
grant to continue further studies in Islamic University of Medina Saudi Arabia, enlisted in the 
department of theology, and finished his doctorate degree in 1992. On his return to Indonesia 
he taught at the graduate school of Islamic studies in Muhammadiyah University of Jakarta.  
Another prominent figure in the party was the General Secretary, Muhammadh Anis 
Matta, born in Bone South Sulawesi 1968. He studied at junior and senior high schools at 
Darul Arqam Muhammadiyah Boarding School of Gombara, in South Sulawesi. In 1986, after 
finishing his studies, he moved to Jakarta to study Islamic Law in Saudi-owned school LIPIA, 
which he finished in 1992. Anis Matta was very popular among Tarbiyah community, in 
which among other things was indicated by the fact that many publishers confirmed that 
books with an introductory chapter from him raised the selling.1 Leadership succession in PK 
was also unusual, in which it always carried out smoothly and quickly, without much debates, 
let alone antagonism. This smoothness of leadership successions, which occurred in all of its 
organizational levels from national to sub-districts, had become a positive characteristic of the 
party, and at the same time was starkly in contrast with other parties that experienced 
common troublesome process of leadership changes, often ending up in party splits.  
 
3.3. PKS: The Consolidation 
Meanwhile, following the PK’s failure to pass electoral threshold and was hence 
unable to be present in the next election, the Tarbiyah community founded a new party named 
Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) in Jakarta 20 April 2002, with Al-Muzammil Yusuf as the 
chairman and Hario Setyoko as the general secretary, and among the 50 founders were Umar 
Salim, Zulkifliemansyah and Suswono (PKS, 2004). The smoothness of the merging process 
indicated that PKS was carefully prepared to function as a new political vehicle for Tarbiyah 
community after the first one they developed was unable to continue the journey. PKS 
document records that there were 51 persons who signed formal registration of the party in 
notary. And different from PK founders who were senior members and become list of 
Tarbiyah’s whose who, PK founders were ordinary activists.  
 
                                                 
1 My personal observation during 1998-2002. 
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Earlier that year, Anis Matta informed that if the threshold ratified, his party would change its 
name into ‘Islamic Justice Party’ (PIK, Partai Islam Keadilan) (Kompas 28 February 2001). 
Even it presented in a join-statement with other 14 parties, in Sahid Jaya Hotel Jakarta on 8 
June 2002, which failed to pass the electoral threshold to reject the ratification of the political 
law, and demanded the government to allow them to participate in 2004 elections. In the 8th 
national meeting of Majelis Syuro April 2003, PK decided to merge with PKS (Kompas, 16 
April 2003). In the party, the chairman was Hidayat Nurwachid and Anist Matta retained his 
position as the general secretary, and al-Muzammil Yusuf moved into the vice chairman. 
Since Nur Mahmudi Ismail was replaced by president Wahid in March 2001, PKS was 
effectively outside the government. During Megawati’s administration PKS decided to stay 
outside the government, and became opposition party. The official version of this decision 
was that it wanted to exercise oversight-functions, to monitor and criticize the government. 
However, an interpretation suggests that the true reason of its oppositional stance was 
ideological, in which it believed that a woman should not become a national leader. To 
participate in the cabinet under a female president meant that it would contradict its own 
principle, and it decided to stay outside (Asa, Tempo 5-11 July 2004.). 
And during 2002 and 2003 it put full concentration in developing its organization and 
building a mass base. There were at least two different levels of consolidations which took 
place, i.e. organization and programs. At the organizational aspect, PKS reformulated its 
leadership structure by giving more power and control over the organization to Majelis Syuro 
(Deliberation Assembly). During PK period, the highest decision making institution was party 
national congress, and the Majelis Syuro assumed responsibility to implement decisions and 
policies taken by the congress. In PKS period, although its constitutional status was still under 
the national congress, the Majelis holds the capacity as the highest decision making 
institutions, in which all major party policies and programs are taken in it or need to be 
approved by it. Moreover, although its members were composed of large numbers of people 
representing various elements, organizational as well as regional representatives, its 
functionaries who are responsible for routine activities were from small group of people who 
have been working together prior to 1998. This had enabled the party to work efficiently, 
decisions could be taken in simpler way, and programs could be executed more effectively. 
Other organizational improvement was the creation of auxiliary institutions, which the 
most important are the Electoral Wining Body (Badan Pemenangan Pemilu, Bapilu) which 
tasks are to manage party campaigns and mobilize support for elections. Under the leadership 
of Muhammad Razikun, this body developed systematic programs and training for party 
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activists and symphatizers, and promoting party images through networking with other 
organizations and in the media. Other important auxiliary body is Board of Experts (Dewan 
Pakar) which members are professional from various expertise, and which one of the tasks is 
giving advice to the party according to their special vocation (Republika, 09.03.2004).  
PKS also revised its political programs. During the PK period it pursued idealistic 
programs, such as clear in the case of its decision to nominate Didin Hafidudin as its 
presidential candidate. In the new period, the party started to touch pragmatic political 
programs. The first step is formulating the image as a “clean and care” party. The first, clean, 
refers to PKS programs to fight against corruption. And it was quite successful not only to 
talk the talks, but also to walk the walk, of the jargon. In fact, attitude of anti-corruptions was 
also the main characteristic of its political career during PK. The difference between the two 
periods was that during the PK period, the politicians and activists perceived it as mainly 
moral obligation to be pursued personally; while in the PKS period, a new meaning was 
added to the same activities: in addition to religious and moral duties, anti-corruptions are 
now a political project that needs to be publicized as the main image. As was explained by 
PKS Member of Parliament, Rama Pratama, in a teleconference with PKS Japan, it is 
inappropriate at personal level for a Muslim to tell other people about his good deeds. 
Because the Prophet said that if a Muslim doing a good deed with his right hand, his left hand 
should not know it. This is to guarantee that the person is sincere in doing his deed, and to 
prevent personal pride. But when it comes to party matters, this rule does not apply. PKS 
cadres and activists must publicize their good deeds, in order to socialize and advertise the 
party’s reputation. This is not about personal show offs, but rather about party PR strategies 
(Pratama, 25.02.2007). 
The second jargon, that PKS is a care party, was carried out through social services 
programs, mostly during natural disasters such as floods and earthquakes which occurred 
frequently in the country. PKS activists were almost always the first team arrived at the spot 
of such natural disasters, before the government agencies, to give emergency assistants. And 
they always arrived with their political identities, such as party uniforms, or party flags. They 
also distributed T-Shirts with a party logo on it, and/or party stickers. PKS workers also 
developed their skills in cooperating with the media, and asked for coverage in their public 
activities. The media were commonly quite cooperative, since these activities were emergency 
services in characters, although intended as party campaigns and advertisements. The media 
also keen to report sensational actions of PKS politicians and parliamentarians in refusing 
illegal money or rejected briberies. However, these political enthusiasm sometimes went too 
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far, for example, during emergency relieves following the Tsunami in Aceh in early 2004, 
PKS activists reportedly put stickers and other party logo to aids belonging to another Muslim 
organization, which sparked small incidents. 
At the same time PKS still exhibited its original Islamist character, such as concerns 
about international Muslim politics. It repeatedly organized rallies and demonstrations 
condemning Israel’s occupations in Palestine.  It promoted supports for the Palestinians, and  
initiated demonstration rallies against US invasion to Afghanistan and Iraq. It released a 
number of official statements on these matters, sent a letter to UN General Secretary 
protesting Israel’s massacre of civilian Palestinians in Janine refugee camps, and in 
collaboration with other Muslim organizations and NGOs released a statement protesting US 
invasion to Iraq (PKS, 2006: 157-159). 
The program bore fruits in 2004 elections. In the parliamentary elections held on 24 
April, PKS surprisingly won 7.35 percents of national votes. 24 parties were present in the 
elections, 17 got seats, and only 13 more than 1 seats. 
 
THE RESULT OF 2004 ELECTION 
 
 
PARTY   VOTES %  SEATS 
Golkar    21.58   128   
PDI-P    18.53    109 
PKB       10.57      52 
PPP         8.15      58 
PD         7.45      57   
PKS       7.35      45   
PAN       6.44      52   
PBR        2.44      13   
PBB        2.62      11   
PDS       2.13      12   
PPDK       1.16       5 
PKPB       2.11       2 
PP       0.77       2 
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The surprising surge of PKS has changed the political map in the parliament. Formerly, with 
only seven seats PKS needed to join other party to form a fraction in the parliament, now PKS 
can form its own fraction: PKS-Fraction (FPKS). Furthermore, with more seats in the 
parliament PKS gained more power in political bargains. On 5 July 2004 Indonesia held the 
first direct presidential election, in which five pairs of hopefuls raced: Wiranto – Salahuddin 
Wahid, who were nominated by Golkar; Megawati and Hasyim Muzadi endorsed by PDI-P; 
Amin Rais – Siswono Yudhohusodo from PAN; S.B. Yudhoyono – Jusuf Kalla from 
Democrat Party; and Hamzah Haz and Agum Gumelar nominated by PPP. PKS did not 
nominate their own candidate, and initially preferred to stay outside the government, to 
further develop party’s organization and mass-base. However, more than eight million votes it 
garnered was so attractive that pushed candidates to approach PKS. In Majelis Syuro session 
held in late April 2004, the party decided not to nominate presidential/vice presidential 
candidate, and in late June it issued a press release stating that it did not endorse any 
presidential candidates, and even advised its members not to participate in campaigning any 
candidate (PKS, 2006: 196-97).  
 PKS reluctance to endorse any candidate generated controversies inside the party and 
confusing the wider public. And in fact the hesitance was caused by heated controversies 
among its leaders on which candidate it should support. The debate was prolonged among 
members of Majelis Syuro, the party highest decision-making body. They were split into two 
equal camps: one side preferred Amien Rais, because had strong Islamist credential, both 
personally as well as his political views, and he had been long ally for many PKS leaders, and 
in fact many PKS members and activists at grass-root levels became his campaigners. The 
other camp, based on pragmatic calculation preferred Wiranto, who was former chief of the 
military and was nominated by the largest party Golkar, and was supported by the largest 
Muslim organization NU. In the last minutes, PKS released a statement that it endorsed Amin 
Rais. However, both Amin and Wiranto failed in the first round of the election. In the second 
round, PKS decisively endorsed S. B. Yudhoyono who competed against Megawati. This 
quick decision can be read both as result of PKS political calculation, that Yudhoyono had a 
bigger chance to win, and as an ideological strategy, to stop the incumbent Megawati.  
 When eventually Yudhoyono won and became the first directly elected president, PKS 
joined coalition government. In fact, there were many, inside and outside the party, who 
hoped PKS would play an opposition role given its anti-corruption reputation, to oversee and 
criticize the government which is plagued by rampant corruptions. Even many of its leaders 
preferred that their party will stay outside the government (Kompas, 11.08.2004). However, 
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eventually it decided to join the cabinet. Initially, it nominated four candidates to serve in the 
cabinets: Anton Apriantono for Ministry of Agriculture, Yusuf Asy’arie for Ministry of 
Housing, Adhyaksa Dault for Ministry of Youth and Sport, and Suripto for Attorney General, 
but received three ministerial portfolios, and failed to take attorney general position. 
According to PKS MP and member of Board of expert Zulkieflimansyah, the decision to take 
part in the cabinet was taken as an exercise for the party, so that the party would have a real 
experience in running government which was very important for its future 
(Zulkifleiemansyah, interview 25.06.2007). The term exercised seems fit to the situation, 
given the fact that those ministers are not from Tarbiyah leaders or activists, but rather 
professionals who were agree with the party’s political visions and missions and agree to 
work with and bring political profits for the party. 
 Another significant event for PKS in post 2004 general elections was the election of 
its president, Hidayat Nurwahid, as the chairman of People Consultative Assembly (MPR). 
During New Order era, MPR was the highest state institution which selected the president, but 
in post-Suharto politics it no longer enjoys its former status and becomes a join session of the 
two Chambers of the Parliament. Notwithstanding, the MPR chairman still holds a prestigious 
status.  The ability to put its representative in such position was a great achievement for PKS. 
Commenting on this event, Azyumardi Azra, a prominent Muslim intellectual, wrote that the 
raise of Nurwahid in the position has a number of significances. At the personal level, 
Nurwahid who has educational backgrounds on Islamic studies and holds Master and 
Doctoral degrees from Madinah University Saudi Arabia, marked a moment in where a 
Muslim politician with Islamist backgrounds was accepted in contemporary Indonesian 
politics. While at institutional level, it meant that PKS is now a mainstream party, and no 
longer the party of student activists (Azra, Media Indonesia, 10.11.2004) 
A few days after being elected as the MPR chairman, Hidayat resigned from his 
party’s post, which was handed over to Tifatul Sembiring as a caretaker until the next 
congress was held to elect a new leader. Again, there was no sign of debate or rivalries in this 
succession. Sembiring was eventually elected as the party’s president in the National 
Congress held July 2005 in Jakarta. Tifatul Sembiring was a former coordinator of PKS 
region I, which includes North Sumatra and Aceh. He was born in Bukit Tinggi West Sumatra 
1961. Graduated from Institute for Informatics and Computer Management (STI&K) Jakarta 
in 1982, he worked as a civil servant in State Electric Company for several years. In 1990 he 
joined Nurul Fikri foundation, and served as a preacher in Khairu Ummah. He spent six 
months in Pakistan, studying international politics in the Center for Asian and Strategic 
 119
Studies, Islamabad - Pakistan. His last post in the party was as a Coordinator for region I of 
Sumatra, which was responsible to coordinate 10 provincial branches. In 2004 election 
Sembiring successfully flocked 380 PKS representatives to provincial and district parliaments 
throughout Sumatra, and brought 17 representatives to national parliament. This success 
catapulted him into first rank figures in the party.  
Another figure that came to the front was Hilmy Aminuddin who holds the position as 
the chairman of the powerful Deliberation Assembly (Majelis Syuro). His father, Danu 
Muhammad Hasan was a prominent figure of DI/TII and a close aide of Kartosuwiryo. But 
Machmudi reports that Aminuddin considers his father as his “biological, not ideological, 
father”. He spent in military detention for some time in early 1980s, for possessing and 
distributing what the military classified as confidential information (Machmudi, 2005: 108).  
 
 
4. CONCLUSION  
 
This chapter discusses the history of PKS, from its organizational origins in Tarbiyah 
movement, to the success story in 2004 elections, and a joined coalition government. The 
intention of this chapter is to portray the party’s history using theory of party’s life cycle to 
understand its basic structures and pattern of functions. As is reviewed in the opening section, 
scholars of party studies suggest that a political party organization is like a living being, in 
which the societal backgrounds function as its parents, the environment contexts and 
processes in which it was born, the experiences it went through in formative years, all are 
important in building the party’s character and “personality”. This type of personality—in the 
word of Panebianco, degrees of institutionalization and systemness—provide information 
about how it will behave in given situations, how it will react to certain internal and external 
changes. 
 The societal background of Tarbiyah movement was fast moving modernizing 
segment of Indonesian society, i.e. the younger and more educated—and subsequently better 
economic condition—of university students and young professionals. The movement itself 
emerged because of several simultaneous factors: (i) The paradox of modernization and the 
advancement of higher education among Muslims that produced ‘objectification of Muslim 
consciousness’, instead of detaching them from religion and tradition, it fostered them to 
embrace their religion more tightly and pursued it more systematically. (ii) Postcolonial 
Muslim politics, in which Muslim politicians who contributed significantly to the country’s 
struggle and independence from colonialism, were thwarted from political participation in 
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post-colonial Muslim country by secular regime and military. The Muslim politicians then 
switched their activities from power-politics into politics of religious propagation (dakwah), 
recruited and trained younger and better education Muslim generations. (iii) The renewal 
influence of Islamic movements in the Middle East, a major source of religious dynamics for 
Indonesian Muslim for centuries, which witness new surges of Islamist movements during 
political crises in 1970s. This urbanizing and modernizing societal background invested the 
organization pragmatic and objectives oriented characteristics. It adopted successfully non-
violent Islamist ideology of Muslim Brotherhoods with its gradual political agenda, in which 
success in politics requires preparation from individuals, family, and society. Its activists were 
also skillfully adapted to hostile political environments during the New Order era, and it 
suffered no significant conflict with the authority, which was common for Islamic movement 
at that time. 
 When political environment changed in favor of Muslims, when Suharto swung his 
political alliance from the military to Muslim community, the movement came out of the cold 
and into public activities. And when eventually the regime changed and people were 
electrified with democratic euphoria, Tarbiyah ativists decided to form a political party. The 
formation process of the party resembled what Panebianco describes as “territorial 
penetration” in which a group of people agree to form a central party organization, which 
subsequently created or stimulated the creation of the lower level branches. This genesis 
process, in Panebianco’s theory, will produce a strongly centralistic party organization. And 
PKS was, in fact, showed a strongly centralistic party, in which the central leadership holds 
huge power and control over the organization. One may argue, at this point, that PKS 
centralistic was a product of its ideological inspirations which strongly emphasizes loyalty 
and obedience to their leaders, socialized in Tarbiyah activities. Yet it is equally true that its 
genetic factor facilitated the central leadership to have greater control to the organization, 
since the central leadership has common ground and solid coordination, while regional 
branches were created by it and hence dependent upon it. 
 During and after its formation PKS had neither external sponsor organization nor 
charismatic leaders that stood above the organizational mechanism. Therefore, from its 
formative period the party has internal source of authority, and that it run on the basis of its 
own organizational structures and mechanism. It is true that the party was in fact created by, 
and a vehicle of, Tarbiyah movement; however since party leaders were also the most senior 
Tarbiyah activists, the movement did not function as an external sponsor for the party. Among 
the most notable example of PKS organizational centrality was the smoothness process of 
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leadership successions because, in addition to its ideological characteristics that prefer 
deliberation over competition, leaders in central office have known each-other for years and 
have established patterns of communications and interactions. 
 Finally, PKS organizational development in recent years has confirmed the presence 
of oligarchic tendency. At organizational level the tendency has been indicated by revisions of 
organizational functions, in which during PK period the highest decision-making body was 
party national congress which decisions were implemented by the Majelis Syuro; whereas 
during PKS period, the Majelis assumed the status of the highest decision making body, and 
although major policies were taken through consultations and deliberations, the practical 
interpretation and strategies of implementations of the policies were in the hand of a small 
number of key leaders. Meanwhile on programmatic level, the oligarchic tendency was 
indicated by the shift of the party course from strongly emphasizing ideological drives—
focusing their attention to party objectives—during PK period, into focusing on 
organizational survival, growth and expansions. Political values were added to doctrinal 
values and behaviors. For instance, in the previous period to be moralist in politics such as 
emphasizing that anti-corruption was a religious duty for every individual that should be 
pursued personally; while in the later period the same programs has been enacted in different 
ways - as political actions that should be publicized for party advertisements.  
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CHAPTER IV 
BETWEEN INTERNAL ASPIRATIONS AND EXTERNAL REGULATIONS: 
THE IDEOLOGY AND INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT OF PKS 
  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter I have shown the chronological account of the PKS, starting from its 
origins in the Tarbiyah movement by adopting its ideological orientation from the Egyptian 
Muslim Brothers, and further focusing on its organizational genesis, formation and 
consolidation. Also, I have explained how those organizational elements influence the very 
party behavior. Recalling the findings of Jonasson’s research on Islamist parties, one may 
argue that the behavior of PKS is a mere product of its ideological orientation. And in fact, 
PKS linkage behavior seems to be not too different from those Islamist parties Jonasson 
studied. Internally, it exhibits strong ideological tendencies, in terms of how it recruits 
members and activists and also requiring its members to commit to its ideological values; 
while externally it tends to be pragmatic, mobilizing support not only from within the Muslim 
community, but also from other segments of society, while at the same time willing to 
cooperate with other parties from different ideologies. Thus, it could also be interpreted, 
referring to Jonasson’s conclusion, that PKS behavior was under the encompassing drive of 
its religious ideology, in which religion should be enacted in personal and political behaviors, 
even though its messages aim at addressing all people, not only the Muslims.  Therefore it 
theoretically had the ability to mobilize support not only from within the Muslim community. 
 It is true that ideology plays a significant role in influencing political behavior of the 
PKS. However, it is just as well true that ideology is not the only factor affecting the 
outcome-behavior, or perhaps not even the most significant factor. In this chapter, I will 
explore the ideological orientation of the PKS, in a more detailed way, in order to reveal its 
true caliber in affecting party behavior. In doing so, I will apply the theory of cognitive 
institutionalism from Douglas North, which perceives ideology as an integral part of 
institutions, and its influence on actors’ behavior besides other institutional factors. As was 
introduced in Chapter I, North defines institutions as “humanly devised constraints that shape 
human interaction”. Throughout history human beings were in need of institutions to stabilise 
their life as well as to structure the incentives for interactions - in society, politics and 
economy. (North, 1990, 3). Furthermore, North classifies institutions into formal institutions, 
characterized by well-defined rules with a wide scope and various specifications, including 
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constitutions, statute and common laws, specific bylaws, and, finally, individual contracts 
(North, 1990: 47); and informal institutions, which can be any kind of convention, codes of 
conduct, norms of behavior, and so on, which have arisen to coordinate "repeated human 
interaction" (1990: 40). In this case, ideology, together with culture and religion, are examples 
of informal institutions. For North, ideology and institutions constitute two sides of the same 
coin, both playing similar roles in constraining behaviors, and at the same time setting 
opportunities for interactions, transactions and collaborations by reducing uncertainties and 
facilitating distribution of resources (Fiori, 2002). 
 This theoretical insight transcends the current theoretical antagonism between the 
‘partisan’ and ‘strategic’ point of view on ideology. The first camp understands a political 
party to be a “policy seeker”, thus its ideology constitutes guidelines for party behaviors. 
Moreover, a political party commonly does not choose its ideology arbitrarily, but rather it 
represents orientations and interests of societal background, from which the party originally 
emerged. In their famous seminal study on party identification, Lipset and Rokkan wrote that 
political parties are traces of antagonism between various cleavages in society (Lipset and 
Rokkan, 1967), which imply that each party’s orientation is structurally set by its history and 
its behaviors are guided by ideological orientations. On the other hand, there is a growing 
number of publications suggesting that political parties, in fact, ‘use’ ideology, strategically, 
in order to pursue its real objective of gaining power. These pieces of literature, generally 
labeled as rational-choice approaches, suggest that politicians are rational beings whose 
actions are well-calculated in order to achieve gains and to avoid losses. One of its 
progenitors, Anthony Downs, wrote that any political party is an “office seeker”, in which 
instead of seeking to win elections in order to implement a certain set of policies in line with 
its ideological aspirations, political parties implement certain policies in order to win elections 
(Downs, 1957).  
 By using North’s theory this chapter shows that in fact ideological-partisanship and 
rational-strategic behavior are interconnected. The former refers to the party’s perception of 
its environment and its judgments about it, while the latter explains the party’s efforts of 
dealing with the environment - either changing or maintaining it. North’s breakthrough lies in 
his model of human rationality. Different than proponents of partisan-behavior, who perceive 
that human behavior is bound to their history and societal structures, North argues that human 
actors have creative capabilities to resist structural constraints, and to change and modify the 
given structures. However, different than supporters of the rational choice theory, who deem 
the human creative capability as independent of any structural constraints, North suggests that 
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actors’ creative capacities are limited by their knowledge and information. In theory, humans 
have the full capacity to change and engineer their institutional or structural environments; 
however, lack of knowledge and information may cause them to be unable or unwilling to do 
so (North and Denzeu, 1994). 
 This chapter will thus point out how the ideological formulations of PKS run parallel 
with the existing institutional settings. On the one hand, ideology contains the party’s political 
objectives and agendas, but on the other hand it simultaneously contains strategic elements of 
how to handle the environment and achieve these objectives. I apply Hinich’s and Munger’s 
definition of ideology as a worldview that explains three major topics of human collective 
life: ethics or “what is good and what is bad?”; economy or “how should the society’s 
resources be distributed?”; and politics or “where does power appropriately reside?”. The first 
section of this chapter explains PKS ideology by analyzing the PK/PKS manifesto and 
statutes, followed by an explanation of parties programs as a derivative of ideology. The 
second section elaborates institutional contexts in which the party operates, focusing on the 
electoral system and the party system as the main institutions that determine party 
competitions and distribute resources. The last section concludes and compares the 
parallelism between PKS ideology and programs and its institutional environments.  
 
2. PKS IDEOLOGY AND PROGRAMS 
In Chapter II I analyzed two major Islamist parties in Indonesian history, the Sarekat 
Islam and Masyumi. Applying the Northian institutional perspective I pointed out how the 
two political organizations interpreted Islam differently as a political ideology or in fact as a 
political program, according to their respective institutional context. Although both parties 
similarly used Islam as the solution for the political problems arising among the Indonesian 
people, in reality they came up with significantly different ideological and programmatic 
formulations. For SI which operated under colonial government, which for centuries had 
implemented not only repressive and exploitative politics, but also discriminative policies that 
undermined and marginalized native Indonesians, Islam emerged as an ideological source 
providing doctrines and values by inter alia stipulating universal equality for human being, 
and denouncing social and cultural discrimination and economic exploitation. In the hand of 
SI leaders, Islam became a strongly socialistic ideology that propagated anti-colonialism and 
anti-capitalism.  
While the Masyumi operated in a very different institutional context, as a transitional 
post-colonial Republic after World War II  that was desperately struggling to build the state 
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almost from the scratch and having to cope with difficult negotiations with the former 
colonial power, as well as being under the shadow of a competing world of ideologies and 
super powers. In such situations, even though it aspired to implement Islam as the political 
system — quite similar to that of SI, and, in fact, many of Masyumi’s leaders were former SI 
members — they came up with significantly different ideological and programmatic 
formulations. For the Masyumi, Islam is the best ideological option for Indonesian Muslims 
and for Indonesia in general in which Muslims constitute the majority of the population. In 
their eyes, Islam appears to be better than both Capitalism, which had caused wars and 
colonialism due to its doctrine of unlimited economic quests, and Communism, which 
contradicts the basic nature of humans as spiritual beings because of its underlying atheist 
ideology and its materialist and collectivistic interpretations of history producing a 
dictatorship by the proletariat. For the Masyumi Islam provides a balanced view on human 
nature and human history, in which individuals have full rights to pursue material 
achievements according to their ability while at the same time having collective duties to take 
care of and supporting the poor and the needy. The Masyumi also believed that Islam has 
democratic and progressive traits, which lead the party into formulating political and 
economic programs in the most rational ways, including the acknowledgement of the status 
quo of the dominance of foreign economies and signing security cooperation with the US. 
It is interesting to start discussing PKS ideology by exploring how the party leaders 
perceived the historical context of their own party. Similar to SI and Masyumi, PK was an 
Islamist party founded upon the values and the teachings of Islam. The PK Statute stipulated 
that its ideologic base was Islam and its objectives were to bring about justice and prosperity 
to Indonesia that pleased Allah (Basic Statute PK, Article 2, 5). The wording (phrase) of the 
PK political objective was, in fact, a literary translation of traditional wisdom of the ideal 
objective of Muslim politics (Arabic: Baldatun Thayyibatun wa rabbun ghafur). This phrase 
has been slightly edited in the PKS statute, stating that the party is based on Islam as a 
political ideology and its objectives are: “PKS is a party of religious propagation (dakwah) 
which objective is to realize a justice and prosperous society approved by Allah, in the 
Republic of Indonesia based on Pancasila.” And it adds that PKS will achieve those 
objectives through the following efforts: (1) Freeing Indonesia from all kinds of oppression; 
(2) nurturing Indonesian society into an Islamic society; (3) preparing the nation to tackle 
future problems and challenges; (4) building societal and governmental systems which are in 
line with Islamic values; (5) developing a new just, prosperous and respected Indonesia (Basic 
Statute Chapter V, article 5 and 6). 
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In terms of substance or content, PKS ideology is quite similar to those of SI and 
Masyumi, however, given the fact that they were a part of different historical settings, which 
all produced different perceptions as to what the respective problems, solutions and 
opportunities are, each party understands this similar substance differently. According to the 
political manifesto pf PK, the core group of its founders was made up by student activists who 
were part of the so-called “Generation 1998”—the term refers to groups of academicians, 
journalists, opposition politicians, NGOs and student activists who advocated political reform 
that, in the end, forced Suharto to resign. This means that the founders perceived PK as an 
agent of democratic reformation, toppling authoritarian power that repressed political rights of 
Indonesians and installing democratic politics (PK Political Manifesto). 
The party founders consider that the party, which was declared in 1998, was a 
continuous part of Muslim political history back to the colonial era.  
 
The party which was declared in 20 July 1998 in Jakarta has a deep historical and 
ideological root. Its supporters include generations that were actively involved in 
taking over the country’s independence. And the younger generation in the party 
constituted a determinant element in student movement during political reformation. 
They are part of “generation 1998”, and the heirs of the historical mandate from the 
previous generation (PK, 1998: 1). 
 
 
In its historical recollection, the PK manifesto states that Muslims have played significant role 
in political development of the country in its colonial period and after gaining independence. 
Unfortunately, the political establishment tended to treat and discredit Muslims as threats to 
the political stability of the country, while in fact the ideological and political commitments of 
Muslims were intended for the good of the nation (1998: 7). The party manifesto admits that 
the coup attempted by the communist PKI was irrefutable evidence about the validity of 
Muslim political conviction during the Sukarno era, in which the Communists who repeatedly 
launched military coups were a latent threat, because of its atheism, anarchism and radicalism. 
Thus it was really strange—from the party’s point of view—that the new political 
establishment under Suharto’s New Order government took anti-Muslim political attitude, 
which is undermining the fact that Muslims had great contributions to the history of the 
nation. The regime even carried out systematic political engineering to weaken the Muslims’ 
political roles by simplifying the party system. All in all, the course of policy pursued by the 
New Order regime had caused historical disaster for Indonesians (PK 1998: 8).  
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 Hence, PKS perceives its historical context as facing the challenge of an authoritarian 
and dictatorial regime; and Islam emerges as the solution to the challenge, in other words 
Islam is interpreted as the liberating and democratizing ideology. 
 
2.1. PKS Ethics  
The first fundamental point of PKS ideology is defining what is good or the ethical 
norm. And for this point, the most fundamental concept was the party’s name “Justice”. The 
party was named “Justice” (Arabic and Indonesian: Adil) to summarize what it sees as the 
most important value in Islam, adopted from a Qur’anic verse (Maidah: 8): “Justice brings 
you close to Allah.”  
 
The name “Justice” was chosen, because it represents the most fundamental nature of 
the universe. It was upon this principle that God created heaven and earth. According 
to the Islamic tradition, justice means to put everything in its proper place… The 
highest level of justice is the justice of faith, in acknowledging the truth of 
Monotheism, and God’s right to be worshiped, gratified and remembered (PK, 1998: 
14).  
 
Thus for PKS, the word justice has three different, but interconnected, levels of meaning. The 
first is the “cosmic sense” of the word, by which justice refers to the order of universe, in 
which the universe in its complexity is balanced and has consistent orders.  In fact, those 
natural laws are nothing else but God’s own laws, since God created and maintained them. 
The word “Justice” was chosen as the name of the party, since it signifies ‘God’s natural law,’ 
that bound all of His creatures (Jati Diri PK). 
 The second sense of the term was its “moral sense”, in which justice also constitutes 
the highest ideals of human life. God is the creator and humans are the creatures, therefore the 
most appropriate and just thing humans must do is to follow God’s guidance, i.e. through 
Islam. The founders and supporters of the Justice Party believe that the Islamic teaching is 
comprehensive, encompassing all aspects of human life.  
 
The all-inclusiveness of Islam is in the nutshell of Muslim’s understandings of their 
religion. “Islam is a complete system of life, governing all aspects of human 
activities. Islam is the state and the country, the government and the citizens, moral 
and power, blessing and justice, culture and law, science and judiciary, material and 
natural resource, business and wealth, jihad and propagation, army and doctrine, true 
belief and rights observance.” The inclusiveness of Islam is a prescription to be 
observed. Islam is a way of life which includes religion, politics, the state and the 
society (PK, 1998: 10).  
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The third sense of justice is the “technical-sense”. Since justice is seen as the most 
prevalent character of cosmic and historical orders and processes, it is also the most rational 
and the most effective way of succeeding in any human activity. Politics is perceived as 
having no exception, while justice is seen as the most effective way to reign, and injustice as 
the road towards total destruction (Chapter II, Article 5). In short, the ultimate ethical value 
for PKS lies in justice, which in religio-cosmic terms is understood as completely and 
consistently abiding by Islamic teachings, in all aspects of life. 
 The next important issue in examining the ethical formulation of PKS can be seen in 
its standpoint towards religious pluralism or rather its perception of people of other 
persuasions. At first glance, an irritating impression can arise while studying the political 
manifesto of PK, due to its ambiguous views on the topic. Yet otherwise, it acknowledges 
political equality of all people from different primordial backgrounds - be it ethic, culture or 
religion - within the state. In fact, PKS membership is not defined as welcoming only 
Muslims (PK/PKS Statutes). Instead, the manifesto mentions: 
 
It is through the state that human rights are guaranteed, and human dignity is 
protected equally in spite of the different religious, ethnic and cultural backgrounds 
(PK Manifesto). 
 
At this point the position becomes obvious that the party acknowledges the equality of the 
Indonesian people, regardless of their respective background, guaranteeing them to have 
similar rights in front of the satate, and to deserve equal treatments. Yet other parts in the 
document seem to try to differentiate between the Muslim community and other persuasions 
within the Indonesian population.  
 
The Justice Party seeks to crystallize the ideals of Indonesian nation, represent the 
spirit of intellectual and social reforms (tajdid and islah). We try our best to become 
a safe place for everyone who is concerned about what is happening with the ummah 
and the people (PK Manifesto).   
 
Democracy has become the spinal cord of the struggle to accommodate political 
aspirations of the entire society. Starting from this understanding, we are forming a 
political party as a vehicle of religious propagation (dakwah), in order to bring about 
universal ideals and to promote political aspirations especially from the Muslim 
community and the Indonesian people, in general. This party will from now be 
called the Justice and Prosperous Party (PKS Declaration). 
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The passages clearly show that PKS differentiates between Muslim and non Muslim actors, 
and it prioritizes the Muslim community without neglecting the interests of other Indonesian 
people. Of course this is simply a general principle, since, in practice, politics are no more 
than a rivalry of interests. Another notion in the standpoint of the PKS party is that it holds on 
to a “proselytizing” ideology. In the first citation, the PKS seeks to promote tajdid and islah - 
two basic concepts in Islam - which in fact means reforming and developing society, in an 
Islamic kind of way. In similar vein, the PKS declaration stipulates that the party is a vehicle 
for dakwah, or for propagating Islam in and through politics. The proselytizing agenda is also 
clearly found it the following PK manifesto: 
 
The resignation of Suharto has opened the windows for freedom and opportunity. 
Yet, it does not mean that the task of propagation is over. The road is a long way to 
go, since in many aspects of life the community of Muslims still lagged behind. 
Their worldview and way of life are still not inline with Islamic guidance and 
teachings. The existing social structure is still unsupportive to efforts for building an 
Islamic society.  
The struggle for Islamic propagation must go on. The deliberation of propagation 
activists has led to the conclusion that we have to take the opening opportunity, in 
seeking to bring about an Indonesian state appreciated by Allah. The formation of a 
political party with an Islamic ideological orientation is necessary to achieve the 
objectives of propagation of Islam, in a democratic way, and acceptable to the wider 
public. Therefore they agreed to establish the Justice Party (Manifesto PK) 
 
 Finally, the fundamental issue in of the PKS ideology is pertaining ‘gender equality’. 
Recent studies suggest that gender equality is the lowest point within Muslim democracy 
(Norris and Inglehart, 2003). Traditional Islamic values—derived from Qur’anic teachings—
strongly discourage women’s participation in public activities and especially in politics. 
Among the most popular Qur’anic verses being used to discourage women’s roles in politics 
are (4: 34) “The men are leaders for the women, as God has granted superiority for the 
former over the latter, and because men earn the living. Good women are those who obey of 
Allah and take care of themselves”; and a prophetic tradition which says: “A nation would not 
be in luck if they give the leadership to a woman.”   
 Again, one finds that stance of the PKS for gender equality is ambiguous. The 
standard statement is that basically women have the same rights as man in politics but since 
they are – by nature - different than men they must adjust the equality according to their 
nature. PK Manifesto mentions:  
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Civil society is the model for a just society, when plurality becomes the potential for 
the development of a nation. When members of parliaments are thoughtful and 
critical, ministers are professionals, and judges and attorneys are wise and brave. 
Businessmen become a blessing for the state and the people, religious leaders and 
artists are a vanguard of the nation’s culture and civilization. The military men are 
professional soldiers who provide security for the people without losing their 
political rights as citizens. Women are sisters of men with equal rights and 
obligations according to their respective natures, and working together equally for 
the good of the nation (PK Manifesto). 
 
Yet in fact, it is a sensitive issue for the party. During the PK period, the Shariah Council 
(Dewan Syariah) issued a statement regarding women’s participation in the party. The 
statement imprints a strong patriarchal perspective of women as naturally inferior, incapable 
and less rational, whose natural inclination is sexual attraction: 
 
Politics has religious values (ibadah) in Islam; therefore women have equal 
opportunity from men according to the natural division of labor. When women 
should become active in politics, they must obey the guidelines prescribed by 
Islamic ethics: (1) Wearing decent dress, the ones that are not body-fitting and not 
transparent; (2) Do not resemble men in appearances and in behaviors; (3) Should 
not use perfumes, wearing accessory or showing-off their beauty; (4) They must not 
artificially soften their voice, or whispering sensually when they speak; (5) Control 
their gaze; (6) Do not cause controversies; (7) Do not neglect their main tasks as 
housewife (Dewan Syariah PK, 3/III/1999).  
 
The same Council, now part of the PKS, issued another fatwa on women’s participation in 
politics, in this case regarding women candidating for becoming a Member of Parliament. In 
this time, women participation in politics is only allowed in an emergency situation. 
 
(1) Politics is an integral part of Islam, (2) Seeking the good and refusing the vice is 
collective duties of both men and women; (3) Since politics is part of the effort to 
seek the good and to refuse the bad, women’s participation in politics is needed; (4) 
Female participation, including becoming a MP is allowed on the basis of riel 
benefits and emergency needs, under the following requirements: [a]. permission by 
their husbands, [b]. non-interference with the tasks in their family, [c]. have the 
moral and structural ability to avoid controversies, [d]. strictly follow Islamic rules 
in meeting with men, in their dressing and speaking, and in getting along with men 
other than their relatives; (5) The minimum and maximum number of women in the 
parliament is confined to the need, and not of certain quota (Shariah Council PKS, 
17.07.2003) 
 
Another document, an anonymous fatwa included in a volume published by PKS and put next 
to the fatwa from the Shariah Council on women participation in politics, pointed out that 
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women are not allowed to become the national leader. It cites various sources to support the 
argument, especially coming from classical Muslim jurists, who denied women’s right of 
obtaining the position of any national leadership, and from the history of Muslim politics in 
which the common practice never elected women as the caliph (PKS DIY, 2004). 
 
2.2 PKS Economy 
 The ideological concept of an economy, following Hinnich and Munger’s definition, is 
defined by the concept of how collective economic resources of the society should be 
distributed. In fact, PKS has no clear ideological concept of economy. However, following its 
worldview of interrelatedness between natural, moral and technical moral laws, the party’s 
documents indicate that economic prosperity is a natural consequence of people complying 
with the principle of justice. Justice ensures the mechanism of social control.   
 
Justice paves the way to the truth, righteousness, beatitude and happiness. Justice 
provides for everyone their fundamental human rights, and accommodates for their 
creative potentials. Justice spreads security, and frees people from fear and 
intimidation. Justice guarantees proportional redistribution of the state’s resources 
and equal opportunities for economic activities (PK, 1998: 4). 
 
The document also states that, since prosperity stems from justice, it is thus obligatory for 
every citizen to enact the principle of justice in their own personal conduct (PK, 1998: 6). 
According to the Islamic tradition, there are two different but interconnected rules for human 
collective life. The first is the rule of personal obligation (shariah), namely the obligation of 
every individual to follow God’s rule, while the second is the rule of collective strategy 
(siyasah) which emphasizes people’s collective physical and economic well-beings. Both of 
them stem from justice. The triumph of the ruler and the prosperity of the ruled depend upon 
the enactment of the principle of justice. When an individual ignores his personal duty, it 
implies that he is doing harm to himself, which at the same time affects the collective well-
being (PK, 1998: 24). 
 To some extent, the economic concept of PKS resembles the “social market-economy” 
of a Christian democracy, albeit in a primitive form, in which it prefers prioritizes economic 
empowerment to the lower-level economic segments, such as peasants, laborers, fishermen 
and small businesses, without refusing free competition of market economy. Yet, it is still 
highly symbolic and tainted with politics of identity, meaning that its formulation is intended 
to highlight and strengthen the Islamic identity.  
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 The institutionalization of justice politics and economy, in addition to strengthening 
political institutions in general, will prevent the emergence of totalitarianism, 
anarchism, individualism and excessive capitalism which have proven negative to 
people’s well being. The Justice Party commits to efforts of economic redistribution 
and development, and enactment of democratic, clean and just governance (PK 
Manifesto) 
 
In line with this economic concept, the PK and PKS programs on economy mention: 
 
Economy: The development of a robust national economy based on justice; 
developing productive industries which are not dependent on foreign capitals; 
endorsing people’s participation in creating a competitive economy; empowering 
agricultures, farms and maritime industries to create sustainable supply for the 
people; improving export-oriented industries such as oil and mines based on fair 
distribution for people’s prosperity and developing small-scale industries; improving 
the exploration of natural resources that provides the opportunity for equal 
participation and avoids monopoly; developing welfare service systems such as tax 
and alms for resource redistributions (PK Programs). 
 
Economy and Welfare: (i) projecting Islamic values in economic behavior and 
policy, (ii) building economic power for Muslims and the nation through 
independent projects, rejecting cartelism and the monopoly system which destroy 
people’s economy, (iii) maintaining Muslim wealth by endorsing the development of 
Islamic industries and economic projects, (iv) not to let a single coin drop into the 
hand of the enemy of Muslims, (v) protecting natural resources from exploitation 
averse to public interest, (vi) developing problem-solving economic projects to 
develop the people’s economy, in collaboration with committed national and 
overseas partners (PKS Programs). 
 
 
2.3. PKS Politics 
 With regard to the ideological concept of politics, or where the power appropriately 
resides, the party perceives that the ultimate authority belongs to God, and therefore the 
society and the state should be run according to God’s laws: 
 
This means that the absolute sovereignty belongs to God (Qur’an, 3: 26-27). And 
God as the owner of absolute authority wants humans to act as His vicegerents on 
earth. Therefore, one can only claim to have the legitimate authority as long as it is 
implemented to fulfill His will (Qur’an, 6: 165). Therefore, according to Islam the 
government should be practiced through the principle of sovereignty of the people, 
in order to realize God’s sovereignty (PK, 1998: 21) 
 
On the one hand, this concept implies that pious people should take over the 
leadership positions in society, as they have better knowledge of God’s laws. A further 
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document of PKS cites a Qur’anic verse: (Nuur: 55): “Allah has promised those among you 
who believe and do righteous good deeds, that He will certainly grant them succession to (the 
present rulers) in the country, as He granted it to those before them, and that He will grant 
them the authority to practice their religion, the one He has chosen for them i.e. Islam.” 
When applying the ideological point of view of the PKS to this verse, it can be concluded that 
being pious, following God’s guidance, is morally the most legitimate and technically the 
most effective way to come to power. After all, He was the creator and He is the authority 
who decides what will happen and what will not. 
It is interesting to note at this point that, even though this view on that matter seems 
similar to the one of the Masyumi, it is in fact significantly different. According to the PKS 
the rights to take over political power is in the hand of pious people, i.e. people who 
thoroughly and consistently practice the divine rules; the Masyumi term, in comparison, is 
Ulama which means “people who are knowledgeable on religious matter”. This also 
emphasizes the specific character of PKS’s religious view, which is populist and stresses the 
practice and implementation of religious teachings, rather than learning them in scholastic and 
elitist manner, as was proclaimed by the Masyumi. 
 On the other hand, the political worldview of the PKS implies the adoption of 
democracy, in which the political authority is in the hand of the people, and which 
acknowledges the equal rights of all people. It also advocates people’s political participation, 
to struggle against tyranny and to obey the constitution. The people’s active participation in 
politics represents a high value of patriotism, culture and religiosity. It also pledges the 
supremacy of a civilian government, while criticizing the tyranny of a military dictatorship. 
The civilian government must follow democratic principles, support the development of the 
potentials of all segments within the nation, protect the weak and guarantee citizens’ freedom. 
The military should limit its functions to protecting the nation from external threats and 
maintaining domestic stability (PK, 1998: 4).  
It also promotes and supports the people’s participation in politics. Ideally, citizens 
should know about their proper rights and duties. One of the most important duties is to 
exercise control over the government, when it ignores the principles of justice. And this 
proactive participation can only be realized if the citizens have the political capacity and 
capability. Therefore, for the PK political education and empowerment for the citizens is 
substantial for creating any form of democracy. And the development of the people’s political 
capacity to achieve a balance of power between the ruler and the ruled is the objective of the 
PK (PK, 1998: 4).  
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 Finally, it is important to add here that for the PK, democracy is basically a procedure 
to regulate political process. It is not an end in itself. Democracy is only one mean to achieve 
the real duty, which at last is the will of God. 
 
One of the basic principles of democracy, namely the participation of the people in 
the political process is in line with the Islamic principle of deliberation (shura). In 
Islam deliberation is a procedure of exercising in politics and government. Since 
humans are vicegerents of God on earth, in writing laws and regulations, legislators 
must obey and must not contradict God’s law and regulations (PK, 1998: 21).  
 
As the extrapolation of those ideological concepts of politics, programs of the PKS state the 
following: 
a. Building an Islamic system at societal and state level. 
b. Building political communication to persuade people to participate in politics 
by: (i) building a public awareness for the importance of Islamic politics as the 
solution to the nation’s and the state’s problems, (ii) strengthening the 
credibility and effectiveness of the communication between the party and the 
society. 
c. Building political cultures by: (i) enhancing the role of Islam as the source of 
cultural values in politics, (ii) developing egalitarian and democratic patterns 
of political behavior, (iii) developing rational political behavior and (iv) 
developing an inter-party solidarity. 
d. Endorsing political participation by: (i) nurturing situations that could appeal 
to the people’s consent for political participation through PKS, (ii) preparing a 
favorable atmosphere to attract the voluntary participation of the people in the 
party programs.  
e. Building external relations by collaborating in order to achieve goodness and 
piety, and avoid sins and law breaking. Moreover, the relation with other 
Muslims would be based on a flexible amity (wala), and the connection with 
infidels would be footed on strict commitment to the Islamic principles 
(barra), through: (i) collaboration and loyalty towards the Islamic party, its 
organizations and its institutions at the national or even at the international 
level, (ii) actively participate in creating conducive conditions for the 
realization of collaboration and unity among Muslim organizations, (iii) 
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positive thinking toward other Muslim organizations, (iv) denying a 
compromise with all institutions fledging the flags of infidelity. 
 
2.4 PKS Platforms  
 In the terminology of party studies the term ‘party platform’ refers to policy 
formulations or policy positions promoted by a political party. Commonly, parties formulate 
their platform during election campaigns, to tell the public what kind of issues or policies the 
party stands for. A platform is more specific than an ideology, since it reveals the 
interpretation of the party’s ideological worldview in a given context of political competition; 
yet, it is still more general and more abstract than party programs. Therefore, a party platform 
records its ideological aspirations, as well as its strategic and programmatic visions.  
 The fundamental message of the platforms are found in its “visions and missions.” 
The PK’s political vision was “Justice that leads into the truth, the good, the beauty, and the 
happiness of life. Justice provides the people not only with an opportunity to achieve their 
fundamental rights as human beings, but also with a support mechanism for their innovations 
and creativeness. Justice spreads the sense of security and frees people from any kind of 
intimidation and fear; under just systems there will be no discrimination, both towards 
minorities or the majority. Justice guarantees a fair and proportional distribution of the 
state’s resources  and offers equal opportunities for economic entrepreneurships.” Its 
political missions were: “To bring about Indonesia as a strong nation as the carrier of 
Blessing for human beings, so that Indonesians would be able to contribute to human 
civilization and the World becoming a  tranquil garden of life.” 
In the statutes of PKS, the party’s visions and missions are reformulated more 
systematically, that it is: (1) A party of religious propagation which strives for Islam as the 
solution for political issues and problems. (2) An agent of transformation of Islamic values 
and teachings in all processes of nation building. (3) The pioneer to build cooperation with 
various groups with the similar mission to establish an Islamic system and values as a 
universal good (not only for Muslims). (4) A contributor to the achievement of civil society in 
Indonesia. Their political missions are: 1. Spreading the Islamic propagation and creating 
cadres as elements of reform. 2. Developing Islamic societal institutions as centers for reform 
and solutions. 3. Building the Islamic public opinion and creating a conducive atmosphere for 
the implementation of problem-oriented Islamic teachings. 4. Advocating political education 
of the society, protecting and empowering citizens’ rights. 5. Promoting goodness in politics, 
under the framework of Islamic laws and ethics. 6. Cooperating actively with other Islamic 
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organizations to achieve unity among the Muslim community, and with other organizations to 
follow the agenda of national reformation. 7. Participating actively in supporting the 
oppressed Muslim countries.  
 Those political visions and missions are then translated into what the party calls 
“Basic Principles”, which include the following ten points: 
 
1. Integral, in which every action and policy must take various relevant aspects into 
consideration. This point also shows the perceptions of PKS that Islam provides a 
complete system of life, so that good Muslims should follow Islamic guidance in every 
aspect of their life. And perhaps it is interesting to note here that the meaning of the 
French term ‘integriste’ is equal to ‘fundamentalism’, and to a concept in party studies 
‘total-integration’ that refers to a type of political party that seeks to totally integrate its 
members into its programs, exemplified by communist and fascist parties. 
2. Reformist, all the party’s policies lead into reform and the refinement of individuals, 
society, the government and the state, in order to enact Gods’ words, to make His laws 
prevalent, and to establish His kingdom. This point affirms what I call the ‘proselytism’ 
character of PKS’s politics, as it seeks to convert people to their value system. 
3. Constitutional, in terms of following God’s constitution which regulates the very relation 
between humans as such and between humans and their Creator. Upholding and following 
Islamic Law in every aspect of life is a mandatory requirement for Muslims as a 
consequence of their faith. The Qur’an and the Prophetic Traditions are constitutional 
foundations for the party’s policies, programs and behaviors. 
4. Moderate, in thoughts and actions, in individual behaviors and in organizational policies. 
At practical level, it means rejecting any form of extremism, oppressions and vices.  
5. Committed and consistent, to Islamic teachings by turning the “transcendental laws” found 
in the Qur’an and Prophetic Tradition—and the thoughts of qualified ulama—into the 
foundation of the party’s policies, programs and actions. 
6. Growing and developing, endorsing creativity in improving the party vertically as well as 
horizontally based upon the Islamic values. The key factor in continuous development is a 
sustainable program on human resource development, to enable vertical mobility and 
horizontal expansion. 
7. Gradual and proportional, in party programs and development being in line with both the 
divine and natural laws. Hurrying is a wrong way of carrying out programs, and will 
inevitably lead into imbalance and failure. This gradualism strongly reflects the political 
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agenda of the Muslim Brothers, with its bottom up Islamization programs: starting from 
teaching Islamic values to individuals and families. After the people have been made 
familiar with it, Islam can be promoted by public norms without much resistance, and 
when the societal system has been Islamized the people will naturally demand for an 
Islamic political system. 
8. Priority on effectiveness, in which PKS takes the good of Muslim community as its main 
objective, and thus the benefits for the community are the main scale according to which 
the evaluation of party programs shall be undertaken.  
9. Future oriented, in which the PKS focuses not only on short-term achievements but also on 
long-term targets, without neglecting the current and past situations. This is in fact a very 
important point for the party, as it pays very high attention to recruitment and 
indoctrination in order to guarantee the sustainability of their organization. 
10. Global awareness, in terms of the PKS acknowledging that Islam is a universal religion 
and da’wa activities should follow the nature of Islam itself, without loosing attention to 
the unique context in which ones live. And this also explains the party’s concerns towards 
international issues in Muslim countries.  
 
3. INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT OF INDONESIAN POLITICS (1980-2006) 
After explaining the key points of the party ideology and platform, in this section, I will 
discuss the setting of the institutional environment in which the Tarbiyah movement and the 
PK/PKS operate. Firstly, I will explore the institutional settings of Indonesian politics under 
the New Order regime, especially focusing on the dominant role of the military in national 
politics, state engineering and coercion of electoral system and party system, and the 
feebleness of the legislative bodies in front of the executive branch of government. Next, I 
will discuss the regime change and its institutional implications, in which— in the word of the 
American Indonesianist Dwight King—the old political institutions were only half-heartedly 
reformed. Finally, I will elaborate, in detail, the further democratic consolidation marked by 
2004 parliamentary and  presidential election. 
 
3.1. Institutional Settings in New Order Period 
When one studies the history of Indonesian politics under the New Order regime, it becomes  
clear how it massively engineered and coerced political institutions, on its way towards 
power. The political manufacturing was started immediately after the Suharto rose to power in 
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1965. There were four fundamental elements or stages through which the authoritarian regime 
engineered the political institutions.  
Firstly, the increasing proportion of the role of the military in national politics. In fact, 
although the participation and intervention of the military in politics are not uncommon in 
new democracies such as in Southeast Asia, the role of the Indonesian military in politics was 
quite unique.  While usually military involvements in political affairs are interventionist and 
temporary in character, Indonesian armed forces had been able to obtain a constitutional, a 
legal as well as a cultural basis for its political functions. Historically, the Indonesian armed 
forces—especially the army—had played the most important role during the early years of the 
history of the republic, and proved itself as the most resilient institution at the time when the 
new nation went through various political and security crises. Initially, political doctrines of 
the Indonesian military emerged as a response to the political instability during the liberal 
democracy era of the 1950’s, when political parties driven by various ideologies were in 
prolonged quarrels among themselves and against the president that led into national political 
deadlocks amid an increasing public dissatisfaction, which triggered regional rebellions. At 
that moment, the doctrine was rather humble, a middle-way policy in which the military 
should be involved by stabilizing the national politics. It was neither a full political actor nor a 
mere spectator (Lev, 1963, Feith, 1964). 
When Suharto came to power in 1965 he established a new political regime—the New 
Order—with the military as its backbone. The regime then installed a legal and institutional 
basis for the new political roles for the military. Firstly, the preamble of the 1945 Constitution 
stipulates that the struggle for independence should be continued by social, political and 
economic struggles to achieve a united, sovereign, just and prosperous Indonesia. It means 
that the armed forces which had been involved in the struggle for independence should 
become an integral part of the social, political and economic developments. Secondly, the 
1945 Constitution  also stipulates ,in article 30 paragraph one, that all citizens have the right 
and duty to participate in defending the state; which implies that if the civilians have this very 
right and duty in defense activities then the military which basic function lies in defending the 
state should also be allowed to participate in politics. Thirdly, article 10 of the Constitution 
stipulates that the president is the highest commander of the armed forces, and therefore he 
has the full range of rights to use the military for other functions other than defense. Fourthly, 
the statement made by the Defense Minister in May 1966, demanded that the idea of the 
armed forces being the instrument of revolution and the instrument of the state, and the 
perception of its socio-economic functions to protect the spirit of revolution should be 
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recognized and guaranteed. Finally, the decree of the Security Minister no 177/1966 stipulates 
that, outside the defense functions, the Indonesian armed forces have the status of a functional 
group and are organized as one, as well, and therefore should participate in social, economic 
and political affairs and national developments (Moertopo, 1972: 48-50). 
 Under the banner of the dual functions, Indonesian armed forces gained a dominant 
position of influence in every major national enterprise, from security to economy and from 
politics to governmental administrations. In 1960s it was successfully eliminated and banned 
what they called the ‘extreme left’ of the communist party and communist ideology. And 
during 1970s it sought to do the same thing to the ‘extreme right’ of the political Islam. The 
regime passed a package of five Political Laws in 1985 which marked the apex moment of its 
totalitarian control over the nation. Firstly, the law No. 1/1985 on Election, which stipulates 
that only three organizations—Golkar, PPP and PDI—were the official participants; and that 
the election committee was in the hand of the government, itself led by the Ministry of 
Interior Issues and the national military commander. Secondly, Law No. 2/1985 on 
Composition and Status of the Parliament, which ensures that half of the members of the 
representative bodies were chosen by the government. Thirdly, Law No. 3/1985 on the 
Political Parties, in which required the election contestants to adopt Pancasila as their 
organization sole base. Fourthly, Law No. 5/1985 on Referendum, which specifies that a 
national referendum to acquire the consent from the majority of Indonesian citizens is 
required in order to amend 1945 Constitution. And Finally, Law No 8/1985 on Mass 
Organization, which also required all mass-based organizations operated in the country to 
adopt the state ideology Pancasila as the sole base. 
The law package 1985, was the final blow from the regime to take control Indonesian 
political system. Some analysts argue that in this policy the regime, in fact, targeted Muslim 
politics, since Islamic ideology is the only significant social force not yet brought to heel, not 
yet accept the regimes’ opinion on where authority ultimately resides. The policy received 
vast criticism not only among Muslims who felt that the regime tried to elevated the Pancasila 
above their religion, and a small group of hardliner Muslims did react provocatively which 
then repressed by the authority violently caused hundred of casualties. Yet, the rejections and 
suspicion also expressed by Christian communities who feared the regime would implement 
secularization policy. (Ramage, 1995: 36-37).  
The armed forces also took control of Indonesian economy especially the state own oil 
company (PERTAMINA). The armed forces divisions also developed their own business 
institutions and enjoyed large portions of state projects. In running its businesses, the army 
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officers received assistances and collaborations from Chinese community. Meanwhile the 
domination of active as well as retired ilitary officers in politics and governmental 
administrations were very conspicuous. By 1980 almost 50 percent of the cabinet positions, 
75 percent of the posts of secretary-general, 80 percent of the posts of director-general, 84 
percent of the posts of minister secretary, and 75 percent of provincial governors’ posts were 
taken up by military officers (Koekebakker, 1994). 
The second factor that constituted the fundamental structure of political institutions in 
New Order era was the establishment of Golkar as the regime’s political vehicle. Golkar 
(Golongan Karya, or Functionary Group) was originally established by a number of military 
officers in 1964 as an association of anti-communist organizations. When Suharto gained 
power, the new regime was dominated by the military that held prevalent negative sentiments 
toward political parties and civilian politicians—a trauma from 1950s. When eventually the 
regime was forced to call for elections, as the proper way to legitimize the regime change, it 
turned into Golkar which, in February 1970, was switched into political organization of the 
government to compete in the upcoming elections. Interestingly, in line with anti-political 
party sentiments prevalent among the military and was now imbued with economic 
developmentalism, the regime claimed that Golkar was not a political party and that its 
objectives were not ideological—like those of political parties—but rather tangible economic 
developments (Moertopo, 1972: 50).  
In the course of its development, Golkar evolved into a tool by which the regime 
accommodated, structured and exploited major elements in Indonesian political system. 
Internally Golkar consisted of three major factions that represented three main political 
resources: i.e. the military which was known as the ‘A section’ (stand for ABRI or Indonesian 
Military); the bureaucracy which was called the ‘B section’ (Indonesian Birokrasi or 
bureaucracy); and other groups outside the military and bureaucracy, such as business and 
other social and cultural groups, that was called the ‘G section’ (stands for Golongan or 
groups). The regime had been able not only to accommodate those major political resources 
but also structured them to work for its interests. Among the most consequential was the so 
called ‘mono-loyalty doctrine’ for public servants, civil as well as military, to the government. 
The presidential decree No. 6/1970 stipulated that civil servants could join political parties 
with approval from their superiors and should resign if they were elected as candidates. 
However, since Golkar was not a political party, civil servants could join Golkar and became 
its candidates. Meanwhile the military personals were not eligible to vote, yet still they could 
become candidates for Golkar (Antlov and Coderoth, 2004: 7). 
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Thirdly, New Order political manufacturing was not only at organizational levels, but 
also went down deeply into the political rules of the games. In 1973 it engineered the party 
system by forcefully merged ten political parties present in 1971 elections into two political 
parties: all four Muslim parties joined into United Development Party (PPP, Partai Persatuan 
Pembangunan) while five secular and Christian parties merged into Indonesian Democratic 
Party (PDI, Partai Demokrasi Indonesia). In this way, the regime co-opted and discredited 
political parties into right-wing and left-wing ideological organizations, while depicting 
Golkar image as centrist non-ideological economic-oriented organization (Liddle, 1978). The 
government officials had been also notorious in their interventions into parties’ internal 
affairs, by endorsing cooperative politicians to lead the parties and hindered unwanted 
politicians from taking strategic positions in the parties (Weatherbee, 2002). 
Moreover, it also launched controversial policy known as “floating mass” politics, 
intended to stripped off ideological sentiments and ideological identifications from the masses 
by banning activities of political parties under district level, hence the lowest level of party 
organizations were at district levels. Again, since Golkar was not qualified as a political party, 
it was allowed to have its branches at sub-district (Kecamatan) and village levels. According 
to the architect of the policy, it was designed to overcome the latent political instabilities 
among mass-people especially in rural areas which constituted the largest portion of the 
Indonesian citizens caused by competing political parties that marshaled the people in line 
with their respected ideological orientations. In order to prepare the Indonesian people to be 
ready for national development, focusing primarily in economic achievements, the mass-
people at village levels should be depoliticized and be freed from conflicting political 
ideologies (Moertopo, 1972: 96).  
Therefore, nothing was surprising when Golkar disproportionately dominated all 
elections during the new order era. In the first elections 1971, it already emerged as the 
majority winner by collecting 63 percents of national votes, and made Indonesian party 
system practically dominant party system:  
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Elections’ Results during the New Order Era (1971-1997) 
 
PARTY    1971 1977 1982 1988 1992 1997  
Golkar     62.8 62.1 64.1 73.0 68.1 74.5 
  
Parmusi        5.4 
NU     18.7 
PSII       2.4 
Perti        0.7 
PPP      29.3 28.0 16.0 17.0 22.4 
 
PNI       6.9 
Christian Party      1.3 
Catholic Party      1.1 
IPKI       0.6 
MURBA      0.1 
PDI      8.6 7.9 11.0 14.9 3.1 
 
It is important to note at this point, however, that although the military and Golkar had 
dominated Indonesian politics, the actual dominant player was indeed President Suharto 
himself. Suharto ruled Indonesia following traditional Javanese political culture, which 
perceived political power as personal property—that work like magical power; it should not 
be shared, since distribution and decentralization of power will dilute the power (Anderson, 
1972). Suharto sustained his power in Indonesian politics not by nurturing systematic support 
from the military and Golkar, but rather using old colonial trick of “divide and rule” by 
playing personal loyalties. In this way, he actually kept the military and Golkar weak 
institutionally, as the military personnel as well as Golkar politicians knew that the only way 
to advance their career was not by following the standard procedures of their organizations 
but rather through personal credits to Suharto.  
And Suharto had to reap what he seeded. By mid 1980s, a number of senior military 
officers, under the leadership of the chief commander Gen. L. B. Murdany started to be 
critical toward Suharto’s politics, which they perceived as hindered the development of a 
professional Indonesian military. Murdany criticized what he saw as excessive expansions of 
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the business of Suharto’s children. He even tried to expose Suharto’s corrupt policies to 
international attentions (Kingsburry, 2002: 92. Jenkins, 1986). Subsequently, the critical 
attitude toward Suharto increased among the military when he appointed as vice president 
Maj. Gen. Sudharmono who was unpopular among military officers. Inconvenience with the 
development in the military, at the end of the decade Suharto took surprising political 
maneuver by moving closer toward Muslim community. Firstly, he removed the Catholic 
Murdani from the chief commander of the armed forces, moved him into less influential 
position of defense minister, and replaced him with pious Muslim Try Sutrisno in 1988. 
Suharto also brought more Muslim generals into strategic positions. Suharto also approved the 
bills on religious subjects in public schools and marriage bill special for Muslims. Even 
personally he changed his public image from an earnest follower of Javanese mysticism into a 
pious Muslim when in 1993 he brought his family and closest aides into royal pilgrimage to 
Mecca to perform one of the basic pillars of Islamic religion.  
The most substantial Suharto political swing to cooperate with Muslims took the form 
of his approval of his closest aide Habibie, then minister of Science and Tecnology, to head 
the Association of Indonesian Muslim Scholars (ICMI, Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim 
Indonesia) founded in 1990. ICMI was in fact a loosely organized hybrid association whose 
members came from different segments in Muslim community and with different 
agenda.There were at least three different groups of ICMI members, activists and leaders each 
with their own different interpretations of what the organization should achieve (See Hefner, 
1993).  
The fist was government bureaucrats, which include technocrats who worked under 
Habibie in Agency for Research and Technology (BPPT), a number of high ranking Golkar 
functionaries, some cabinet ministers, university professors and businessmen. This group of 
people did not really actively take part in ICMI activities, and their participations were more 
symbolic and politically motivated.  
The second was moderate Muslim figures and thinkers like Nurcholish Madjid, Emil 
Salim and Sitjipto Wirosardjono who perceived ICMI as an arena through which Islam could 
be developed as public discourses, how Muslims could discuss their religion and adapted it 
into contemporary social and economic context, and fashion it into more active social force to 
improve the education level and economic fortunes for Muslim community.  
The third was modernist Muslim activists, like Amien Rais, Adi Sasono and 
Imaduddin Abdurrahim, who held a more ambitious political agenda for the organization. The 
main agenda of this faction was the so called “proportionalization” of political and economic 
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resources for Muslim community as the majority of Indonesian population. In politics, they 
argued, the New Order regime was unfairly gave more share to the Christians in political, 
governmental as well as military posts—which was in fact true—and they demanded that the 
trend should be reversed in favor of Muslims. In economy they took the blame to the 
Indonesian Chinese community who disproportionately dominated the countries business and 
economy, and they also requested that Muslim economic actors should be given wider 
opportunity to play their part (Ramage, 1999: 90-105).  
ICMI was quite phenomenal, in term that in relatively short term it had been able to 
attract and organize huge national political resources that significantly influenced the balance 
of the country’s politics, brought more Muslim figures in strategic posts in bureaucracy as 
well as military positions, and culminated in the election of Habibie as Vice President in 
1997. Therefore it was natural that criticism and negative reactions toward ICMI were soon 
emerged to the surface. Interestingly, the first and perhaps the most ardent critics came from 
internal Muslim community, represented among other by Abdurrahman Wahid, then the 
chairman of NU Muslim organization, who accused ICMI as merely a political vehicle of 
Suharto and the new order regime, and a Trojan horse to co-opt Muslim from within. Another 
strong reaction—naturally—came from the Christian community who feared that ICMI could 
become a pretext for fundamentalist Muslim group to discriminate them. Finally, mixed 
reactions came from the Indonesian armed forces where the internal tensions already visible 
between the so called “green” or Muslim-minded and “red and white” or nationalist officers. 
A group of senior military generals reacted critically to ICMI’s expanding influence, and 
warned the public that it could be divisive and counterproductive for national unity; while 
other groups enjoy cordial cooperation with the Muslim organization (Hefner, 1993).  
 
3.2. Regime Change and Institutional Reforms 
In 21 March 1998 Suharto stepped down under the double pressures both from various 
political oppositions and monetary and economic crises that severely hit the country for 
several months. He transferred the power into the Vice President Habibie, who subsequently 
formed a transitional government to prepare elections. 
 Before proceeding to discuss Habibies’ government, it is important to note at this 
point, that since the later years of Suharto government and during Habibie’s term of 
presidency, the most dominant political actors were the military and Muslim groups. The 
military was the most robust and influential institutions. After the temporary sour relations 
with Suharto during Murdani’s period of leadership, the military was able to get the favor 
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from Suharto when it was succeeded in bringing its commander in chief Sutrisno into vice 
presidency in 1993. Sutrisno’s successor Hartono was also able to get closer into Suharto’s 
inner circle. While Hartono’s successor Feisal Tandjung was even seemed to have closer 
relation to the regime’s inner circle than to the military. During Tandjung leadership a number 
of younger generals rose and started to play important roles in the armed forces, which 
include Wiranto who was to be the next armed forces commander in chief, Prabowo who is 
Suharto son-in-law, and S. B. Yudhoyono the future president.  
In the meantime, the greater clout enjoyed by Muslim groups in national politics was 
undeniably caused by Habibie’s support through ICMI, which injected a considerable self 
confident for Muslims to take parts in public affairs. Among the most prominent Muslim 
figures in this period were Nurcholish Madjid a Jakarta-based professor of Islamic studies, 
whose thoughts on Islamic neo-modernism—focusing on how to make Islam a moral force for 
Muslim who live in modernizing and religiously plural Indonesia—attracted wide followings 
across the country; Amien Rais then the chairman of Muhammadiyah who constantly 
advocated critical views on Suharto that made him expelled from ICMI; and Abdurrahman 
Wahid then the chairman of the largest Muslim organization NU who was well known of his 
close relations with Christians and Chinese communities.  
It is also interesting to note that at during this period both the military and the Muslim 
groups were internally divided between those who were in favor of political reform and those 
who favor status quo. Thus the Muslims and the military involved in an antagonism yet also 
strange collaboration. On the one hand, among the military, the so called ‘green’ generals like 
Tandjung and Prabowo because of their personal attachment to the president involved in 
various maneuvers in hindering political reformations. Tandjung and Prabowo were closed to 
radical and fundamentalist Muslims, and reportedly involved in the establishment of 
Indonesian Committee for Solidarity of the Islamic World (KISDI), a notorious radical 
Muslim group which advocated the greater role of Islam in Indonesian politics. Prabowo also 
created a think-tank that produced pamphlets accusing the Christians and the Chinese as the 
perpetrators of the country’s economic crisis and the fall of Suharto. And Prabowo’s men in 
the military were also involved in kidnapping students and other political activists to 
intimidate the proponents of political reform (Hefner, 2000).  
Meanwhile other group of militar generals, the so called ‘red and white’ under the 
leadership of Wiranto and Yudhoyono—albeit un-publicly—were supportive to the reform 
movements, and were in bitter rivalries with Prabowo and his men in taking control the 
military. When Suharto eventually step down, Wiranto and his faction won the rivalry and 
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Prabowo and his men were dismissed from the military. On the other hand, Muslim groups 
were also divided between the pros and the cons for political reform. The former included 
most of the ICMI figures, and especially Amien Rais and Abdurrahman Wahid whose 
keenness in promoting reformation had attracted sympathies and supports from the ‘red-
white’ generals; while Muslim groups—like KISDI—were involved in collaborations with 
other military faction in defending the status quo (Mietzner, 1999). 
 Move on into Habibie’s administration. The common wisdom was that it was intended 
as transitional government which main task was institutionalizing the reform and preparing 
elections for the new government. And in only one year of time—a very short time by any 
measure, interjected with political blunders such as the referendum that led East Timor into 
independent—it managed to underwent fundamental institutional reforms that paved that way 
to the democratization process. At least three institutional reforms had been undergone quite 
successfully: i.e. (a) reform of the party system by providing freedom to organize political 
parties and remove the ideological constraint; (b) reforms on electoral system especially on 
setting up independent election committee and the neutrality of public servants; (c) and 
reforms on the legislature system by adding new chambers and decreasing the number of 
unelected legislative members, especially from the military.  
 Revising the Party Law was the first significant step taken by Habibie’s 
administration, by passing the Law No. 2/1999. There were significant changes in the new 
law compared to its predecessors. Firstly, it called-off the old provisions of party laws that 
limited the number of political party, and provide the legal basis to organized political parties 
in quite easy way, in which it required at least 50 people aged 21 and over as founders, 
acquiring legal notary  notification and submit it to the ministry of justice. The law at the 
same time stripped off the special status of Golkar as elections participant of non-political 
party organization. Secondly, it cancelled the old stipulation that required political parties to 
adopt Pancasila as the only base, and permit parties to adopt various ideologies provided they 
do not contradict with the state ideology. Thirdly, it also abolished the old policy of ‘floating 
mass’ by allowing political parties to set up branch organizations at sub-district and village 
levels (Stockman, 2004).  
 The next institutional reform pushed forward successfully by the administration was 
on electoral system, which revised and improved the system from pseudo democratic during 
the New Order era into a more genuinely democratic one under the Law No 3/1999 on 
Elections. The fist significant revision dealt with the Election Commission (KPU). In the 
previous regime the Commission was under direct control of the executive from the national 
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down to village levels. Now it was changed into an independent body which members were 
recruited from government officers, representative of political parties and independent 
representatives, neither of which dominate the institution. It also stipulated the establishment 
of an independent election oversight body (Panwaslu) to administer violations of elections’ 
rules, and the law regulated the strict and fair rules regarding the role of civil servants in 
elections. While the old 1975 law unfairly prohibited civil servants from participating in 
parties electoral activities but allowed them to do so for Golkar, the new law stipulates that 
they could not participate in any kind of electoral activities and should maintain strict 
neutrality, while retaining the right to cast ballots. Finally, it required that in order to be able 
to present in elections, political parties should have branch at least in half of the total number 
of provinces, and in at least half of the total number of districts in those provinces  (King, 
2003: 52-55). 
 Lastly, substantial reforms were also undergone in restructuring the system and the 
performance of the legislatures under the rubric of Law No 4/1999 on structures and functions 
of the legislatures, to provide it with more independent power and remove possible 
interventions from the executive branch. The law restructured the composition of the 
legislative body into three chambers: (a) The House of Representative (DPR) with 500 
members consisted of elected representatives of elections’ participants; (b) Regional 
Representative Body (DPD) which was composed of 165 appointed members representing 27 
provinces; (c) People Consultative Assembly (MPR) with 700 members—formerly 1000—
consisted of the whole members of DPR, DPD and additional 165 group representatives. In 
the new structures the elected members were 95 percent, while in the old structure it was only 
43 percent. It also took substantial effort to reform the legislative body by reducing unelected 
military representatives, from 100 to 38, which significantly reduce the political clout of the 
armed forces in the institution.  
 When the elections were eventually took place in 7 June 1999, most of local as well as 
international observers deemed them as free and fair; while many analysts perceived them as 
more resemble to those of 1955 than any single election during Suharto Era. Out of 48 parties 
participated in the polls, 21 parties acquired sets in DPR, out of which only 10 parties had 
more than one seats. 
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!999 Election Result 
 
PARTY                  VOTES   SEATS 
PDIP       33.73   153 
Golkar       22.43   120 
PKB       12.60   51 
PPP       10.70   58 
PAN       7.11   34 
PBB       1.94   13 
PK       1.36   7 
PNU       0.64   5 
PDKB       0.52   5 
PKP       1.01   4 
PDI       0.62   2 
 
The aftermath of 1999 elections clearly bear the fruits of institutional reforms carried 
out by the transitional government. Firstly, the composition of the House of Representative 
clearly reflected the new constellation in the nations’ politics. Golkar, which in the previous 
six elections always earned absolute majority could only garner about one-third of the least of 
its previous achievements. The plural-majority in the House was taken by PDIP, which was a 
reformed faction of the old PDI under charismatic leadership of the daughter of the former 
president Sukarno, Megawati Sukarnoputri. Secondly, the elections witnessed the comeback 
of Muslim politics. During Suharto era, PPP as the only party for Muslims could only collect 
29 percents in 1977 elections, yet in 1999 at least nine Muslim parties gained seats in the 
House with more than 35 percent of the total votes and 37 percents of the total seats. 
 The new constellation in the legislature inevitably brought new face for Indonesian 
politics, with the most prevalent phenomena being the diminishing dominance of the status 
quo and the rising power of Muslim politics. In the MPR session 2000 to elect new president 
the parliament seemed to be dominated by rivalries between the election winner PDIP and 
Golkar. As events unfolded, however, both PDIP and Golkar were proved unable to utilize 
their political capitals. On the one hand Golkar was unable to continue its nomination for 
presidency when its candidate Habibie withdrew from the race after the Assembly (MPR) 
rejected his presidential reports. On the other hand PDIP which seemed over confident ruled 
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out communications and lobby with other parties, which eventually caused it ended in big 
lost.  
The winner in the aftermath of the institutional reforms was unexpectedly Muslim 
groups. Under the skillful leadership of Amien Rais who organize ‘Central Axis’ faction in 
the Assembly to accommodate aspirations from Muslim parties. When Golkar failed to 
continue nominating Habibie as its presidential candidate, the Central Axis lobbied Golkar to 
support its candidate Abdurrahman Wahid. Wahid nomination was in fact very much 
unanticipated since for years he had been Rais’ most bitter rival and no one at that time 
expected that Rais would nominate him, and it also controversial since in the last month he 
and his party had been very close to Megawati and PDIP. The defining moment opened up in 
the Assembly session to elect new chairman of the Upper House legislature (MPR) which was 
won by Rais with support from Golkar, followed by election of the chairman of the Lower 
House (DPR) which was won by Golkar chairman Akbar Tandjung with support from Central 
Axis. Yet the height moment was the election of president, with Central Axis nominated 
Wahid and PDIP nominated Megawati. Live broadcasted in national televisions, Wahid was 
elected president, after won tight race with Megawati.  
 
3.3. Democratic Consolidation 
Although some analysts and observers seems dubious on the effectiveness of 
institutional reforms carried out during Habibie’s term—on the fact that it was unable to 
eliminate the old players from taking part in the new government, when Golkar still command 
a large portion and the military retained its unelected faction in the legislature—a close 
observation utilizing institutional analysis suggests that it did make difference in providing a 
better playing field in which potential political actors could expect to play a fair, peaceful and 
sustainable political games.  
A substantial example in which ones can examine the impact of the institutional 
reforms is on party system or the structure and system of inter-party competition and 
cooperation. Political Scholars, most notably Linz and Stephan, deem political parties and 
party system as one of fundamental arenas of democracy. Hence, the condition of party 
system indicates the condition of the country’s democracy: the more stable the party system, 
the more stable its democracy, and vice versa (Linz and Stephan, 1996). Traditional party 
system theories, built on experiences of industrialized democracies count the number of 
parties and the spectrum of ideology as the main parameter to the system’s stability. The 
fewer the number of parties in a system and the less polarized their ideology indicate a strong 
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and stable party system, and the more the number of parties in the system and the more 
polarized their ideology imply that the system is unstable and the parties could easily in 
conflict with one another (Sartori 1976).  
  However, recent studies pioneered by Mainwaring and Scully have shown that the 
indicator cannot accurately explain party systems in new democracies in Latin America, 
Eastern Europe and Asia, as countries in these regions have very different historical 
trajectories than those industrialized democracies. Mainaring and Scully then propose that the 
most important indicator of the stability of party systems in new democracies is ‘degree of 
institutionalization’ of the systems. They listed four elements of institutionalization. Firstly, 
whether the inter-party competition is competitive in which parties moderately compete 
against each other, collusive in which parties collude with each other to fool their 
constituents, or combative when parties behave as if taking down the opponents is more 
important than the survival of the system (see also Norden, 1998). Secondly, to what extent 
parties have their root in the society, in terms that the parties have stable supports from 
portion of the society in one election to the next, so that parties are not easily come and go. 
Thirdly, the legitimacy of election in the eyes of party as the only procedure to be in power, 
that will minimize the possibility of extra democratic ways. And fourthly, the stability of the 
organizations of political parties (Mainwaring and Scully, 2005). 
To asses the impacts of institutional reforms to the behaviors of political actors, it 
would be sufficient by measuring the pattern of political competitions. At this point Deborah 
Norden theoretical scheme, which is derived from the experience of Latin America countries, 
is useful to explain to what extent democratic transition and institutionalization structure the 
pattern of political behaviors. In her scheme, party system competition refers not only to the 
interactions among political parties, but also includes other non-party actors such as the 
military and revolutionary groups. Such situation is typical in new democratic countries.  
According to Norden the best possible pattern is competitive system, where political 
parties genuinely strive to represent different political interests in the society but at the same 
time accept the uncertainty of the process and ready to accept defeat. Moderate competitions 
prevent any violent maneuvers from the military or revolutionary groups, as it is able to 
absorb and incorporate different interests smoothly. It doesn’t mean all the violent and 
revolutionary drives are gone, but rather have no opportunity to emerge because violent and 
revolutionary are unlikely to get popular supports. The second possible pattern is collusive 
competition. Referring to Katz and Mair theory on Cartel party system (1995), Norden 
suggest that during democratic transitions there are several examples in which the political 
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elites collude with each other, exploit the resources of the state for their own interests and 
advantages, yet at the same time pretending to represent the interests of the people. In some 
cases such situation is helpful to prevent and reduce horizontal conflicts between groups in 
the society by confining political interactions only at elite level, as was proposed by Arend 
Lijphart in his Consociational Democracy. But she notes that Latin America experiences show 
that such competitions hindered genuine democratic transitions. Lastly, the worst pattern of 
political competition is combative competition, a situation where the drive of competition is 
excessive. In such situation, political actors play a zero-sum type of political game, in which 
defeating the rivals is more important than maintaining the stability of the whole system   
(Norden, 1998: 430-433).  
 In the aftermath of 1999 election that marked the democratic transition, the political 
competitions were still unstructured, tinted with bitter ideological rivalries and the significant 
involvement of the military in the national politics. The political competitions were 
unstructured because the democratic transition took place in a relative sort period of time. 
Previously, during the New Order era, political competitions were severely restricted, and no 
one had any experience of open competition. When eventually democratization provided open 
arena for political competitions, nor one really knew who their competitors were and what 
they would like to do. The rivalries were delicate and did not match with formal institutional 
or organizational groupings. There were overlapping lines of competitions: between the 
reformers and the supporters of the status quo, between civilians and the military, and 
between the Islamic and the secular groups.  
 Thus among the reformers there were internal rivalries between the civilians and the 
military as well as between the Islamic and the secular. Inside the military there were also 
divisions between the supporters of political reforms and the supporters of the status quo, as 
well as between the symphatizers of Islamic and the secular politics. And there were divisions 
among the supporters of political Islam between the reformers and the pro-status quo. As a 
result, the political competitions by and large did not rely on the formal rules of the game, but 
rather exploiting informal systems and networks, such as religion, ideology, regionalism and 
other primordial elements (see Walters 1999: 59-64, Mietzner, 1999: 65-104). The 
competition was then tended to be combative, in which political actors sought to advance their 
political agenda without too much concerned about the sustainability of the newly installed 
democratic institutions—as was elaborated in the previous section.  
 Dwight King has called it “half-hearted reform” because of reformers unwillingness or 
inability—or both—to carry out the reform thoroughly and started genuinely new pages of 
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Indonesian politics. The reformed institutions were barely effective in producing democratic 
politics, since the playing field still populated by old players from the previous regimes who 
desperately protect their interests. Yet, as King also noted, the successful institutional reforms 
were indeed huge achievements, since they were achieved in remarkably peaceful political 
negotiations, and there were no visible alternatives around. And in fact, what actually 
happened in the period was similar to the often cited illustration from O’Donnel and 
Schmitter who likened democratization process with multy-layer chess game:  
 
“with people challenging the rules on every move, pushing and shoving to get to the 
board, shouting out advices and threats from the sidelines, trying to cheat whenever 
they can—but nevertheless becoming progressively mesmerized by the drama they 
are participating in or watching and gradually becoming committed to playing more 
decorously and loyally to the rules they themselves have elaborated” (1986: 66) 
 
 The obvious indications of the progress were constitutional amendments, which was 
taboo and practically impossible in the previous regime which venerated it as sacred. At least 
four amendments are relevant to our discussion. First is revision on chapter three that 
stipulates that president and vice president are elected directly by the people and no longer by 
MPR. This would increase the political clout of the president since he would have a direct 
mandate from absolute majority of Indonesian people. However, the revised constitution also 
put constraints to presidential power in which he no longer have the authority to draft laws.2 
Furthermore he also can no longer dissolve the parliament, and his terms were explicitly 
limited into twice. The next points of amendments dealt with MPR, which was stripped-off of 
its status as the supreme institution, and no longer held the rights to elects president ant vice 
president. Yet it acquired new right to amend the constitution. Other major revisions were 
also carried out on the structure and functions of DPR. It has more members, from 500 to 550, 
all of whom elected, and the unelected military faction was abolished. The abolishment of 
military faction in the legislature was great democratic achievement. DPR also acquired 
exclusive rights to write laws and budgeting and monitoring functions. Lastly, the 
amendments added new clauses on Regional Representative Body (DPD) as new chamber in 
the legislature which tasks are representing the interests of the regions, and on Elections 
which are formerly only regulated under laws. 
                                                 
2 Among the most bizarre institutional formula in the original 1945 Constitution was that the President has the 
rights to writhe laws. Even the most learned expert of constitution could not make sense how the writers of the 
constitution did not understand this (Manan, 2005: 25) 
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The second significant institutional development was the ratification of new Law No 
21/2002 on Political Parties. At least three major revision were administered that significantly 
would influence party behaviors and thus party system, i.e. requirements to form new party, 
party’s right to recall its representatives in the legislatures, and on party funding. On the 
formation of new party, in addition of having at least branches in 50 percents of the total 
numbers of provinces, and 50 percent of districts or municipalities in those provinces, the law 
added that it also had to establish branches in 25 of the total number of sub-district regions in 
each of those districts. This regulation was clearly intended to simplify the party system by 
making new parties more difficult to emerge. The next revision in the party law, the granting 
of rights to parties to withdraw its representative in legislatures, was controversial. Critics said 
that the clause would inevitably create oligarchic political parties that would recall any 
dissident representative, and subsequently would undermine the performance of legislative 
members who inevitably would concern about their parties’ interests than those of their 
constituents. Yet the proponents—party leaders who drafted the law—maintained that it was 
designed to facilitate a more effective organizational performances. Lastly, the law added new 
section on party finance that provisioned that parties permitted to receive limited amounts of 
money from individual and organizational donators. This clause was designed to make party 
competition more balance, by limiting the financial gaps between small and big parties. 
 Further reforms were also done on electoral systems to elect legislatures (Law No 
12/2003) and president (No 23/2003). There are two different electoral systems applied for 
two different chambers: Majoritarian System was used to elect four DPD members in every 
province, while DPR members were elected using closed-list Proportional Representation. 
The law also regulates campaigns funding to guarantee its transparency. Perhaps the most 
significant element in institutional reform was the provision to make the electoral committee 
(KPU) as independent and permanent body. Finally, the new electoral regulation was created 
to elect president and vice president, which can only be nominated by political party, and that 
to be elected to presidency the par-candidates must acquired absolute majority of votes, and if 
the first round election does not produce the result a second round is needed. 
 As was expected the institutional engineering produces impacts on the behavior of 
political parties and influence the institutionalization of party system. First they influence the 
electoral outcomes that subsequently influenced party behavior. Series of elections were 
carried out during 2004, and Indonesians like to say “year of voting frequently” in the way of 
saying “year of living dangerously”. The first round was legislative elections, to vote for DPR 
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and DPD representatives, held in 5 April 2004. Out of 24 contestants 17 parties received seats 
in DPR and 12 parties acquired more than one seat.  
 
The Result of 2004 General Elections 
 
PARTY    VOTE   SEATS 
Golkar     21.58%  158 
PDIP     18.53   109 
PKB     10.57   53 
PPP     08.15   58 
Democrat    7.45   57 
PKS     7.34   45 
PAN     6.44   52 
PBB     2.62   11 
Pelopor    0.77   2 
PBR     2.44   13 
PKPB     2.11   2 
PDS     2.13   12 
PPDK     1.16   5 
 
The second round of election was the first-round presidential election, in 5 July 2004 with 
five pars of presidential candidates:  
 
The First Round Presidential Candidates 
 
CANDIDATE    PARTY  VOTES 
S.B. Yudhoyono - M.J. Kalla   Democrats  33.57 
Megawati - H. Muzadi   PDIP   26.61 
Wiranto – S. Wahid    Golkar   22.15 
Amin Rais – S Yudhohusodo   PAN   14.66 
Hamzah Haz – A. Gumelar   PPP   3.01 
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Since no absolute winner came out in the first round, the presidential election needed the 
second round which was held in 4 October 2002 with two pars of hopeful: 
 
The Candidates of the Second Round Presidential Race 
 
S.B. Yudhoyono – M.J. Kalla   Democrat  60.62 
Megawati – H. Muzadi   PDIP   39.38 
 
  The 2004 legislative and presidential elections marked the new pattern of competitions 
as the result of further institutional engineering and democratic consolidation. To return to 
Deborah Norden theoretical scheme, at this point the political system was more competitive 
with significant atmosphere of collusive character. Firstly, the rivalry between civilian and the 
military was significantly reduced as the new system has reduced the political roles of the 
military, and the new leaderships in the armed forces endorsed professionalism of their 
institutions (Rabasa, 2005, Walters 1999). Secondly, the ideological rivalry between the 
Islamist and the secular was also diluted by the stability of interests-based competitions. By 
2004 the members of the Central Axis coalition which were solidly and enthusiastically 
promoted primordial ideological programs against the secularist have dispersed and pursued 
their diverse political interests (Ananta et al, 2005: Chapter 1). Lastly, the rivalries between 
the reformers and the supporters and symphatizers of the status quo was also disappear, 
because democracy has become the only viable choice for most of Indonesian citizens as well 
as for the majority of the political actors. A number of opinion surveys that recorded the 
preferences of both the public and the elites convincingly indicate that Indonesian public and 
elites have strong confident not only to the idea of democracy as the best political system, but 
also to the process through which democratic process were carried out (IFES 1999, 2002, 
2004 (I-XVIII); TAF 2002, 2004, LP3ES 2004). Although the people’s confidents toward 
democratic system and its institutionalizations had been lower in 2004 compared to 1999—
apparently because of the prolonged tough economic conditions—the scores are still high.  
 
5. CONCLUSION 
This chapter explores the ideological formulations and political programs of the PKS. In 
terms of ideology, PKS is a direct heir of PK political missions since the core actors of both 
parties are the same, i.e. activists from the Tarbiyah movement. Both parties adopted Islam as 
political ideology, and promoted the teachings of Islam throughout society and polity level. 
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However, different from SI which perceived Islam as a socialistic ideology to freeing 
Indonesians from colonial oppression, or from the Masyumi party, which perceived Islam as a 
pragmatic-and-democratic ideology that provides an alternative identity for Indonesians amid 
conflicting international ideologies, the PKS founders saw Islam as a liberal-democratic 
ideology that untying Indonesians from authoritarian regimes and instead leading them into 
democracy. Under the influence of Egyptian Muslim Brothers, PKS develops gradual visions 
of political agenda: starting from Islamizing individuals, the family, the society, and then the 
politics. Therefore, it perceived democracy as perfect system that accommodates their 
political missions.  
On morality, or what is good for society, the key term for PKS is the word “justice”. 
Understood as “to put things in their proper places,” justice is understood in three different 
levels: Firstly, cosmic sense, in which justice refers to the natural laws that are constant and in 
perfect balance, and in fact they are God’s laws. Secondly, moral-sense, in which justice is 
moral law that human being must follow and enact as God’s creatures. Thirdly, technical-
sense, because justice represents natural and moral laws, it is also the most effective way to 
pursue political power. On economy, or how the society’s resources should be distributed, 
PKS vaguely indicates that they should be distributed fairly, and giving priority to the poor 
and weak societal segments, yet do not neglect economic growth. While on politics, or where 
power appropriately resides, PKS perceives that since the ultimate power belong to God, the 
pious people should take the power. However, interestingly, different from Masyumi which 
perceived pious men as special group of people, the ulama or intelligentsia, PKS understand it 
as moral consent and capacity that could be owned by every Muslim. 
 This chapter also explains institutional settings in which Tarbiyah movement and PKS 
operated, started from New Order era, the regime change, and the democratic consolidation. 
Institutional settings during the New Order era had authoritarian characteristics. Firstly, it was 
characterized by dominant roles of the military in national politics. This produced 
undemocratic political process, when the military used its intelligence services to curb not 
only the potential oppositions but rather to abolish political capacity of the public. Secondly, 
the manipulation of political system, by co-opting political parties, forced them into two 
parties and banned their organizational activities below district level, while on the same time 
the regime setup Golkar as political vehicle, which was allowed to present in election and 
since it was not a political party I could operate below district level. Thirdly, other 
institutional settings in this period were the engineering of electoral system, in which the 
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government controlled the electoral committee, and Legislature in which half of its members 
were appointed by the government. 
 After the regime change, Indonesia underwent democratization process. Initially the 
process was in the form of ‘pact’ democratization, in which the system changed but the actors 
remained the same. This ‘half-hearted reform’ had slowed down the democratization process, 
and even produced intense and sometimes violent political competitions. However, by 2004 
the reformers were able to push further the democratic consolidation, by passing bills that 
stipulates more democratic election system, direct presidential election, and stronger 
legislatures. This produces smoother political process and moderate political competitions.  
 To return to Douglas North theoretical proposition, ideology and institutions are in 
fact two sides of the same coin: the former represent the inner side, the perspective by which 
actors interpret and understand their environment, the latter is the outer side or the tools by 
which actors handle and structure the environment. People, as political actors, need ideology-
and-institutions—the structures that we commonly refer as ‘institutions’—to facilitate 
political interactions, transactions and collaborations, by regulating the behaviors so that each 
actor knows what he and his rivals can and cannot do. Institutions thus reduce the uncertainty 
in political games, by providing schemes of possible options of behaviors actors can do. 
Under such conditions, according to North, ideology and institutions have mutual-substitutive 
and complimentary relations. When the existing institutions can provide certainty for stable 
and sustainable interactions, actors tend to follow the formal rules; yet when the formal 
institutions cannot provide certainty for stable and sustainable institutions actors tend to rely 
on ideology in their behaviors in interactions, transactions and collaborations. The next three 
chapters will discuss PKS political behaviors—in organization, in elections, and in 
government—in which I expect to see that the behaviors will reflect the dynamics relations 
between its ideology and the existing institutions. 
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CHAPTER V 
BETWEEN IDEALS AND EFFECTIVENESS:  
PKS BEHAVIOR IN ORGANIZATION 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapters have discussed PKS ideology and its institutional contexts, in order to 
understand the basic elements that structure PKS political behaviors. Ideologically, PKS 
strongly exhibits Islamist characteristics, with a religious-moralist political worldview. It 
perceives political processes as merely an extension of an individuals’ religious morality 
wherein the good or the bad of political conditions are simply reflections of the conditions of 
morality of the people. Thus, the logical way to reform and improve political conditions is by 
improving the morality of individual citizens. This political outlook is rooted in religious 
interpretation that perceives social and natural processes to be regulated by one divine law 
which governs natural orders. Both laws have common source and have common precision 
and effectiveness.  
 PKS emerged in a time of democratic transition and consolidation in a predominantly 
Muslim country. Democratization has restructured the pattern of political competitions from a 
previously authoritarian system in which a strong leader took control over almost all 
fundamental political structures into a more open and more competitive political system. 
Although at that time Indonesia adopted representative political system exemplified by 
regular elections and representative legislatures, the system had been heavily manipulated to 
serve the interest of the regime and did not function democratically. Political parties were 
strictly regulated and stripped of their representative capacity, elections were rigged to 
guarantee the domination of the government party, and the legislature was no more than 
rubber stamps for the executive. Following the regime change, democratization has 
successfully, if incrementally, introduced more open party laws to accommodate pluralities of 
political interests in society, free and fair elections, as well as an increasingly stronger and 
independent legislature. Successful direct presidential elections have also brought a 
government with stronger popular legitimacy. 
 This chapter discusses PKS's organizational behavior, focusing on the internal 
structures and mechanism of the party organization. By definition, organization is a means to 
achieve goals, and one can expect with certainty that different goals will need different types 
of organization. And there are different organizational types within various political parties, 
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which are designed to achieve different political objectives. Thus, one can infer a parties 
objectives from its organizational structure.  The last chapter has outlined PKS ideology and 
political objectives and the institutional setting in which it participates in political 
competitions. This chapter will discuss how PKS adapts its ideological objectives to existing 
opportunities in political competitions structured by the democratizing political institutions. 
The first section introduces theories of party organization which show distinct basic structures 
and mechanisms of party organization. The second section explains the organizational 
structures of the PKS, and the third section discusses the internal mechanism of leaders and 
candidate selections. Special discussion on female participation is elaborated in the third 
section, focusing on how PKS had negotiated its conservative ideological perceptions of 
female participation in politics with democracy’s demand of women greater political 
participation.  
  
2. THEORIES OF PARTY ORGANIZATION  
2.1 Party Orientation and Organizational Consequences 
Political parties are unique organizations both in their functions and their structures. The most 
fundamental and unique function of a political party is what scholars call linkage: i.e. to 
connect peoples' preferences to government policies. It includes functions such as ‘interest 
articulation and interest aggregation,’ ‘socialization and mobilization,’ as well as ‘elite 
recruitment and government formation.’ Sometimes, scholars further classify the linkage 
functions into three stages: (a) connecting people to a party’s programs, (b) connecting a party 
to the state, and (c) connecting people to the state (Lawson, 1988: 33-34). Others add that 
linkage can be formal, in which a party integrates people into the governmental process 
through formal party membership or informally through direct communication via mass 
media and surveys (Poguntke, 2002: 44-46). In short, the distinctive function of a political 
party that differentiates it from other organization is that it is the means by which people 
participate in political decision makings. 
 Scholars tend to agree that political linkage is the universal function of political party, 
or its meta-function (Jonasson, 2004: 17). However, there are several linkage types, by which 
different parties link people’s preferences to government policies in different ways. Since 
linkage is the most fundamental function of a party, different linkage types produce different 
organizational setting as well as different patterns of behavior. Following Katz and Mair's 
typology, there are four party types, i.e. the elite party, the mass-party, the catch-all party and 
the cartel party. Each of these maintain different organizational structures because they serve 
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different linkage type, or the way they connect the people with the state. There are five 
organizational structures which function differently in different party types: (i) party goal, (ii) 
style of representation, (iii) party membership, (iv) the relation between members and leaders, 
(v) its principal resources, and (v) how they organize their works: 
 
a. Elite Party, has the political goal of redistributing of power among its members. 
Secondly, it acts as a trustee that represents the political interests of the elites. 
Thirdly, this type of party is elitists and its membership is restricted, and therefore 
there is no need for active recruitment. Fourthly, there is no hierarchical relation in 
party organization. Fifthly, its principal resources are personal contacts with those 
elites who mobilize their contributions. Sixthly, party work is irrelevant since party 
membership is restricted and there is no need for mass-mobilization. 
b. Mass-Party, has the goal of representing the interests of certain group or groups in 
society—including regional, class, religious, or ethnic, etc.—in order to promote 
or to maintain social conditions according to the interest of the group it represents. 
Secondly, party is part of the society and acts as delegate of the group into the 
state. Thirdly, party membership is large and expands as the party needs more 
members to legitimize its cause and to support its work; yet at the same time it is 
also homogeneous and restricted as membership is based on certain collective 
identity. Fourthly, on leaders and members relation, since parties represent societal 
groupings, party leaders are accountable to their members. Leaders-members 
relation is bottom-up in character. Fifthly, a party's principal resources are 
members’ dues and contributions. Sixthly, since members are the main resource, 
party works are labor-intensive, and party workers are unpaid. 
c. Catch-All Party, has the political goal of offering social ameliorations or 
developments beneficial for all groups in the society, and does not represent the 
interest of a certain group. In this case, the party is a political entrepreneur which 
sells its programs to voters from various societal backgrounds. Secondly, party 
membership is large and open to all segments in society, hence it is heterogeneous. 
Thirdly, members-leader relations are top-down, in which party leaders represent 
certain policy preferences that compete with other groups of leaders with different 
policy options, while party members can only support their leaders or chose an 
other party. Forthly, party funding comes from wide sources, not only from 
members’ dues. Fifthly, party works are both labor and capital intensive. On the 
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one hand, since a party develops a large membership it can mobilize its members 
for party activities; on the other hand, since party leaders act as political brokers 
offering better policy alternatives and not as members’ delegates, they commonly 
also heir professional workers for party activities especially during election 
campaigns. 
d. Cartel Party, has the political goal of subtracting state resources for the interests 
of politicians and for the survival of the party, and does not represent the political 
interest of citizens. Secondly, the party acts as an agent of the state that mobilizes 
public supports for governmental activities. Thirdly, membership is open to 
different societal segments, but there is neither specific obligation nor specific 
rights for members. The difference between members and non-members is blurred. 
Fourthly, since the ultimate goal of the party is to serve the interests of politicians, 
not the members who have neither specific rights nor obligations, the relationship 
between leaders and members is mutually independent. Fifthly, in line with its 
political goal, the party's primary funding sources are state subventions. Sixthly, as 
the party has no significant attachment to its members, party activities relied 
heavily on professional workers. 
 
What is interesting from the previous classification is that party organizational structures and 
mechanisms are a combination between the ideals of linkage functions and organizational 
effectiveness. The former rooted in ideological orientation pertaining to the objectives of the 
party's political activities, while the latter is a product of the adaptation of institutional 
settings such as social structures, party laws and regulations, and inter-party competition 
(Katz and Mair, 1995). 
 
2.2. Party as Non-Unitary Actor 
Party organizational distinctiveness is not only confined to external functions and behaviors 
but is evident in internal structures and behaviors as well. American political scientist Joseph 
Schlesinger found that political parties combine the organizational properties of business 
firms, pressure groups, and government bureaus (Schlesinger, 1984). He explains his 
argument by asking three basic questions applicable to any organization in order to unveil its 
basic characteristics. One is how does the organization maintain itself? Two is what is the 
principal work or principal output of the organization? Three is how does it compensate its 
workers or participants? In answering the questions, Schlesinger develops three trichotomous 
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variables: (1) an organization maintains itself through market exchanges or non-market 
devices; (2) it primary output is either collective or private goods; and (3) it compensates 
participants either directly or indirectly. Applying these principles to party organization, he 
found that it uniquely combines properties of three different organizational types mentioned 
above. 
 Like a business organization, a political party sells its product to a political market of 
elections to earn profits through votes. The votes collected from elections for the party, like 
money earned by a business firm from it’s trading in economic market, is a value-neutral 
currency usable for other political transactions to gain offices or even to form a government or 
initiate other transactions—high or low. The market-oriented character of political parties has 
a major impact on its organizational arrangement. One is that earning votes from an election 
becomes a goal in itself for party to maintain its survival, confirming Downs’ statement that 
“Parties formulate policies in order to win elections rather than win elections in order to 
formulate policies (Downs, 1957: 28). Second is that the orientation affects internal 
competitions in party organization since the political market of election, just like economic 
market, sends clear signals of whether the party gains profit or lose in its business. 
Consequently, individuals or units responsible for the success of the party in elections gains 
considerable influences in organizational decision-makings. People who contribute to the 
party’s electoral success will rise to power, and vise versa.  
 Unlike a business firm that sells private goods that are available only to the people 
who pay for them, a political party produces and sells collective goods that are usable for all 
people both who buy them and who do not. Parties formulate programs and policies for the 
society as a whole, and never only for its voters. It is in this respect that political party 
organization resembles the organization of a bureau or a governmental agent. This brings 
decisive consequences for the mode of survival of political party, namely how it pays or 
compensates its workers or participants. 
 With regards to the mode of compensation to its activists who support it, a political 
party has another organizational model. Different from business firms and bureaus that pay its 
participants directly, political party compensate its workforces indirectly through promises for 
future policies. In this respect, a political party is similar to a voluntary organization. This 
organizational property also has significant impact to the party's organizational behavior, 
especially in relation with the participants and other stakeholders. Direct compensation such 
as in a business firm or a bureau permits the organization to have great control over 
participants and their activities, and to motivate them to exercise their skills to achieve the 
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organizations’ goal without so much concern for the goal itself. Indirect compensation, on the 
contrary, forces political party to always be concerned with the aspirations of its participants 
and try to formulate policies in that direction. Political party's have only loose control over its 
activists, it cannot direct the activists’ behavior, and it is unable to prevent or deny its activists 
from gaining benefits from other sources.  
 The unique characteristics of party organization—that combine the properties of 
business firms in selling product in a market, bureaus or agencies in producing and selling 
public goods, and voluntary or pressure group in its indirect compensation to its 
participants—makes party organization formulate distinct internal structures, what Stephen 
Katz and Peter Mair call the “three faces of party organization” (Katz and Mair, 1993).  
Following other party scholars (Daalder, 1983; Laver and Schofield, 1990) Katz and Mair 
maintain that a political party does not represent a unitary actor in its behavior. There is 
always internal heterogeneity in party organization, and they outline three basic faces of party 
organization, namely the party on the ground, the party's central office and the party's in 
public office. Although each of these faces contains further heterogeneous elements, they 
represents independent organizational parts that are influential for the party's organizational 
behaviors.  
 
 a. Party on the ground refers to a party’s local activists, members, loyal voters and 
regular donators whose main task it is to maintain party organization at the lowest 
levels, as well as to promote party programs to potential voters. Highly voluntary 
works characterize this face of political parties. For example, although most 
members see the party's success in an election as primarily important but ones 
cannot expect them to work all-out for this. Similarly although there are 
organizational procedures of entering and exiting party organization, what matter 
for people to enter or exit the party is their personal will. This face, thus, always 
reflect the ideals and normative tendencies of the party. Party on the ground 
embodies strong power when it comes to national or local congress, where it has 
the ability to put pressures to fix any unsatisfactory performances of party 
leaderships. Party on the ground also has control over important resources, such as 
members, activists, and local funding sources. However, it also has obvious limits 
in which it is unable to participate in decision-makings on party policies, let alone 
on wider public policies.  
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 b. Party in public offices consists of party representatives who hold offices in the 
executive as well as legislative branches of government. In democratic politics, the 
party in public office depends on its success in electoral competitions. One of the 
unique features of party in public office is that many of the benefits it earns are, in 
fact, personal benefits for the persons who hold the office, both material and 
status. For party organization, party in public office bring at least three benefits: 
one is participation in decision-making for public policies; two is patronage which 
means that a party representatives who hold a positions in a governmental office 
can become a financial source for the party; and three they also bring knowledge, 
skills, and experiences of governing that are very important for the party. 
However, party in public office also faces several constrains in performing their 
activities. First is the fact that their offices are a direct or indirect result of the 
voters’ support and should therefore be attentive to the political aspirations of the 
voters which limits them in doing any political maneuver. Second is they must 
compromise with and make concessions to the party’s coalitions partner(s), and 
also going through interactions with non-partisan or career government officials 
who have a different perception on how government bureaucracies should be run, 
or how public policies should be made. This puts them in a risk of disappointing 
party followers. 
 c. Lastly, party central office is the party's top leadership, usually located in the 
national capital and consists of two different, but often overlapping, parts: one is 
national board committee(s), and the other is the central party staff or secretariat. 
They are either elected in party congresses or recruited in some other ways to 
represent the party on the ground, party in public office or other party 
stakeholders. Being the central management that is responsible for any external 
communications and relations, the party's central office also connects other faces 
of party organization. On the one hand, it coordinates national campaigns in which 
it supervises the party on the ground on behalf of the party in public office; while 
on the other hand, it may also supervise the party in public office on behalf of the 
party on the ground. However, it centrality may also put the party central office in 
an ambiguous situation. If its members are united it becomes the dominant part 
that controls other faces of party and draws resources from them for its own use;  
otherwise, when its members are not united, it will turn into merely a battle-ground 
or empty shell that is impotent and ignored. 
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2.3. Party Internal Mechanisms  
As is clear from the previous paragraphs, political party is internally a plural actor, because of 
its basic functions and organizational structures. There are plural actors inside the party 
organization, with different orientations and different patterns of behavior. In line with this 
idea of the internally plurality of orientations in the party's organization, John D. May 
proposes an interesting theoretical framework to explain this asymmetrical orientation which 
he calls the Special Law of Curvilinear Disparities (May 1973). According to May, party 
activists can be classified into three organizational levels, i.e. top-leaders, intermediary-
leaders, and followers, in which top-leaders and followers tend to be more pragmatic in their 
orientation and behavior while the intermediate-leaders tend to be ideological and are 
potentially a source of extremism. There are, at least, three factors leading to these polarizing 
ideological orientations.  
Patterns of intra-party surveillance and control: In party activities followers embody 
the parties most important element in that they determine the party’s success or failure in 
elections, hence its coming to power, and therefore a party tend to be receptive to what its 
followers say. It is natural that top leaders are more exposed to followers’ scrutiny and tend to 
be more receptive to the dynamics of the constituent. Intermediary-leaders, on the contrary, 
are less exposed to public inspections and  follow strict interpretation of the party’s 
ideological orientations. 
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Patterns of recruitment to intermediary-echelons: Intermediary-leaders  of a party’s 
social base commonly come from the economically middle class. This group of people, 
characterized by dynamic social and economic mobility, is sensitive to policy issues that will 
influence their living-conditions. Therefore it is expected that they will enthusiastically 
support policies advantageous for their living-improvement and denounce opposing policy 
preferences.  
Political socialization. The nature of the followers’ commitment to a party's 
ideological orientation is often low because they commonly live in plural communities and in 
constant interaction with other people who hold different political beliefs. In the same vein, 
top-leaders of a party, many of whom hold public positions, are also in constant interactions 
with leaders from various political parties. Top-leaders’ interactions with their rivals make 
them flexible and tolerate of differences of opinions. Intermediary-leaders also tend to interact 
mostly with likeminded fellows and colleagues that make their ideological outlook stronger 
and more rigid that both the mass and the top-level leaders. 
 It is crucial, therefore, to analyze internal mechanisms of a party's organization in 
order to arrive at a fundamental understanding of the impact of ideological orientation to the 
behavior of different actors inside the party.  
 
2.3.1. Leaders Selection 
The first basic mechanism of a party's organization is leadership selection, through which 
party chose group of people to lead the organization based on who is eligible to be elected 
leaders, and who is eligible to elect the leaders. 
a. On the eligibility of the candidates of party leaders, the options can be closed 
system in which only members and activists can be nominated as leaders. 
Alternatively, the procedure can be open, in terms that anyone interested to 
participating in party leadership, even without prior formal acquaintances with the 
organization, can also be nominated. 
b. Regarding the eligibility to participate in selecting the candidates, the procedure 
can be (i) confine to only top-level leadership, (ii) to party activists, or (iii) open to 
all party members. Some scholars evaluate the procedures of electing leaders as 
the reflection of the quality of a party's internal-democracy.  Parties whose 
decision making processes are controlled by a small group of people exhibit a 
lower quality of internal-democracy, while parties whose decision making 
processes are controlled by a large group of party members exhibit a high quality 
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of internal-democracy. Thus the first procedure is the least, and the last procedure 
is the most, democratic. (Scarrow, 1999). Yet in a closer inspection, considering 
the asymmetry in ideological orientations between the top leaders, the 
intermediary leaders, and the followers, the situation is not so linear. The first 
procedure is undemocratic, but the third procedures may produce similar result. 
When the decision makings are in the hand of the members—who commonly 
indifference toward ideology—it is intended to facilitate the top leaders political 
pragmatism, and by-pass activists’ ideological preferences (Katz, 2001: 287-289). 
 
 2.3.2. Candidates Selection 
The second most fundamental party organizational process is candidate selection, in which it 
nominates persons to hold positions in governmental offices, both legislative and executive 
branches. And it goes without saying that this process is very important for a party as it is the 
sine qua non of its participation in democratic processes. The candidates, if elected to public 
offices, will assume several task such as distribute(??) resources—material, knowledge, 
networks, etc.—from their positions within the party, deliver constituent preferences into 
policies, and shape party’s public image for the next elections. Quite similar to the procedures 
of leader selection, options of procedures utilized in candidate selections revolved around the 
asymmetrical relations between party followers, intermediary-leaders, and top-leaders with 
regard to who is qualified to be nominated and who is qualified to participate in the 
nomination process. 
a. With regards to who is qualified to be nominated as party’s candidates for public 
offices, it can be closed or open. The first is when only persons from inside the 
party can be nominated as candidates; while the second implies that anyone from 
outside the party—commonly with certain additional requirements—can also be 
nominated as candidates. 
b. With regards to who is eligible to participate in the nomination process, there are 
three options: it can be limited to the exclusive and top-level leaders, it may 
involve party activists, or it can include wider participation by members and 
sympathizers. Again, similar to the situation in a party selection of leaders, the 
options of various modes for candidate selection do not necessarily imply degrees 
of a party's internal-democracy. The decision to include party followers and 
sympathizers in the candidate selection processes often serves as pretext for party 
top-leaders to maintain full control over the course of party policies and evade the 
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ideological baggage of party activists and local leaders (Pennings and Hazan, 
2001).  
 
2.3.3. Women Representation  
The last but by no mean the least, an organizational aspect of political party which is 
important to be discussed is women representation.  For the current research, this point is 
relevant, with regard to the issues of democracy and political Islamism.  
 For the former, it has become irrefutable fact that women are underrepresented in 
politics, in virtually all countries in modern world (Rule, 1994). Given the fact that in most 
societies women constitute around the half of the population, political under representation of 
women directly reflects deficiencies of democracy. The notion that female representation 
reflects the degree of democracy is consistent with empirical data that shows that female 
representation is higher in advanced democracies compared to less democratic and non-
democratic countries. In other words, female representation constitutes an integral element of 
democracy, and the empowerment of women in politics directly contributes to the effort of 
democratization (Inglehart, Norris, Welzel, 2003).  
 Gender equality is perhaps the least democratic aspect of Islamist politics. Interesting 
findings by Norris and Inglehart show that the widest gap between Western and Islamic 
cultures exists not in their democratic orientation, but rather on their conception of gender 
equality. Intended to refute Huntington's argument on the nature of clashing civilizations in 
which he points to the antagonistic political visions as the root of future clashes between the 
democratic Western and undemocratic Islamic civilizations, they offer statistical data of 
Islamic countries on the quality of democratic practices in Islamic societies that are relatively 
equal to those of Western societies. The true difference between the two, they argue, is in the 
perceptions of gender relation in which Westerners uphold egalitarian views while Muslims 
maintain ordinate gender relations. Thus the article dubs Western and Islamic antagonism as a 
“clash of Eros” rather than a “clash of Demos” (Norris & Inglehart, 2003). 
 Female representation in a party's organization is therefore crucial for its participation 
in democratization processes. Comparative analyses on the roles of political parties in 
promoting gender empowerment and representation have shown at least four factors are at 
stake; two of which are internal while the other two are external. The first is organizational 
factor, with regard to the degree of centralization of decision-makings. Centralistic parties, in 
which decision-makings are in the hand of small number of elites, tend to be more receptive 
to the demands and pressures for promoting greater female representation; while parties 
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which have a decentralized decision-making procedure tend to resist giving women greater 
roles. The second is ideological factor, in which leftist-oriented parties tend to be more 
accommodative to women roles and participation in politics; while rightist-oriented parties 
tend to oppose greater roles and participation for women. The third is societal factor, namely 
the presence or absence of women's organizations and their relative degree of activeness. The 
presence of women organizations in the society and their activeness in dealing with political 
issues is conducive to a party's willingness to accommodate female participation—and vice 
versa. The fourth is institutional factor, namely whether or not female participation is 
stipulated (or implied) by party laws or electoral laws. Formal institutional endorsements, 
such as quotas for female candidates, significantly influence parties to encourage greater 
female participation (Caul, 1999: 80-84).  
 
3. PKS ORGANIZATIONAL TYPE  
Let start now to discuss PKS's organizational structures and mechanisms. This sub-section 
explores the party's organizational elements with a view to determine its organizational type 
as elite, mass, catch-all, or cartel type. The primary sources of information are PKS official 
documents that record agreements and conventions among the party's leaders with regards to 
party policy and habits. Special attention is drawn to differences between PK and PKS, as 
they represent different phases of development and different institutional contexts. 
 
3.1. Party Goal 
 The first point is on the party's political goal. What does it want to accomplish through 
political participation? Both PK's and PKS's statutes definitely stipulate that their objective 
was/is to promote social reform, to promote Islamic values in society and in the polity. PKS's 
statute outlines the party political visions: (1) it is a party of religious propagation that 
promotes Islam as the solution in politics, (2) it represents the transformative force of Islamic 
values in the development of the ummah and the nation, (3) it will cooperate with other 
elements which have  objectives to enact Islamic values, (4) it will promote the development 
of civil society in Indonesia.  
Its political missions is to: (1) mobilize Islamic religious propagation and train its 
activists as agents of change, (2) developing Islamic social institutions, (3) encourage the 
Muslim population to support the implementations of Islamic teachings in the society, (4) 
cooperate with other Islamic groups and non-Muslim groups, and (5) advocate supports for 
other (??) Muslim countries under oppressions (PKS Basic Policies). 
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 Cursory readings of the party's official documents will show ambiguity in the way it 
addresses its constituents. On the one hand, there are many basic statements that show that the 
party works to promote Islamic values as well as Muslim's political interests. PK ‘Party 
Identity’ (Jatidiri) stats: 
 
Deliberations conducted by activists of Islamic dakwah have arrived at the 
conclusion that the developing situation should be utilized in order to achieve our 
ideals, to realize an Indonesian nation and state that Allah is pleased by. The 
formation of a political party based on Islamic teachings is necessary to achieve the 
objective of Islamic dakwah democratically so that it is acceptable to the society. 
And, they agreed to form a political party named PK. 
 
The social reality in Muslim countries necessarily requires opportunities for Islamist 
parties to emerge. Muslims have never given up their struggle to realize their 
political ideals since religious propagation (dakwah) including the struggle to enact 
virtues and reject vices are vital to the survival of Muslim ummah. Therefore, the 
formation of the party as a formal and legal political modus will serve, on the one 
hand, the  empowerment of Muslims’ collective potential and, on the other hand, to 
accommodate Muslims aspirations to prevent discontents and extremism. The party 
is a structured method that represents the political aspirations of the Muslim ummah 
(Jatidiri PK, p. 4). 
 
 
Other official statements gives the impression that the party's political goal is to promote 
Muslims political interests in a way that represents the mass-party,. vis-à-vis, other societal 
groupings. A recommendation from the ‘Sharia council’ on communal conflicts between 
Muslims and Christians in eastern province of Maluku stipulates: 
 
The Shariah Council considers that it is obligatory for Muslims in Ambon to arm 
themselves and to take any actions in self-defend against any attack that will happen, 
individually and collectively. Allah has revealed in the Qur’an (Haj: 39) that 
‘Permission has been granted to fight for those who were fought, because they have 
been wronged. And Allah is surely able to give them victory’ (Dewan Syariah, No. 
3/III/1999).  
 
PK central office also released similar statements: 
 
With regards to concern over the worsening situation in Ambon, PK's Central Office 
recommend that: (1) muslims in Ambon use their right of self-defense to arm 
themselves, to fights against enemy’s attacks, and to overcome enemy’s plans to 
attack. This right of self-defence is among fundamental human rights that should be 
used whenever ones life is under threat while protection from the authority could not 
be expected…; (5) PK underlines clear indications that riots in Ambon seems to be 
well organized and controlled by actors highly skilled in mass-agitation and have 
access to munitions, logistics and transportation, and utilizing local thugs and 
criminals as field operators. We strongly believe that these riots are controlled from 
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outside the province, as direct manifestation of political competition among national 
elites (PK, Sikap Kami, 2001: 44, 47). 
  
However, on the other hand, there are also a number of statements that suggest PK/PKS 
works not only for Muslims interests but for all other Indonesians. PK declaration statement 
states: 
 
In order to realize the true objectives of the Indonesian Proclamation of 
Independence, actualize political independence, maintain national sovereignty and 
unity, and engender a spirit of democratic reform with the endorsement and support 
of the Muslim community (umat) from various regions we, as the sons of the nation, 
declare the formation of PK (PK Declaration Charter). 
 
Similarly, PKS declaration statement states: 
 
Democracy is the fundamental framework that accommodates the political 
aspirations of the society. Based on this notion, we founded a political party to be 
part of our dakwah activities to realize our universal ideals and to promote the 
political aspirations of the Muslim community in particular and all Indonesian in 
general. The party is PKS (PKS declaration charter) 
 
PK's manifesto also states: 
 
The strategic position of PK is to become a movement that crystallizes the ideals of 
the nation and reflects the spirit of political reform and social improvement in 
modern history. We do our best to become a place for all people from different 
groups who are concern with the conditions of Muslims (umat) and Indonesian 
people (rakyat) who are disenfranchise and marginalize from politics and economy. 
 
The ambiguity in addressing its constituents is found in other official documents, 
especially in party programs, which articulate the party's objectives as  representative of the 
interests of Muslims and Indonesians as if the two are different entities with common 
interests. It seems that PK/PKS takes a simplistic logic of democratic representation in this 
point, by implying the fact that Muslims constitute the majority of Indonesians and therefore 
the interests of Muslims represent the interests of the Indonesian people in general. 
Theoretically, however, the simplistic logic of democracy bears a fundamental defect which 
potentially leads to the so called ‘tyranny of the majority,’ in which the majority perceives 
itself as representing the whole community and thus undermines the rights of the minority. 
Organizationally, with regard to linkage type, this position causes ambiguous linkage type.  
To some extent it resembles the mass-party type that promotes social reform for the interests 
of the Muslim community, yet it also exhibit the linkage characteristics of catch-all parties 
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that promote social amelioration as being beneficial for to whole society, and therefore also 
seeks support from non-Muslim voters.  
 
3.2. Style of Representation 
PKS calls itself the ‘dakwah parties’. This term has two connotations: on the one hand, it can 
mean that it is a party that takes religious propagation as its political mission. Yet on the other 
hand, it can also means that it is the party of the activists of dakwah. It is this second sense of 
the term that is the source of the style of the representation of the party. Dakwah activists are 
preachers and religious guides, whose task is to provide moral and religious guidance and role 
model to the community.  
 In this sense, the style of representation of the PKS resembles that of elite-party, in 
which it acts as a trustee of their constituents, which has full authority and capacity to act and 
make decision on behalf of their constituents. Party leaderships are elected by party members 
through national congresses. Once they are elected the leaders have internal mechanism to 
make decisions and direct party’s course, without consulting to their members. Following its 
ideological visions, the party leaders are not only political, but also moral, leaders. It is 
customary in PKS to call the party leaders ‘ustadz’ (Arabic: (religious) teacher), even though 
the person in question is not a cleric and has no religious educational background. This has 
two implications: firstly, PKS maintains its culture as religious-propagation organization, 
which leaders command religious knowledge and authority. Secondly, it implies that in 
organizational procedures and mechanisms, obedience and loyalty to party leaders are not 
merely administrative or political matters but also moral and religious duties. Therefore in 
PKS, the leaders’ conscience and wills are morally higher than the followers’ consents. 
Answering a question on the possibility of PKS members’ protest to the party’s decision to 
support Yudhoyono presidency, as he has came from secular party and has no Islamic 
credential, PKS leader Almuzammil Yusuf answered confidently that it is uncommon in his 
party for members to protest the decisions taken by the party leaders, and therefore highly 
unlikely, that his members will protest about it (Kompas 28.08.2004). 
 The highest leadership level in PKS is the Majelis Syuro (Deliberation Assembly), 
which members represent all important elements in the party. It is this institution which 
represents the locus of the representative style of the party. The assembly’s tasks include: (1) 
It selects party leaders at the national level. (2) It formulates party objectives, programs and 
agendas for the national congress. (3) It holds the right to discuss and submit amendments of 
party statutes to the national congress. (4) It drafts the budget of the party and oversees its 
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evaluations. (5) It drafts the guidelines for party annual programs, and oversees the 
implementations. (6) It adjudicates complaints, critics and accusations that harm party’s 
public image (PK-ART, art. 18; PKS-ART art. 20).  
 Another example of the parties’ perception about their representative function is the 
formation of the Sharia Council (Dewan Syari’ah). During PK period, its function was more 
administrative, to provide religious grounds for party programs to guarantee that no program 
would breach religious norms, and to provide religious perspectives and answers for issues 
and problems faced by the party (PK statute, article 20). In PKS statute, meanwhile, the 
functions of the Council extends from administrative-advisories to ‘stipulative’ (fatwa) in 
which it passes religious edicts related to party programs as well as for general religious 
issues. These edicts are binding for party members and followers. Moreover, it also has the 
capacity to conduct ‘arbitrary’ (qadha), to arbitrate disputes among party members, based on 
sharia laws (PKS-ART, art. 12). 
  
3.3. Membership 
Officially both PK and PKS have open memberships. PK statute stipulates: “every Indonesian 
citizen is eligible to become party member” (PK-AD Article 6). Other document breaks down 
the membership requirements: (1) Male and female who hold Indonesian citizenship, (2) 
Seventeen years of age or over, or married, (3) Have no criminal record, (4) Agree with party 
objectives, (5) Apply membership to local branches, (6) Comply with members’ duties, (7) 
Pledge membership and loyalty oath to party principles. 
 In closer observation, however, it is clear that the membership is homogeneous, as the 
membership requirements lead into religious uniformity. Point four in the membership 
requirement entails that ones have to agree with the objectives of the party, which is 
promoting Islamist politics. Therefore it is highly unlikely that non-Muslims will be interested 
to become a member. Moreover, point seven stipulates that in order to become a party 
member on needs pledging the membership’s oath, which reads: “I witness that there is no 
God but Allah, and Muhammad is His Messenger. I pledge to follow the Book of Allah and 
the examples of His Messenger, to commit to PKS political vision and mission, and comply 
with members’ duties. Allah witnesses my oath.” (PKS Membership, Art. 4). If there are non-
Muslims who are interested to become members of the party, the membership administration 
will inevitably make them Muslims. Thus, officially PKS membership resembles Catch-All 
party which membership is open and plural to different segments in society, but in practice it 
is more like Mass-Integration party whose membership is open but homogeneous. 
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3.4. Elites and Members Relation 
PK/PKS evolved from the Tarbiyah movement, and the parties members are mostly members 
of the Tarbiyah groups. The activists of the movement, being trained and grew in unique 
tradition of organization, constitute a single group of interconnected networks. Virtually, all 
Tarbiyah activists are connected with each-other by senior-junior organizational relations. The 
relations are highly personal and therefore the organizational solidarity is also very solid.  
 When the network was turned into a political party the senior activists became the 
leaders and the juniors became rank-and-files and members. Organizational relation between 
PK/PKS leaders and members is almost identical with the relation between senior and junior 
activists in Tarbiyah movement. Since the party leaders command not only political but also 
moral authority, and that politics is extension of morality, the leaders’ actions are accountable 
to God, and not to the members. Again, in this point PKS resembles Elite party, in which 
leaders are not accountable to members.  
 
3.5. Funding Sources 
 PKS’s statute stipulates that the party has a number of funding sources. Firstly, from 
members, which include: (a) Membership regular dues (b) mandatory contribution, mainly 
religious alms which are—following traditional Islamic law—mandatory for persons with 
income more than the price of 520 kg rice, which is around US$ 30, per month. The amount 
of mandatory alms are 2,5% for regular incomes, 10% for non-regular additional incomes, 
and 20% for grants. (c) Voluntary contributions.  
Secondly, party also received alms and other voluntary contributions from non-
members. PKS founded several filial organizations which are active in collecting religious 
alms not only from the party members and supporters but also from the wider Muslim 
community. Given the fact that many people do not know that the institutions belong to PKS, 
they have been able to collect alms and contributions from Muslims who do not support and 
do not agree with PKS political programs. Thirdly, it also collect regular and irregular grants 
and contributions from any institution, as long as they are legal and unbinding (PKS-ART, 
Art. 30). Regarding the stipulation of its statute on primary funding sources, PKS resembles 
Catch-All party in which it can collect funds not only from its member’s contributions, but 
virtually from everywhere. 
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3.6. Works and Campaign 
In its organizational activities PKS combines both unpaid and paid workers. For regular 
administrative activities in party offices and bureaucracies, it heirs paid workers. Most of 
them are recruited from its activists. Some worked in full time while many others are part 
timers. The party recruited professional workers for more serious organizational tasks, such as 
legal and financial administrations. For public activities, such as public gatherings or other 
public socializations, it commonly mobilizes activists who will organize the activities 
voluntarily. 
 With regard to campaign activities PKS also hired both professional and voluntary 
workers. Party professional workers were responsible for management, financial and legal 
matters, and were also responsible to carry out campaigns in mass-media. Meanwhile, for 
mass-mobilization activities, such as canvassing, lawn signing, or distributing leaflets and 
other campaign publications, PKS relied heavily on its voluntary activists. At this point, PKS 
organization resembles the organization of Catch-All party. 
 
4. THREE FACES OF PKS ORGANIZATION 
4.1. The Party on the Ground 
As was explained in the previous section, officially the membership of the party is open. All 
Indonesians are eligible to become a party member with the following requirements: 
Indonesian citizen, seventeen years of age or over, or married, no criminal record, agree with 
party objectives, apply to party branches, comply with party regulation, and pledging 
membership oath. However, at the practical level this open membership is highly unlikely in 
term of religious identity, as the process of recruitment requires one to become a Muslim by 
swearing party oath, which includes Islamic consecration by pledging shahadah 
(acknowledgement statement that ‘There is no God but Allah, and Muhammad is His 
Messenger’). 
 The administrative process of membership enrollment consists of five steps: (1) 
Membership admission is granted in a formal party forum organized specially for that 
purpose. (2) Party branches organize administrative selection process, to make sure that the 
applicants meet the requirements. (3) Newly admitted members read and sign membership 
oath. (4) Party functionaries responsible for the membership admission sign the oath as 
witness. (5) The signed oath document is formally handed down to the new members (PKS 
Membership, Art. 5) 
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 There are six levels of party membership. The levels are then classified into three 
different types of membership, which refers to seniority and degree of organizational rights. 
All members from different levels of memberships are subjects to similar duties to the party. 
With regard to the rights of the members, there are general rights shared equally by members 
in all levels, and there are special rights according to different levels of membership. The 
general membership rights include: (1) The rights for communal supports and solidarity from 
other members, (2) the rights to express ideas and initiatives, (3) the rights to propose and 
initiate activities, (4) the rights to request rights for self-defend, sue, and appeal to higher 
level of arbitration (PKS Membership, Art. 6). 
 The first category of membership is Supporting Members (Anggota Kader 
Pendukung). This membership represents the lower level of activity, in which members are 
not expected to participate in the party organization more than supporting party programs and 
activities. There are two different levels of supporting members. The first is Newbie (Anggota 
Pemula) whose membership is granted by Sub-District party branches (DPC). To become a 
newbie one needs to apply for formal membership, meets administrative requirements, and 
participate in ‘training orientation’ organized by party. A Newbie has the rights to participate 
in party official activities at Sub-District level, to join trainings organized by party, and to 
hold party ID card. The second is Junior Member (Anggota Muda) whose membership is 
assigned by party branch at district level (DPD). Junior member has the rights to participate in 
party official activities at the district level (DPD), to join trainings organized by party, and to 
hold party ID card. 
 The second category of membership is Core Members (Anggota Kader Inti). As the 
name indicates, this type of membership represents a more active level of involvement in 
party organization. At this level, the members become party activists who are not only support 
their organization passively but also have more say and opportunities to propose and initiate 
activities. There are three different levels of this membership type. The Third is Intermediate 
Member (Anggota Madya) whose membership is assigned by party branch at district level 
(DPD) and legalized by party provincial branch (DPW). To achieve this level of membership 
ones need to participate in second level party training. The fourth is Senior Member (Anggota 
Dewasa) whose membership was assigned by party provincial branch (DPW), and has 
participated in advanced-level party training. The fifth is Specialist Member (Anggota Ahli) 
whose membership is assigned by party central office (DPP) and hold ID card issued by the 
central office. The sixth is Top-Level Member (Anggota Purna) whose membership is 
assigned by party central office and has participated in expert-level party training. 
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 The core members (the third to the sixth membership levels) have greater 
organizational rights, such as: (a) the rights to elect and be elected in various organizational 
positions, (b) the rights to participate in party activities and decision makings at 
organizational levels in which they are members, (c) the rights to advise and criticize party, 
(d) the rights to be protected from arbitrary measures out of their activities for the party, (e) 
the rights to have defendant in dispute settlements, and in public court, (f) the right to hold 
party ID card. 
 Lastly, the third category of membership—which constitute the seventh type of 
membership—is Honorary Members (Anggota Kehormatan). It is a special membership 
granted by party to non-member individuals who made exceptional contribution to the party. 
Honorary members have the rights to participate in party activities at all levels, and have 
capacity to make suggestion and advice to the party. 
 All party members from all level of memberships are subjects to general duties, which 
include: (a) To follow Islamic values and norms in their personal activities. (b) To adopt 
Islamic interpretation specified by the party as is elaborated in the decrees passed by the 
National Congress and the Deliberation Assembly. (c) To participate in Islamic programs and 
events organized by the party. (d)  To protect the party from any accusation according to 
his/her own ability and opportunity. (e) To seek to become public exemplars in doing good 
deeds and patriotism. (f) To comply with party guidelines in daily activities. (g) To do their 
best to achieve the objectives and ideals of the party. (h) To participate actively in party 
meetings. (i) To seek to build and strengthen the relations between the party and other 
organizations. (j) Loyal to the leaders and follow the will of the majority. (k) To seeks to 
strengthen the ties between the party and the wider public. (l) To avoid any action that is 
counterproductive to the objectives of the party. (m) to carry out responsibly any mandate 
assigned by party. (n) To take care and to protect the properties belonged to the party. (o) To 
follow the edicts and suggestions passed by the party with regards to public issues. (p) To pay 
membership dues regularly. (q) To give alms and charities to the party. (r) To raise funds and 
contributions for the party (PKS Membership, Art. 12). 
 Since PKS perceives itself as a dakwah party, and thus party activities are none other 
than religious activities, in addition to those administrative requirements there are other 
ideological requisites for the party members. On the one hand, it requires its activists to have 
religious and spiritual qualities, which include ‘strong faith’, ‘correct enactments of religious 
rituals’, ‘firm morality’, ‘healthy body’, ‘good intellectual capacity, ‘independent 
economically’, ‘personal management’, ‘strong determination’, and ‘willing to help others’. 
 178
On the other hand, the party also requires the activists to have collective organizational and 
political qualities or what it calls ‘profile’ of PKS activists. Firstly, party members have to be 
‘strong and independent,’ in which party activists must have degree of stability in moral, 
intellectual and economic qualities. Secondly, they have to be ‘dynamics and creative,’ in 
which PKS activists are required to always improve their knowledge, skills and achievements. 
Thirdly, they have to be ‘specialists with global insight’, in which the activists have to master 
a special vocation and profession, yet at the same time knowledgeable to the dynamics of 
wider situations. Fourthly, they have to become ‘effective recruiters’ in which party activists 
have to be able to socialize the party’s visions and missions to their surroundings and recruit 
people to join the party. Fifthly, they have to have ‘collective solidity and solidity’ in which 
party activists have to maintain internal collective solidarity, and give priority to it over 
personal interests and ambitions. Sixthly, they have to be ‘reformers’ in which activists have 
to able to make positive contributions to their environments. Finally, the y have to become 
‘public role-model’ in which PKS activists are required to seek to become figures and leaders 
in their society (PKS, 2005) 
 From the preceding explanation, it is clear that PKS party membership is highly 
demanding. According to Susan Scarrow, given the fact that political party is a voluntary 
organization, if it requires anything from its members it must provide incentives which are 
equal to the requirements to its members. Otherwise, the requirements will not be effective 
(Scarrow, 1994). And what incentives PKS offers to its members and activists? The first is 
“tangible incentives,” namely career opportunities in the party leaderships which certainly 
will bring incomes as well as prestige. However, since career opportunities are highly 
competitive, and will only motivate limited numbers of aspirants, PKS provides another 
“intangible incentives,” namely religious and spiritual rewards which are available to 
everyone who willing to seek it. It consistently indoctrinates its activists and members that 
politics is an integral part of religion, and thus all party works are no other than religious 
activities which will be rewarded by God. This proved to be very effective incentive to 
mobilize party workforces. 
 Such religious motivation strongly has been successfully motivated members and 
activists of the PKS to carry out the party programs actively, assertively, and even 
aggressively. One of the favorite strategies of the PKS’s activists is socializing the party’s 
programs through religious institutions such as mosques, religious forums, schools, 
universities and other institutions. Such strategy gives PKS both positive and negative credits. 
On the one hand, socializing party visions, missions and programs through religious events 
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have been very effective, as the audience the to receive the messages not only as political but 
also as religious messages. However, the assertiveness and aggressiveness of PKS activists in 
infiltrating religious institutions—many of them belong to other Muslim organizations which 
have different religious interpretations and different political affiliations—have triggered 
strong reactions from established Islamic organizations, especially two mainstream 
organizations NU and Muhammadiyah. The latter, Muhammadiyah, even issued an official 
decree to ‘clean-up’ its organization from PKS elements and activities, because it perceives 
PKS has taken advantage arbitrarily and contaminates the organization with foreign elements 
(Muhammadiyah Central Board, decree No. 149/2006). 
 
4.2. The Party in Public Office 
In contrast to the tendency of the party on the ground, which is dominated by idealistic 
tendency to embody and promote party ideal values, the party in public office is characterized 
by pragmatic and flexible behavior. These characters rooted in the unique function of the facet 
of party. The party in public office represents the ‘pragmatic’ nature of political party which 
ultimate goal is gaining power. Therefore for the party in public office ideals and ideology are 
oftentimes merely instrumentals. This brings several consequences to the party in public 
office. Firstly, since its ability in achieving and maintaining positions in the governmental 
posts depends on the votes of constituents, which is an external element of party, it needs to 
be receptive to what the voters want. Secondly, its interactions with leaders and representative 
of other parties, and professional bureaucrats who have less partisan views on how the 
government should be run, force the representative of the party in public office to be flexible 
in their behaviors. However given the nature of its political mission, which is to achieve and 
to maintain power, for the party in public office political pragmatism and flexibility are 
positive rather than negative (Katz and Mair, 1993: 595-597). 
 The PKS face in public office also exhibits greater tendency of pragmatism and 
flexibility. During the PK period, the tendency was less visible because its organization had 
not fully diversified. The party faces, thus, still had similar mood and most organizational 
decisions were taken unanimously among different party faces. However, even at that phase, 
the public office facet was the most dynamic in terms that PK frequently changed its 
decisions. The first example was on presidential nomination. Following deliberation 
conducted by the Deliberation Council (Majelis Syuro), the party decided to nominate Didin 
Hafiduddin as its presidential candidates, who won the nomination against more ‘real’ 
candidate such as Amin Rais and Nurcholish Madjid. Clearly, the nomination was to boost its 
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idealist credential rather than a genuine competition for power. However, when Amin Rais 
organized ‘Central Axis’ political caucus to nominate Abdurrahman Wahid, PK changed its 
policy, cancelled Hafiduddin’ nomination and endorsed Wahid.  
 Wahid was a controversial figure, whose liberal thoughts and statements often 
perceived by the conservative Muslims as insulting. Therefore, initially the PK responded to 
Wahid’s nomination cautiously. In an official statement 17.09.1999 about Central Axis’ 
nomination of Wahid, the party stated:  
 
It is beyond doubt that the formation of Central Axis and Amin Rais’s maneuvers to 
nominate Wahid as presidential hopeful is controversial and raise a big question 
among members of the caucus, given the fact of who Wahid is and what he has done 
in the past. Therefore on this matter we have a number of notes: 
1. It is possible that the members of Central Axis have different political 
objectives, at organizational and at individual levels. 
2. The caucus members have not yet agree on any candidate for presidency. 
3. Abdurrahman Wahid, the chairman of PKB, was a unique man whose 
statements were often controversial and insulting for the Muslims 
community. 
However, in spite of those mentioned points—especially the controversial 
nomination of Wahid—and the possibility of hidden agenda about the candidacy, 
from practical-pragmatic point of view, the Central Axis is still preferable than the 
other caucuses, and therefore PK must retain its involvement in it. The ideal basis of 
the involvement is to promote the interest of Muslim community, and it reflects 
PK’s commitment to maintain the unity of Muslim ummah…  
PK has decided not to participate in the next government… This abstain from 
government position will be used as bargaining leverage, including with Wahid as 
the presidential candidate. We will support any political group and leader that 
commit to promote Islam and the interests of Muslims, and commitment not to 
pursue policies contrary Islamic values and not to make statements insulting to 
Muslims, since Muslims are majority in this country and have always been abused. 
What we want are those commitments, and not ministerial positions in the cabinet 
(PK 2001: 80-82). 
 
 Eventually the PK endorsed Wahid candidacy, because the other candidate was 
Megawati Sukarnoputri, a women and came from secular party. PK took the decision on the 
basis of ‘minimum risk’, and voted for Wahid. Furthermore, although the aforementioned 
statement stipulates that PK would not participate in the upcoming cabinet, when Wahid 
elected president it agreed to receive one ministerial position. With regard to this decision, PK 
issued an official statement to their constituent, that the decision to accept the cabinet post 
was intended to maximize the achievements of party’s missions. It also argued that the 
previous statement to abstain from government position was under consideration “if the 
formed government is weak, has minimal public supports and unstable,” (PKS 2001: 94)—a 
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reserve which does not exist in the former statement. In line with what Katz and Mair explain 
on the characteristic of the party in public office, changing statements and positions are 
positive, instead of negative, since they are perceived as the party’s ability to win political 
competitions. 
 During the PKS era when party organization has become more complex and 
differentiation of organizational functions have been more institutionalized, the pragmatic 
characters of PKS facet in the public office started to be in conflict with other faces, 
especially with the party on the ground. Perhaps the most significant was the controversial 
decision to support the government policy to raise oil price and cut subsidy. At first the PKS 
leaders explicitly rejected the government plan because the policy was unpopular and caused 
more economic burden to the economically already suffering Indonesians. PKS was clearly 
understood that supporting the government policy would incite unpleasant reactions from 
their supporters and constituents. Therefore, PKS president Tifatul Sembiring and former 
president Hidayat Nurwahid maintained that their party rejected the plan, and they quickly 
added that this was a positive-critical attitude of the party as a member of coalition 
government. However, after they met with the president one week later, PKS leaders changed 
their position drastically, by giving full support to the government policy. “We have to come 
to term with political realities,” said Tifatul Sembiring, referring to the fact that the majority 
of parties in the parliament supported the plan, and the fact that PKS is part of the 
government, and abstaining from supporting the government policy in decisive moment 
would risk its cabinet portfolio (Tempo, 28 Maret-03 April, 2005). 
 The decision triggered strong reactions from PKS supporters. KAMMI, student 
organization affiliated with the Tarbiyah community and PKS, protested PKS support to the 
policy. They sent their representative to the PKS Fraction in parliament to deliver they 
protests, and questioned the party’s commitment to struggle for the poor. KAMMI’s branches 
in some provinces were also voiced similar demands (Tempo, 21-27 March 2005). Even some 
PKS regional branches also voiced their disappointments toward the party’s decision to 
support the unpopular policy. Few of them even urged their leaders to withdraw from 
coalition government, since the support had deteriorated PKS popularity. The damaging 
impact of oil price policy has caused great concerns among PKS leaders, since some surveys 
indicated that the party’s public rate had drop drastically from 7.3 in 2004 election to 2.6 after 
the controversial decision (Interview with Imam Nur Azis, 22.05.2007). 
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4.3. The Party Central Office  
As was elaborated in the opening section of this chapter, the party central office is a meeting 
point between the party on the ground and its section in public office. PKS central office has 
its headquarter in Jakarta, and it manage the national party bureaucracy. 
 PKS central office can be classified into several layers of organizations. The first and 
the most important is the Deliberation Assembly (Majelis Syuro) which is the ultimate 
decision-maker in party. However, there are slight different official statuses of the assembly 
during PK and PKS periods. During the former period, it was explicitly mentioned that the 
Assembly was the second highest institution after the National Congress, while during the 
PKS period the  Deliberation Assembly has become the highest decision making institution. 
 The requirement to become members of the DA according to PKS statute are: at least 
30 years of age (25 in PK statute), hold Expert Member qualification, loyal to party and 
shows commitment to follow party’s guidelines, have no criminal or administrative sanctions 
in the last three years, sufficient knowledge of Islamic teachings, respected and trustworthy 
(PKS ART, 16). The requirements clearly include not only formal-administrative 
qualifications, such as involvement in party activities indicated by holding high grade of 
membership and show no record of violating laws and regulations, but also personal-
ideological prerequisites such as knowledge of Islamic teachings, loyalty to the party, and 
even respected and trustworthy qualifications.  
 The tasks and the rights of DA are fundamental for the party. (1) It prepares and 
carries out the party National Congress. (2) It selects and appoints the DA chairman, the vice 
chairman and the secretary. (3) It selects the chairman, the vice chairman and the secretary, 
and the members of the Party Advisory Assembly. (4) It selects the chairman, the vice 
chairman and the secretary, and the members of the Shariah Council at national level. (5) It 
selects the chairman and the vice chairmen, the general secretary, the general treasury, and 
some other personnel of the Party Central Office. (6) It drafts the party objectives, and drafts 
decrees and recommendations for the National Congress. (7) It has the capacity to amend the 
party statutes. (8) It drafts the party budgets and oversees the reports, (9) It drafts the party 
programs and oversee the implementations. And (10) it has the responsibility to protect and to 
take necessary actions against any action harmful for party public image (PKS ART, Art. 7). 
 The second institution in PKS central office is the Party Advisory Assembly (Majelis 
Pertimbangan Partai). The number of PAA members is at maximum one-third of the number 
the DA members, and are selected from among the DA members. Its formal status is as the 
care-taker of the DA tasks on the daily basis: (1) It elaborates the policies taken by the 
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National Congress and the DA into the party programs. (2) It supervises and oversees the 
implementation of the party policies. (3) It takes the responsibility to responds to general 
public issues. (4) It prepares the National Congress and the DA sessions and meetings. (5) It 
submits recommendations for the party programs and strategies in elections, and verify 
(legalizes) the party candidates for public offices. (6) It selects the party representatives and 
delegates to other organization, institutions or events. (7) It drafts the operational guidelines 
for the party programs and strategies. (8) It ratifies the budgets which is proposed by the 
Central Leadership Council to the DA. (9) It assigns the personnel for the departments in the 
Party Central Office. (10) It takes the responsibility to protect and to take necessary actions 
against any actions harmful to the party public image (PKS-ART, Art. 8-9). 
 The third institution in the party central leadership is the Shariah Council (Dewan 
Syariah), which provides reasoning and arguments of Islamic laws for the party programs and 
policies. It holds several functions. Firstly, it issues edicts from the Islamic perspective on 
politics and other matters, both for the party members and for the wider society. In fact, the 
SC edicts, recommendations, and guidelines cover a wide range of topics, from international 
politics such as terrorism and US invasions to Iraq and Afghanistan, to the dynamics of 
national politics such as elections and ethnic conflicts, to general religious discourse such as 
the role of women in politics and political party, to very detail guidelines of religious 
conducts such as Ramadhan fasting, religious alms, even on whether or not a milking mother 
should perform fasting (Dewan Syari’ah PKS, 2000). 
 The last institution in party central leadership is the Central Leadership Council 
(Dewan Pimpinan Pusat), which is the executive body of the party bureaucracy. It has three 
types of responsibility for the party organization. The first is the conceptual functions: (a) To 
draft the party annual programs and budgets for the party executive bureaucracy at national 
and lower levels, and propose them to the Party Advisory Assembly. (b) to draft the proposal 
for the amendments of the party statutes to the PAA. (c) To provide strategic policies for the 
party bureaucracy at lower levels. The second function of the Central Leadership Council is 
the structural functions: (a) Responsible to accept legal contributions for the party. (b) To 
write the annual accountability reports of the party programs and spending to the PAA. (c) To 
propose the list of the tentative party candidates. (d) To write reports to the Deliberation 
Assembly every two months. The third function is managerial functions: (a) To assign the 
personnel for the departments in the party bureaucracy. (b) To lead, supervise and oversee the 
party bureaucracy at the lower levels. (c) To initiate and to coordinate the supporting 
institutions of the party. (d) To legalize the leadership at the provincial level. (e) To supervise 
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and evaluate the party programs at the provincial level. Finally, the fourth function is 
operational functions: (a) It implements the party policies and programs formulated by the 
Deliberation Assembly. (b) It issues the party official statements. (c) It recruits members and 
develops human resources for the party. (d) It coordinates the party representatives who hold 
positions in public offices (PKS ART, Art. 14-117). 
 From the previous explanations, there are two crucial points important to be noted at 
this point. The first is the changing structure of the Deliberation Council, in which during the 
PK period its functions were more as advisory body and deliberation forum for the 
representatives of various segments in the party. The PK statute was also explicitly mentioned 
that the DA was the second highest party institution after the National Congress, which tasks 
were to implement policies taken by the Congress. In the PKS statutes, however, the DA has 
assumed new roles as the highest decision-making body, and the National Congress become 
merely procedures to elect the members of the DA. The long and detail articles explaining the 
functions of the National Congress found in the PK statute were also absent in the PKS 
statutes. The DA organizational rights have also been expanded. Formerly it had the right 
only to propose amendment of the statutes, which would be assigned by the National 
Congress. Now, it has the right to assign the amendments. These changes indicate the process 
of centralization of the party organizational structure, from the hand of the members through 
the National Congress into small group of leaders in the Deliberation Assembly. From the 
perspective of the theories of party studies, this indicates the process of ‘oligarchy’, yet at the 
same time it also indicates a process of organizational maturity by seeking the more effective 
organizational structures (Katz, 2002: 87-118).  
The second is the changing relations between the party in central office and, on the 
one hand, the party on the ground and, on the other hand, the party in public offices. During 
the period of PK, the decisions and the statements of the party central office reflected more of 
the aspirations of its activists and constituents (the party on the ground), characterized by 
critical stances toward government policies. Yet during PKS period the opinions of the face in 
public office started to dominate the central office. A noticeable example was during 2004 
presidential elections in which it only reluctantly supported Amien Rais who represented 
Muslim politics, and then supported and joined S. B. Yudhoyono who has neither Islamic 
background nor Islamic credentials. The same tendency was also apparent in the party 
decision to support the government policy in increasing oil price. And perhaps the most 
controversial have been its willingness to join coalitions with the secular parties—and even 
with a Christian party--in regional elections. More policies taken by central office generated 
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protests and resentments from party activists who see their party started to give priorities to 
political success over dakwah missions. 
 
5. THE INTERNAL MECHANISMS  
 5.1. Leaders Selection 
Leaders’ selection in PKS follows principle of deliberation, a system deemed as fundamental 
for Islamic politics, based upon Qur’anic teaching. According PKS general secretary, Anis 
Matta, deliberations (Arabic: syuro) is an Islamic way of collective decision-makings. It is a 
procedure through which a group of people bring together ‘collective reason’ which is 
superior to ‘individual reasons’. He acknowledges that there is no guarantee deliberation will 
bring the best result, because information can be inaccurate and human analyses are never 
perfect. It is possible in which people trough deliberation collectively decided something that 
would be proved to be wrong. However, being a collective effort, mistakes taken in 
deliberations are more likely to be noticed and corrected since participants have different 
views and perspectives that will scrutinize each other. And if they do make wrong decision, 
collectively-made decisions will enable the participants to share the burdens of the mistake 
and handle the consequences. Therefore, the most difficult part with deliberation as the 
method of decision-makings is how to accept deliberated decision when someone knows from 
his personal perspective that it is not the best alternative. Hence, according to Anis, given the 
fact that politics is always transient, it is much better for Muslim politicians and activists to 
stick with their collective unity and solidarity than following their individual opinions, as the 
former is better in self-correction than the latter (Matta, 2002). 
 According to PK statute, deliberation is the official procedure for the party decision 
makings. At the national level, there is National Congress in which party representatives elect 
the members of Deliberation Assembly, and deliberative sessions for other national level 
institutions. At the provincial level, there are Provincial Deliberations where provincial party 
branches held meeting to elect party executive personnel for provincial branch levels. And so 
on in the lower branches levels (PK ART, Art. 13). 
PKS uses both election and appointment in choosing their leaders. At the national 
level, the highest institutional deliberation forum is the National Congress. It is held in every 
five years, participated by representatives of provincial and district levels of the party 
branches across the country. The number of representatives from provincial and district levels 
are taken in proportion with their memberships, in which large provinces have more 
representatives than the small ones.  
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It is interesting to compare the statutes of PK and PKS with regard to the National 
Congress. In the PK statute, there is detail exposition on the status, functions and procedures 
of the congress. Firstly, “National Congress is the highest authority in the party, which holds 
the rights to elect and impeach members of Majelis Syuro, and evaluate the accountability 
reports of Central Leadership Council, the Shariah Council, and Party Advisory Assembly 
(MPP)” (PK AD, art. 8). Secondly, on the event of the congress, PK’s statute stipulates that: 
(i) National Congress is held every five years; (ii) the participants of the national congress 
include: representatives of provincial branches, members of the party Central Bureaucracy, 
members of the Shariah Council, members of the Advisory Assembly, and members of the 
Deliberation Assembly; (iii) Deliberation Assembly can invite additional participants for the 
National Congress, such as professionals of certain expertise (PK ART, Art. 14). Thirdly, the 
tasks of the National Congress, according to PK statute were: (i) Elect and impeach members 
of the Deliberation Assembly, (ii) Impeach members of the Advisory Board, (iii) Impeach 
members of the Shariah Council, (iv) Impeach members of the Central Leadership Council, 
(v) Assign the party statutes and its amendments, (vi) Formulate the party policies and its 
revisions, (vii) Evaluate the performances of the party leaderships and their accountability 
reports, (viii) Discuss and decide the party strategies in elections, (ix) Formulates strategic 
decisions and other recommendations, (x) Assign the event of the next National Congress (PK 
ART, Art. 15)  
  Those details on National Congress are absent in PKS’ statutes, and the highest 
organizational structure is now the Deliberation Assembly. The body also assumes all the 
fundamental functions formerly held by the National Congress, such as assigning the party 
statutes and its amendments, formulates the party strategies in elections, discussing and 
assigning strategic party policies, and overseeing and evaluating the party leaderships. 
According to Zulkieflimansyah, this organizational process is inevitable to make the party 
more effective, in which party decision makings are in the hand of few capable personnel 
(Interview with Zulkieflimansyah, 25.06.2007). However, referring to Michels’ theory of 
party oligarchy, the organizational effectiveness in PKS has been in expense of the members’ 
rights. Following PKS statutes, although Members still have the capacity to participate in 
electing party leaders, they have been stripped off of many of their previous organizational 
rights. 
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5.2. Candidate Selection 
Candidates’ selection is among the most fundamental organizational processes for political 
party, since it represents the core relations between the party and its constituents. In 
democratic politics, the success of party candidates in bringing votes in elections is decisive 
not only for the success of party in public offices, but also for party survival in general.  
PKS adopts unique procedures of candidates’ selections, which reflect both 
democratic and oligarchic tendencies. On the one hand, party candidates for public offices 
were selected by party members and the process of selection is systematically bottom up. Yet 
on the other hand, members have no rights to nominate the candidates, and the nomination 
was carried out by the party leaders. 
 A good example is the the procedures of candidate selection in one of the PKS 
provincial branch of Yogyakarta during 2004 legislative elections (See, PUI PKS-DIY, 2004). 
PKS calls this process Internal General Election. But before explaining the process of party 
internal election, it is important to review the requirements of candidacy set by PKS. There 
are administrative and ‘rules of thumb’ requirements. The formal or administrative conditions 
for the nominees of the candidates are: (i) hold at least ‘senior’ membership level for 
candidates for national and provincial legislatures, and ‘intermediate’ level of membership for 
district legislatures; (ii) holds at least high school diploma of educational qualification; (iii) 
not in a condition of under party disciplinary sanction; (iv) not under any condition the party 
deems as obstructive for public office activities; (v) not in the third terms of the same level of 
candidacy.  
The last point stipulates that PKS candidates can only be nominated for legislative 
offices maximum for two terms in the same level of legislatures. If they want to be nominated 
for the third terms, it has to be in different level of legislative posts. This rule has two main 
objectives. Firstly, it is intended to share experiences in public office positions to as many 
party members as possible. Public office posts will bring knowledge for the holders and 
networks for the party, hence the more party members have opportunities to hold positions in 
public office, the more networks will be brought into party. Secondly, PKS perceives 
governmental positions as parts of party missions, i.e. religious propagation (dakwah), thus 
the limit of maximum two terms in office is intended to avoid governmental positions become 
personal property of the candidates (Interview with Zulkieflimansyah, 25.06.2007). However, 
not all PKS members are happy with the rule. The limited terms in office will imply that PKS 
members of legislatures are always new in every two period, and this will cause no PKS 
members are senior enough in legislature. Firstly, it will cut the accumulation of legislative 
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knowledge and skills, as the members are periodically renewed. Secondly, it will prevent PKS 
from holding leadership positions in the legislatures, since commonly ones who are elected 
for the positions are senior legislative members who have long serving experiences, as well as 
respected by members from different parties and factions (confidential interview, Jakarta 
08.05.2007). 
 On the meantime, the informal requirements or the rules of thumb for candidates 
nominees are: (i) moral commitment: which include commitment to the Islamic sharia, such as 
to reject bribes; commitment to the party and the Tarbiyah community, for example by 
regularly attending party’s meetings and paying dues; and acceptable among party 
community. (ii) have interest and potential in political activities: such as keenness and 
sensitivity to social conditions and problems, and have ability to analyze and propose 
solutions. (iii) organizational and administrative capabilities: such as fluent and articulate in 
expressing ideas, able to organize and manage forums and conduct negotiations; preferable to 
have expertise that fit with the sectional commissions in the legislatures, such as commerce 
and industry, budgeting, constructions, and social-cultural. (iv) well known in wider 
community, which implies that the person should be known for its good deeds an not the 
contrary. 
 The Internal Election Committee had around two weeks to announce and socialize the 
process of the internal election to the party members. In this period, party functionaries 
selected the nominees, which number was 120% of the intended number of candidates. The 
next step was selection process, which consisted of two successive phases. In the first phase 
of internal election, the participants were confined to the ‘core members’ level or above. 
Perhaps the most interesting point was that PKS did not allow its members to nominate their 
own selves. Ones could only be nominated, as well as nominate, other people. This rule is 
intended to prevent personal competition and to discourage personal ambitions for political 
positions. A senior PKS MP, in explaining this rule, said that the Prophet forbid us to give 
position to ones who ask for it, because it indicates ambition, and ambition will only gives 
trouble (Yoyoh Yusroh, 21.06.2007).  No campaign, either positive or negative, was allowed 
in the first phase of internal election. Participants selected four names to be nominated for 
each of the five district legislatures in the province, four names for the provincial legislature 
and four names for the national legislature. Out of this, the Committee ranked the selected 
names according to the votes they acquired, up to 120% of the allocated seats in each 
legislature. At this point, the Committee has the right to add additional candidates outside 
those names selected from the first-phase internal election, under the permission of the party. 
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 The second phase of internal election was started by socializing the event to the party 
members, which was accomplished in around two weeks. Different from the first-phase that 
did not allow any campaign; in the second phase campaign was obligatory for the nominees, 
in the form of short article containing their visions, missions and programs if they were to be 
elected as party representatives. The campaign-articles were then distributed to the party 
activists and members as part of internal-election socialization. In the second phase, the 
participants of the internal election were open to all PKS members from all levels of 
membership. They selected candidates from the list provided by the committee 30% of the 
total number of seats in each legislature. Out of this, the Committee ranked the nominees 
according to the votes they acquired, to be nominated officially as the candidates of the party. 
In addition to the candidates who were selected through internal-election, the Committee—
under the party’s permission—could add ‘Honorary Candidates’ (Caleg Kehormatan), 
selected from among party ‘honorary members’, provided that they agreed with party 
programs, they had potentials to attract voters, and their rank in the candidate list must be 
lower than the candidates selected through internal-elections. The Committee could also 
included ‘additional candidates,’ from the party members did have potentials provided that it 
did not exceed the 120% of allocated candidate; and this procedure was also intended to meet 
the quota for female candidates. 
  
6. WOMEN REPRESENTATION 
In the previous chapter on ideology, I have explained how PKS ideological perspective on 
women’s participation in politics has been changed in line with the development of 
democratic political institutions. Initially, during PK period, it issued religious decree that 
stipulates discouraging and redundant rules on women involvement in political activities. 
Stipulations such as ‘should not wear body-fit dresses,’ and ‘should not artificially soften their 
voice to make it attractive,’ and ‘should not show-off their beauty’ are certainly redundant, 
because under normal conditions no female activists would do that, as those behaviors are 
explicitly contradict the Islamic values of decency. It would be equally redundant and 
unnecessary to stipulate that male PKS politicians should not make tattoo in their body, 
because basically no one would do that. The fact that the Sharia Council released the decree 
was more reflected their religious outlook, which follows traditional and conservative notions 
on women, who are depicted in classical Islamic literatures as less-rational and less-capable 
than men, and have natural tendency for show-off and seduction, therefore should be 
restricted in public activities. However, during PKS period, without specifically revise the old 
 190
decree the party develops more encouraging and supportive attitudes toward women 
participation. 
 With regard to women participation in organization, PKS gives relatively open 
opportunities for women, and women politicians and activists participate in every section of 
party structures. Women were among the original founders of the party, five out of fifty, and 
the party allocates seats for women in every organizational structure. In the powerful 
Deliberation Assembly, ten out of one hundred members are women; in the Party Advisory 
Board three members are women; even there are two women members in the Sharia 
Council—something very unusual for Islamic organizations. In addition, PKS also has its 
special department for women, which deals with special women issues (Interview with PKS 
MP Yoyoh Yusroh, 21.06.2007). In comparative perspectives with other mainstream Muslim 
organizations as well as with older Islamist party such as Masyumi, PKS give their female 
members greater opportunities in organizations. In the other Muslim organizations, women 
are commonly given a special section in the organization. This special organization is run by 
women, focusing its activities on women matters—reproduction, family, children, education, 
welfare, etc.—and they do not involve in the main organization. While in PKS, in addition to 
special Women Department, female politicians and activists involve in various segments of 
the main organization.  
 Women are also constitutes a major portion of party workforce. In the socialization of 
the party and especially during election campaign activities, women contributed significant 
roles for the party. Since 2002 PKS has created a filial organization called “Justice Women” 
(Wanita Keadilan). This organization is intended to empower female activists and members, 
provides trainings on women knowledge and skills, as well as on politics. The organization 
subsequently created local posts (POS Wanita Keadilan), which have been growing in 
number, more than one thousand such posts across the country, with around forty five 
thousands participants (PKS-online, 24.12.2007). According to its statute, the objective of the 
organization are: (i) to improve the relation between PKS and the society; (ii) to help the 
society to improve their living conditions; (iii) to improve women’s roles in realizing healthy 
and happy family; (iv) to train women as the problem solvers for women and family issues; 
(v) to provide reserve resources for the society in emergency situations; (vi) to improve PKS 
women activists in socializing the party to the society; and (vii) to promote the female 
activists as leaders in the society. Interestingly, the statute include a “disclaimer” article to 
disband the organization whenever the party perceives it as “disadvantageous, impedes party 
programs, or trigger internal conflicts” (see, Guidelines for Justice Women, 2003) 
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 A closer inspection to the ‘curriculum’ of the Justice Women organization shows that 
PKS seek to combine a training methods that would produce women activists who are on the 
one hand highly commit and loyal to the party ideology and programs, while on the other 
hand they are progressive and capable in socializing and carrying out party programs. It seems 
quite natural, but when one remembers PKS ideological vision on women participation in 
politics, the programs is not so natural, because in a sense it contradict the parties 
discouraging view on women public activisms. The programs of the organization can be 
classified into three clusters: Firstly, ideological trainings, to strengthen the understanding and 
commitment of those female activists to the party ideals, which mostly consist of learning 
details of Islamic theology and ethics. Secondly, domestic trainings to endow female activists 
with knowledge and skills to handle family managements ranging from household economy, 
children education, emergency assistances, to reproduction health. At this point, there is en 
explicit suggestion that the primary—or the proper—role of women is in domestic affairs as 
the managers of their husband’s properties, while public activism are secondary and require 
explicit permissions from their husbands. Thirdly, political trainings, where the activists learn 
not only the party objectives and strategies, but also the wider sociological and economical 
aspects of why such programs are necessary, as well as analyzing other political parties’ 
programs, their strengths and weaknesses (see, Guidelines for Justice Women, 2003). The 
programs seem unusual, in which it would produce female activists who are submissive and 
complementary in the domestic affairs, while active and independent in the public affairs. 
 PKS gives significant portion for women for candidates of M embers of the 
Parliaments during 2004 elections. PKS did fairly well in providing women candidates. At the 
national level it had 446 candidates and all of them passed the qualification requirements. 
Although there is no further information on how many of them were actually elected as MPs. 
As a comparison, the female candidates of other Muslim parties were as follow: PPP 497 
candidates; PKB 551 candidates; PAN 554 candidates, and PBB 372 candidates. With regard 
to the recommended 30% quota for female candidates PKS did even better, where it fulfilled 
the quota in 65 electoral regions (Daerah Pemilihan), which was the highest number compare 
to all other parties, while PAN and PKB did it in 45 regions, PBB did it in 42 regions and PPP 
only in 30 electoral regions (Republika, 29.01.2004). At the national legislatures, PKS had 
one female out of seven MPs (14%) during 1999-2004 period; while it has more female MPs 
in the current period of 2004-2009 but their percentage is lower, i.e. three out of forty five 
(6%). Although small in number, PKS female MPs are active in the parliament. For example, 
Yoyoh Yusroh is the vice-chair of Commission VIII of DPR, and is the secretary of Women 
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Caucus in Parliament (Kaukus Perempuan Parlemen), an informal forum in the parliament to 
organize and mobilize support for women’s role in the legislative bodies and to promote and 
support regulations and laws deal with women’s interests. Yoyoh acknowledges the impact of 
the new party law which stipulates quota for 30% female candidates. Although the law does 
not make the quota mandatory, it does make significant impacts, in which more female 
candidates have been nominated by parties. And she points to an interesting by-product 
situation, in which following the stipulation of the quota some parties put more female 
candidates in the second list, thus when some replacement do occurred for MPs, many 
females entered the legislative body. At the beginning of the current term, female MPs were 
only around 11.3%, but the number has been increased in the middle term into around 12% 
(Interview with PKS MP Yoyoh Yusroh, 21.06.2007). 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
This chapter elaborates the organizational behavior of PKS. Given the fact that party 
organization is always internally plural, where there are different elements with different logic 
of mechanisms, it is natural to expect inconsistencies in party organizational behaviors. There 
are three major elements inside party organization: i.e. the party on the ground which 
represents ideal element, the party in public offices which represent realist element that seek 
to maximize power interests, and the party Headquarter that functions as the meeting point 
between the two conflicting elements. Moreover, party organizational behaviors are also 
under simultaneous influence of ideological aspirations and institutional constraints; therefore 
party is in constant tension between sticking to its internal codes of behavior and following 
external rules in order to win the game. 
 There are conflicting drives inside PKS organization, between idealistic elements 
commonly associated with the party activists versus the realist element represented by its 
politicians. Interestingly, the balancing power played by the party headquarter underwent a 
rhythmic change, from previously in favor of the idealistic camp but then moved into favoring 
the realist camp. During PK period, for instance, after 1999 election it nominated Didin 
Hafiduddin as its presidential hopeful, rather than Amin Rais and Nurcholish Madjid, on the 
ground that the former is preferable from moral point of view given the fact that he did not 
involved in any aspect of New Order Regime—although the party eventually withdrew 
Hafiduddin candidacy and joined other Muslim parties to nominate Abdurrahman Wahid 
coming the real presidential election. 
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 In the national party leadership, furthermore, PKS has also indicated a symptom of 
‘oligarchy’ in which the party is increasingly under the control of small number of key 
leaders, and minimize the role of activists and members in party decision makings. In the PK 
statute, for instance, the highest decision making body in the organization was the National 
Congress, while in the PKS statute the status is assumed by the Deliberation Assembly which 
also takes on greater control over party organization and its mechanisms.  
 Other interesting features of PKS organization unfolded in the previous paragraphs 
were unique combinations of organizational characteristics, in which it combined different 
features of different party types. It resembles the Mass-Party in terms of party activities, in 
which its organization and networks were active around the year and not only during election. 
Yet it also resembles the Catch-all Party in its memberships, in which its memberships is open 
to all Indonesians and not only for Muslims, which meant that it sought to mobilize supports 
from different segments in society. Again, it also exhibited element of the Elite Party with 
regard to the relation between leaders and members, in which the party perceived party 
leaders as guides for members and they act as trustee on behalf of its constituents, the relation 
is up down, and thus the party leaders are not held accountable to their members. 
 And perhaps the most intriguing reality in PKS organizational behavior pertain to 
women roles. Ideologically PKS holds conservative views on women and gender relations. 
The Syariah Council released several statements, which the party deems as binding, 
suggesting discouraging views on women public roles and political participations. In reality, 
however, female activists of PKS play significant and important roles for the party 
organizations, and the surprising fact was that PKS had the highest percentage of female 
candidates during 2004 election. Not only do they participate in all organizational posts—
including in the powerful Deliberation Assembly and the Ulama Council—but also in 
organizing campaigns, and mobilizing mass supports. Thus, in sum, PKS organizational 
behaviors bear imprints not only its ideological inspirations, but also constraints of democratic 
institutions.  
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CHAPTER VI 
BETWEEN MORAL PROPAGATION AND POLITICAL PROPAGANDA:  
THE BEHAVIOR OF PKS IN ELECTIONS 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter, the behavior of PKS in organization was discussed, revealing its 
organizational structures and mechanisms. The most important point laid out in the discussion 
was that a political party is not a unitary actor. In other words, there are plural actors within 
the organization of a party, each having their individual objectives and logic of organizational 
mechanisms. Therefore it is natural to expect inconsistencies in the organizational behavior of 
a party. Furthermore, it has also been shown how the behavior of PKS in organization is 
simultaneously influenced by ideology and its institutional context. The former supplies 
guidelines on what the party’s objectives are, while the latter provides the context for 
competitions which compels the party to focus on how to win the competition, so that it 
sometimes neglects its long-term objectives. It is interesting, then, to witness how PKS seeks 
to combine the two influences which, in many points, are not in line with each other. With 
regard to party goals, for instance, PKS has developed an ambiguous character: on the one 
hand, following its ideological inspirations, it is an Islamic party with the ultimate objective to 
establish Islamic systems in society and in politics. However, in line with the institutional 
requirement to be successful in democratic competition, on the other hand, it offers open 
memberships, with every Indonesian citizen being eligible to become a member, irrelevant of 
their religious affiliations. Another interesting example is PKS's perception and behavior with 
regard to women participating in politics. Inspired by its ideology, PKS has issued guidelines 
discouraging the participation of women in politics, which mirrors its conservative religious 
outlooks. Yet, as a result of institutional constraints of party and electoral laws which promote 
intra-party democracy and women's representation, PKS has opened opportunities for its 
female activists and politicians to take up virtually any organizational post, and formulated 
programs that provide opportunities and encourage female participation in party activities. 
 This chapter will discuss the behavior of PKS in election and examine, on the one 
hand, the influence of ideological inspiration and, on the other hand, the impact of 
institutional constraints. The first section opens the discussion by explaining the key points 
based on theories of electoral behaviors, such as the articulation and aggregation functions of 
a party in election, frequently occurring odds between electoral objectives and the strategies 
to achieve them, as well as positive and negative campaign practices. The subsequent sections 
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of this chapter will then describe the behavior of PKS in election in more detail. The first 
section explains how the party articulates the political interests of its constituents and 
aggregates the competing articulations within the system. The next section explores PKS's 
electoral objectives and how the party seeks to formulate strategies in order to win electoral 
competitions without neglecting its ideological objectives. The following section examines 
PKS's campaign practices, and in the final section PKS's impressive electoral success in the 
2004 election will be discussed in the light of emerging theories of electoral behaviors in 
Indonesia. 
 
2. ELECTORAL BEHAVIORS: THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Election is undoubtedly the most fundamental procedure in democratic politics. It facilitates 
the basic function of democracy, i.e. governance by the people. Through elections the citizens 
of a country elect their representatives and give them the mandate to form the government, 
and through regular elections those citizens are able to express their approval or disapproval 
to the performance of their representatives, i.e. of the government. If the citizens approve of 
its performance - or if there is no alternative to it - they will continue to support the 
government, but if they disapprove - or if there is a better alternative - they will withdraw 
their support and mandate and give them to whom they believe to be this alternative. 
 Due to the centrality of elections in democratic processes, political parties as the main 
actors of those events will do their best to succeed. And it goes without saying that elections 
are benchmarks for a party's success or failure. Given the fact that, as elaborated in chapter V, 
parties have different organizational types with different political goals as well as internal 
structures and mechanisms, they also perceive elections and how they should act in them 
differently. Elite parties and mass parties, both having constant social bases and representing 
the interests of given societal groupings, tend to see an election as an opportunity to activate 
their networks, whereas catch-all and cartel parties, which do not have such permanent bases 
in society, tend to perceive elections as marketing events for promoting and selling products 
to the voters. However, since electoral behaviors are not merely routine activities as parties 
implement their programs, but rather political competitions in which parties seek to defeat the 
others, research on electoral behaviors of parties has found that competition strategies in 
elections do influence parties as much as their political objectives. And since strategies to win 
the competition are sometimes not in line with requirements imposed by the objectives, it is 
possible that a party’s electoral success contradicts its own political objectives. This section 
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explores theoretical insights on complex situations parties are confronted with in their efforts 
to align competition strategies with political objectives. 
 
2.1. Electoral Functions of a Party 
The main actors in elections are political parties, and as practically all the functions of an 
election are performed by the parties, they are the actors of democracy. So substantial is the 
parties’ role in democracy, so that scholars dub the 20th century not only as a century of 
democracy and democratization, but also as a century of party democracy (Mair, 1989). Of all 
the functions parties perform in elections; those which are relevant to the topic of this chapter 
will now be discussed. 
a. Interest articulation: The term interest articulation refers to, perhaps, the most 
fundamental function of a political party in democratic politics, which is to 
represent a given set of interest in society. For example, a conservative party 
represents the interests of groups in society wishing to retain the existing social 
and cultural orders, while a radical party reflects the interests of other groups who 
want to alter these structures; labor parties expresses workers' interests, while 
religious parties promote the interests of different religious groups - and so on. 
Students of political science commonly refer to those different party orientations 
as ‘party ideologies’. Scholars vary in their analyses of the relation between 
orientations, i.e. ideologies, and political interests of the societal groupings. 
Scholars using sociological approaches suggest that different party ideologies 
merely reflect different historical developments in society that have frozen into 
political cleavages (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967). Other scholars using psychological 
approaches have found that what we call ideological aspiration is in fact partisan 
alignment to a political identity which was acquired during formative years in 
human development and is commonly inherited from the parents. Once the 
partisan identity has been acquired or formed, people will make life-long efforts to 
rationalize and legitimize their political preferences (Campbell et al, 1960, 1966). 
However, scholars with economics approaches admit that parties are the 
independent variable taking the initiative to formulate the ideologies to be offered 
to their constituents. Proponents of this approach point to many different sources 
of evidence to support their notion, such as political records showing how parties 
changed their political orientation or shifted their ideological formula as their 
constituents changed, or as they wanted to target different voters (Downs, 1957).  
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However, whether party ideology is the product of deliberate initiative or merely 
of structural necessity, it is clear that, in elections, parties provide choices for 
voters, and thus it is parties which articulate the interests of society. In this way, 
parties help voters to simplify the complexity of politics into a definite alternative 
set of 'policy packages'. The options in elections are choices parties provide 
(Budge & McDonald, 2006).  
b. Interest Aggregation: The next function of a political party is what scholars call 
‘interest aggregation,’ a process by which the party articulates a given set of 
political interests and, at the same time, accommodates alternative or competing 
interests. Etymologically, the term aggregation is synonymous with ‘combine’ or 
‘compromise’ and refers to the act of gathering elements from various sources, on 
the basis of which a compromise is worked out. This is the unique way of political 
parties to articulate and promote political interests, which differentiates them from 
other organizations such as pressure groups or NGOs. Although the latter also 
articulate and promote interests of society, the way they do it is rather 
straightforward, not really taking into account what other groups or organizations 
advocate. Political parties, however, in articulating and promoting a certain set of 
interests, directly take into account the issues other parties are promoting and 
accommodate those issues into their own. Thus, when eventually one or a number 
of parties have won the election and form the government, their policies would not 
only represent the interests of a certain group, but also to some extent 
accommodate the other groups (King, 1969: 137-140). This function also calls to 
mind the organizational property of parties as producers of ‘public goods’, as 
discussed in the previous chapter, i.e. the product of a party's policy should be 
valid for all members of society and not only for the party's supporters. 
 In a more technical analysis, the parties' aggregation of interests serves to make the 
democratic process work. According to the so-called ‘Arrow’s impossibility 
theorem’, plural options by plural actors could lead into a cycle of choice:  
 
Actor 1 prefers A over B 
Actor 2 prefers B over C 
Actor 3 prefers C over A.  
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The Arrow theorem suggests that plural options lead into a cycle of choice, and 
there is no best option people agree upon. In such cases, arbitrary decisions need to 
be taken to stop the cycle arbitrarily and nominate one option as the best. Applied 
to political processes, the theorem implies that elections with plural parties cannot 
be really democratic because they lead to a cycle of choice, in which there is no 
best option, and therefore arbitrary measures will be taken by political elites, most 
probably behind closed doors, to decide which option is the most preferable. 
However, political parties can minimize the likelihood of the cycle by 
‘aggregating’ the options, i.e. by formulating an option which accommodates the 
elements of other options (Klingemann, Hofferbert, Budge, 1994: 14-16).  
c. Leaders' Recruitment: Maybe the most straightforward function of a political party 
in election is to provide candidates for voters to choose as their political leaders. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, a party may select its candidates from 
different sources - from inside or outside the party - and in different ways – by 
selection or nomination. However, a party’s capacity for the recruitment of 
national leaders can extend beyond what one may commonly think. In many 
countries, for instance, military leaders as well as leaderships of the police and the 
judiciary and senior administrators are appointed by the government. Therefore, 
although a party , through elections, provides candidates only for elected posts in 
the legislative and executive branches of the government, it will indirectly affect 
the recruitment of other non-elected government officials (King, 1969: 43-45). 
d. Voters' Mobilization: The last function of a political party to be discussed is 
mobilizing voters to cast their votes at the polling stations. Contemporary scholars 
frequently point to the diminishing influence of parties on the public, saying that 
parties no longer have the full capability to mobilize the masses, as people now 
have other alternatives to express their political aspirations. However, although 
they no longer have the capability of previous decades, a political party is still the 
most effective organization when it comes to political mobilization. It is important 
to add at this point that the expression 'mass mobilization' does actually include, or 
rather imply, the act of political communication in general. A political party 
articulates political interests and communicates them to the public. In this way, the 
party acts as a channel of communication between the government and the 
citizens. In previous decades, a party would communicate through its organization, 
by recruiting people as party members and providing them with information, or it 
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trained activists to provide information to the public. In line with the development 
of mass communication, political information has now become more accessible to 
the public, which reduces the role of parties as the providers of political 
information. However, political parties seem to accept, and adapt to, the new 
development and even take it as their advantage. In fact, instead of becoming 
marginalized by the proliferation of mass communication technologies, parties use 
them to maximize their ability to communicate to a wider audience. Thus it is 
customary for a contemporary political party to develop double communication 
channels and mobilization methods, i.e. formal channels through party 
organizations, and informal ones through mass media (Poguntke, 2002). 
 Interestingly, research suggests that the process of mass mobilization can take 
place in three different ways, incidentally corresponding to three theories of the 
relations between party ideologies and voters’ orientations. Firstly, a party's 
mobilization activities are merely the catalyst of already existing political 
cleavages to foster the cascading aspirations. Secondly, mass mobilizations are 
contingent to the existing institutional settings, and thus built upon the structures 
of opportunities, incentives and constraints at hand. Thirdly, it is also possible that 
parties create new layers of political discourse and identity which are independent 
of social cleavages and institutional arrangements (Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1992). 
 
2.2. Election Objectives and Strategies 
As the most fundamental procedure in democratic politics, elections are also on top of a 
party's agenda, and therefore it will spend a lot of time and energy on preparations for the 
event. However, given the fact that different party types have different political objectives and 
different types of organizational activism, parties perceive elections differently and prepare 
for them in different ways. 
For a mass party, as its political objective is to represent the interests of a certain 
cleavage in society, and its organizations are commonly active all year round in recruiting 
members, training activists and socializing its missions and programs, elections are merely a 
moment of verification of these activities. For this type of party, political mobilization is a 
regular activity, and during election times it only activates its network of supporters to make 
sure that they cast their votes in the polling stations. This also applies to elite parties, which 
commonly have a static social basis. Similar to mass parties, elite parties normally mobilize 
their support from a given societal group and do not aim to reach other groups. 
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For catch-all and especially cartel parties, however, which do not have firm social 
bases, and the main objective of which is to sell political programs and policy packages to all 
groups of society, elections are precious and decisive moments. These parties are commonly 
active only at election times, and dormant in other months. During elections they will recruit 
paid professionals to build temporary networks in order to socialize their platforms and 
political programs, and appeal to all citizens to cast their ballots for them. 
 Although parties may have different objectives in elections, research on electoral 
behavior suggests that objectives or orientations are only starting points, since electoral actors 
need to adjust their objectives in line with the reality of the electoral competition. There are 
many examples in which the adaptation to the existing structures of the competition becomes 
more important for a party than its original objectives when generating the campaign strategy. 
A party which is confident that it will win the election tends to pursue offensive strategies, 
commonly by broadening its rhetoric and expanding its audiences. By adopting this strategy, 
of course, the party risks to lighten its original identity and thus to disturb its traditional 
supporters. A party less confident of winning the race tends to pursue conservative or 
defensive strategies. It will tighten its ideological grip, highlight its identity and focus on 
mobilizing its core supporters, in order to get a better chance in the elections (Hinich and 
Ordershook, 1974). Considering party competition and cooperation, if a party has no 
information on how other parties are likely to act in the elections, it tends to apply a zero-sum 
game strategy and is not likely to cooperate. However, if a party does have information on 
what the others are going to do, or if it even has information about public ratings on current 
issues relevant to the elections - through the media or its own survey - it tends to take a softer 
approach and may be willing to cooperate with its competitors (Ferejohn, 1978)  
  Although, with regard to its objectives, a mass party perceives elections merely as 
formal events to verify its political work, different perceptions regarding the chances to win 
the elections and different degrees of information about competitors and their strategies can 
therefore affect the party's actual behavior during the elections. If the party is confident to win 
the elections, it may decide to maximize votes by appealing to potential voters different from 
its traditional supporters. It will then need to accommodate the other groups’ aspirations and 
at the same time risk to lose its core supporters. Moreover, if the party has no information at 
all about what other parties may or may not do, it is predictable that it will adopt all-out 
strategies. If such information is available, however, the party will be more likely to adopt 
cooperative strategies. In the same vein, a catch-all party, which is traditionally open to all 
constituents, will be most likely to adopt a defensive strategy and focus on given target 
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constituents if it perceives the competition to be disadvantageous or if it does not have 
sufficient information about other parties’ strategies. 
 
2.3. Election Campaigns: Positive and Negative 
Campaigning is an activity a party is busy with during election times, i.e. different kinds of 
activities by which the campaign actors – the party, its candidates, and other organizations - 
seek to maximize their electoral gains (Farrell, 1996: 61; 2002: 63-64). One may think that 
campaigning is just a natural part of a party's electoral activities, however, from a historical 
perspective, this is not the case. Looking at the two-century history of political parties, in fact, 
campaigning during elections is a new invention in most democracies. Activities specifically 
devoted to mass mobilization during election times have taken place since the second half of 
the last century, in line with the birth of catch-all parties and the development of television as 
the new mass medium. 
Scholars call this phenomenon ‘Americanization’ of party politics (Farrell, 2002), 
since the type of party described above and its activities during elections originated in the Us. 
They were then adopted by European countries during the 1970s and by many other countries 
across the world in the following decades. In fact, until the 1980s, only four democracies - the 
US, Canada, Australia, and Japan - permitted the use of television as a commercial medium 
for election campaigns (Farrell, 1996: 173). During the 1960s, Leon Epstein predicted the 
coming of what he called ‘contagion from the right’ as a new development in party politics, 
meaning that right-wing party organization would become the trend in democracy (1967). 
This was an answer to a previous theory by Maurice Duverger, who suggested that in modern 
democracies - referring to the post-war period - mass parties invented by leftist groups would 
become the norm in democratic politics, which he called ‘contagion from the left’ (Duverger, 
1954).  
 Systematically, campaign activities can be classified into the following five clusters of 
actions (Howell, 1982: 406-407):  
a. Research or gathering information on the constituency. This activity is normally 
conducted implicitly, since a party should already be informed about its potential 
constituents. However, as society changes, there is always the possibility that the 
party will need to adjust to changing situations, such as new parties or new voters. 
Furthermore, in recent years research has almost become necessary because party 
competitions now tend to focus on party programs rather than ideology, which 
means the party needs to keep up-to-date with the issues that matter to the public. 
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b. Personal contact, in which party leaders, candidates or other campaign actors meet 
with potential voters, commonly through rallies or mass meetings. Such events 
provide the opportunity for campaigners to communicate with voters in interactive 
ways, not only to promote themselves, but also to learn more about what their 
supporters want and how to deal with it. 
c. Mass mobilization, which refers to different ways of mobilizing support through 
proactive and direct contact, ranging from door-to-door canvassing and 
distributing flyers and stickers to lawn signings. The idea of mass mobilization, in 
this case, is to persuade the public to support and vote for the party. In recent 
years, the internet has become an increasingly popular way for parties and 
politicians to get in contact with their constituents, as it is relatively cheap and far-
reaching. 
d. Elite mobilization is another vital activity in election campaigns. Like mass 
mobilization, elite mobilization is a proactive way of campaigners to approach and 
persuade prominent individuals or leaders of organizations to lend their support to 
the party. Yet, unlike mass mobilization, which can be carried out easily by party 
workers and activists, elite mobilization requires special skills and abilities and can 
therefore only be performed by specialists, so a party will normally have the 
resources for this special task. 
e. Advertising in newspapers, on the radio or on TV is a special type of campaign 
activity which involves rather complex procedures requiring considerable skills, so 
that parties commonly recruit outside professionals. Furthermore, it is also very 
expensive - particularly TV adds – so that governments in many countries set tight 
regulations to ensure the fairness of the competition between big and small parties. 
f. Finally, fund raising is a decisive part of a campaign. People commonly think that 
rising funds is only a supportive event in preparation for the actual campaign. 
However, many studies have proven that fund raising is a campaign in itself, in 
which people who are willing to contribute to a party's funds tend to cast their 
votes for it. 
 
Interestingly, scholars of party politics have found that a campaign can be positive or 
negative in its nature. Positive campaigns refer to campaigns one usually witnesses during 
elections, in which campaign actors promote their parties or candidates and try to persuade the 
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public to vote for them. Negative campaigns, on the contrary, are campaign efforts that focus 
on negative elements of a party's opponents, which include: 
a. Attack Advertisements, which are common in electoral campaigns using mass 
media, in which campaign actors portrait negative aspects — from ideology, 
reputation and intellectuality to physical conditions — to ridicule and defame their 
opponents. 
b. Fear Mongering or scaremongering refers to campaign techniques which take 
opponents’ issues or programs and exaggerate them into something negative, 
fearful and threatening. For instance, turning issues on pro-choice (the right to 
abortion) into threats of legalizing homicide, or presenting a program for national 
defense as a promotion of war and conflicts, etc.  
c. Smear Campaigns are another dirty tactic popular in election campaigns. Smearing 
is a way to implicate negative images, to stigmatize opponents or competitors with 
something demonic by exaggerating their identity disproportionately or 
incorrectly: labeling people who promote poverty alleviation as ‘communists,’ for 
example, calling those ones who support freedom of expression ‘anarchists’, or 
tagging those who promote religious values as ‘fundamentalists,’ etc. 
d. Push Polls are also increasingly observable in election campaigns. This refers to 
polls using tricky questions to pass certain political messages on to the 
respondents. For example, in the US presidential campaign in 2004 a pollster 
asked the question: ‘Would you be likely to support John McCain if you knew he 
had fathered an illegitimate child who was black?’ McCain in fact adopted a 
Bangladeshi girl (www.pollster.com). 
e. Voters' Suppression, as the last type of negative campaign, concerns any kind of 
intimidation to discourage people from supporting a certain party or candidate. 
This can be carried out by government agencies — including the police and the 
military — as well as other campaign agencies and other interests groups. It is 
usually more effective if a large number of voters are intimidated individually 
since those individuals may not consider a single vote to be significant.  
 
Scholars believe that negative campaigns are negative for politics, and thus for 
democracy, since they discourage people’s participation. Firstly, a negative campaign 
demobilizes partisanship, reducing the incentives to participate in elections by discouraging 
potential supporters from voting for their candidates more than deflecting them from 
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supporting the sponsor of the campaign. Secondly, such a campaign also affects independent 
voters who will become less interested in the targets, but who may also have negative 
sentiments toward the sponsor of the campaign. Thirdly, this type of campaign is likely to 
result in a negative atmosphere of the elections, as it inflicts negative and nasty images to the 
political process, and thus discourages the public from participating in democratic politics 
(Ansolabehere et al, 1994). 
 However, other scholars do not agree that all negative campaigns demobilize turnout, 
and are thus defective for democracy. In some cases, real world experiences have proven that 
negative campaigns do mobilize people to come to polling stations and cast their ballots. 
Three arguments are put forward to explain why this is the case. Firstly, negative campaigns 
can help to raise public awareness on crucial problems by exaggerating them, sometimes 
disproportionately, and in this case they motivate people to take part in the political process to 
address them, i.e. in the elections. Secondly, contrary to the previous inference, negative 
campaigns actually stimulate potential voters, both partisan and independent, to participate in 
politics by raising anxieties about the targets. And thirdly, surveys indicate that negative 
campaigns to some extent remind people that the election race is tight, the competition is 
close, and every vote counts. Such conditions do motivate people to see that a single vote 
matters, and thus to cast their ballots on the Election Day (Martin, 2004). 
 It is important to mention here, that the debate between proponents and opponents of 
negative campaigns seems to confirm other research findings on the effectiveness of election 
campaigning. An interesting survey on the survivability of campaign messages finds that 
issues touching the emotions of constituents tend to last longer during the campaign period, so 
the writer concludes that effective campaign rhetoric must be able to touch the voters’ 
emotional awareness and understanding (Jerit, 2004). Thus, negative campaigns may work as 
effective as the positive ones as long as they target people’s emotions rather than their 
cognition.  
  
3. PKS'S ARTICULATION AND AGGREGATION OF INTERESTS 
One of the most fundamental functions of a political party is to articulate political interests. It 
seems very plausible to follow Downs’ proposition that what people want in politics, and 
from their government, is policy and not philosophy. People want government policies and 
programs to make their lives better. However, seen from any viewpoint, it is impossible for 
voters to name every detail of the government policy options they want, since political 
activities and processes are too complex for ordinary people to comprehend: therefore, they 
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need "shortcuts". Parties provide shortcuts for people to understand policy options using a 
simple label, named ideology. Thus, for Downs, interest articulation implies that it is an act of 
simplification, and it is ideological. Ideology enables a party to formulate a given set of 
political preferences which is distinguishable from its alternatives. Ideology is useful both for 
voters and parties: for the former, it simplifies the complexity of political enterprises by 
means of an understandable set of propositions, while for the latter, ideology helps to appeal 
to given groups and mobilize their support (Downs, 1957: 98-99). 
 
3.1. Continuity and Discontinuity of Muslim Politics 
 PKS declares itself an Islamist party, adopts Islam as its political ideology and seeks to 
promote Islam as the solution to the nation's political problems. In its Platform of Basic 
Policies (Kebijakan Dasar), the party declares its visions to be: 1. Party of religious 
propagation (dakwah) which strives for Islam as the solution to political issues and problems. 
2. Agent of transformation of Islamic values and teachings in all processes of nation building. 
3. The pioneer in cooperating with various groups having similar missions to establish the 
Islamic system and values as public goods for the Indonesian people. 4. A contributor to the 
development of civil society in Indonesia (PKS Basic Policies). 
Meanwhile, PKS's political missions are: 1. Spreading Islamic propagation, recruiting 
and training party activists as elements of reform. 2. Developing Islamic social institutions as 
centres of reform and for the solution of societal problems. 3. Influencing the public opinion 
and creating a conducive atmosphere for the implementation of Islamic teachings to solve 
problems. 4. Advocating political education, protecting and empowering citizens’ rights. 5. 
Promoting political correctness in the light of Islamic laws and ethics. 6. Active Cooperation 
with other Islam organizations to achieve unity among the Muslim community, and with other 
organizations to achieve the agenda of national reformation. 7. Active support of the 
oppressed Muslim lands (PKS Basic Policies). 
Those objectives certainly indicate that PKS seeks to represent the political interests of 
the Muslim community. This intention is also affirmed by the PK manifesto which repeatedly 
mentions that the party is a continuation of the political ideals and struggles of previous 
Muslim organizations. The document states that the Muslims in Indonesia, constituting the 
majority of Indonesian citizens, bear the collective burden to build Indonesia as a respected 
nation. And in fact, 20th-century history records that Muslims have tried to do that: from 
pioneer Sarekat Islam in the early decades of the century to the Youth Oath in 1928to the 
national independence in 1945, Indonesia eventually gained a significant role and status 
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among non-aligned nations. However, the dawn of hope turned out to be a ‘fake-dawn’ (fajar 
kadzib), and the country fell into internal colonialism, exploited and corrupted by its own 
rulers. The Old Order regime under Sukarno, who made ‘politics as the leader’, failed to 
empower the nation, and the New Order regime under Suharto, who built his authoritarian 
regime upon economic development, was also unable to stand as its foundation was crippled 
by regional financial crises. In the post-New Order era, the party emerged as a continuation of 
the long history of Muslim political struggle (PK manifesto). 
However, one may ask at this point which Muslims PKS wants to represent. 
Indonesian Muslims are a diverse community with different strands of theology, social 
movements, as well as political orientations. Scholars of Indonesian Islam have formulated 
several typologies to map the internal varieties in the Muslim community (see Geertz, 1960; 
Effendy, 2002; Liddle 2002). One which is relevant to this chapter is Allan A. Samson’s 
classification of the political strands into radical-fundamentalist, reformist, and 
accomodationist. The first refers to the political tradition of DI/TII, which sought to replace 
the existing secular-democratic republic with an Islamic political system, involving violent 
programs and actions to pursue their objectives. The second strand is represented by 
Masyumi, whose ultimate goal is also to establish an Islamic system in politics, but with no 
intention to replace the republic form of state or the democratic political system. This political 
tradition is called reformist, as it wants to reform, not to replace, the existing system in line 
with Islamic values. The last strand is the tradition of NU, which was also supportive to the 
idea of establishing Islamic systems; however, its immediate concern was political survival, 
which leads to flexible political behaviors, such as cooperating not only with nationalists but 
also with communists (Samson, 1971-1972). Contemporary assessment of internal dynamics 
in the Muslim community at the micro-level shows that the three strands do exist and can 
explain the differences in religious orientations among Muslims (Permata, 2005).  
Surprisingly, although PK/PKS claim to be the continuation of Muslim political 
organizations in the past, they formulate a political articulation which is very different from 
those of major traditional strands in Muslim politics. According to Machmudi, PK/PKS, 
stemming from the Tarbiyah movement, marks a new phase in the political history of 
Indonesian Muslims. The new Muslim generation was a product of complex political 
processes in the Muslim community, in national as well as international politics. Machmudi 
suggests three simultaneous factors that produced this new generation. Firstly, the failure of 
old-style political Islam to stand up to the repressions and the infiltration by the New Order 
regime, which caused Muslim activists to split into three different camps: those who refused 
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the regime and switched their political activities into non-political ones, such as religious 
propagations, those who remained in the political lines, yet under heavy restrictions and co-
optations, and those who joined the regime and sought to do something from within. 
Secondly, intriguingly, although it was repressive toward the Muslim politics, the New Order 
regime facilitated the systematic Islamization at the societal level, by stipulating laws that 
made religious education mandatory in public schools, and through the empowerment of the 
Ministry of Religious Affairs, which was actually dominated by Muslim affairs. All of this 
made students of public schools become familiar with Islam, and thus receptive to Islamic 
ideas and ideals. Thirdly, international influences, such as the Islamic Revolution in Iran, as 
well as the direct encounters of Indonesian students studying in the Middle East with new 
political trends and movements, injected a global sense to the new Muslim generation. Thus, 
following Machmudi, the emergence of the Tarbiyah movement and PK/PKS was a rejection 
of the old legacy of Muslim politics. In his own words: 
 
One of the most salient characteristics of Indonesian Muslims since the 1980s has 
been their tendency to connect themselves with global issues and movements. This 
has undermined the authority of local scholars in dealing with religious issues. They 
were considered to have been co-opted by the governing regime and so not to speak 
for the interest of the ummah. The younger generation of Indonesian Muslims has 
been attracted to foreign movements because of their “original” and “authentic” 
cachet and their image of not having been manipulated by the state. Jemaah 
Tarbiyah has adopted new models in carrying out its dakwah activities derived from 
the Muslim Brothers of Egypt…(Machmudi, 2006: 34). 
 
So, does PKS constitute a continuation or a rejection of the legacy of Indonesian Muslim 
politics? Taking into account both the party’s history and its objectives, it is clear that it 
constitutes both a continuation and a rejection of the old legacy. It is a continuation of moral 
ideals and a rejection of historical institutions. PKS, like other Islamist groups, perceives 
history as a continuous moral narrative of the eternal battle between good and evil, sincerity 
and corruption, which dates back to the time of the Prophet Muhammad. The party views 
itself as a manifestation of the eternal ‘spirit’ of truth, which is to enact justice in human 
history: 
 
Contemplation to the history of the nation reveals that the crises rooted in human 
actors and the values they expressed in collective life. The key terms are tyranny and 
wrongdoing. Our society had been polarized into the strong group who oppressed, 
and the weak group who was oppressed. Tyranny demolishes human dignity, 
deprives human rights and creativity, and eventually weakens the nation. 
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Enacting justice is the only way toward better Indonesia, since justice is the nature 
of things, the very principle upon which Allah created heaven and earth (PK 
Manifesto).  
 
It is no coincidence that PKS calls itself ‘dakwah’ party, or party of religious propagation. 
The term has given the party a strong Islamic brand, since dakwah or propagation — with 
various levels of meaning: (a) advocating moral righteousness, (b) proliferating Islamic 
teachings, (c) proselytizing people into Islam — is fundamental in Islam and all Muslims 
appreciate it as a religiously important activity. Yet, on the other hand, the term dakwah has 
also enabled the party to be neutral in relation to the existing theological and political frictions 
inside the Muslim community.  
  
3.2. A Moral Problem Needs a Moral Solution  
As was explained in the previous paragraphs, political parties have a unique way to 
articulate their interests, namely that they do not only represent, but also aggregate interests, 
taking into account the alternatives and accommodating the competing interests. By 
articulating their political rhetoric in terms of dakwah, PKS is able to claim a connection with 
the legacy of Indonesian Muslim politics. However, ideologically, it represents a new strand 
in Muslim politics and has adopted its inspirations from the Egyptian Muslim Brothers, which 
is significantly different from the mainstreams of political Islam in Indonesia; and 
sociologically, it also claims to be a brand-new movement being concerned with international 
politics and feeling a strong solidarity to the fellow Muslims overseas, which is also dissimilar 
to mainstream Islamic movements.  
To understand how the party aggregates the plurality of interests within Indonesian 
politics, let’s have a look at its political rhetoric with regard to electoral activities. In line with 
its brotherhood ideology, PKS perceives societal and political realities and processes as the 
direct continuation of individual morality. Thus, any serious and meaningful effort to reform 
society must start from the individual. Good individuals will create a good society, and a good 
society will produce good political systems. Good individuals will also start good families, 
bringing up a good new generation and thus guaranteeing the sustainability of the good 
system (Interview with Chalid Machmud, Yogyakarta 19.04.2007).  
This argumentation proved to be very timely, at a time when the nation was hit by a 
severe financial crisis: economic conditions plunged drastically, the currency exchange value 
devaluated up to 700%, and prices of basic goods rocketed, this beingcombined with a 
national political atmosphere of strong sentiments of anti-status quo, which the public 
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perceived as corrupt, collusive, and nepotistic (or KKN in the Indonesian acronym). At that 
time, playing with a personal-moral rhetoric was very effective because it was parsimonious 
and in line with people’s experiences in daily life. PKS argued that the core of the muddled 
problems faced by the nation — what the media dubbed a multi-dimensional crisis — was 
rooted in the nation’s morality. This was, in short, a moral crisis, and if one really wants to 
improve a situation, one needs to start right at the heart of the problem, i.e. by improving 
people’s morality. Arguing like this, the party was able to introduce itself to the wider Muslim 
community, and to appeal for their support. 
However, there has been a change in PKS's way of articulating morality as the 
solution. During its early period, PK  would expressively, and rather innocently, declare its 
mission to promote Islamic values, support the interests of Muslim politics, and defend 
Muslims and their interests against external competitors and threats. The PK website archives 
[which are now closed; some files, however, are still available at www.geocities.com]do not 
only contain the regular party program and information on recruitments, trainings, and other 
organizational activities, but also show PK's attention toward and direct support of Muslim 
groups during inter-religious conflicts in the Maluku province. One report even mentions that 
one of the local leaders was killed in the conflict, which was later denied by the Central 
Office (Press Release, 18.07.2000). The web archives list a number of reports written by PK 
activists, describing the conflict as systematic efforts by enemies of Islam to persecute 
Muslims, and they appeal for support from Indonesian Muslims to help their persecuted 
brothers in waging Jihad. One of the reports reads: 
 
Dear Brothers, we could not let the tragedies of Ambon, Tual, and Malifut occurr 
again in Tobelo, in which the Muslim minority was persecuted and forced to leave 
from their villages. These actions were planned and organized by the Protestant 
Church of Ambon (GMP) where there are militant Christians who want to destroy 
Islam.  
The Christians have prepared themselves in Tobelo. A Muslim guy who converted 
to Christianity told his Muslim relatives in Tobelo that the Christians had piled up 
bombs to destroy minority Muslims’ houses in the area.  
Dear Brothers, we have to get ourselves ready for Jihad. If they sell, we must buy. 
However, we are in shortage of funds, arms, and logistics. 
One thing is sure, dear Brothers, in this region where we are a minority, we cannot 
rely on the government apparatus. The Ambon, Tual and Malifut cases were a clear 
indicator, and we must learn from it.  
And who will help them other than we who are aware of the meaning of 
brotherhood? 
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So please, dear brothers, help with whatever you have, to support our brothers who 
are preparing to defend their religion and humanity. Please contact us in this Justice 
Post (Report of Justice Party Ternate). 
 
Note how the passage constantly portrays Muslims as a persecuted minority, and thus implies 
they have the moral right to self-defense and the need to be supported. PK's Central Office 
also released an official statement demanding that the government declare the conflicts were 
actually religious conflicts, as well as advising Muslims in conflicting regions to arm 
themselves and to defend themselves with whatever they had, and even to stop the enemies 
from attacking and planning to attack [which can be understood as advising to take 
preemptive action], and appealing to Muslims across the country to help and pray for the 
sufferings and the blood of their brothers (DPP PK, 12.01.1999).  
These religious enthusiasms, including direct confrontations with other religious 
groups, were actually uncommon among mainstream Muslim groups in Indonesia. Muslim 
groups involved in the conflicts were radical, the most infamous of which being Laskar Jihad 
who sent thousands of fighters from Java to conflicting regions, reportedly escorted by 
elements of Indonesian military (Hefner 2000). By taking part in religious ethnic conflicts, 
PKS showed solidarity with those radical groups that made it unable to reach the wider, more 
moderate, Muslim audience. The 1999 legislative election, in which it gathered 1.7% of the 
national votes, was hard evidence that the party would only reach a small audience.  
After the election, and especially after PKS began to play an active role in parliament 
and in the cabinet, wherein PKS leaders experienced real politics in a democratic system, in 
which they had to articulate interests as well as cooperate, collaborate and make political 
deals with and concessions to other political actors with different religious backgrounds and 
political affiliations, the party maintained its moral rhetoric, but changed its tactics. It would 
still advocate a gradual moral reform, starting from the individual, to the family, society, and 
polity. It also maintained elements of confrontative rhetoric to defend Islam against its 
enemies. However, at this time, the enemies who oppressed and persecuted Muslim fellows 
were in far-away countries, such as Palestine, Iraq and Afghanistan. Both PK and PKS 
organized hundreds of demonstration rallies to protest against Israeli actions against the 
Palestinians, and against the US invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. The party's Central Office 
also released a number of statements, appeals and summons against injustices toward 
Muslims overseas. It even issued an official statement refusing the participation of Israeli 
delegates in the International Parliamentary Union (IPU) meeting in Jakarta 2000 (DPP PK, 
 211
10.10.2000). In doing so, it was  able to use religious rhetoric against the enemies of Islam 
without jeopardizing  relations to moderate Muslims and non-Muslim groups in the country.  
In actual fact, the party used rallies and demonstrations as public relations campaigns. 
Through such events it wanted to get credentials as a heroic party being concerned with 
Muslim problems and willing to show solidarity toward fellow Muslims in difficulties, and as 
a courageous party challenging the international superpowers. This Islamic heroism was in 
fact a catchy issue, which easily attracted sympathies from the public, especially from 
youngsters in urban areas — who, in addition to their psychological need of a hero, were 
fairly well-informed of international affairs. Furthermore, the party also used such events to 
promote the moral quality of its activists and members, as they always carried out the 
activities in a peaceful manner. It is perhaps no exaggeration to say that PKS has transformed 
political rallies, which had formerly been identical with a show of force, almost always 
having chaotic effects, into orderly and peaceful political entertainment.  
With regard to domestic politics, especially after the metamorphosis into PKS, the 
party reformulated its moral rhetoric to be more neutral, with a focus on concrete actions. It 
now calls itself “Clean and Care” party. The first term refers to its moral credentials, which 
the party deems as the solution to national crises. It has been able to prove that its politicians 
at various levels of legislature command superior moral values, by refusing bribes or 
returning illegitimate kickbacks. Helped by massive media coverage, PKS politicians have 
successfully built up a strong reputation as the defender of high politics, in a situation when 
the public started to distrust politicians and political parties who appeared to be busy 
quarreling against each other rather than finding solutions to ease people's tough life 
conditions. The second term points to PKS's proactive actions, such as providing help and 
support to the people in difficulties, especially during natural disasters like floods, which are 
regular events in urban areas during the rainy season, and also earthquakes, which frequently 
occur across the country. In such situations, PKS activists and sympathizers often arrived at 
the scene — complete with party uniforms and flags — prior to government agencies to 
provide emergency assistance. Facilitated by the media, again, the party has steadily built on 
its record as a caring party. 
It is at this point that PKS starts to exhibit the characteristics of a catch-all party, in 
terms of seeking to mobilize support from different segments of society — although its 
political goals remain reformative and not ameliorative. PKS leaders have started to recognize 
the nature of Indonesian electorates, which is normally curvilinear with the majority located 
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in the middle of the curve. Thus, in order to attract more voters, they will have to move into 
the center of the political spectrum (Zulkieflimansyah, 2005).  
 
4. PKS'S ELECTORAL OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGIES  
PKS has changed its political articulation, from representing the interests of conservative 
Muslims, which in many ways implies confrontations with the interests of other groups, into a 
political rhetoric which is more open, representing the interests of the wider community of 
more moderate Muslims and non-Muslims. In this way, the party has succeeded in attracting 
more support and votes, while, at the same time, it risks to lose its conservative supporters. 
This section discusses PKS's objectives in elections and the strategies to achieve them. Again, 
at this point, there are two different opinions on what a party really does when it participates 
in elections: the first represents the ideological drives perceiving elections as test-cases to 
monitor the public acceptance of the party's moral callings, while the second reflects the 
rational camp suggesting that elections are opportunities to mobilize support for the party’s 
political projects and programs.  
 
4.1. Moral propagation  
PKS declares itself a dakwah party, whose main objective is to reform the political system in 
the light of Islamic values through a gradual process, starting from the individual, to the 
family, society, and polity. It is this gradualism — adopted from the political programs of the 
Muslim Brotherhood — which has made PKS's history relatively peaceful.. The development 
is consequential, such that later developments are logical results of the previous ones - in 
other words, the initial parts of the process constitute preparation stages for the subsequent 
ones; so, in order to maximize achievement in any one stage, one needs to maximize the 
preparation stages. 
 There is a standard term commonly used in the Tarbiyah community and therefore 
also by PKS leaders, on the structure of their dakwah agenda. The term has been widely used, 
although it is not found in PKS documents. Apparently it is extracted from the teachings of 
Sayyid Qutub, the martyr of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers (Correspondence with an IM 
activist in Germany, April 2008). There are five different stages of dakwah, commonly called 
mihwar (orbits) of dakwah: The first is Ta’sisi, the formation stage or orbit of dakwah which 
refers to the initial process of the formation of the dakwah movement. The second is 
Tandzimi, the foundation stage, which refers to the establishment of organizations, including 
the recruitment of cadres as well as the development of organizational networks. The third is 
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Sya’bi, the socialization stage, in which the dakwah movement starts to introduce its activities 
to the wider public, and to openly recruit members. The fourth is Muasasi, the penetration 
stage, which consists in the participation of the dakwah movement in institutional political 
processes, such as joining elections. The last stage is Dauly, the government phase, in which 
dakwah actors eventually take governmental positions. These stages are continuous, such that 
the initial ones are preparations of the subsequent ones (Sembiring, 2005).  
 This logic of gradualism also applies to PKS's electoral activities, as the party 
perceives elections as an indicator of the public acceptance of its political missions. Using 
dakwah terminology, constituents are nothing but ‘dakwah targets’ to whom the party as an 
agent of religious and moral reform directs its programs. This reflects the extent to which the 
Indonesian public, the majority of which are Muslims, understands and supports PKS's 
missions and programs. Commenting on this point, Imam Nur Azis from Bapilu explains that 
elections provide easy and accurate facts on the public acceptance of and support for PKS 
(Interview with Imam Nur Azis, 22.05.2007).  
Electoral activities are normal communication activities, which are in fact dakwah 
activities. Therefore PKS actively organizes routine meetings, trainings, indoctrinations, and 
consolidations. Undoubtedly, PKS is the most active party organization in Indonesia, its local 
branches having regular meetings on a weekly basis (Interview with Imam Nur Azis, 
22.05.2007). These activities, especially at local branches, are facilitated by the fact that PKS 
mixes religion with politics, by using religious forums to socialize their political programs. In 
many cases, weekly meetings are held in the form of religious forums, in which party leaders 
deliver religious speeches containing political messages. Religion provides a double 
advantage for PKS: on the one hand, it motivates people to attend the party's meetings and 
activities, which they believe to be religious activities which will earn them religious rewards, 
and, on the other hand, it conceals the political messages delivered in the meetings, which 
helps to create a religious image of PKS politicians and conceals the political dimension that 
tends to be negative for them. In addition, using religion in party forums has also enabled 
PKS to reach wider audiences. In fact, in some cases they have deliberately concealed their 
political identity, apparently holding politically unaffiliated religious forums, in order to 
attract wider audiences.  
This perception of electoral activities was very strong during the PK period. In 
preparation of the upcoming 1999 elections, the party's central office issued a statement to its 
members and symphatizers, advising them on the following points: Firstly, all members and 
symphatizers need to strengthen their determination to dedicate party activities as religious 
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actions to serve Allah’s will. Secondly, all need to bear in mind that the party's ultimate 
mission is to enact God’s laws on earth, to achieve correctness, justice and happiness in 
worldly life and thereafter. Party activities are not the end, but rather the way to realize it and 
to prove that Islam is a universal blessing. Thirdly, the first priority is unity among Muslims. 
Differences in religious interpretations and political orientations among Muslims should not 
trigger prejudices or prevent cooperation. Fourthly, the party is a tool among many others and 
has no self-legitimacy, and thus party members have to avoid chauvinistic attitudes and 
behaviors. Fifthly, electoral success or failure is not an indication of the ultimate value of the 
party's activities. What matters is to do one's best in learning and practicing Islamic teachings, 
to cooperate and seek unity among Muslims, and let Allah do the rest. Sixthly, one needs to 
nurture and improve one's expertise in carrying out the party programs because expertise is 
the key to success. Seventhly, one has to be cautious not to do any wrong to other people 
through one's speech, actions, or behavior, both toward Muslims or non-Muslims, because 
inflicting unpleasant things to others will cause equally bad things to the doer (PK Central 
Office, 22.08.1998). 
  The official statement clearly reflects PK's perception at that time: the party is merely 
a tool for personal piety, and not even the only one. Therefore party activities — including 
those in elections — are not the yardstick for party success or failure because what matters are 
the personal efforts to achieve personal piety. Indirectly, the passage also reflects the party's 
belief in God’s omnipotence. In another statement, specifically for Election Day, the party 
suggested that its activists and members: (a) purify themselves by repenting to God upon their 
wrongdoings, (b) intensify religious activities such as prayers and reciting the Qur’an to bring 
them closer to God, (c) intensify social activities and welfare activities through party 
organizations, (d) be prepared for any difficulties and challenges and be patient with them, (e) 
seek to find the positive in people, and persuade them accordingly to support the party's 
mission, (f) do not forget to pay alms because material capability is fundamental for dakwah 
(PK Central Office, 13.5.1999).  
 
4.2. Political Propaganda 
However, there is another interpretation of the nature of electoral and other political 
activities inside PKS. This view has a similar starting point to the previous one, namely that 
PKS is a dakwah party whose ultimate mission is to islamize the political system. It also 
agrees that PKS follows the gradual political agenda of the Muslim Brothers, in the form of 
the dakwah orbits or stages. However, this perspective argues that the political orbit is unique 
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and needs to be understood according to its own context. Proponents of this camp agree that 
the dakwah stages constitute a continuous programs in which the later parts are products of 
the previous ones and the success of the initial stages is necessary for the success of the 
subsequent ones (Rama Pratama, in his dialogue with PKS-Japan radio, 25.02.2007. The 
following information is taken from the dialogue unless stated otherwise).  
According to this viewpoint, politics deals with power. There is nothing wrong with 
seeking power and, as a political party, PKS is doing just that. The point is not whether a 
dakwah party should seek power or not, but rather how it should go about it. A party needs 
power, and dakwah needs power, to be able to reform society according to Islamic values. 
The party’s task is to find out how to do politics according to Islamic guidelines. However, 
different from the logic of dakwah activities in the initial stages, which is measured on the 
consistency with internal-collective doctrines, in the political stages, the yardstick by which 
one can measure successes and failures of dakwah activities is their public acceptance. In 
politics, a party is not only accountable to its own principles and members, but also — and 
more importantly — to the public. This is what one calls public accountability. Given the fact 
that the public is diverse, with heterogeneous cultural identities, religious backgrounds, and 
political orientations, party actions and behavior have to be rational and transparent. For 
instance, in politics it is no longer sufficient to use internal deliberations (syuro) to elect party 
leaders, not because syuro is no longer valid or ineffective, but rather because political actions 
require public accountability.  
In the Sya’by stage, whose purpose is to socialize the dakwah movement to the wider 
public, dakwah actors charmed the public with their moral superiority, and PKS was quite 
successful to influence the public opinion. However, to be really successful, charming the 
public with personal piety is not enough. At this point, real actions are needed to effect 
changes and make real contributions to the improvement of life conditions. The parameters of 
politics are public acceptance and public utility. A party cannot cite Qur’anic verses or 
prophetic sayings to support political programs, but must use rational explanations to show 
that they will produce objective benefits for the public. If PKS manages to do that, the public 
will approve and support it - not only the Muslim community, but also non-Muslims.  
At this point, a party needs different resources to carry out political tasks to achieve 
public accountability. There are four requirements for success in politics: firstly, human 
resources with both ideological (manhaj) and personal (fikr) capacities, since many decisions 
need to be taken in transient situations in which there is no time to consult with party leaders, 
no time for deliberation sessions, and no time to ask fatwa from the Syariah Council. These 
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people should have a sufficient understanding of the party's ideological principles, and the 
capacity to make maneuvers and take decisions according to the respective context without 
transgressing the basic principles. They need to understand Syariah not in terms of rigid lines 
but as corridors that enable flexible interpretations. They should go in a principles that 
basically all are allowed unless specifically forbidden; not the other way around in which all 
are forbidden unless there are specific guides. Secondly, party activists need to develop 
supporting infrastructure, such as organizational networks, professional assistance, and funds. 
Thirdly, one needs media strategies to achieve wide media coverage of party activities. The 
public must know what the party has done. This is not about personal piety, but rather about 
political strategies. It is true that — according to prophetic sayings — if one gives something 
with her right hand, the left hand should not know about it, meaning that she must be sincere 
in doing so. However, when it comes to political actions, what is at stake is public 
accountability. When PKS helps people in need, one must bring reporters and make sure they 
publish it. This is not about personal piety, but about public accountability. Lastly, all the 
potential should be directed to motivate and persuade people to participate in the party's 
programs and activities (Rama Pratama, in his dialogue with PKS-Japan radio, 25.02.2007).  
This perception of political communication is different from the former one during the 
PK period. Previously, political communication and also electoral activities were perceived 
merely as tools for moral propagation, and not as objectives in themselves. Now, although 
religious morality is still the ultimate objective of PKS politics, party activities are perceived 
as having an independent reality which needs to be pursued in line with its own nature and 
logic. The PKS Syariah Council released a statement which suggests that mobilizing as many 
followers as possible is permitted for the dakwah movement, and thus PKS needs to formulate 
a strategy for it. Since Indonesian people are heterogeneous, the party needs to adapt to this 
heterogeneity in order to mobilize support of people with different backgrounds: 
 
Our society has heterogeneous cultures, and as a party which represents the state, it 
would be unethical for us to refuse people’s participation only because they do not 
match our standard. The party needs to function like the state, to protect and to 
accommodate the plural inspirations of its members and sympathizers, although we 
have regulations to select and to filter people’s participation in line with our 
principles. But the principle is, vote first and later on we can propagate them. 
(Syariah Council, 17.07.2003, bold added).  
 
At this point, it is quite clear that PKS starts to perceive political and electoral 
activities as an independent reality which needs to be pursued in its own rights. In order to be 
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successful in political competitions, including elections, PKS does not only need pure hearts 
and compliance with Islamic principles, but also professional capabilities regarding political 
skills and tricks - and PKS does take this issue seriously. PKS has organized various programs 
to improve the party's capacity as well as the individual expertise of its politicians. For 
instance, it has held several training sessions, inviting consultants to help them improve their 
organizational capacities, sent its politicians to pursue postgraduate studies and conduct 
research on various aspects of the party and its activities (Interview with Imam Nur Azis, 
22.05.2007), and even invited TV consultants to train PKS politicians to perform in front of 
the camera (Al-Muzamil Yusuf, dialogue with PKS-Japan radio, 23.07.2004).  
 
5. PKS'S CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES 
In line with its changing attitudes toward electoral activities, from formerly perceiving them 
as insubstantial and contingent to efforts of moral –struggle, to the view that political 
activities have their independent realities and need to be pursued in their own logic, PKS has 
also made different experiences in conducting election campaigns. During the PKS period, 
campaign activities were carried out in a spontaneous manner and rather innocently; the party 
would socialize and promote their program and appeal to people to vote for it. Later on, 
during the PK period, the party began to realize that a campaign is not like an athletic sprint in 
which participants only need to do their best, but rather like a football game in which a team 
not only has to do its best, but also needs to make sure that it can beat its opponents, and thus 
needs to adjust its strategies to those of the opponents as well as the dynamics of the game.  
 As a reaction to the tense political atmosphere before the 1999 elections, in which 
party supporters clashed with each other and claimed casualties, the PK Central Office 
released a statement (Seruan) repeatedly stressing the need for the party cadres and activists 
to focus on the bigger picture of politics, such as to maintain harmony and unity among the 
Muslim community, to avoid conflicts and violence, etc., and not to be preoccupied with the 
campaign objectives only. It reads: 
 
Recent developments pertaining to conflicts and violence clashes between followers 
of parties during the General Election (1999) campaigns have disturbed faithful 
people. How could we have such a fragile sense of Islamic –unity –and solidarity 
(ukhuwah), and neglect the sanctity of human life and property, especially among 
Muslims? 
The Justice Party as a party of moral propagation does not want its cadres involved 
in such violence, conflict, and other dirty conducts to win votes. Therefore we 
appeal to our members and supporters: (1) to maintain harmony among Muslims and 
Indonesians, (2) to seek to play as examples for Muslims and Indonesians by 
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consistently practicing clean politics and avoid dirty political tricks, (3) to become 
pioneers to enact a political culture that prioritizes public services and dedicates its 
efforts to the benefit of the public (PK Central Office, 13 May, 1999)  
  
Again, in terms of the internal party organization, one can see how the party on the 
ground which was characterized by ideal orientations dominated the mood of PKS's campaign 
activities. However, in the following elections of 2004, when political competitions were 
more stable than in 1999, PKS focused its objectives on how to maximize its electoral 
achievement, and thus designed the electoral campaign accordingly. Considering the 
elections, it is apparent that PKS deemed them not only important but also urgent, or even as 
an emergency, and it framed the elections using Syariah terms in which it is obligatory 
(wajib) for people to vote - if they do, they will be rewarded, and if they don’t, they will be 
punished (spiritually).  
 
Elections represent the struggle between good and evil, the result of which is 
decisive for the nation and the state. Therefore the participation of the Muslim 
ummah in elections is obligatory, to increase the votes and to elect a just and wise 
national leader who will be able to bring our state into a just state according to 
Islamic teachings. Otherwise the political power will fall into the hands of evil 
groups (ahlul batil), and thus they will control us, set rules and laws for us. And this 
would be very bad for us.  
A formula in Islamic jurisprudence says that if an obligation can only be achieved by 
doing certain things, then those things become obligatory. Since to enact a just 
society and state is obligatory for Muslims, the participation in elections as a 
necessary requirement is also obligatory. Another formula says that an instruction to 
do something implies the prohibition of doing the opposite, and thus, since the 
participation in elections is obligatory, to abstain from voting is forbidden (PKS 
Syariah Council, 17 July 2003) 
 
 
fLooking at the party's behavior, PKS then got more focused on the small picture of 
political procedures —the elections, the campaigns —than on the wider picture of social 
harmony, since it had sensed what was at stake - however, it has to be noted here that it still 
maintained its normative tone of political ideals. For instance, the party published the so-
called “Campaign Ethic”, suggesting that: 
 
Campaigns are essential for political competitions because through them a political 
party introduces and socializes its program and mobilizes voters to vote for it. Due 
to the fact that campaigning is very important, we need to set rules so that it will be 
in line with Islamic ethics and does not transgress the Islamic Shariah. Even more 
because PKS has declared itself an Islamist party, it has the moral obligation to 
follow Islamic ways in conducting campaigns.  
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A campaign is political propaganda for a party to appeal for support from the 
public. A campaign is similar to dakwah, i.e. to advising good deeds both toward 
good people as well as bad people. Thus PKS campaigners should follow the 
following guidelines: (1) to be sincere and free themselves from low motives; (2) to 
use polite and sympathetic ways to introduce the party and its programs; (3) to not 
force people; (4) to not cheat or lie; (5) to not give exaggerating, unnecessary 
promises; (6) to maintain Islamic solidarity; (7) to not promote themselves 
unnecessarily; (8) campaigns have to be solution-oriented; (9) to conduct campaigns 
in an orderly manner, and to not disturb other parties; (10) to not forget prayer times; 
(11) to be good examples for the people (PKS Central Office, 05.03.2004, bold 
added) 
 
 With regard to actual campaign activities, the pattern is also similar in that during the 
PK period, in the 1999 election, the party perceived the activities as contingent to higher, 
idealistic objectives, while during the 2004 elections in the PKS period, the party, without 
abandoning its moralistic vision, would recognize the activities in their own right. Firstly, in 
preparing for campaigns, the party consistently advised its members to intensify their 
religious activities. This was simultaneously directed toward two ends: first, to generate self-
confidence — being close to God — so that their performance would be maximum; and 
second, to impress the public by showing that the party is run by pious people, and thus 
constitutes the best alternative in times of moral crisis. Meanwhile, during the 2004 elections, 
PKS prepared for the vote in quite a professional manner: the party —like everybody else — 
followed various surveys and polls on public opinions closely and used them as information 
for their strategies. More specifically, it formed an ad hoc committee to write down the party 
platform, and to elaborate the party visions and missions for a wider audience.  
 Secondly, during campaigning the most common activities are personal contacts in 
which party leaders and other campaign actors meet people in mass rallies or other gatherings. 
It is interesting to see how, during the PK period, there was a strong tendency among PK 
campaign actors to perceive their party as a brand-new Islamic movement, different from the 
existing mainstream Muslim organizations, and how they tended to rely on their own network 
of institutions and activists in their efforts to reach the voters. In addition, in 1999, most of the 
top party leaders were known only within their networks, and it would not have been very 
effective for them to introduce themselves using individual figures of their politicians. Thus, 
the only effective alternative was to reach the voters through creating a personal image of 
their activists, showing that they were in fact a group of pious, faithful Muslims, and Muslims 
could trust them to represent their political aspirations (Interview with Chalid Machmud, 
19.04.2007). Yet, in the 2004 elections, when the Indonesian public knew more about the 
party and its key figures, the party took a different way to get in touch with the voters and 
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started using personal charms of their leaders. Figures like Hidayat Nurwahid, Anis Matta, 
and Nur Machmudi Ismail were known by the public outside the Tarbiyah community, and 
they were able to attract public attention. This was quite successful, which is shown, for 
example, by the fact that Nurwahid was one of very few candidates who could garner the full 
quota for their votes.  
Thirdly, with regard to elite mobilization as an element of campaigns, during the PK 
period, the party was still preoccupied with the representation and articulation of the political 
interests of the Muslims  - thus, their efforts to mobilize support from the elite were limited to 
the Muslim community. During the PKS period, in the 2004 elections, PKS was quite 
confident to appeal for support from elites who, traditionally, are not associated with political 
Islam.By way of illustration, PKS people published a pocket book with the title 16 Public 
Figures Talk about PKS (Pustaka Saksi, 2004), in which they interviewed sixteen famous 
persons from various backgrounds: from preacher to military general, from actress to 
professor, from businessman to poet. All of them give positive comments on PKS, especially 
regarding its clean record and its sympathetic behavior. What is interesting is the fact that 
these people have different cultural-religious backgrounds and different political affiliations: 
from committed supporters of political Islam to independent-minded professionals, secular-
nationalist military figures, and leftist political activists, as well as a number of Christians. 
This means that PKS was deliberately seeking to get the support from the elites outside the 
boundaries of traditional support of political Islam - and they would surely not have had such 
confidence had they still clung to strict ideological interpretations in their electoral activities. 
 Fourthly, with regard to mass mobilization, there were also interesting developments. 
During the PK period, in the 1999 elections, there were strong ideological perceptions among 
the party electoral actors, who believed that the party represented the political aspirations of 
conservative Muslims, so PK would only seek to woo support from the Muslim communities. 
Actually, at that time, as the party emphasized moral reforms as its political mission, to 
Islamize the society and the polity, it would reach a given segment of the Muslims only. 
However, during the 2004 elections, the party shifted its rhetoric, portraying itself no longer 
as an agent of Islamization, but rather of high politics, to fight corrupt practices and recover 
from the moral crisis. PKS had greater confidence to reach a wider audience. A case in point 
can be found in a pocket book of thirty pages called “Handbook for Cadres for the 2004 
Election”. In the book, compact step-by-step techniques of mass mobilization are explained. It 
specifies what a cadre has to do to mobilize support: (1) door-to-door canvassing to introduce 
the 6W + 1H (what, who, why, which, when, where, and how — very concise information on 
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the party, its candidates and how to vote for it); (2) organize welfare services and disaster 
emergency assistance to gain public sympathies; (3) approach local figures, both the ones who 
do and those who do not support the party; (4) outdoor signings using party flags, stickers, 
billboards, etc; (5) mobilizing family members, relatives, and friends during campaign rallies; 
(6) actively monitoring election processes; (7) report practices of money politics of other 
parties; (8) cooperate with activists from other parties to prevent any conflict during 
campaigns; (9) inviting the media to every public event; (10) inviting public figures  to party 
events; (11) standardization of campaign issues and rhetoric, such as anti-corruption, anti-
America, etc; (12) saving money to mobilize funds; (13) distributing Party ID cards, since 
Indonesian people tend to feel unethical to change their party affiliation once they are 
assigned to one of them; (14) recruiting new activists; (15) campaigning tours to remote 
villages; (16) routine physical exercises and midnight prayers; (17) purify the intention that 
these are religious activities, and Allah will reward them. The book also details techniques 
and tricks how to talk to known people and to strangers in the streets, using popular direct 
selling methods (PKS, 2004). 
 Fifthly, one feature which has become more and more dominating in campaigns  is 
media advertising. As was explained in the previous section, media advertising is the most 
expensive campaign activity, and thus commonly only affordable to big parties. This also 
happened to PKS: during the 1999 election, the party was still small and had only limited 
funds, so, naturally, it could only pay for cheaper advertising in local and communal Islamic 
media. The situation changed during the 2004 elections, in which the party organization and 
funding had unfolded, PKS was able to pay for space in national media, including TV ads. 
One interesting example was a PKS TV ad featuring the popular rock band SLANK, which 
was infamous for being involved with drugs. These ads were consistent with the main tone of 
PKS's electoral behavior: on the one hand, it modernized its campaign techniques by hiring 
professionals; on the other hand, it sought to reach a wider audience beyond the conservative 
Muslim community.  
 Sixthly, related to the previous aspect, the modernization of campaign techniques has 
shifted the pattern of party work, from labor-intensive to capital-intensive activities. This 
means that funding is more and more substantial for election campaigns. As was explained in 
the previous chapter, in discussing organizational features, the party has changed its major 
funding sources from members’ contributions to open contributions from other sources. This 
changing pattern can also be observed in campaign activities. During the 1999 elections, the 
party relied almost exclusively on membership dues and contributions, while in the 2004 
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elections, it had more funding sources, including contributions from non-affiliated 
businessmen. One unique technique of PKS to mobilize material support was collecting small 
contributions from its supporters and sympathizers, as well as using recycled materials, for 
example, turning unused headscarves into party flags, or printing the party logo on unused t-
shirts. 
 Finally, important to discuss at this point are the elements of a negative campaign in 
The behavior of PKS. As was defined earlier, a negative campaign is any attack on negative 
characters of political opponents. Although PKS consistently advises its campaign actors to 
stick to high politics and avoid dirty tricks in their electoral behavior, negative campaigning 
does still occur due to the party's usage of religious forums and religious language in 
promoting its political visions and missions. It is typical for PKS activities that party leaders 
use religious forums to socialize their politics, even though in many cases they would seek to 
conceal the political elements. Coincidentally, in Islamic traditions of religious propagation, 
there are two central terms referring to fundamental dakwah activities: amar ma’ruf 
(persuading the good) and nahi munkar (preventing the evil). The two are inseparable. Thus, 
when party campaigners use religious forums, they inevitably promote what they perceive as 
good and denounce the opposite, and sometimes even the alternatives. One example is found 
in religious speeches by Dr. Daud Rasyid Sitorus, a lecturer at the State Islamic University of 
Jakarta and former party functionary during the PK period. One of his favorite themes is 
criticizing liberal Muslims - and, given the fact that he used to attend religious forums, he 
followed the principle of nahi munkar in referring to liberal Muslims. In one of his speeches 
he said that liberal Muslims should not count as Muslims because they conduct their activities  
based upon greed and lust, and their true intention is not to promote or defend Islam, but 
rather to destroy it (downloadable from www.pks-anz.org). These are, of course, very strong 
and inflammatory words, which would spontaneously provoke the audience.  
 
7. EXPLAINING PKS'S ELECTORAL SUCCESS 
PKS was very successful in the 2004 elections, multiplying the votes it had gained in the 
previous elections. For most people, this was surprising because, in spite of the fact that the 
party and its key leaders  were well-known to the Indonesian public compared to the 1999 
period and had the reputation of being a moralist party with an unparalleled record of anti-
corruption, many people would not expect PKS to gain such a high number of votes. Firstly, 
PKS was still less known than other Muslim parties, such as PPP, PKB, PAN, and PBB. 
These parties have prominent figures in their organizations who are widely known by the 
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Muslim community because they have been active in politics or other public activities since 
the New Order era, while all PKS figures have only appeared in public after the regime 
change. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, other Muslim parties are commonly 
regarded as continuations or representations of previous Muslim organizations: PPP was the 
official political party for the Muslims during the previous regime, PKB was created by the 
largest Muslim organization, NU, in a similar fashion as PAN was formed by Muhammadiyah 
activists, and PBB claims to be the reincarnation of Masyumi. Therefore they have permanent 
supporters in the Muslim communities; while PKS, stemming from a network of student 
organizations, is regarded to have only a narrow and transient societal basis.  
 However, pre-election surveys had actually predicted that PKS would be able to pass 
the three-percent electoral threshold and gain between three to seven percent of the national 
votes (Mujani, 2004). There are two factors which analysts believe to have substantially 
contributed to PKS's electoral success: the first is its track record as an anti-corruption party, 
with its parliamentarians rejecting briberies and returning kickbacks repeatedly, which was 
exposed by the media. Before the 2004 election, PKS was a very small party, nevertheless, it 
was able to raise the issue that the nation’s multi dimensional crisis was rooted in a moral 
crisis, and that the country needed to find a moral solution by bringing pious people to power. 
The public easily bought this understandable rhetoric. It also had a good record to not only 
"talk the talk" but also "walk the walk". The second factor deemed to have helped PKS to 
succeed was its willingness to change its campaign rhetoric from communal issues, such as 
religious reforms or Islamization, to institutional ones like a clean government and anti-
corruption. This shift enabled the party to move into the center of the political spectrum and to 
mobilize support from a wider spectrum of the society (Mujani, 2004). 
 PKS's success has motivated students of Indonesian politics to figure out what really 
happened with Indonesian political behavior. There are now two different camps trying to 
theorize the recent developments. The first follows the psychological approach of William 
Liddle and Saiful Mujani, who suggest that PKS's success was not unique, since there is 
another party, the Democrat Party, which did not yet exist in the 1999 election, but managed 
to collect 7.8% of the votes in 2004, which reflects a more fundamental change in political 
behavior, i.e. the increase of rational voters and the waning of communal politics (politik 
aliran). The last term originates in Clifford Geertz’s theory on religious variants among 
Javanese people and has been popularly used to explain the political streams in Indonesia, 
which are divided along religious-cultural lines of secular-nationalist (abangan) and Islamic 
politics (santri), the latter camp being further subdivided into traditionalist and modernist 
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factions. Using data from four national opinion surveys conducted after the elections in 1999 
and 2004 and after the presidential elections, Liddle and Mujani state that, in order to explain 
the electoral behavior of Indonesian voters, party identification and social background (the 
main components of communal politics) are insignificant compared to the leadership factor. 
The data show that in the 1999 elections, 88% of the respondents who preferred Megawati 
voted for her party PDI-P, 89% of the ones who preferred Habibie voted for his Golkar Party, 
95% of those who preferred Abdurrahman Wahid voted for his PKB, and 75% of those who 
preferred Amien Rais voted for his PAN. This pattern was similar during the 2004 elections. 
Yet, the most telling data has been collected in the presidential elections, as S. B. Yudhoyono 
- who barely had party support - won the election and gained the votes of 82% of the Golkar 
partisans, 78% of the PPP partisans and even 29% of the PDI-P supporters — at a time when 
the national leaderships of these three parties pledged to support Megawati. For Liddle and 
Mijani, this is clear evidence of the significance of the leadership factor in structuring voter 
behavior (Liddle and Mujani, 2000, 2006; Mujani 2004a, 2004b, 2004c). 
 Although Liddle and Mujani's arguments look very convincing, other analysts have 
different opinions. In his discussion comparing patterns of voting behavior in the democratic 
elections of 1955 and 1999, using district level data, Dwight Y. King found that there are 
strong correlations between the two elections despite the four-decade interval: the major 
Muslim parties in 1999 — PPP, PKB, PAN — collected support from regions which had 
supported Islamic parties in the 1955 elections (Masyumi, NU, PSII), while the secular parties 
PDI-P and Golkar garnered support from areas which had supported secular parties in 1955 
(PNI, PKI). Referring to Liddle and Mujani's theory, King argues that communal politics — 
including religious, regional, and social factors — are still useful in structuring the voters’ 
choices in the 1999 elections, and that party identification is the source of the political leaders' 
popularity, rather than the other way around, which Liddle and Mujadi had suggested (King 
2003, Ch. 7). King’s findings are affirmed by Anis Baswedan's analysis of the vote circulation 
during the 1999 and 2004 elections. Focusing on the spectacular success of PKS and PD, 
Baswedan shows that the PKS voters in 2004 were modernist Muslims who had voted for 
PPP, PAN and PBB in 1999, while the PD voters had formerly been supporters of nationalist 
parties, such as PDI-P and Golkar. This means that the behavior of these voters can be 
explained by religious, sociological and regional factors (Baswedan, 2005). King et al also 
present data from the 2004 elections which further support this point: firstly, the rising 
number of votes for PKS, which had, in fact, no prominent leadership figures compared to 
other Muslim parties; secondly, Golkar's success in collecting votes despite the fact that it had 
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not nominated any presidential candidates; thirdly, the personal success of S. B. Yudhoyono 
referred to by Liddle and Mujani, which might also have been influenced by other factors, 
such as the massive media coverage following the Bali bombing in 2002, when he was the 
minister in charge and gained people’s sympathy after being mistreated and sacked by 
Megawati - and lastly, there are two additional factors — poverty and education levels — 
which explain the voters' party choices: poorer regions voted for PDI-P and PKB, whereas 
electors with higher education levels preferred Golkar and PAN. All of this evidence indicates 
— according to King et al — that the emergence of rational voters in Indonesia as claimed by 
Liddle and Mujani cannot be supported, and that the Indonesian voters’ behavior is still 
strongly influenced by communal factors (King, Baswedan, Harjanto, 2005). 
 Which theory, then, is better to explain PKS's electoral success in 2004? Interestingly, 
it seems that both theories have the capacity to explain the party's success story in the last 
election. King and Baswedan provide solid empirical data showing that the PKS voters came 
from regions which are traditional supporters of political Islam, and that the party did less 
well in regions of traditional supporters of secular parties. This means the people voted for 
PKS because of its religious credentials, and PKS was able to promote its image as the party 
of pious people who cannot only preach high politics, but also practice what they preach. This 
also reminds one of the famous Downsian theorems: a party may shift its position within the 
political spectrum, but it cannot leapfrog its neighbors, since in a multi-party system, a party 
articulates the political interests of a given cleavage which embeds the party position in the 
political spectrum (Downs, 1957). However, Liddle and Mujani are also correct in pointing 
out the emergence of rational voters and the diminishing influence of old-style communal 
politics. This is supported by the fact that a large portion of the traditional supporters of 
political Islam decided not to vote for the inheritors of their old favorite parties, but voted for 
the brand-new Islamist party because PKS had been better in articulating their political 
interests. And this is undeniable evidence of the rationality of — at least — PKS voters.  
Both theories on the pattern of Indonesian electoral behavior  sum up the findings of 
this study to, namely: there are two factors which have simultaneously contributed to PKS's 
success in increasing its votes, the first being its ability to build up and maintain Islamist 
credentials, and the second being its willingness to use a democratic rhetoric, using phrases 
like  clean government and anti-corruption rather than ideological ones. 
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8. CONCLUSION 
 Undoubtedly, holding elections is one of the most fundamental elements of democratic 
politics, as it is the process by which citizens, as the owners of political authority and 
sovereignty, exercise their rights. Elections are also crucial activities for political parties 
because they are the benchmark of a party's survival, which might depend on its success or 
failure. This chapter has explored The behavior of PKS in elections, focusing on the influence 
of ideology and the democratizing political institutions which regulate electoral competitions.  
 Firstly, this chapter has traced the way PKS has been articulating its political visions 
and missions. It is interesting to see how it developed an unusual way in presenting itself to its 
constituents: on the one hand, the party claimed to be a continuation of the long history of 
Muslim politics in Indonesia, starting from the colonial era, then leading to the struggle of 
independence and the Old Order era, to the resistance against hostile treatments of the New 
Order regime, and into the democratization era. On the other hand, however, PKS also insists 
that, with the development of the party, a new history of Muslim politics in Indonesia has 
begun. This is because the party has adopted its political inspirations not from local Muslim 
politics, but rather from overseas, i.e. from the Egyptian Muslim Brothers. Party activists have 
explained that their party preferred to draw on foreign inspirations because during the 1970s 
and 1980s — the period of the party’s genesis — Muslim leaders in Indonesia were co-opted 
by the regime and did thus not really represent the interests of the Muslim community. 
Secondly, this chapter has elaborated the pattern of PKS's political aggregation. 
During its early years, the party portrayed itself as the representative of the political interests 
of the Muslim community. It formulated political programs to promote religious and moral 
reforms, in order to improve and empower the Muslim community and to establish Islamic 
systems in the society and the polity. Given the nature of political competitions, in which 
promoting certain interests often means conflicting with other groups who have different 
interests, PKS's enthusiasm in promoting the interests of the Muslims led to its (indirect) 
involvement in the inter-religious conflicts in Maluku  In this context, PKS demanded from 
the government that those conflicts be declared religious conflicts. This way of articulating 
political interests pushed the party away from the mainstream Muslim communities, which 
led to its poor performance in the 1999 election. Having learned from this experience, during 
the subsequent years PKS changed its political articulation in that it no longer promot 
religious and moral reforms, but focused on a less ideological rhetoric, using phrases like anti-
corruption and clean government. In this way, it was able to attract the mainstream Muslim 
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communities and thus performed very well in the 2004 election, increasing its votes to six 
hundred percent compared to the previous election. 
 Thirdly, the chapter has also analyzed PKS's electoral objectives during the 1999 
election, compared to those of 2004. The party's electoral objectives during the 1999 election 
were heavily influenced by its ideology, which made the party formulate them in idealistic 
terms. At that time, the ultimate objective of all party activities was to promote Islamic 
teachings, which included the elections. Elections were perceived merely as a contingent 
means to moral propagation. Thus, the party consistently advised its activists and members to 
focus their attention on promoting and propagating Islamic moral values, and not to be too 
concerned and preoccupied with how many voters they would mobilize. In the ultimate 
analysis, the party’s success lay in the ability of its activists to propagate Islam to the 
Indonesian public, and not in the number of votes they collected at the polling stations. 
However, during the 2004 election PKS held a completely different opinion on what the 
election was about, and on the role the party played in it. By this time, it no longer perceived 
the election merely as a contingent activity, but rather as a substantial one which was 
worthwhile to be pursued in its own right. The party then devoted serious attention and effort 
to collect as many votes as possible, not really being concerned with the question whether the 
voters really understood the party’s missions. 
Fourthly, with regard to campaign activities, the party developed different patterns of 
activities during the 1999 election and during the 2004 election. In the former, because of its 
heavily ideological rhetoric, it could only reach its core supporters and networks, and was 
hardly able to mobilize support apart from  its traditional followers. This led into a vicious 
circle, in which limited networks meant limited resources, which further implies a limited 
scope and limited capacities in campaign activities. However, during the 2004 elections, as 
the party was no longer constrained by its ideological burden and began to formulate its 
political articulation more rationally, its electoral activities developed in a virtuous circle, i.e. 
when it moderated its rhetoric, it could reach a wider audience and develop wider networks, 
which enabled it to accumulate more resources, and thus expanded the scope of its electoral 
campaign activities. 
Finally, this chapter has explored the theoretical explanations for PKS's surprising 
success during the 2004 elections, by analyzing two competing theories by, first, William 
Liddle and Syaiful Mujani and, second, Dwight King and Anies Baswedan. Liddle and 
Mujani have argued that PKS's drastic increase in electoral gain reflects the overall change in 
the electoral behavior in Indonesia, i.e. the decline of ideological politics (politik aliran) and 
 228
the emergence of rational voters. One indication for this is that voters cast their ballots for 
political leaders rather than parties. Another indication is the fact that S. B. Yudhoyono won 
the presidential election even though he was supported only by small parties. In contrast, King 
and Baswedan have suggested that ideological politics are still in place, and that rational 
voters have not yet emerged. They provide empirical data showing that Indonesian voters in 
various regions still vote for the same party as in the 1955 elections! They point out that PKS 
could increase its votes only in regions which are traditional supporters of Islamic parties and 
did not perform well in regions which are supporters of secular parties. Upon closer 
inspection, however, the two theories can be seen as complementary rather than conflicting. 
The fact that PKS voters come from traditional supporters of Islamic parties clearly supports 
King and –Baswedan's thesis that ideological politics is still in place. However, the fact that 
those voters prefer PKS to their former parties means they are able to chose the more 
articulate party, which supports Liddle and Mijani's theory that the electors have become 
more rational. 
In sum, the findings of this chapter confirm that PKS's patterns of behavior have 
changed, from heavily ideological in its early years and during the 1999 elections to more 
rational in subsequent years, and especially during the 2004 elections. Given the fact that the 
party has not changed its ideological orientation, the change in the electoral behavior must 
have been caused by other factors. Referring to the findings of Chapter IV, which have shown 
how political institutions in Indonesia have been successfully democratized during the period 
of 1998-2006, this chapter’s findings also confirm North’s theoretical formulation that an 
actor will behave ideologically when the existing institutions are unstable and more rationally 
when the institutions are stable and function effectively.  
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CHAPTER VII 
BETWEEN OFFICE AND POLICY:  
THE BEHAVIOR OF PKS IN GOVERNMENT 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
So far we have discussed that the political party is the actor of democracy. It performs 
fundamental functions of democracy, such as articulates citizens’ interests, channels political 
communications, mobilizes the masses in elections, and facilitates the recruitment of political 
leaders. All of these processes lead to the final destination of political enterprises, i.e. to win 
the elections, form government and execute policies. To be in power is perhaps the most 
substantial part of party political activities. So substantial is this aspect that scholars include 
power seeking in the very definition of political party. Schumpeter, for instance, among the 
earliest scholars to elaborate on the modern theory of the political party, defines it as “a group 
whose members propose to act in concert in the competitive struggle for political power” 
(Schumpeter, 1942: 287), a definition echoed by Anthony Downs in his classic treatise that 
“political party is a coalition of men seeking to control the governing apparatus by legal 
means” (Downs, 1957: 24), and reiterated  by Sartori decades later when he wrote “a party is 
any group that presents in elections and is capable of placing through elections, candidates 
for public offices” (Sartori, 1976: 64).  
 One clear point in those definitions of a party’s struggle to power is that it is pursued 
by regular and legal means called elections. The last chapter has discussed party behaviors in 
elections, which include ‘interests articulation’ in which the party translates people’s political 
preferences into political programs; ‘interests aggregation’ a mechanism by which the party 
not only voices the political aspirations of certain groups of people but also accommodates the 
other competing aspirations and their articulations into a set of policy preference; ‘leaders 
recruitment’ in which parties directly provide candidates for public offices and indirectly, if 
these candidates are elected, will influence the recruitments of other unelected officials such 
as the military, the judiciary and other senior administrators; and ‘mass mobilization’ where 
the party—through all sorts of campaigns and other political communications—brings people 
into the process of voting to decide who will have opportunities to hold public offices and/or 
form government.  
 Interestingly, empirical observation on what PKS had done in elections shows that 
party electoral behaviors are driven by two different logics and motivations, i.e. an ideological 
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drive to achieve the party’s political missions, and institutional contexts to survive and 
succeed in party competitions. During the 1999 elections, under the influence of its political 
ideology that it is a dakwah party, it perceived elections as merely instrumental to moral 
propagation activities, and it strongly advised its members and symphatizers not to be 
preoccupied with efforts to collecting votes but rather intensifying their spiritual activities. 
However, during 2004 elections, the party changed its tone, started to see elections as a 
legitimate objective in itself needing to be pursued in its own logic, and organized and 
mobilized its activists and members to carry out virtually all sorts of campaign techniques and 
strategies in order to win as many electors as possible—without so much concern whether 
those electors really understand the party’s visions and missions.  
The situation is consistent with the theoretical formulation of Northian institutionalism 
perspective. The party relied, where party relies on ideology in their behaviors in a time when 
formal political institutions are not stable and have not functioned effectively. And it changes 
its behavior in the later period not because it abandons its ideological orientation but rather 
because the existing institutions start to function more effectively to reduce uncertainty and 
facilitate fair interests distributions. 
 This chapter discusses the aftermath of elections when a party elected into government 
positions. It explores to what extent PKS behaviors in government are driven by its 
ideological aspirations and to what extent they are products of institutional constraints. The 
first section of this chapter outlines the theoretical framework on party government, especially 
the conflicting influences of ideology and institutions. First it opens with discussion on the 
nature of party behavior in government, by exploring debates between spatial and saliency 
theories on party competitions each with different consequences for party behavior in 
government, and second it continues the discussion by applying such theoretical frameworks 
to observe PKS political behaviors in government. 
 
2. THEORIES OF PARTY GOVERNMENT 
2.1. Party Government and Democracy 
Scholars commonly agree that there are two different types of democratic procedures, i.e. 
direct and indirect. Direct Democracy is a political procedure by which the citizens decide 
directly what their government should do, commonly associated with the political tradition of 
ancient Athens. Although it is regarded not as the standard form of modern democracy, 
interestingly enough, direct democracy has occurred more often in recent decades in the form 
of referendums in which citizens directly decide specific policy to be taken by their 
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government, mostly on general policies such as constitution, sovereignty and independence, 
international agreement and treatise, allegedly because of the widespread feeling among 
citizens that governments have become remote and disengaged from the interests of the 
constituents, and elections alone cannot guarantee sufficient choice and accountability 
(LeDuc, 2003: 16). 
 The more common practice in modern democracy is indirect democracy, commonly 
called Representative Democracy, in which through elections citizens elect a group of people 
to run the government. This group of people, commonly organized in political parties, is 
chosen by either majority or plurality of citizens who are eligible to vote, serve in a definite 
period of time and are accountable to the regular process of elections. Interestingly, although 
often heralded as the grand invention of modern politics, representative democracy become 
the norm in modern politics because of its practicality and effectiveness to carry out large 
scale popular political enterprises, rather than its ‘democratic’ characters. Some even accused 
representative democracy as not fully democratic because the elected governments act as 
trustee which formulate policies based on their own considerations, and not as delegates who 
always consult to the constituents what policies to be taken (David Held, Models of 
Democracy: 84-88). 
 It is this representative concept of democracy which is widely adopted by students of 
party studies. Richard Katz explains that democracy is equal to party government because: (a) 
government decisions are made by party officials or those under their control, (b) government 
policies are formulated within political parties, (c) these parties then act cohesively to enact 
and implement policy, (d) public officials are recruited through political parties, and (e) public 
officials are held accountable through political parties (Katz, Future of Party Govt, 1996: 
196). Elections as basic procedures in democracy are not designed to produce internally-
democratic parties, but rather as effective parties to carry out policies, and enabling citizens to 
regularly assess the parties’ performances. Thus, according to this dominant view, the basic 
requirement of democracy must be ‘internally-effective’ political parties, rather than 
‘internally-democratic’ ones (See, Schumpeter 1943: 269, Sartori, 1976: 152). 
 With regard to party government, the view implies that the party is the office-seeker, 
whose ultimate objectives are to maximize control over the benefits of political-offices. 
Proponents of this notion view politics as a sort of competition and offices are the fixed prize. 
Thus, although parties seem to be immersed and preoccupied with the intensity and the thrill 
of the processes of competition, their ultimate aims are none other than winning the 
competition and get the prize (Rikke, 1962: 33-34). However, this pragmatic view on parties’ 
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behavior in government has its own opponents, who suggest that political parties are basically 
policy-seeking animals, which ultimate mission is more than merely to compete in democratic 
politics and win governmental offices, but rather a step further to influence government 
policies. Based upon empirical evidence of the formation of coalition governments, supporters 
of this theory contend that government coalitions are almost always be formed by parties of 
‘connected’ ideologies (De Swaan, 1973: 87-88). 
  Interestingly, then, this last notion on the nature of party government, i.e. that parties 
in their political competitions are not only concerned about winning public offices but also 
influencing public policies, brings us into a notion of the nature of party democracy, namely 
that government by the party—the representative government—is in fact democratic 
government, because it does concern with policy preferences of the constituents. 
 
2.2. Spatial vs. Saliency Theories of Party Government  
Is it true that representative government by parties is democratic because parties in 
government are not only concerned with winning competitions but also with formulating 
certain policies? Anthony Downs presents a negative answer. In his opinion, the ultimate 
objective of parties is to win the present and following elections, and thus they will be 
motivated to change their positions in order to maximize public support. Consequently, 
government parties in power are always willing to enact policies which have maximum 
capacity to garner public supports, in order to be reelected in the elections (Downs, 1957: 93-
94). This also means that the policies are possibly different from what parties said during 
elections.  
However, if Downs’ spatial model of party competition is true, why do parties—
especially the major ones—look consistent in their campaigns and policy proposals for 
decades? Why do leftist parties consistently propose leftist programs even though sometimes 
it forced them out of governmental positions, and so do the rightist parties? Why don’t 
politicians leave their parties when it lost in elections and found new and better ones? Why 
don’t new parties emerge in every election? These are among the questions spatial theory of 
party competition cannot answer satisfactorily.  
Revising Downs ‘Spatial’ theory, David Robertson proposes a revision theory he calls 
‘Saliency theory’ of party competition. In it he suggests that parties cannot change their 
ideological and policy positions arbitrarily, because they are bound by their constituents who 
do not change their preferences arbitrarily. If there are changes in public discourses and 
issues, instead of changing their positions to be as closer as possible to the popular issues, 
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parties accentuate or highlight certain aspects or elements of the issues from their respective 
positions (Robertson, 1976:). For example, during the raising popularity of ‘environment’ as 
political discourse in Europe that gave rise to the so called ‘Green parties’, other established 
parties adopted the issue and portrayed it from their vantage ideological perspectives, so that 
they could accommodate the new issues without changing their ideology and general policy 
positions.  
 
2.3. Campaign’s Premises and Government Policies 
Using Robertson’s saliency theory of party competition, a group of scholars of party 
studies analyze the policy capacity of party governments in various democratic countries. The 
researches are intended to answer two different levels of questions: on the one side, they 
explore organizational mechanism of party behaviors in their competitions for power, 
especially with regard to the consistency between what they said in electoral campaigns and 
what they actually do when elected government. On the other side, and related to the previous 
point, the studies intend to provide evidence on the ‘democraticness’ of representative 
government run by parties. The findings convincingly support Robertson theory, i.e. that on 
the one hand parties are flexible in responding to the dynamics of political issues and public 
preferences, yet on the other hand they do so while maintaining their own respective 
ideological positions.  
A research conducted by Budge, Robertson and Hearl found significant correlations 
between party manifestos in nineteen democracies in Europe, America and Asia with 
government policies in forty years period (1940s-1980s). The study also provides answers to 
the widespread perceptions among students of party studies: firstly, different from what 
scholars believe, that 1960s marked ‘the end of ideology’ in democratic politics (Bell, 1966), 
where parties and governments had been less ideological and more pragmatic, Budge and his 
colleagues found that parties consistently use policy pledges in ideological terms, because 
such vocabularies are useful both to tell the public about the parties programs and to 
differentiate them from their competitors. Secondly, the study also suggests that—contrary to 
the allegation that parties’ representative governments are less democratic because parties acts 
as trustees rather than as delegates—party governments showed a high score of consistency 
between what they promised during elections and what they actually do when elected as 
government (Budge, Robertson, Hearl, 1997). 
Furthermore, in another study conducted by Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge in 
analyzing ten advance democracies in Europe, US, Asia and Australia, which focus on the 
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party governments policy capacity, the data indicate that more than fifty percent of average 
party governments implement policies in line with what they promised during elections—the 
highest score was France with 80%, the lowest was Australia with 40% (Klingemann, 
Hofferbert, Budge, 1994). This study, thus, also confirm that party governments have 
democratic capacity to deliver their electoral premises, formulated in three different 
parameters:  agenda, mandate, and ideological factors (Klingemann, Hofferbert, Budge, 1994: 
Chapter 1 and 2). 
Firstly, Agenda capacity of party behavior refers to the capability of political parties 
that participate in democratic politics to react to the popular political discourses and issues. 
Researches on party performances in various democracies across the world indicate that the 
score is relatively high, where trends in party programs and rhetoric do reflect the general 
concerns of the society in given period, and the changing issues and concern at the societal 
levels were usually also followed by changing in parties’ programs. In Europe and America, 
for instance, almost uniform trends of party programs for disarmaments in post WW II years, 
the soft resurgence of rearmaments following Korean and Vietnam wars, and the shifting 
budgetary programs from foreign policies into domestic welfare, closely reflected the 
concerns of wider society (Klingemann, Hofferbert, Budge, 1994). Hans Keman calls this 
‘party sensitivity’, referring to the extent of parties responsiveness to the issues the people 
deem as important, and his observation also substantiates that parties are commonly sensitive 
to the concerns and preferences of their constituents (Keman, 2002: 232-234).  
Secondly, mandate capacity refers to the willingness and capability of parties in 
government to implement their own policy programs, rather than those of outside the 
government. If parties in government implement policy based on their programs they 
presented to the electors, it can be said that the governing parties have the mandate capacity, 
which means that they follow the wants of their constituents. In Keman’s term it is called 
‘party responsibility’ in which parties have ability to bring the political preferences of their 
constituents into policies (Keman, 2002: 217-223). However, the governing parties do not 
have mandate capacity if, when elected government, they implement policies based on other 
parties programs. Such situation is not impossible where parties adopt their opponents’ 
programs either for collusive motives to share resources with opponents in cartelistic system, 
or because they want to increase popularity for the next elections by changing policy 
positions—as is envisioned by Downs’ spatial theory. Yet, studies by Budge et al and 
Klingeman et al found that parties in government have strong mandate score, and although 
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there are negative scores, in which party governments adopt policy of their opponents, these 
are very rare (Klingemann, Hofferbert, Budge, 1994; Budge, Robertson, Hearl, 1997). 
Finally, ideological capacity refers to the extent of which party governments’ mandate 
capacity—their ability to implement policy based on their own electoral programs—is inline 
with their ideological tradition. This point assesses to what extent parties are willing and able 
to change their ideological and policy positions in expense of their identity. The study by 
Klingeman et al confirms that parties in government are very stable in their ideological basis, 
although from time to time there are constant dynamics where parties converge and diverge. 
In all countries being studied, the leftist governments constantly implement leftist policies, the 
liberal governments implement liberal government programs, and the religious parties in 
governments advocate religious oriented programs (Klingemann, Hofferbert, Budge, 1994: 
247). Even more interesting is the fact that the three different ideological strands have their 
own respective policy styles. Governments by the Leftist parties were the most persistent to 
their ideological positions, governments by the Rightist parties were flexible and pragmatic, 
while the Religious parties’ governments situate in the middle of the two opposite styles 
(Budge and Keman, 1993: 217). 
 
2.3. Coalition Formation and Portfolio Allocation  
In democratic politics, governments are formed either by one political party or a 
coalition of a number of parties. The former is common in two parties or dominant party 
systems of democracies, whereas the latter is customary in multi-party political systems. 
Given the fact that Indonesia has adopted a multi-party system the latter is the one that is 
relevant for this study. Coalition government is a government that is formed by a number of 
parties that agree to each other. There are a number of theories which seek to explain based on 
what parties reached agreements with their competitors to form a join government, which 
generally can be classified into two broad categories, i.e. office-oriented and policy-oriented 
coalition theories. 
Office oriented theories, as the name indicates, maintain that the only plausible ground 
for parties to come to an agreement with their opponents is power, i.e. in the form of 
government positions. Thus, these theories assume that parties are always willing to join with 
whichever rivals to form a government provided they received power sharing. The oldest 
theory of this type is ‘winning coalition theory’ that proposes that parties are willing to join in 
coalition to form a majority in parliament (Riker, 1962: 280). This proposition derived from 
Parliamentary Government in which a majority in government is necessary to the survival of 
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the cabinet; yet it also applies to Presidential Government in multi-party system (like 
Indonesia) in which majority in parliament is needed to ensure the effectiveness of 
government programs. Because if the President has only minority supports in Parliament, he 
or she will face difficulties to get her or his proposed bills passed by the legislature, and thus 
the government programs will not be effective. 
Other scholars observed that winning proposition is insufficient to explain the 
mechanism by which parties agreed to form a joint government. This is due to the fact that, 
following the office-seeking assumption, parties will maximize their office share, and thus 
they need to minimize the number of coalition partners. These scholars propose ‘minimum 
wining theory’ which suggests that parties will agree to join forces in forming government, 
but they will not seek to collect as many partners as possible to reach absolute majority in 
parliaments. On the contrary, the objective of parties in joining coalition government is to 
hold government positions as many as they can, and in doing so they have to minimize the 
number of participants in the coalition just enough to reach majority status. This will prevent 
coalition partners to share their power unnecessarily (Gramson, 1961; Laiseson, 1966). 
However, some others perceived that although office-seeking coalition theories have a 
solid logical base they are not really able to explain real-world politics, in which parties 
oftentimes refuse to join in coalitions, or that certain parties tend to form coalition 
government with certain type of parties. These scholars contend that office is not the main 
objective for parties in taking part in government, but rather policy is the main reason. Parties 
want to be in government not just because they want to hold office positions, but rather 
because they want to influence policies—either for ideological reason, or for pragmatic 
grounds to increase their votes in the next elections. 
This camp thus proposed ‘minimal connected theory’ of coalition that suggests that 
parties will participate with other parties only if they have close-connected ideologies. This 
theory has normative as well as pragmatic grounds. Normatively, because the main objective 
of parties to be in public offices is to influence government policies, it would be irrational to 
recruit coalition partners that will pursue the opposite direction of policies, and thus will 
neutralize their policy courses. Pragmatically, moreover, recruiting coalition partners with 
similar ideologies will strengthen the government because all coalition members have similar 
or almost similar policy orientations, and thus will likely make governance function more 
effective so that in the end it will increase it’s rate in the eyes of their constituents and the 
public (Axelrod, 1970). 
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Yet, still, another scholar suggests that parties with similar ideological positions are 
not necessarily pursuing similar policies. This is because, as was explored in previous 
chapters, parties are internally-plural actors with heterogeneous competing interests inside 
their organizations. Thus, given the different internal dynamics in each party, it is highly 
likely that even parties with close ideological orientations accentuate different policy 
priorities in given period of time or in given political situations. Therefore, if parties’ main 
objective in governance is influencing policies, policies’ congruence among coalition partners 
is substantial. De Swaan, the pioneer of this approach, proposes ‘minimal policy distance’ as 
the norm for parties to join in a coalition, in which in order to be successfully forming a joint 
government, the participants have to agree on certain courses of policies the government will 
pursue, although they may have wide ideological distances (De Swaan, 1973). 
The next fundamental point in coalition government is portfolio allocations among 
coalition partners. There are two main perspectives on this. Firstly, some scholars argue that 
the only parameter for power sharing in a coalition government is the relative size of each 
participant. This rule is so fundamental so that its proponent dubbed it as ‘iron law of 
proportionality’ (De Winter, 2002: 190). This perspective suggest that a coalition distributes 
governmental positions to its members according to quantitative contributions to the 
parliamentary power of government, and that cabinet and other office portfolios are 
translatable into quantitative values, or into ordinal hierarchy such as senior, core, ordinary, 
and junior ministries. Thus the biggest party will receive the biggest share in form of more 
number of ministers or few ministers but with high quantitative values, while smaller partners 
have to be satisfied with fewer shares (De Winter, 2002: 189-191). 
However, secondly, it turns out that government positions are not neutral, i.e. that 
different cabinet positions have different values for different parties. In line with research 
findings mentioned in the previous paragraph, that parties in government tend to pursue 
policies inline with their ideological orientations, observations on the portfolio allocation in 
coalition government is also indicates that ideology play substantial roles in influencing 
parties’ choice of government offices. Not all parties are willing to receive any position. On 
the contrary, different parties tend to give priority to different positions inline with their 
ideological orientations. Budge and Keman propose an interesting systematic scheme on how 
parties from different ideological traditions give score to common cabinet positions (Budge 
and Keman, 1993: Chapter 4). Of course the chart is hypothetical, but it provides a sound 
logic of the relations between party ideologies and their priorities for government positions. 
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Ranking of Cabinet Ministries according to Party Ideologies  
(Budge and Keman, 1993: 97) 
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3. PKS BEHAVIOR IN GOVERNMENT FORMATION 
 One of the unique features of Indonesian politics is the tradition of ‘deliberation and 
consensus’ (musyawah dan mufakat) where, according to the common wisdom, every 
decision should be taken on the consent of all participants. This means that majoritarianism, 
or decision taken by the majority, has never really been popular. Even absolute majority will 
not meet the ideal requirement, let alone plurality majority. During the New Order era, the 
regime had always been heralding deliberation and consensus as the highest norm of 
Pancasila democracy, differentiating Indonesian political culture from foreign ones—Western 
or Eastern, Left or Right. The regime then manipulated this spirit of harmony as its best tool 
to protect its dominance in national politics, legitimized its power by contriving rubber stamp 
legislatures by carrying out theatrical political shows of ‘deliberation and consensus’ in due 
time every five years, and using the same reasons—sometimes violently—to suppress 
political opponents and dissents. The spirit of political harmony is still prevalent in post-
Suharto Indonesia, in which virtually all cabinet administrations during this period have tried 
to include as many factions in the system as possible, to form highly oversized coalition 
governments.  
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 It is in such political context that PKS has been participated in governmental positions. 
It held governmental posts in two out of four post-Suharto administrations, i.e. during 
Abdurrahman Wahid and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono administrations. Those are coalition 
cabinet that involved political processes of coalition formations. This sections explores the 
institutional processes of PKS involvements in government formations and coalition building, 
focusing on the influence if the party ideological aspirations vis-à-vis the impacts of 
democratizing political institutions.  
 
3.1. Abdurrahman Wahid Administrations  
The 1999 election was the first free and fair one in the last forty years. The political processes 
preceding and accompanying the election made it the most ideologically charged political 
process in reform era, because it was the first direct contest between various factions—
religious vs. secular, military vs. civilian, reformers vs. pro status quo. Political factionalism 
was taboo during New Order era, and thus the proponents of the existing factions had 
virtually no channels of political communications. When the barrier of authoritarianism was 
eventually lifted and the democratic arena for political competitions was set up, those factions 
entered into competitions in a very tense atmosphere because they hardly knew who the main 
players were, which ones are friends and which are ones opponents. Although the rules of the 
game were set, no one really knew with whom they were going to compete. In such 
situation—exactly like what the Institutionalist describe—the politicians relied on the 
informal system of information and rules of the game, i.e. ideology. 
 The substantial role of informal institutions during the early years of democratization 
was clear from the track record of PK. During those years the party carried out its political 
programs based on information and networking with other Islamic groups and parties, which 
convinced that they had similar visions and missions as well in competition with similar 
opponents. The first political move taken by PK as a political organization was the formation 
of Communication Forum of Islamic Parties (FSPPI, Forum Silaturrahmi Partai-Partai 
Islam) in mid-1998, founded during a meeting of the Indonesian Islamic parties with 
Malaysian PAS in Puncak, West Java. The parties which joined the forum were United 
Development Party (PPP), Crescent Star Party (PBB), Justice Party (PK), Islamic Ummah 
Party (PUI), Indonesian Islamic Party of Masyumi (PII-Masyumi), Ummah Awakening Party 
(PKU), Nahdatul Ummah Party (PNU), Indonesian United Islamic Party (PIPI), Indonesian 
Islamic Thariqat Party (PITI), Indonesian Sarekat Islam Party (PSII). 
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 The Forum’s first political action was a statement requested the government to call off 
Law No. 3 and 8/1985 that required mass and political organizations to adopt Pancasila as the 
sole base. Next, fully realized their minute caliber, eight of the Forums’ members—ten minus 
PPP and PBB—agreed to join their remaining votes in the election to get additional seat, the 
so called Stembus Accord. However, there were different interpretations on how the accord 
should be carried out. The Forum interpreted it as agreements among parties to combine their 
remaining votes among themselves and get additional seats for them. In this way the Forum 
would receive 58, out of which PK would get 10. On the other side, the Indonesian Voting 
Committee (PPI, Panitia Pemilihan Indonesia) suggested that members of a stembus accord 
would be counted as a single party, and consequently if they still have remaining votes it 
should also be distributed among other parties. In this way the Forum would only get 39 seats, 
with 7 for PK. This controversy led into prolonged debates, that made the General Election 
Commission (KPU) propose to abolish the accord and the remaining votes would be 
distributed to all parties according to their ranks—in which the Forum would receive 43 seats, 
and PK would have 7. Eventually, voting in KPU decided to cancel the accord (IFES, 2002: 
5-7).  
 With only 7 sets and failed to pass electoral threshold, PKS was in fact a tiny party in 
the parliament, and it needed to join other party to form a parliamentary fraction. There were 
two different groups invited PK to form a joint fraction. The first was of course comprised of 
members of the Forums—again, minus PPP and PBB which had enough votes to form its 
own—that requested PK to join the Daulah Ummah fraction. At the same time, there was 
another offer from PAN which intended to increase the size of its Fraction. Finally PK 
decided to join PAN, and formed a reformed fraction. According to Hidayat Nurwahid, there 
were a number of reasons why PK chose to join nationalist PAN rather than those Islamic 
parties: firstly, Amien Rais factor was somehow more reliable warranty for PK in uncertain 
situation. PK leaders knew Amien and other PAN top leaders very well as Muslim political 
activists, and they believed that they would pursue political agendas parallel with their own. 
Secondly, Rais and PAN also had excellent credential as reformist, which was inline with PK 
political visions. Hidayat said that he proposed the name ‘Reform Fraction’ because at the 
same time Golkar intended to name its fraction ‘Golkar Reform’. In his opinion Golkar was 
going to hijack the term ‘reform’ because the party was in fact the representation of the status 
quo, and if it got opportunity to claim the name, the iconic term ‘reform’ would be destroyed 
indefinitely. Thirdly, in line with the spirit of democratic reform PK decision to join PAN 
made Reform Fraction the fifth largest fractions in the parliament with 41 seats and thus had 
 241
the right to receive vice chairmanship in the legislature, defeated the Military Fraction which 
held 38 seats from the position. Had PK not joined PAN, the military would have leadership 
position in the parliament, which meant counterproductive to democratic reform. Finally, by 
joining PAN, PK would have opportunities to learn real politics from PAN politicians 
(Damanik, 2002: 282-286).  
The next political coalition PK joined in was the formation of Central Axis and the 
presidential election by the parliament. Different from the widely held belief that the coalition 
had been initiated by Amien Rais in order to mobilize support from Muslim politicians, closer 
observation revealed the opposite situation, where the forum was initiated by a number of 
senior Muslim politicians to bring Rais back into his proper habitat of Islamic politics. It was 
triggered by Rais agreement to join forces with Megawati and Abdurrahman Wahid in 
furthering reform agendas. This move was responded with anxiety by Islamic politicians, 
based on ideology as well as democratic considerations. On the one hand, ideologically, they 
associated Megawati and her PDI-P as representing secular and Christian politics; while on 
the other hand many perceived both Megawati and Wahid as not really reformist, because 
they were reluctant to support reform agendas such as amending the constitution and 
demilitarization of politics (Suharsono, 1989: 86-88, Eep Syaifullah Fatah, detik.com 
12.05.1999).  
Central Axis grew into more solid coalition and attracted major Islamic parties such as 
PPP and PBB to formally join in. Rais surprisingly nominated Abdurrahman Wahid as the 
alternative candidate. Meanwhile, other coalition members such as PBB and PK was still 
willing to accept Habibie, on the fact that he had considerable Islamic credential as the 
founder and patron of the powerful Association of Indonesian Muslim Scholars (ICMI). At 
this point, Yusril Mahendra the chairman of PBB said to the media that Wahid’s nomination 
was Rais personal initiative and did not represent Central Axis agenda, while PK although as 
a member of Reform Fraction with PAN did not reject Rais proposal to nominate Wahid, in 
fact its members of parliament did not put their signatures in the official document of Reform 
Fraction when dominating Wahid (Wahono, 2003: 115).  
PK’s attitude seemed perplexing, and needed further explanation. Three factors are 
worth to be elaborated. Firstly, the fact that PK was a new party and its leaders were also 
newcomers in real politics. As was unfolded in the last chapter, during this period PK leaders 
still perceived party as merely tool to achieve objectives of propagating Islam in politics. 
Thus, well before the June 1999 election, in December 1998, it had carried out a selection 
process for its presidential candidate, and came up with Didin Hafiduddin, a lesser known 
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Muslim figure from Bogor, West Java. In its official statement dated March 1999, the party 
explained that Hafiduddin was chosen because he met the PK qualifications: such as 
considerable religious knowledge and moral integrity, common political visions with the 
party, as well as not involved in previous regime (PK Bayanat, 13 March 1999).  
Secondly, PKS had strong negative sentiments toward Abdurrahman Wahid, because 
he was a controversial figure who advocated liberal Islamic interpretations and easily 
criticized established notions and traditions, and also has close relations with secular and 
Christian communities. This had made the PK reluctant to publicly endorsed Wahid 
candidacy. This sentiment was clearly expressed in the party statement in September 1999, in 
which it suggested that Wahid was a controversial figure who used to made statements 
insulting to Muslims. Therefore, if the PK would support Wahid candidacy, the party needed 
to ask Wahid commitment to promote the interests of Islam and Muslims, not to implement 
policies that contradict Islamic values, and not to make statements offensive to Muslims (PK 
Bayanat, 17.09.1998).  
Thirdly, despite the fact that the party was still in idealistic political mood, plus a 
boiling negative sentiment toward Wahid and suspicions of personal interest from Rais in 
nominating him, the PK found no alternative better than program and agenda put forward by 
Amien Rais in Central Axis. Indeed, the previously mentioned the PK statement, after 
expressing aversion toward Wahid as well as suspicion toward Rais, added that “from 
pragmatic point of view Central Axis political agendas were much preferable than the 
alternatives” (PK Bayanat, 17.09.1998). What it meant by ‘pragmatic’ point of view was in 
fact not merely a power-oriented political agenda, but rather a simple way in understanding 
the whole picture of political environment. It was beyond doubt that the PK preferred Habibie 
much more than Wahid. However, the fact that Habibie was nominated by Golkar meant that 
he stood in the way of democratic reform, and the PK would be in jeopardy had it supported 
him. It seemed that the familiarity of PK’s leaders with Rais personal records was the major 
guideline for the PK in its grappling effort to understand the uncertain political environments 
(Wahono, 2003: 134). 
  Habibie eventually cancelled his candidacy after his Presidential Report was rejected 
by the Parliament, and thus in the D day of presidential election in 20.10.1999, there were 
only two candidates, Wahid vs. Megawati. For PKS the choice was, then, between two non-
ideal candidates, and thus it needed to take the closest one to the ideal position. Wahid had 
more points than Megawati (PK Bayanat, 13.10.1999). Strategically, Wahid was also more 
preferable than to be abstained, due to the fact that he was nominated by coalition of Islamic 
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parties and also supported by major Muslim politicians, and thus abstaining would made PK 
separated from their fellow Muslims. Quoting the spiritual leader of Egyptian Muslim 
Brothers, Mustafa Masyhur, PK official statement said: “Accepting an un-ideal choice in 
unity with other Muslims is preferable than choosing the ideal one but in separation from 
other fellow Muslims” (PK Bayanat, 13.10.1998). 
 When Wahid was elected president, he offered the PK one ministerial position in his 
cabinet, and PK accepted the offer and nominated its chairman, Nur Mahmudi Islamil, for the 
position. In a meeting held following the offer, PK leaders discussed which department was 
the most preferable, and they agreed for several criteria: firstly it must be populist ministerial 
in term that it facilitates the party propagation mission, secondly it should be in accordance 
with the party’s human resources in order to maximize its performance, thirdly it was 
preferable to have a department which didn’t receive foreign funds, and fourthly it also 
preferred a department with the least amount of problems. Based on this criteria, the PK 
proposed to have the Minister of Agriculture in the coming cabinet. Wahid seemed to agree 
with the PK proposal, so that Ismail was on the cabinet list as the Minister of Agriculture until 
the last hour of the official announcement of cabinet formation. However, when the new 
Indonesian United cabinet was wade public, Ismail was shifted into the Minister of Forestry 
and Horticulture (PK, Bayanat, 29.10.1999).  
 
3.2. Megawati Administration 
Abdurrahman Wahid’s administration did not last for long, because of the very nature of the 
oversized coalition he built, in which he recruited ministers from every corner of political 
camps, which had not only different but also contradictory agendas. He swore in his 35 
ministers in October 1999, and by August 2000 he already needed to reshuffle his cabinet, 
changing 17 ministers and reducing the number of ministers in his cabinet to 26. 
Unfortunately, the composition of the new cabinet did not reflect the original constellation of 
his supporters from Central Axis and thus triggered strong reactions from the latter. 
Furthermore, Wahid’s acrobatic and controversial managements earned him increasing 
number of political opponents, especially from Central Axis which felt he had abandoned 
them, the conservative Muslim groups who were angered by his plan to open diplomatic 
relations with Israel and to lifting up the bans for Marxism and Communism, and from the 
military that was upset by the president’s interventionist policies toward the armed forces.  
 The antagonism between the president and his opponents, especially in the parliament, 
mounted because of the complexity of the situation as well as ‘zero sum game’ behaviors of 
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the major political actors. In May 2001 the parliament launched investigation against Wahid 
on the allegations of corruptions. When Wahid was unable to prove that he was innocent, his 
opponents in the parliament started to prepare for his impeachment. Wahid occasionally 
threatened to disband the Parliament if it was going to impeach him—which only increased 
the latter enmity. In a desperate situation on July 22nd, 2001, president Wahid invited the 
leaders of the military fraction in legislature, told them he would fire the commander of the 
armed forces if they do not back up his plan—a threat which met with negative response. 
Eventually in one o’clock early morning 23 July 2001 Wahid issued a presidential decree to 
dissolve the parliament, disband Golkar party, and call for an election in one month. 
However, without support from the disenchanted military, the decree practically ineffective, 
and by 08:30 AM the MPR—the upper house parliament, then the highest political institution 
which elected president and vice president—opened its special session to impeach the 
president, and in 16:45 PM the MPR chairman Amien Rais removed Abdurrahman Wahid’s 
presidential mandate, and sworn vice president Megawati as the president. 
 The PK fully supported Wahid impeachment and Megawati’s raise to presidency. 
Interestingly, the PK did not join the cabinet, although Megawati reportedly offered one 
ministerial position. This decision to refuse a governmental position by political party was 
unusual in any measure, especially amid the office-thirsty atmosphere in the Central Axis 
coalition in which the PK was the most junior partner. At least four factors might have 
motivated PKS to take the decision. 
 Firstly, Megawati presidency was controversial among conservative Muslim because 
of her gender. PKS conservative ideology perceives political leadership was the privilege of 
male politicians, and thus Megawati was not a choice when there were many capable male 
politicians. Secondly, joining the government under Megawati presidency was not preferable 
from policy point of view, because she and her party was perceived as the reincarnation of 
secular-nationalist PNI during previous era, and thus the archrival of Islamic politics.  Thirdly, 
another anti-Megawati sentiment was because many people perceived PDI-P as the political 
camp for Christian politicians. One of the most notorious figures was Maj. Gen. (ret.) Theo 
Syafe’i, one of Megawati closest aide, who was believed to have strong anti-Islam sentiment. 
Fourthly, PK leaders felt that they needed to improve their party organization as it failed to 
pass the electoral threshold and was unable to contest in the next election.  
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3.3. Yudhoyono Administration 
Fully motivated to continue participation in election PK was renamed into PKS in 2003. No 
significant changes occurred, in terms that PKS inherited everything from PK including 
leaderships, memberships, assets, and networks. Its decision to stay outside government was 
proven correct, and it was fruitful during the 2004 election, when it increased its votes from 
only 1.7% in the last election to 7.3% and became the 6th largest party, bypassing many others 
including former coalition partner in Central Axis such as PAN which earned 6.44% and PBB 
which shrunk into 2.62% and failed to pass the new electoral threshold.   
 The 2004 election also marked a new development in Indonesian democracy, where 
for the first time the people had opportunity to choose their president and vice president 
directly. This new development was designd to increase the stability of democratic institutions 
by giving the president greater legitimacy. This was, in a sense, a full circle for the 
democratization of political institutions. During the New Order era, the president dominated 
the national politics while the legislative branch was merely a rubber stamp authority. The 
democratic institutional engineering, through the 1999 elections, increased the authority and 
legitimacy of the legislature, which in fact came at the expense of those of the president. 
Thus, in the aftermath of 1999 election, the legislature was so powerful vis-à-vis the 
executive, that it impeached the president when he started to challenge the legislature. The 
popularly elected president would have greater as well as an independent legitimacy, to 
balance the power and the legitimacy of legislative branch of government. 
 It is interesting to note how the PKS prepared its electoral actions seriously, not only 
in achieving as many votes as possible, but also in anticipating the aftermath of the election. 
During the 3rd National Meeting of Majelis Syuro in early January 2004, the party laid out a 
number of options to anticipate the electoral result: Firstly, if the party collected more than 
20% of national votes, it would nominate its own presidential or vice presidential candidates. 
Although no one would really expect such achievement, as a matter of principle this must be 
anticipated because the party believes that God is omnipotent, and He grants power to 
whoever He wants. Secondly, if its votes would be less than 20% it would not nominate its 
own candidate, however if the vote would be more than 3% or pass the new electoral 
threshold it would join in the government. Thirdly, if PKS votes would be more that 3% but 
less than 20% it would consider supporting candidates from other parties provided that the 
candidates met PKS criteria (PKS Bayanat, 26.08.2008). Interestingly, though, there was no 
option for the worst scenario, i.e. how if the party failed to pass 3% votes. Perhaps, although 
the party strongly believes that God is omnipotent and do what He will, pre elections surveys 
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already indicated that the party would garner between 3 to 8 percents of national votes 
(Mujani, 2004) 
 After the election result was available, and the party successfully increased its votes 
six hundred percent higher than the previous one, the PKS held another national meeting of 
Majelis Syuro in late April 2004, to discuss the party’s further plans. Based upon the previous 
meetings, it decided not to nominate its own presidential candidate but would participate in 
government and thus would support candidate from other parties. At this point, the PKS was 
still obsessed with what it called “coalition of the Ummah” (koalisi keumatan), i.e. grand 
coalition from Islamic parties. In a press release it said: 
 
Thanks to God that in the legislative election held in 5 April 2004 PKS collected 8.3 
millions votes or 7.34% of national electors, and thus would receive between 45 to 
48 seats in the parliament—three seats still in dispute—or about 8% of total seats in 
legislature. This number, however, is far from the target set by the 3rd Majelis Syuro 
meeting in order to nominate presidential or vice presidential candidate. The votes 
are also far from significant if we refer to Golkar that collect 21.58% and PDI-P with 
18.53%. However, the number of votes collected by Islamic parties in this 2004 
election was in fact significant, in which PKB collected 10.57%, PPP 8.15%, PAN 
6.44%, PBB with 2.62%, PBR with 2.44% and PNUI with 0.8%. In sum these 
Islamic parties garnered more than 39%, and if they could join forces they are 
stronger than either Golkar or PDI-P (PKS press release, 25.05.2004). 
 
When its initiative to build grand coalition of Islamic parties did not avail, as easily predicted 
because of increasing frictions inside, as well as between, Islamic parties, in the meeting PKS 
discussed two option: Firstly, to continue participating in the government despite the failure 
of “the coalition of the ummah”, in the risk of increasing friction and polarization inside 
Muslim community. Secondly, not to participate in government and focus its energy to 
legislative activities—with more than 1100 legislators in all levels—in order to increase its 
capacity and opportunity in the next election. Eventually, the 4th MS meeting decided to take 
the second option, and at the same time gave mandate to the party highest institution (MS) to 
observe the development of the presidential elections, in order to provide further 
recommendation to support or not to support any candidate (PKS press release, 25.05.2004, 
see also Kompas 17 April 2004).  
 When presidential election kick-off was approaching, the debate inside the PKS was 
mounting on whether to abstain from the race or support a candidate. In the next meeting of 
Majelis Syuro, the forum agreed to take the recommendation of the 3rd meeting, i.e. to 
participate in the government and consequently support the candidate of the other party. The 
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argument was that the PKS needs real experiences in running the government, as part of the 
preparation to become a ruling party. And such experiences can only be gained through 
participation in government administration (Interview with Zilkiliemansyah, 25.06.2007). But 
which candidate would it support? For most of the supporters of PKS, as well as external 
observers, the option was quite easy, i.e. there was a candidate who had very close ideological 
as well as organization relation with the party: i.e. Amien Rais. However the choice was not 
that easy for the party leaders. The forum was in fact split evenly into two different camps, the 
one mostly supported by younger leaders who prefer Rais because of his Islamic as well as 
reformist credentials, in addition to the increasing pressure from its supporters to back up Rais 
(Kompas, 17.04.2004). However, other groups led by the more senior leaders highlighted 
more pragmatic elements, i.e. the chance to win the race, and they found that the former 
military chief commander Wiranto was preferable to Rais, because he was most likely to win. 
In addition, another line of argument suggested that PKS’s main concern was not winning the 
election, but rather stopping Megawati and thus Wiranto was the choice (See, Syu’bah Asa, 
Tempo 5-11 July 2004).  
  Eventually it gave its support to Rais. However, the internal debate had prolonged for 
weeks, that in the end when it decided to support Rais candidacy there was only less than two 
weeks time left before the Election Day, and Rais’ strategists complained that this last 
minutes back up meant very little because most of voters would already made up their minds. 
In a bigger perspective, however, PKS’s apparent difficulties in deciding which candidate it 
would support, was not unique for the party but rather common phenomena among Islamic 
parties, especially former members of Central Axis coalition. The PKB was split for on the 
one hand, its leaderships supported Wiranto who had run with Abdurrahman Wahid’s little 
brother Solahuddin, while on the other hand large portions of its supporters stood behind 
Megawati who picked NU’s chairman Hasyim Muzadi as her running mate. The PBB was 
also split, as it’s chairman Yusril Mahendra sided with secular general Yudhoyono, while 
other more ideologues leaders such as Sumargono backed up Rais. Meanwhile PPP’s attitude 
was no less ambiguous by nominating its chairman as its own candidate albeit with very slim 
popularity. Some argued that Haz had been involved in a behind-door agreement with 
Megawati to stop Rais, because of the overlap constituents between PAN and PPP, so that 
Haz running would reduce Rais’s supports (Syu’bah Asa, Tempo 5-11 July 2004, Denny J.A., 
Lingkar Survey Indonesia, 03.11.2003). 
 The first round presidential election in July 26th, 2005, decided that no candidate won 
absolute majority—50% + 1—and thus a second round was needed. And the two pairs of 
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candidates who collected the most motes was Yudhoyono-Kalla with 33.57% and Megawati-
Muzadi with 26.61%. Thus, the PKS candidate failed to go through the next round. However, 
differing from the first round in which the party was slow in deciding its choice, the option 
during the second round was clear, i.e. other than Megawati. The PKS was quick in made up 
its mind to stand behind Yudhoyono-Kalla, together with PBB. The party reportedly sent an 
envoy to both Yudhoyono and Megawati to get to know their programs and agendas, although 
these lobbyers had no rights to negotiate any deal with those candidates (Kompas, 
17.08.2004). In the 6th Majelis Syuro meeting in August 2004, it unanimously agreed to 
support Yudhoyono-Kalla, because: (a) they were closer to the party criteria than the 
contender, (b) PKS supporters were inclined to Ydhoyono, and (c) surveys indicated that he 
would win the contest. In late August 2004 it released official statement, explicitly stated as 
binding to its members and supporters, to support the Yudhoyono-Kalla ticket during the 
second-round presidential elections that following month (PKS Bayanat, 26.08.2004).  
The party also explained that it had signed an agreement with Yudhoyono in exchange 
for its supports. There were five points in the agreement: Firstly, the candidates agreed to 
pursue political reforms to achieve a clean, sensitive and professional government marked by, 
among others, a willingness to fire ministers proven guilty of corruption. In addition, they 
agreed not to repeat the same mistakes of the previous administration, and not to abuse the 
political power against Muslim community as well as Indonesian people in general. Secondly, 
they agreed to defend the sovereignty of the United Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) from 
international intervention. Thirdly, they agreed to continue democratic reforms, to develop a 
civil society with civil supremacy in politics, and not to invite a militaristic government nor to 
create a police state. Fourthly, candidates agreed to promote the nation’s morality and social 
prosperity, as well as improving law enforcements and protecting human rights. Finally, the 
candidate agreed to support the Palestinian struggle for an independent state, and to not 
establish diplomatic relations with Israel (PKS press release, 27.08.2004). The last point is 
perhaps the most interesting part, because it marks a purely ideological drive in the party 
behavior within the government formation.  
 When Yudhoyono won the second round held in 20 September 2004 convincingly, 
with 60.62%, the PKS automatically became governing party. Given the fact that the PKS was 
one among three parties officially supported Yudhoyono in second round—the others were 
the PBB and Yudhoyono’s Democrat Party—the party should receive a significant share. 
Initially Yudhoyono offered four cabinet position to PKS, in which the party responded by 
nominating four candidates: Soeripto for Attorney General, Adhyaksa Dault for minister of 
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Youth and Sport, Anton Apriyantono for minister of Agriculture, and Yusuf Asyari for 
minister of Housing—but only the last three were accepted by Yudhoyono when he 
announced his ‘United Indonesia Cabinet’ (Kabinet Indonesia Bersatu) late October 2004 
(www.pks-jakarta.com [accessed, 08.03.2008]). PKS choices for ministerial positions were 
consistent with its attitude in previous time, in which it sought to get portfolios which could 
facilitate it to reach the wider public, to help socializing the party’s popular image for the 
subsequent elections (www.zulkieflimansyah.com, 08.06.2006 [accessed, 19.05.2007]). 
Interestingly, during the negotiation of cabinet formation, the PKS strongly suggested 
Yudhoyono not to recruit in his cabinets persons who were in support of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and those who have association with corruptors or black big 
businessmen (konglomerat hitam) (www.pks-jakarta.com [accessed, 08.03.2008]). 
 
4. PKS BEHAVIOR IN POLICY MAKING 
As was explained earlier, there are two competing theories on what political party really seeks 
after it obtained public office positions. The first theory suggests that the party will likely use 
the positions to advance its chance to get reelected. This means that, since the ultimate 
objective is being in power, a party will do anything accordingly, including changing its 
policy and ideological positions. The second theory, meanwhile, contends that party is not 
only a power-seeking animal, but also a policy seeking one, which implies that for the specific 
party, public office positions are merely instrumental for its ideological mission to implement 
certain policies. Of course these options are not completely mutually exclusive. The common 
situation is that those options occur simultaneously with different balance of portion: in some 
cases parties give priority to office-seeking behavior while relaxing its policy or ideological 
positions, while in other cases they take policies as the more important agenda than office 
positions. 
 To examine which position PKS takes in its participation in democratic politics, this 
section explores the party’s policy capacity to understand whether positions in public office 
are more important than implementing public policies. Following the theoretical framework 
laid out in the beginning of this chapter, firstly, this section will examine the relationship 
between PKS’s policy promises during the election campaigns and the political aspirations of 
the Indonesian public, to discover the party’s electoral sensitivity. Secondly, this section 
examines whether the party ought to implement the policies it has promised during the 
election campaigns, or if it should, in fact, pursue different ones.  
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4.1. PKS Electoral Responsiveness 
4.1.1. 1999 Election 
 The main sources of PKS’s electoral promises are the party electoral programs, or the 
party platform. These documents are intended as explanations to its potential voters about 
what it stands for and what policies it will implement when succeed in gaining governmental 
positions. During the 1999 election, the party issued a document called “National Agenda” 
that contains general outlines on policy positions the party promoted and supported (See, 
Agenda Nasional Partai Keadilan, 1998). As a typical party platform, the document contained 
mostly broad and abstract statements on what it will promote if it achieved public office 
positions. These policy pledges will be measured against aspirations of Indonesian citizens 
during the time around the election. Fortunately, there are a few public opinion surveys 
conducted in the country on politics, democracy and religion, such as by International 
Foundation for Electoral Studies (IFES), The Asia Foundation (TAF), and Center for Studies 
on Islam and Society (PPIM). All of these are national surveys designed to provide national 
level data on the subjects. 
 The PK’s “National Agenda” is a short document of about 1,500 words and classified 
into 14 sections. The first section is a short introduction, under the heading “General” 
(Umum), which explains the broad outline of the party’s policy orientations. The first 
paragraph reads: “Character building using religious norms and religious values”.  The 
second paragraph reads: “promote a strong united country, in which ulama, intellectuals and 
government apparatus cooperate to develop the nation”. The last paragraph, however, refers 
to different point: i.e. “Reorient national development programs in order to revive the 
nation’s potentials from economic, political and social destructions caused by the New 
Order”.  
 To what extent did Indonesian public concern about the role of Islam and the Ulama in 
politics? The general political orientation of the party to “build the nation character through 
religion” did not reflect the general aspirations of Indonesian voters, because several surveys 
consistently found that the majority of Indonesians perceived economy (e.g. inflation, high 
price of basic goods, difficult to find jobs) as the major problem faced by the nation (TAF, 
2001; IFES 2002: 12), the community (IFES, 2002: 12), and the family as well (IFES 1999b: 
10). However, people did concern with the morality of their political leaders, in which 47% of 
them were dissatisfied with the leaders’ moral credential, while only 32% were satisfied 
(IFES 1999a: 12) A survey by PPIM even found that the majority of Muslim community 
(57% in 2001, 67% in 2002) agreed with the idea that the best solution for Indonesia is an 
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“Islamic government led by the Ulama”. Thus, although religion and cultural identity were not 
the urgent problems for the Indonesian people in general, the ideas of giving chance to 
religion and religious leaders in politics were preferable for majority of Muslims (Liddle, 
2003).  
The second section was on Economy. There are three main points in the party 
economic programs. The first was: “to develop moral economic system (sistem ekonomi 
moral) in which transcendental values are the foundation of ethic, conceptual as well as 
operational of all economic activities”. It also promised socialistic economic programs such 
as: “justice economy that takes side to the poor”, “to reduce unemployment”, “enforcing the 
rights of laborers”, and “promoting agriculture and supporting the farmers”. Finally, it 
promised to strengthen the state role in economic development. 
 There is no direct information on public aspirations on the moral factor within the 
economy, and 65% of the public believed that the economic problem could be solved through 
democratic reform, i.e. by electing more accountable government (IFES, 1999a: 7). Yet there 
was a portion of the public who believed in moral matters within the economy: Firstly, the 
majority (54%) of the population thought that the economic condition was bad, out of which 
47% (or 25% of the total population) believed that it was due to mistakes made by their 
leaders (IFES, 1999a: 13), while another survey showed many indications that the public 
perceived corruption, collusion and nepotism (KKN) as among the main causes of 
infectiveness of government and state institutions (TAF 2001, IFES 2002: 13). With regard to 
populist economic ideas such as pro-poor initiatives, reducing unemployment, or enforcing 
the laborers’ rights very much matched the aspirations of the public, because more people 
preferred greater state role in the economy—41% for, and 31% against (IFES, 1999a). 
However, this trend was significantly changed after the election, in which 62% preferred little 
state control in economy, while only 30% desired greater state control in economy (IFES, 
1999b: 26) 
 The third section deals with politics, in which the party promises to enact “justice” in 
every level of social lives: from individual, to family, to society, to the state. In the next point 
the document offers “to strengthen national unity and to eliminate any element of 
separatism”. It also promised to further democratic reforms, such as “empowering citizens to 
monitor and evaluate the performance of their political leaders,” “promoting transparency, 
clean government, and faithful governmental leaders,” “developing free and fair election”, 
and “professionalism of the military”—which commonly understood as reducing military 
involvement in politics.  
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 The idea of reforming politics through gradual bottom up process from individuals, to 
families, to societies, and to polities were in fact the PK’s ideological agenda and did not 
reflect the opinion of the public. On the contrary, surveys show that Indonesians were keen to 
see institutional reforms, such as improvement of government policy effectiveness (IFES, 
1999a: 7), finding capable leaders through direct presidential elections (78% in IFES 2002: 
14), as well as decentralization of power (IFES, 1999b: 16) as preferable methods to recover 
from political crises. No indication was found that people perceived separatism as a major 
national problem. The public was keen to support further democratic reforms—after regime 
change: 23% believed that Indonesia was already a democratic country, 28% believed it was 
not yet a democratic country but becoming one, and only 8% said that the country was not 
becoming democratic—although large portion of them, 33%, did not sure or did not know 
what democracy is (IFES, 1999a: 6). Interestingly, public opinion on the political role of the 
military was mixed. On the one hand, the majority (65%) still regarded the armed forces as a 
politically favorable institution, yet on the other hand many of them (54%) did not agree with 
the existing military role in politics (IFES, 1999b: 22-23) 
 The fourth section is on law (Hukum), which include two promises with a strong 
ideological tone:  Firstly, the party promised to “direct the priority of the law and the 
judiciary practices to support the weak in order to achieve sense of justice”. Secondly, the 
party also promised to focus on national identity of Indonesian law by “putting an end to the 
hesitation to choose the legal system that is inline with national identity. Efforts to impose 
Western legal system have made Indonesian laws disconnected from the philosophical, 
sociological, and historical roots of its society”.  
 Pledges to reform judicial systems were parallel with general aspirations of the 
Indonesian public, because the majority of them (57%) believed that the systems were 
severely corrupt, and 54% of them said that the existing legal system did not protect them. 
Even more, 66% of respondents reported that they would never go to any official legal 
institutions to solve their problems (TAF, 2001: 4). However, no opinion was reported that the 
people believed the failure of their legal system was because of the adoption of Western 
systems. It was true that the majority of the public perceived that the existing legal system and 
institutions were corrupt and ineffective, and they preferred to go to informal institutions such 
as deliberation (musyawarah) or religious and local leaders to solve their problems, they did 
not think that the system was wrong. Instead, the public believed that the problems were 
caused by corruption, unprofessional staff, and low professional and ethical standards, and 
87% of the respondents believed that the system could be improved (TAF, 2001: 4-5).  
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 The fifth section is on education, which contains three articulate statements: firstly, the 
party would promote “the professionalism of education and the role of teachers”, and thus 
secondly, it would “increase the state budget for educations”, and lastly it promised to 
implement policy on education which “give priority to religious values”.  
 A survey by IFES indicated that education was in fact among the major problems the 
Indonesian public concerned about. Given the fact that the concern about education was 
dealing with the increasing costs because of the worsening economic conditions, the party 
promise to increase government budget on education was answering public demand (IFES 
1999a: 10). In this regard, the point of the public concern about education was focused on the 
costs, and no data was found about the role of religious values in education. 
 The sixth is on science and technology, in which the party promised to “provide moral 
framework to the development and applications of science and technology”. The seventh is on 
environment, in which the party made only abstract promises to use natural resources for the 
benefit of the nation, while protecting them from illegal exploitations. The eighth section is on 
regional government (Pemerintah Daerah), in which the party promised to support 
decentralization of governmental systems and develop clean and respected governments. The 
ninth is on youth (Kepemudaan), promising “to endorse the increase of governmental budget 
for youth programs”, and “endorse the promotion of national leaderships from among the 
youth”. It must be noted here, the fact that despite the party leaders being young themselves, 
the statement can nonetheless be interpreted as self-reassurance for the party leaders. 
 Except for the improvement of regional government—which is parallel with public 
sentiments that perceived district level governments were more influential to their lives (54%) 
as well as trustworthy (58%) than both national (18% said influential, 21% said trustworthy) 
and provincial (13% influential and trustworthy) levels of government (IFES, 1999b: 17)—
none of these subjects were reportedly mentioned by the public as among the major problems 
they were concerned about.  
 The tenth point is on art and culture (Seni Budaya). In these subjects the party 
promised to “develop the arts and cultures oriented toward [morally] high-values,” “to 
optimize institutions to control artistic and cultural productions”, and “to filter the incoming 
of foreign cultures, to protect the nation from their destructive missions”. The eleventh is on 
information (Penerangan), in which the party promised “to endorse freedom of the press 
guided by sense of responsibility toward justice and national unity and identity”, “advocate 
the presses to be selective of their publication materials,” and “will dissuade partisan mass-
media”. 
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  With regard to these subjects, the aspirations of Indonesian public were mixed. 
Firstly, the idea to direct, limit or control freedom of expressions—which include arts, 
cultures, and press—run counter the general sentiment of the public who prefer to have 
greater freedom of expression as part of democratic reforms and human rights, and they 
believed that the freedom is beneficial for the public (IFES, 2002: 25-26). Surprisingly, 
however, the conservative promise to filter foreign cultures in a belief that they are destructive 
was reflected the sentiment of the large portion of Indonesian public, although the opposite 
opinion was also strong, in which 47% respondents perceived Western cultures threatened 
their way of life, while 41% opined that the West as being a source of things which will 
improve their lives (IFES, 1999b: 25).  
The twelfth section is on women (Kewanitaan), in which the party pledged to 
empower women through “the implementation of family welfare programs”, and to promote 
“the role of women as guardian of the nation’s morality”.  
These points strongly reflect the party discouraging views pertaining with women 
public roles. However, this view did not match with public opinion during that time, as was 
shown by survey report where the majority of respondents (64%) believed not only that a 
women could become president—thus assuming major public roles—but also an effective 
one, and only half of them (30%) suggested that a president should be a man—thus opined a 
limited public roles for women (IFES, 1999b: 18, 46). 
The thirteenth point is on health (Kesehatan), in which the party promised to “promote 
the extensions of health services for the society”, “to reform the structure of health 
management, to give priority to the consumers rather than the providers”, “promoting 
professionalism for medical practitioners”. And finally the fourteenth section is on society 
(Sosial), in which the party pledged to promote “social system framed by values of justice”.  
Certainly, health is one of the basic components in any society, and Indonesians were 
also concerned about it. Although no survey data directly mentioned it as the major problem 
they were facing, some respondents did mentioned “lack of public facility” as among the bad 
situations faced by the community (IFES, 2002: 12). Lastly, promoting the values of justice in 
a transitional society would surely be echoing everybody’s desire.   
  
4.1.2. 2004 Election 
During the 2004 elections, the PKS produced more sophisticated and well-prepared 
platform or electoral programs, under a grandeur title “The Agenda for Saving the Nation: 
Outlines of PKS Policy Platform”. The 80-pages document is divided into three main 
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sections: firstly, introduction which includes prefaces from the coordinator of ‘Committee to 
Win Election’ (LPP, Lajnah Pemenangan Pemilu) Muhammad Raziqun, and from the party’s 
chairman Hidayat Nurwahid. This section ends with a summary of the ideological visions of 
the PKS and missions under the heading of “Great Leap to Re-establish a Justice and 
Prosperous Indonesia” as the background and foundation for its policy proposals, which main 
points are the following: Firstly, multi-dimensional crises suffered by Indonesian people for 
several years were in fact divine punishments (adzab), because Indonesian citizens had 
neglected Divine guidance in their collective lives. Secondly, one of the most significant 
contributors to the crises and the punishments was bad political leaders (penguasa dzalim) 
who abused power, deceived the public, and stole the nations’ wealth to enrich their families 
and cronies. God rebuked and humiliated the arrogant ruler through 1998 reform movement. 
Thirdly, the next step to restore the dignity and decency of collective lives, Indonesians need 
to prepare good—i.e. religious—political leaders, because God has promised He will bring 
pious people into power. Finally, the party proposed three consecutive steps: (i) establishing 
religious foundations in collective lives, (ii) conducting radical reforms to the existing 
structures of collective lives, (iii) maintaining the sustainability of the potentials of collective 
lives. The next section contains the twenty one points of policies the party promised to 
promote. The last section is an appendix on the significant of the party platform, written by 
Sapto Waluyo. 
The document—especially the 21 policy points—will be examined against survey 
reports on public opinion around the time of the 2004 general election, to find out to what 
extent those policy promises reflected the general aspirations of voters. By then more public 
opinion surveys will have been conducted, thus more data is available regarding the political 
aspirations of Indonesian public, which include the IFES 2003 National Public Opinion 
Survey, and 18 series of Tracking Surveys conducted between January to October 2004, 
LP3ES 2004 Survey on the popularity of parties, The Asia Foundation 2004 survey on public 
opinion, and a number of national polls conducted by Indonesian Survey Institute (LSI) on the 
topics of Islam, politics and democracy.  
The first point of PKS platform was on strengthening the macro economy 
(Pemantapan Ekonomi Makro), which included two substantial points: i.e. “to end the 
contract with International Monetary Fund, IMF, in order to develop an independent national 
economy”,  and “to eradicate moral and bureaucratic hazards, i.e. corruptions and monopoly, 
to encourage economic investments”. 
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Economy was still the most important issue in public aspirations, and economic 
improvement was all what everybody wanted. The Indonesian public also perceived that 
improper conducts such as corruptions and mismanagements (which should include 
monopoly) were the most important contributing factors. However, drastic policy such as 
cutting relations with the IMF did not seem to be  in the mind of the public. There has been no 
data recently, but in the previous years, a large portion of Indonesians believe that foreign aid 
(79%) and foreign investments are beneficial for Indonesia (IFES, 1999b: 21).   
The second point was on establishing regional autonomy (Pemantapan Otonomi 
Daerah), where the party proposed to make sure that political decentralization must guarantee 
national unity by “balancing resources distribution not only between central and regional 
governments, but also between regional governments to avoid resentments and secession,” 
“increasing revenue sharing for regional governments”, “giving priority to district level of 
governments, rather than provincial ones”, and to introduce “direct election to elect regional 
governments”.  
In line with the increasing pessimistic mood of public opinion, the confidence toward 
regional governments also decreased, where in 2002, 73% respondents said that supervising 
regional governments would be easier, while in 2003 the number reduced into 64%. 
Moreover, the public was also increasingly worried about the misuse of power by local 
governments—51% in 2001, 56% in 2002, and 60% in 2003. Thus, while decentralization 
was favorable, adding local government power capacity stood in contrast to the public mood 
(IFES, 2002: 23-24; IFES 2003: 62-63) 
The third point was on empowering people’s economy (Pemberdayaan Ekonomi 
Rakyat), wherein the party promised to establish “vocational training courses”, to improve 
“laborers’ skills and professionalism”, as well as to “establish Islamic economic institutions 
as an alternative for capitalist systems”. 
Since economy was the number one problem faced by Indonesian people, economic 
initiatives were absolutely in line with their aspirations. However, proposing Islamic 
economic institutions as the alternative for the secular systems was not in public aspiration, 
since they believed that the problems were mostly due to the failure of policy makers rather 
than a matter of system (IFES, 2003: 22). Even the majority of Muslim respondents believed 
that Shariah is a personal, rather than structural, system (TAF, 2003: 11).  
The next points—fourth, fifth, seventh respectively—were on agriculture (Perjuangan 
Petani), where the PKS promised to “conduct land and agrarian policy reforms on rights of 
land ownerships, import limitations, and access to capital and investment”; on labor 
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(Perjuangan Buruh) in which pledges for “improving better regulations”, and “advocate and 
supervise labor unions and laborers religious lives, were made; and on fishery (Perjuangan 
Nelayan), in which it promised to help fishermen “to form strong and effective unions” and to 
create “alternative jobs” as well as “to improve products management”. 
Again, given the general mood of the public on the worsening economic conditions, 
proactive economic programs and especially toward people from lower economic levels—
many of whom felt the government did not care about them (TAF, 2003: 3)—reflected the 
general aspirations. 
The eighth point was on national politics (Politik Nasional), for which it proposed six 
packages of policies, which include: “improving the effectiveness of the parliament”, 
“implementing direct elections for regional governments”, “setting political leaders as moral 
exemplary for the public”, “promoting modest life-styles for public politicians and public 
leaders”. 
 From 2002 to 2003, the public rating toward state and government institutions was in 
steep decline: in 2002 the net rating (the number of the satisfied minus the dissatisfied) for the 
President was +20, in 2003 plunged into -18 (or declined 38%), for the DPR from +6 in 2003 
into -13 in 2003 (or dropped 19%), and for the MPR the score was constant -20 (IFES 2003: 
27). Improvements of the institutions were highly expected by the public, and what the public 
wanted from the politicians in the institutions was more professionalism (IFES, 2003: 22-23), 
rather than personal piety. 
The ninth point was on defense and security (Pertahanan Keamanan) in which it 
pledged to support the division of labors in which the police is responsible for security, while 
the military is in charge for defense. The tenth point was on law enforcement and human 
rights protections (Penegakan Hukum dan Perlindungan HAM), where the PKS proposed to 
focus on the eradication of corruptions and to solve human rights abuses conducted by 
previous regime. The eleventh point was on foreign policy (Politik Luar Negeri) where it 
deemed important to be cautious of fraudulent intentions of global power such as the IMF and 
the US, and to strengthen the principle of free and active participation in international politics 
based on regional proximity, i.e. to have a closer relation with geographically closer countries. 
These first two points pertained with the effectiveness of state institutions which the 
people started to lose confidence, and they certainly would support efforts to improve its 
performance. The last point on international politics was not so much part of the people’s 
agenda, although there were indications of an increasing nationalism, and negative sentiments 
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toward foreign cultures and interests, accompanying the democratic reform (IFES, 1999b: 
25). 
The twelfth point was on education (Pendidikan Nasional) in which the PKS proposed 
to implement low costs education policies, implementing constitutional mandate to allocate 
20% of the state budget to education, and decentralization of education policy. This pledge 
was for sure in line with general public aspirations. 
The next three points—thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth—were the party’s typical 
ideological programs: i.e. on youth pioneers (Kepeloporan Pemuda), which focus on the 
protection from demoralizing cultures, and preparing the youth as the next generation of 
leaders. On Indonesian women (Perempuan Indonesia) was the next point, where the party 
promised to promote women’s rights to observe Shari’a, women empowerment through 
family and welfare programs for women and children, supporting 30% quota for women in 
legislative. Plus, family empowerment (Pembinaan Keluarga) added the party stance on the 
primacy of family as the most important social unit, in which it pledged to implement policies 
to promote happy family lives. 
It is interesting to note that although these are ideological programs, in fact most of 
them—except for the first point—reflected aspirations of the general public. Firstly, 95% of 
Indonesian public recognized that freedom of religion as a basic human right (IFES, 2003: 
67). Secondly, plurality of respondent (42%) believed that the existing percentage of women 
in parliament was too low and would need to be increased through various possible ways 
(IFES, 2003: 37), and public was also supportive to the idea of 30% quota for women 
candidates. Thirdly, majority of Indonesian public (81% in 2002, 78% in 2003) believed that 
their family life was very good or good (IFES, 2003: 17), and logically they would only 
supports policy to maintain—and not to change—the existing conditions. 
The following three points—sixteenth, seventeenth, eighteenth—were general pledge 
on populist themes: i.e. on Social Health and Prosperity (Kesehatan dan Kesejahteraan 
Sasial), where it agreed to increase government budget to 20% for health, and to pay attention 
to public services for disable people. Then, on Conservation of Environments (Pengelolaan 
dan Pelestarian Lingungan Hidup), which focused o the party’s consent to improve law 
enforcements as substantive policy to promote conservations. After that, promised by science 
technology industry (Ilmu Pengetahuan, Teknologi, Industri) was also allowed to endorse 
government support for the development of these fields. 
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The first point was definitely to confirm public demand for affordable health services 
(IFES, 2003: 16), while the second and the third proposals were too broad to be implemented 
as programs, and served more as campaign rhetoric. 
The nineteenth point was on arts, culture and tourism (Seni, Budaya, Pariwisata), in 
which it promised to “promote religious arts”, and “religious culture and traditions” in 
society, as well as to “support tourism as medium for promoting national potentials”. And the 
twentieth points was on religious missionary and supervision in religious communities 
(Dakwah dan Pembinaan Umat Beragama), in which it promoted what it calls “Madinah 
Charter” that obliges followers of religions to observe their own religious teachings. Lastly, 
the twenty-first point was on communication and information (Komunikasi dan Informasi) in 
which the party pledged to support the ratification of anti-pornography law to reduce the 
negative effects of the freedom of the press. 
 The first point reflected the ideological programs of the PKS and did not mirror public 
inspirations. The second point was also in direct opposition with public aspiration that 
observing one’s religion is a right rather than an obligation (IFES, 2003: 67), while the third 
proposal to implement anti-pornography laws for the media somewhat echoed the public 
worry about the negative impact of foreign cultures (IFES, 1999b: 25), which were 
transmitted through modern mass media. 
 
 4.2. PKS Mandate and Ideological Capacities 
This section discusses the PKS mandate and ideological capacities in policy makings. The 
former refers to the party’s willingness and ability to implement policies in line with its 
promises delivered before elections, while the latter refers to the fact whether those policies it 
implemented are in accordance with its basic ideological positions. 
 
4.2.1. Policies during 1999-2004 
Perhaps the first significant political move by the party as part of government institutions, i.e. 
in legislature, was the PK’s decision to join the Central Axis coalition and then join the PAN 
to form the Reform faction in parliament. The main mission of Central Axis was to stop 
Megawati who was representing secular politics from becoming president, and support 
Abdurrahman Wahid as the representation of Muslim politics to the presidency. This 
maneuver was clearly in line to its promise to bring “religion and the ulama” into government 
processes, as well as its ideological stance as Islamist party to promote Islam as the solution 
for Indonesian politics. Together with the PAN, PK formed the Reform fraction that 
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prevented the Military faction in parliament from assuming leadership. This action was also 
match with its electoral promise to support “professionalism of the military”, and was also in 
line with its ideological position as an anti-New Order party given the fact that the military 
was the central element in the previous regime.  
 Secondly, the political actions of PK in government—this time in executive branch—
took place when Wahid gave the party a cabinet position, as the ministry of forestry. This was 
a very tough situation for the party that pledged to promote moralist politics, because it had no 
experience whatsoever in government and the department of forestry was among the most 
corrupt departments, especially with regard to illegal deforestations and embezzlements of 
plantation (reboisasi) projects (Environmental Investigation Agency, 2007). To back up his 
mission, Murmahmudi Ismail appointed Suripto—a former intelligence officer—as the 
department General Secretary (PK, Bayanat). Suripto eagerly ran after suspects of illegal 
loggings and brought more than a dozen of major names to the persecutor (Jakarta Post, 
16.05.2001). However the policy brought him and the ministry in conflict with the president 
who had close relations with big loggers—and soon they were sacked after only less than ten 
month in office (Tempo Interaktif, 27.03.2001). The eagerness to take up corruption scandals 
was in line with the party strong pledge to enact moralist politics and eradicate corruptions, 
and it was also reflected its basic ideological stance. 
 Thirdly, political actions taken by the PK in the government were series of political 
maneuvers together with other Central Axis coalition members to impeach president Wahid in 
July 2001, and appointed vice president Megawati into presidency. As was elaborated in the 
previous section, the PK was perhaps the only Central Axis member that was not under 
office-seeking motivation in impeaching Wahid—in the fact that it refused to join the next 
administration—but rather because of disagreements with Wahid’s policies especially his 
corruption scandals as well as his intentions to recognize Marxism-Communism and to 
establish diplomatic ties with Israel (see, PK Statement, 05.04.2000). However, its consent to 
support Megawati’s presidency contradicted its pledged to promote Islamic politics, and 
contradicted its ideological positions of anti-secularism and rejection of women as political 
leader. The PK tried to redeem it by refusing cabinet bid from Megawati, and became 
opposition.  
 Fourthly, from 1999 to 2002, the PK as part of Reform fraction was involved in 
amending the 1945 Indonesian Constitutions—which was deemed as sacrosanct by the New 
Order regime.  In fact, the PK proposed an amendment to verse 29, which guarantee the rights 
of Indonesians to hold religion and observe its teachings, into a regulation that obligate 
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followers of religions to observe the teachings of their religions, but to no avail (Interview 
with Hidayat Nurwahid, 06.07.2007, see also Nurwahid 2004: 153-162). The constitutional 
amendments were in line with the party promises to support democratic reforms and parallel 
with its anti-New Order ideological stance. More specifically its initiative to amend verse 29 
was strongly reflected its electoral pledge and ideological position. 
 Finally, in 2003, the PK—again as part of Reform fraction, together with other Islamic 
parties—supported the ratification of National Education System bill, which became 
controversial. The bill, among other things, stipulates that students should received religious 
instructions according to their respective faiths. It was controversial because many Muslim 
students attend Christian and Catholic schools, and these latter institutions rejected the bill as 
political interventions (see, US Dept. of State, Religious Freedom Repot 2003). Meanwhile, 
the proponent of the bill argued that Muslim students deserve appropriate religious 
instructions, in addition to widespread suspicion among Muslim community that Christian 
and Catholic schools are instruments to proselytize Muslim students. This political action was 
similar to PK’s electoral pledges to strengthen religious elements in education, and certainly 
reflected its ideological position to promote Islam in society and in polity, as well as to protect 
Muslim political interests. 
 
4.2.2. Policy during 2004-2006 
During this period, the PKS had 45 members in parliament and formed its Prosperous 
Justice Party Fraction (F-PKS). The first major political actions for the new PKS fraction 
pertained with the government plan to increase oil price by 30% in March 2005. As was easily 
predicted, this plan triggered widespread protests from the society as well as from 
parliamentarians. The government maintained that the national budget was in deficit 23, 
trillions IDR (App. 2.3 billions USD), thus it needed to cut oil subsidy from 113 trillion into 
89 trillion. Immediately, six fractions—FPDI-P, FKB, FPAN, FPPP, FPDS, and FPBR—
categorically rejected the government plan, while the PKS as a member of ruling coalition 
was undecided. The PKS unclear decision triggered protests among its supporters, and a 
group of students from the KAMMI handed over a chicken (as a symbol of cowardice) to the 
PKS fraction leaders (Detikcom, 15.03.2005). Under widely publicized pressures from its 
supporters and regional branches, the PKS leaders in the parliament immediately changed 
their mind, and joined the fractions that rejected the plan. The PKS senior politicians said to 
the media that they strongly opposed the plan, and convinced its constituents that the party 
will be on their side. Nurwahid even confidently said that such decision will not affect the 
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relations with the president because one of the agreements in the coalition between his party 
and Yudhoyono was that the PKS would still be critical toward government policies (Tempo, 
04/XXXIV/21 – 27.03.2005).  
 However, after its chairman Tifatul Sembiring met with the president Yudhoyono 
discussing the topic, the PKS changed its side again by supporting the government plan to 
increase oil price. The PKS was not alone in changing side, because the PPP did also the same 
thing. Thus during the parliament session the majority of parliamentarians supported the 
government plan (Tempo, 04/XXXIV/21 – 27.03.2005). The PKS decision prompted 
resentments and protests from its supporters, and even some local branches in Yogyakarta and 
West Nusatenggara provinces demanded the party to withdraw from government coalition 
(see, Tempo Interaktif, 18.10.2005; 19.10.2005; and 28.11.2008, ). In its official press release, 
however, the PKS said that it sought a win-win solution, but was defeated during voting 
because it has only 8% of the parliament members. According to the PKS MP Rama Pratama, 
there were two options put forward during parliament session, i.e. to support the plan and to 
increase government budget but burden the people’ economy, or take the people’s side by 
rejecting the plan yet causing government deficit. The PKS actually proposed a compromise 
solution to cover the deficit not by cutting oil subsidies but rather by saving government 
extra-expenditures in some major ministerial departments, which could add up to 20 trillion 
IDR, yet other fractions did not support it (Republika, 03.10.2005).  
 The second policy actions of the PKS in legislature was in 2006, supported proposal 
for Bill of Anti Pornography and Pornographic Acts (UU Anti Pornografi dan Pornoaksi), 
which would regulate the ethical standards for media and public behaviors. The bill caused 
nationwide controversies, because of its unclear definitions of pornography—which include 
phrases such as “exploiting sensual parts of adult human body,” or “resemble acts of sexual 
intercourse and masturbation” etc (Part II, Chapter 14). It allowed public exposure of adult 
human bodies only for arts, sports, and educations—carried out in special places with licenses 
from the government—as well as traditional costumes if they are parts of rituals (Chapter III, 
Verse 10.1). On the one hand, it was widely supported by conservative Muslim organizations 
and communities who believed that moral decadences were the root of all crises and miseries 
suffered by the country. On the other hand, it was rejected by non-Muslim communities 
because it would intervene their religions and cultures with Islamist ethics (Bali Post, 
12.03.2006), and by secular political parties as well as moderate Muslim communities who 
perceived the bill as merely political agenda of Islamist groups. The bill was also 
controversial in term of its procedure, because it was a program from the previous period 
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(1999-2004), and was not in the program of 2004-2009 legislative period, but suddenly 
introduced by Commission VIII, and then listed as a program by parliament’s consultative 
body (Badan Musyawarah DPR) (Suara Pembaruan, 21.03.06). 
 The PKS was of course a staunch promoter of the bill, inside and outside the 
parliament building. Philosophically, the bill reflected the core PKS ideology that personal 
morality is the root of social and political well beings, and protecting the people’s morals 
would be the most effective way to get out from multidimensional crises. According to PKS 
female MP Yoyoh Yusroh, pornographic materials that are widespread and easily accessible 
have motivated people to conduct sexual violence and crimes, and can cause workers to lose 
their work ethics and performances and cause students to loose their motivations to study. She 
also added that, in her investigations, there are business organizations that systematically 
disseminate pornographic materials, some of them with purely economic motivation but some 
of them apparently have social and political agendas to degenerate the morality of Indonesian 
people, in which the majority are Muslims (Interview with Yoyoh Yusroh, 21.06.2007). 
However, former PKS chairman Hidayat Nurwahid rejected allegations that the bill was part 
of his party agenda to islamize the political system, by pointing to the fact it was inherited 
from the previous era during the Megawati administration (fpks-dpr-ri.com [accessed 
12.12.2007]).  
 The next policy capacity of the PKS in legislature worth being discussed was on the 
government policy in October 2005 to import 500 tons of rice per year from Vietnam between 
2005-2007. This policy was controversial because the Minister of Agriculture—from the 
PKS—informed that national stock was enough because the country had produced surplus 
between 2004-2005. The policy was also resisted by fractions in parliament who believed that 
it was unnecessary, because the stock was enough and the rising price was just right because 
of the rising prize of oil. During session on January 17th, 2006, six fractions in the 
parliament—including the PKS, the only governing party that opposed the policy—agreed to 
form a special committee to investigate the government policy. However, when open voting 
was held in 24 January, the proposal failed to collect support from the majority of 
parliamentarians (Tempo Interaktif, 24.01.2006). 
 It was because of, rather than despite, the fact that the Minister of Agriculture was a 
member of the party, and he was bypassed by the president in this case, that made the PKS 
insist on investigating the policy of importing and forming independent committee, together 
with the PDIP fraction. The committee became a hot topic in the media when it was unfolded 
that the police sent five intelligent agents to spy on it—which caused strong reactions from 
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the parliament. PKS then sent Soeripto to Vietnam to get information pertaining the import 
deals. By mid-February the coordinator of the PKS independent committee, Tamsil Linrung, 
reported that there were striking irregularities in the government project. Firstly, the 
government decision to import rice was based on manipulated data, in which the Central 
Bureau of Statistic (BPS) published a report which indicated national rice stock was short, 
while the Minister of Agriculture confirmed it was enough. Secondly, the price set by the 
government was too high, which was 280.5 USD per ton, while PKS investigators received 
information from the Vietnamese Farmer Association that their standard price was 247 USD 
per ton. Thirdly, there was inconsistency in government report, wherein it reported the price 
was 281 USD/ton when in fact it paid 280.5 USD/ton (Sinar Harapan, 16.02.2006). Based 
upon its findings of the unaccountable irregularities in rice import programs, the PKS fraction 
suggested that the chairman of National Logistic Board (Bulog) should resign (fpks-dpr-
ri.com).  
 The last, but not the most unimportant, action, which the PKS conducted with the 
government, was its coalition with other parties in regional elections to elect provincial 
governors and district mayors. Up until 2008, the PKS won in 92 regional elections, where 8 
of them were provincial and the other 84 were district levels. There are two important points 
in this case: Firstly, out of the 92 regional government positions won by the party, only in five 
districts, the PKS won independently without coalition (or 5.4%), the other 86 were in 
coalition with other parties. From these eighty-six coalitions that the PKS won, only twelve 
(or 13.9%) of the elected leaders were PKS members. Thus, in these regional elections the 
PKS was only a rather unimportant junior coalition partner or it recruited candidates from 
outside the party. Secondly, and perhaps more interestingly, was that in the regional elections, 
the PKS joined a coalition not only with Islamic parties (60%) but also with secular ones 
(40%), and even with a Christian party although in this case they did not win. In those 86 
coalitions 33 were with the PAN (Muslim-based party), 29 were with the Golkar (secular 
party), 24 were with the PPP (Islamic party), 22 were with the PD (secular), 20 were with the 
PKB (Muslim-based party), 17 were with the PBB (Islamic party), 14 were with the PDIP 
(secular party)—and a lost coalition with the PDS (Christian party). The typical response of 
the party leaders to questions about its coalitions with non-Islamic parties were that it shows 
to the public that the PKS is not an exclusive party but an open one and willing to cooperate 
with other parties under the framework of democratic politics, and that the party needs real 
experience in conducting real politics that means it has to deal with political actors (i.e. 
 265
parties) from different ideological backgrounds (Imam Nur Azis interview 22.05.2007, 
Zulkifliemansyah interview 25.06.2007) 
 Discussions in the previous paragraph show how the policy capacity of PKS was more 
dynamic compared to the previous period. With regard to mandate capacity, its support to the 
Bill of Anti-Pornography and Pornographic Acts was the only behavior that fully match its 
electoral promises—to promote moralist societal systems, to control media, arts and 
cultures—as well as its ideological stance that morality is the root for collective well beings. 
The others were rather mixed. Its decision to support raising oil price was clearly contradicted 
its promises to pursue socialistic, populist, economic policies, although there is no ideological 
point that are not in line with the decision. The next two governmental behaviors were in the 
same pattern, in which policy motivations were strong but office seeking motivations were 
also almost equally strong. In the case of rice import policy, PKS conducted independent 
investigations to alleged corruptions and irregularities in the government project, but beneath 
the surface it was also motivated to protect the political position and capacity of its Minister 
of Agriculture. In the same vein, the PKS formed many coalitions with other Islamic parties 
during regional elections, but in fact it also built similar coalitions with secular parties—and 
thus, the main motivation was getting into power, either with Islamic or secular parties.  
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 This chapter has examined the behavior of PKS within the government to unfold the 
influence of ideology in their behavior. The chapter was opened with theoretical discussion on 
what a party does after it won election. In a multiparty system such as in Indonesia, after 
finishing election, a party is often involved in coalition building to form a government. There 
are two theories that explain the process of coalition and government formations: i.e. office-
oriented and policy oriented theories. The former perceives the party as being willing to 
participate in any coalition provided it receives good portfolio share, while the latter sees the 
party as being willing to participate in administrations only if it has capacity to influence 
policy. Furthermore, after holding public office positions, the party will involved in public 
policy implementations, where it may follow two possible logics: firstly, it may implement 
what it promised to its constituents during election campaigns regardless whether it is suitable 
or not to the existing conditions, or secondly, it may follow the existing political development 
and implement policies accordingly in order to be reelected, without so much concern about 
its electoral promises. 
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 As far as the coalition building and government formation are concerned, the PKS has 
been involved in two out of the four government administrations in post-Suharto Indonesia. 
The first was its involvement in Central Axis, a coalition of Islamic parties in the post-1999 
election that was responsible in stopping Megawati from becoming president after her party 
won plurality in election, while nominating and electing Abdurrahman Wahid as president, 
and then impeaching Wahid in 2001 and swearing in Megawati as the fifth Indonesian 
President. The second PKS involvement was in 2004 after it successfully increased its votes 
up to six-hundred percent. Initially, it only reluctantly supported Amien Rais nomination—as 
some of its leaders deemed Wiranto as more preferable because he had more chance to win 
the race—but after both of these hopefuls failed to get into the second round, it took side with 
S. B. Yudhoyono against Megawati. When Yudhoyono eventually won the presidency, the 
PKS become a governing party, receives three portfolios in the cabinet. 
 There was a noticeable pattern in the behaviors of PKS regarding coalition building 
and government formation.  During the post-1999 election, its behaviors were heavily 
ideological, where it was only willing to cooperate with other Islamic parties, and refused to 
participate in Megawati government because she was representing secular politics. Meanwhile 
during post-2004 elections, it started to adopt the calculations of real politics, where it was 
reluctant to support prominent Muslim politician Amien Rais because he was less likely to 
win the competition than secular former military chief commander Wiranto, and eventually 
supported another secular retired general Yudhoyono and joins his administrations. From the 
perspective of Douglas North’s institutional theory, the party behaviors were ideological 
during earlier years because at that time the political institutions were still in the making and 
were not yet functioning properly as mechanisms to reduce uncertainty in political 
interactions, as well as instruments for distributions of resources. During the times of political 
uncertainty—when no one really knew who was going to take which kind of action—the PKS 
relied on ideology as the only guidelines for political behaviors. Whereas in the subsequent 
years, when the political engineering started to bear fruits and the political institutions started 
to be stable and function more effectively as rules of political game—i.e. specifying who are 
eligible to play, and what actions players can and cannot do—the party started to behave 
rationally following the formal rules of the game. 
 Similar patterns also took place in the behavior of PKS during the creation of policy. 
During 1999-2004 it implemented policies following its electoral promises which were fully 
inline with its ideological stance, i.e. supporting democratic reforms and promoting moralist 
politics. For the former, together with the PAN, it successfully prevented the military fraction 
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in the legislature from gaining a leadership seat, while for the latter—especially when it held 
the position for Ministry of Forestry within the Wahid cabinet—it enthusiastically ran clean 
government and anti-corruptions programs, that led to the loggerhead incident with the 
president and caused it’s minister sacked. Whereas during the 2004-2006 period, its policy 
courses were more nuanced, motivated not only by ideological-drives but also office-
orientations. In early 2005, it supported the unpopular government policy to raise oil price 
that brought it into confrontations with its own loyal supporters, while later that year it 
eagerly promoted and supported the ratification of Bill of Anti-Pornography and Pornographic 
Acts (RUU-APP) that reflects its deepest ideological position that individual morality is the 
root of collective well beings; and in early 2006, ran against its coalition partners, it 
conducted an independent investigation of the government policy to import rice from Vietnam 
that bypassed its Minister of Agriculture. Again, the behaviors of the PKS are consistent with 
Northian’s theory of the relation between ideology and institutions, where the political actor 
tends to rely on ideology when the formal rules of the game (the institutions) are unstable, and 
will depend on it when they are stable. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
This research studies the political behavior of an Indonesian Islamist party named the 
Prosperous Justice Party (PKS). The party attracted public and scholarly attention after it 
successfully increased its vote by six hundred percent—from 1.7% in 1999 to 7.3% in 2004. It 
also triggered heated debates among people on the streets as well as among observers and 
scholars because of its Islamist ideology, which intends to promote Islam as the solution to 
the current political problems faced by the Indonesian people. Indeed, the PKS adopted an 
Islamist ideology from the Egyptian Society of Muslim Brothers (Ikhwanul Muslimin), which 
perceives individual morality as being the root of collective well-being. Critics have argued 
that there are undemocratic elements in the PKS ideology—such as mixing religion with 
politics and its perceptions on gender equality and religious pluralism—and thus its 
participation in democratic politics seems to be neither serious nor sustainable. Driven by its 
ideology, the argument goes on, it will eventually implement Islamist policies that are not in 
line with democracy, or even replace democracy with Islamic system. 
 This problem is in fact not uniquely Indonesian, and there have been a number of 
political parties, participating in democratic politics in Muslim countries, that have adopted 
and promoted an Islamist ideology A doctoral dissertation written by Ann-Kristin Jonasson 
from Guttenberg University Sweden, compared such parties in three different countries, i.e. 
Jordan, Turkey, and Pakistan. Jonasson found that these parties organized linkage activities in 
a quite similar way; i.e., that internally they behave like ‘mass-integration’ parties by 
demanding that their members and activists follow ideological prescriptions (i.e. religious 
teachings)--based on the idea that party members must practice what they believe. Externally, 
however, they resemble ‘catch-all’ parties which promote their political programs to all 
segments in the society, as they believe that Islam is a universal religion and its teachings 
should be adopted by all people. Jonasson also notes that this linkage model is similar to that 
of Christian democratic parties. The three parties studied by Jonasson operated in three 
different countries with very different societal backgrounds, electoral systems, as well as 
regime types. Yet despite these very different institutional contexts, they behaved quite 
similarly, and Jonasson concludes that what united them was their Islamist ideologies. In this 
way she sees ideology as being overwhelming and capable of overcoming institutional 
constraints. Her conclusion on the encompassing influence of ideology in Islamist parties’ 
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political behaviors seems to confirm the suspicion that Islamist parties are by default 
ideological and their democratic participation is merely a camouflage. 
 The current research studies this issue by applying a neo-institutionalism perspective 
formulated by Douglas C. North in order to examine the impact of ideology on the political 
behaviors of the Indonesian PKS, vis-à-vis the democratizing of political institutions in the 
country. According to North, institutions—simply defined as ‘humanly devised rules of the 
game’—have two basic functions: (a) reducing uncertainty in human interactions, transactions 
and collaborations by specifying who is eligible to participate, and by stipulating what actors 
can and cannot do; (b) facilitating fair resource distributions. Furthermore, for North there are 
‘formal’ and ‘informal’ elements of institutions. The former refer to the codified rules of the 
game from constitutions, to laws and by laws, to individual contracts, while the latter point to 
informal systems of practices that regulate repeated human behaviors such as culture, religion 
and ideology. On the one hand, formal institutions help informal practices to function more 
effectively, while on the other hand informal institutions provide outlets for actors when 
formal rules become too rigid. This research hypothesizes that ideology will be dominant as a 
guideline for party behavior whenever the formal institutions are ineffective, and it will be 
less so when the formal rules of the game function properly. 
 As a backgrounder to understanding the wider picture of political Islam in Indonesia, 
the current research reviews the history of Islamist parties in the previous decades namely 
Sarekat Islam (1912-1929) and Masyumi (1946-1960). Using North’s new-institutional 
perspective, it argues that these two parties formulated Islam as a political ideology in 
different ways, given the different institutional contexts they were facing. Operating during 
the colonial era, Sarekat Islam defined Islam as an ‘anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist, socialist’ 
ideology, while Masyumi defined it as an ideology that is ‘neither capitalism nor socialism, 
combining the virtuous elements of them and discarding their vicious elements’. Interestingly, 
institutional analysis also shows a typical pattern of the influence of ideology on the political 
behaviors of the two parties. Firstly, when the existing institutions were advantageous they 
tended to behave rationally, proactively and cooperatively. During the first half of its history, 
Sarekat Islam was proactive and cooperative, willing to collaborate with Marxist activists and 
adopting cooperative programs with the colonial ruler. They supported Indie werbaar and 
joined Volksraad because during this period the colonial government implemented 
cooperative policies as a response to their intensifying worries about World War I. Similarly, 
decades later Masyumi also behaved proactively and cooperatively, promoting and supporting 
constitutional democracy at a time when political parties dominated national leaderships, 
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during which Sukarno was only a figurehead president and was powerless because of his 
enmity with the military. Secondly, the Islamist parties’ behaviors tended to be ideological 
and reactionary (they distrusted the rules of the game) whenever the existing institutions were 
disadvantageous to them. Starting from 1920, after WW I was over and the Dutch rulers 
returned to the business of politics of colonialism as usual—i.e. repression, discrimination, 
exploitation—Sarekat Islam leaders turned the course of their organization around by 180 
degrees: they expelled the Marxists from the organization, refused to join the Volksraad, 
launched non-cooperative relations with the Dutch and demanded full independence for 
Indonesia, and even later on promoted international Pan-Islamist programs. In the same vein 
Masyumi turned reactionary toward Sukarno and his policies after 1957, and even a number 
of its top leaders joined regional armed insurgencies against the central government, after 
Sukarno reached agreement with the military, dissolved the parliament, enacted martial law 
and ran an authoritarian government.  
 The same pattern of relations between ideology, institutional contexts and political 
behaviors was also found in the history of the PKS. It originated in a religious community 
known as the ‘Tarbiyah group’, a loose network of dakwah activists founded in early 1980s 
which was organized according to the methods of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers, by 
combining a religious hierarchy a la Sufism and Communist-like cell organizations. Its core 
belief was that individual piety is the root of human conditions, and its ultimate mission was 
pursuing gradual Islamization: from individuals, to families, to society, and to the polity. Its 
simplistic yet clearly articulated ideology made it very popular among university students, and 
its gradualist programs had enabled it to survive and thrive in a hostile political environment. 
During 1980s it was practically a clandestine organization, conducting only very limited 
public activities. By the early 1990s, Tarbiyah activists started to pursue more public 
activities, especially by taking control of intra-campus student organizations.  
By the end of the 1990s, it already had strong networks among student activists in 
major cities across the country. After the regime changed and there was the opportunity to 
form new political parties, the Tarbiyah community agreed to form a party, under the name of 
the Justice Party. Participating in the 1999 election, the party was unable to attract much 
support from outside its networks, because of its rudimentary organization, strongly 
ideological rhetoric about Islamizing the society, as well as its idealistic perception that 
political activities as merely contingent and instrumental for building up dakwah activities. 
During the post election years the party also behaved ideologically, built coalitions only with 
Islamic parties and refused to join the Megawati administration. After it changed its name to 
 271
the Prosperous Justice Party in 2003, it pursued similar objectives but with different 
strategies. Its organization was improved and diversified, it also changed its political rhetoric 
from ‘moralizing the society and the polity’ into ‘promoting clean government and anti-
corruption’ (both of which in fact implied similar meanings) and started to perceive political 
activities as being valuable in themselves. It performed spectacularly in the 2004 general 
election, and this success was followed by further significant changes in its political behavior, 
through the adoption of increasingly pragmatic strategies. 
The noticeable change in pattern of the PKS’s organizational behaviors—from 
clandestine, to open-but-ideological, to programmatic-pragmatic—ran parallel with the 
changes in Indonesian political institutions, which underwent processes of freedom and 
democratization. During 1970s-1980s the military-dominated regime was hostile toward civil 
liberties—and especially toward Muslim politics—so that clandestine activism was 
customary. In early 1990s the political constellation changed, when Suharto built a new 
alliance with the Muslim community that significantly boosted the community’s self 
confidence in carrying out public activities. In the second half of 1990s, Muslim politics had 
gained a strong influence in national politics both among civilians and the military. When the 
moment of democratization eventually arrived, in the form of free and fair elections, Muslim 
politics already had a strong influence and considerable networks and was able to stop the 
secular election winner PDI-P from winning presidential office. At this point, however, 
although democratic institutions had been installed, they were not yet functioning properly as 
mechanisms to reduce uncertainty, let alone to facilitate fair resource distribution. No one 
really knew what others might or might not do, and hence no one really trusted the formal 
rules of the game, and instead they relied on more trusted guidelines: i.e., ideology. Indeed in 
this period most of the Muslim political actors behaved ideologically, using ‘Islam’ as the lens 
through which to understand and make sense of the developing political events, to define what 
is right and what is wrong, as well as to differentiate friends from foes. Nevertheless in 
around 2003 the major political actors had acquired a sufficient understanding of each other’s 
and their own patterns of behavior as well as the virtues and the vices of the existing rules of 
the game. The ratification of the new political laws—especially new party and electoral laws, 
the deletion of reserved parliamentary seats for the military, and direct presidential 
elections—have motivated political parties to play according to the rules: i.e. rationally and 
pragmatically. The presidential election in 2004 witnessed how the ideological attachments 
among Islamic political actors that were conspicuous five years earlier had vanished almost 
without trace.  
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Democratization has enabled Muslim political actors to behave rationally and 
pragmatically, and the PKS represents the most dramatic and delicate case. During the 1999 
elections the party sought to articulate the political preferences of the most conservative 
segment in the Muslim community, and therefore its ideological formulation was located on 
the far right of the ideological spectrum. However, in line with the increasing stability of the 
democratic political institutions, the PKS has changed its image from a conservative party 
into a pragmatic one—without abandoning its conservative ideology. This occurred in an 
intricate way because a political party is not a unitary actor. There are, at least, three main 
actors inside the political party, each with different logics of behavior: the party on the 
ground, which represents the idealist element; the party in public office, which represents the 
realist element;  and the party central office, which mediates the conflicting tendencies. 
During its formative years, the party was dominated by the idealist element, indicated by the 
fact that members had the highest authority over the organization. Every major decision was 
consulted on by the members and the party organization was treated merely as a tool to 
achieve the objectives of Islamic dakwah (and thus disposable). During this time, the party 
also advanced discouraging views on women’s roles in politics. Democratic competition 
nurtured the party to undergo a process of ‘organizational maturation’ by motivating it to 
build a stronger and more effective organization. As a result, it experienced what Michels 
famously called ‘iron law of oligarchy’, i.e. the increasing authority and control of the leaders 
over organization at the expense of the members, and the emerging perception that the 
survival of the organization was equally as important as ideological objectives, if not more 
urgent. The democratic system also encouraged the party to seek a more democratic image, 
and thus it appointed women politicians and activists in virtually all segments of its 
organization. 
The changing balance in the PKS’s organization, from the influence of the idealist to 
the realist elements, affected its behaviors in elections—one of the most important procedures 
in democracy. During the 1999 election—in addition to the poor organization and 
networking—it saw electoral activities as merely contingent to religious activities, so that in 
preparing for the election it constantly reminded its activists and members to intensify their 
religious activities, and warned them not to be too preoccupied with mobilizing voters. This 
was because it believed that the election was merely a means, and one should not distracted 
by it from the true objective of moral propagation. However, during the 2004 election this 
behavior changed dramatically when the party perceived the election no longer as an optional 
means, but rather the means to achieve ideological objectives. As a result, it motivated its 
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members and activists to mobilize as many voters as possible without so much concern about 
whether the voters understood the party’s mission. This new perception enabled the party’s 
campaign actors to reach out to a wider audience outside its traditional supporters, as well as 
to mobilize funds from wider sources. Outside election time, PKS activists actively 
propagated and socialized the party through publicized religious, social and welfare activities, 
which in a sense contradicted its ideological dictum that good deeds must be dedicated 
exclusively to pleasing God and not to mundane targets such as increasing party membership 
or fund raisings.  
In combination with the increasing stability and effectiveness of the democratic 
institutions as arenas for political competition, the changing mood in the PKS organization 
from idealistic into pragmatic also affects its behavior in government. During the 1999 to 
2004 period it behaved ideologically by collaborating exclusively with other Islamic parties 
and showed strong sentiments toward secular politics. For instance, it collaborated with other 
Islamic parties to form a Communication Forum for Islamic Parties (FSPPI), and joined other 
Muslim political actors in the Central Axis to nominate Abdurrahman Wahid as president 
against Megawati. It also supported the Central Axis in impeaching Wahid and appointed 
Megawati as president, but refused to join the Megawati administration. During the Wahid 
administration, the party joined in the cabinet but its uncompromising investigation of 
corruption scandals disturbed the President’s relations with big businesses, and the minister 
was sacked after only ten months in office. In 2003, the party also joined other Islamic parties 
in ratifying the bill of the National Education System. However, after the 2004 election its 
behavior in government changed significantly. During the presidential election it supported 
Amien Rais only reluctantly, and then supported and joined the S. B. Yudhoyono government. 
Except for its fervent support for the draft Bill on Anti Pornography and Pornographic Acts 
(RUU-APP), the PKS’s behavior in government was by and large power-oriented. For 
example, it supported the unpopular government policy of increasing the oil price under 
heavy criticism from its own supporters; it formed an independent committee to investigate 
the government’s policy of importing rice from Vietnam, because this decision had bypassed 
the Minister of Agriculture, who was from the PKS. And finally, it won many regional 
elections in coalition with both Islamic and secular parties.  
 The changing pattern of PKS behaviors is an indication that the democratization 
process in Indonesia is working, and that political institutions have been able to provide a 
sense of certainty for political actors—especially the Muslim ones—to conduct interactions, 
transactions and collaborations according to formally codified rules, motivating them to act 
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rationally and cooperatively in pursuing political objectives. More importantly, as far as the 
PKS’s behavior are is concerned, the democratic system works quite substantively, in terms of 
providing a system of competition that stimulates the party not only to formulate a platform 
and policy programs following the preferences of its constituents, but also to deliver what it 
promised during the election campaign. Democratization has been able to convince the PKS 
that the only way to advance its political cause is by acting democratically and by following 
the rules, even though this sometimes contradicts the party’s ideological tenets. Unless there 
was increasing stability in democratic institutions, it would be unlikely that the PKS would 
declare itself to have an open membership for people from different religions. This is 
particularly so, since the party is pursuing Islamization programs, and one of its membership 
requirements is that one needs to read the ‘shahadah’, which makes  one—at least formally—
become a Muslim. Likewise, democratization would explain the fact that, although the PKS 
have the highest percentages of women candidates and it appoints female activists and 
politicians in every section of its organization—including in the traditionally male-dominated 
Shariah Council—it still holds unequal conceptions of gender relations.  
 Using Douglas North theory of cognitive new-institutionalism, this research found that 
the discrepancy between the PKS ideological aspirations and its actual behaviors is not a 
result of a deliberate plan or hidden agenda to cheat democratic game. But rather it indicates 
an unavoidable influence of institutions on the behaviors of rational actors. As rational actors, 
PKS politicians are subject to the law of human cognitions. Seeking to maximize their 
interests and to minimize risks, the Islamist politicians who participate in a consolidating 
democratic game have no other choice than to comply with the agreed rules of the game, to 
the extent that they have to compromise their ideological principles.  
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